We are studying Tractate Shabbat, page 124, at the bottom of the amud, beginning with the words “Amar Abaye.” We are continuing the discussion of items considered unavailable for Shabbat, examining several different objects and determining their status one by one.
May the merit of our Torah learning protect all those who need healing. May it serve as an elevation for the soul of Shimon ben Julia, whose soul should be bound in the bond of eternal life. Amen.
The cases mentioned here are kanim, the poles used with the showbread table; maklot, sticks used in connection with skinning the Paschal offering; a bolt with a glustera, a rounded knob that could also be used for grinding garlic; and a medukhah, a mortar. All of these cases were discussed before the final leniencies concerning items unavailable for Shabbat were established.
We learned that there was a progression in the laws of these objects. Initially, only three types of utensils were permitted to be moved. Later, additional categories were permitted. At the end of the process, according to Abaye, an object whose primary use is forbidden may be moved only when one needs the object itself or the place where it is situated. According to Rava, such an object may be moved both when one needs the object itself and when one needs its place.
That is the fundamental distinction between Abaye and Rava. Once all the stages of the discussion have been completed, Abaye permits an object whose primary use is forbidden to be moved for its own use, but not merely to clear its place. Rava permits it in both situations. The cases we are now discussing, however, may have been stated before the final leniency concerning such objects.
The first case is the kanim. The Mishnah says that neither arranging the poles nor removing them overrides Shabbat. The context is the table on which the showbread was placed. The loaves had to be arranged with spaces between them, because if they touched one another they would spoil more quickly. Although a miracle occurred with the showbread, one may not rely on a miracle, and therefore the poles were placed between the loaves to allow air to circulate.
Before the later leniency concerning these objects, the priests would not arrange the table on Shabbat. Instead, they would remove the old loaves, place them in a pile, and put the new loaves on the table without placing the poles between them. Only after Shabbat would they enter and insert the poles between the loaves. For the short period between the end of Shabbat and the insertion of the poles, they were not concerned that the loaves would spoil.
Why was the table not arranged on Shabbat? Because the poles were considered an object whose primary use was forbidden, and at that stage they had permitted only three utensils. This table was not one of them. The Mishnah is therefore referring to the period before the first leniency concerning such objects.
Once that leniency was established, however, the poles would be permitted. They are an object whose primary use is permitted, and such an object may be moved without a special justification. Rashi explains that the purpose of the poles was to provide air between the loaves and prevent them from spoiling. Nevertheless, because the loaves would remain together only for a short period—from Shabbat until the end of Shabbat—the priests were not concerned about spoilage.
The important point is that the same object can have a different status at different stages of the development of the laws. At the earlier stage, the poles were not permitted to be moved. After the later leniency, they were permitted.
The next case concerns the maklot. These were smooth sticks used in connection with the Paschal offering. A person would place one end of a stick on his shoulder and another person would place the other end on his shoulder, creating a bar between them. The Paschal offering could then be placed on the bar and used for skinning the animal.
Rabbi Elazar says that when the fourteenth of Nisan falls on Shabbat, the sticks may not be used for skinning the offering. Instead, one person places his hand on the shoulder of another, the second person places his hand on the shoulder of the first, and they hang the animal from their hands while they skin it.
On an ordinary year, the sticks were used because they served a necessary purpose. But when the fourteenth of Nisan fell on Shabbat, the Gemara says that the sticks were not used. This appears to indicate that they were considered objects whose primary use was forbidden, since their principal function was connected with skinning the animal. Nevertheless, if one could perform the same task with one’s hands, the sticks were not used.
This raises a question. These sticks were needed for their physical use; they were needed to hold the offering. Why, then, were they not used? The answer may be that this discussion also predates the final leniency concerning objects whose primary use is forbidden. After that leniency, the sticks should have been permitted when needed for their physical use.
One might ask why this should be different from the laws of the Temple, where certain rabbinic restrictions are sometimes not applied. Tosafot raises this issue. There are cases in the Temple where rabbinic restrictions still apply, except in circumstances where the restriction itself was not enacted. The Gemara’s discussion is therefore examining whether the present case is subject to such a restriction even though it involves the Temple service.
There is also an important limitation to the proof from this case. The fact that the sticks were not used when one could use one’s hands does not necessarily prove that, when choosing between two permitted utensils, one must always choose the object whose use is less problematic. The case here may simply teach that if one can perform the task without any utensil at all, one should do so. It does not necessarily establish a preference between two different utensils, such as a nutcracker and a hammer, when both are already available and both would serve the purpose.
The next case is the glustera. This was a bolt used to secure a door. It was placed across the door so that the door could not open. At the end of the bolt was a rounded knob, and that knob could also be used for grinding garlic.
The Gemara discusses whether the bolt may be moved from one door to another. One opinion says that it may not be moved in the ordinary manner. Instead, one should knock it off one door and cause it to roll or move indirectly to the other door, where it can be used as a lock.
The question is why such a restriction would be necessary. The bolt is primarily a lock, and therefore it is an object whose primary use is permitted. It is not primarily made for grinding garlic. If it is a utensil whose primary use is permitted, why may it not be moved in the ordinary manner?
The answer is that this discussion may not concern the laws of unavailable objects at all. It may concern the laws of carrying between a house and a courtyard. In earlier times, several houses opened onto a shared courtyard. Although the courtyard was technically private property, because it belonged to several people it had the appearance of a public domain. An eruv of courtyards was therefore required in order to carry from a house into the courtyard and from the courtyard into a house.
It was permitted, however, to move utensils that had been in the courtyard before Shabbat within the courtyard itself, even without an eruv. The question concerning the glustera may therefore be where the bolt is considered to be located: in the doorway, at the threshold, or inside the house. If it is considered to be in the house, moving it to another doorway would constitute carrying from one house to another without an eruv. If it is considered to be in the courtyard, it may be moved within the courtyard.
According to the first opinion, the threshold is considered part of the house. Therefore, moving the bolt would involve carrying from the house into the courtyard, and it may be done only in an unusual manner. According to the other opinion, the threshold is considered part of the courtyard. Since the bolt is then considered a utensil that was in the courtyard before Shabbat, it may be moved normally within the courtyard.
This explains why the restriction concerning the glustera could remain even after the later leniency concerning unavailable objects. The issue is not that the bolt is unavailable for Shabbat. The issue is carrying between the house and the courtyard.
The fourth case is the medukhah, the mortar. One version of the discussion understands that the mortar was permitted to be moved when garlic was inside it. The question is why the presence of garlic should matter. If the mortar is an object whose primary use is permitted, why should it not be moved even when empty?
The answer is that this may be a case in which the mortar is being moved for its place. According to Abaye, after the final leniency, an object whose primary use is forbidden may be moved for its own use but not to clear its place. Therefore, if garlic is inside the mortar, it is being moved for its own use, but if it is empty and is being moved merely to clear the area, it remains forbidden according to Abaye.
Thus, the medukhah can be understood even as a case from after the final leniency. The restriction is not necessarily evidence that the discussion took place before that leniency.
We now have four cases: the poles of the showbread table, the sticks used with the Paschal offering, the bolt with the glustera, and the mortar. What do these cases have in common? Each one appears to impose a restriction even though, after the later leniencies, the objects should seemingly have been permitted.
The Gemara therefore examines each case and explains why its restriction may remain even after the general leniency. In the case of the poles, the reason for inserting them was to prevent the loaves from spoiling. Since the loaves would be without the poles only for a short period, there was no immediate concern about spoilage. The poles were therefore not moved because there was no sufficient need for them. Even an object whose primary use is permitted does not necessarily have to be moved when there is no need to move it.
One might ask why the priests did not rely on the miracle that the showbread remained fresh. The answer is that one must act through ordinary human effort. Even though a miracle occurred, one does not rely on miracles when arranging the service. That is why the poles were used in the first place. Nevertheless, there was no concern that the loaves would spoil during that brief interval.
In the case of the maklot, Rabbi Elazar teaches that one could perform the task by placing one’s hands on another person’s shoulders. Since no utensil was needed, the sticks were not used. This does not necessarily prove a rule about choosing one utensil over another. It teaches only that when the task can be done without a utensil, one need not use an object whose primary use is forbidden.
In the case of the glustera, the restriction relates to the eruv and to the question of whether the threshold belongs to the house or to the courtyard. It is not a restriction based on the laws of unavailable objects.
In the case of the medukhah, the restriction may be explained according to Rabbi Nehemiah, who maintains that utensils may be moved only for their regular use. If the mortar has garlic in it, it is being used for its ordinary purpose. If it is empty, one may not move it merely because it is a utensil whose primary use is permitted.
The Gemara now turns to the precise meaning of the Mishnah’s expressions. It says that utensils may be moved for a need, but not when there is no need. What does “for a need” mean, and what does “not for a need” mean?
Rabbah explains that “for a need” means for the physical use of the utensil itself. “Not for a need” means for the place where the utensil is located. According to this explanation, an object whose primary use is permitted may be moved both for its own use and to clear its place. An object whose primary use is forbidden may be moved only for its own use, not to clear its place.
Rava rejects this limitation. According to Rava, when the Mishnah says “for a need,” the term includes both the physical use of the utensil and the need for its place. If one needs the place where the utensil is situated, that is also considered a need. Therefore, an object whose primary use is forbidden may be moved both for its physical use and to clear its place.
According to Rava, when the Mishnah says that an object may not be moved “when there is no need,” it refers to moving an object merely from one place to another without any purpose. If a utensil is outside and may be damaged by rain or heat, one may move it inside because protecting the utensil is a purpose. But if there is no use for it and no need for its place, it may not be moved.
Rava’s interpretation therefore expands the permission. The term “need” includes both the normal use of the utensil and moving it to clear the place where it is situated. Nevertheless, even according to Rava, an object whose primary use is forbidden may not be moved without any purpose.
The Gemara discusses how to understand the phrase “not for a need.” One possibility is that the Mishnah is referring only to an object whose primary use is permitted. Such an object may be moved for its own use or to clear its place, but not merely without a purpose. The Gemara then asks how one can call clearing the place “not for a need,” since Rava has already explained that clearing the place is itself considered a need.
Rava maintains that when the Mishnah speaks of the ordinary use of a utensil, the term includes not only using the utensil for its direct function but also putting it away after use. For example, after a meal, one may clear the dirty dishes from the table. Moving the dishes is itself part of the ordinary use of the utensils, because utensils are normally used and then put away.
This is the underlying disagreement between Rabbah and Rava. Rabbah defines the use of a utensil narrowly, as its physical function. Rava defines its use more broadly, including the normal movement of the utensil when one needs to clear a place or put the utensil away.
The Gemara then discusses Rabbi Nehemiah’s position. Even if Rabbi Nehemiah agrees that one may remove something that is genuinely repulsive, such as a vessel containing excrement, that is a separate permission known as the law of an offensive object. It does not prove that one may ordinarily move dishes from a table merely to clear the table.
According to the first opinion, ordinary utensils may be moved to clear the table because doing so is considered a need for the place. According to Rabbi Nehemiah, clean dishes that remain on the table may not be moved simply because one wants the table to be empty. Only when the dishes or the object itself create an offensive situation does the special permission apply.
This is a practical difference between the opinions. According to the first opinion, even if there are no leftovers and the dishes are not repulsive, they may be moved because one needs the table. According to Rabbi Nehemiah, they may be moved only if they have become an offensive object. If the dishes are clean and do not create such a problem, they remain where they are.
The Gemara then raises several questions against Rava’s interpretation. Earlier, the mortar was permitted to be moved only when garlic was inside it. If Rava permits an object whose primary use is forbidden to be moved both for its own use and for its place, why does the mortar require garlic?
The first answer is that the case is referring to a mortar on a festival, when garlic was being crushed in it. The mortar was moved because it was needed for its physical use. Alternatively, the case may concern moving it for its place, but only when the garlic was still inside it and it was therefore being treated as part of its ordinary use.
The Gemara then discusses a utensil used on a festival for cutting meat. Once the meat has been cut, the utensil might no longer be movable. The question is why it could not be moved after the cutting was finished if Rava permits moving an object to clear its place.
The answer is that the original case may involve a utensil that has a fixed place, or an object that was left in its designated location. The Gemara’s questions and answers are examining whether the object is being moved because of its physical use, because of its place, or because it has acquired the status of a substantial utensil that is normally left in one location.
The Gemara next discusses a piece of wood. Someone wants to place the wood under a bed or another object to stabilize it, or to place it in a doorway to keep the door open. The wood is normally used as fuel. The question is why it may not be used for these other purposes on a festival, since burning wood is permitted on a festival when necessary for food preparation.
This piece of wood is not considered a regular utensil. Its ordinary function is to be consumed in a fire. A utensil is something used repeatedly to accomplish a task and remains intact. A piece of wood used as fuel is destroyed in the process of its use. Therefore, it does not automatically have the status of a utensil.
If the wood was designated before the festival for use as a wedge or as a doorstop, it would have a different status. But if it was merely ordinary firewood, it remains unavailable for other uses. The question is therefore raised according to both Rabbah and Rava: even if a permitted utensil may be moved for its own use or for its place, this piece of wood is not a utensil unless it was specifically designated.
The Gemara answers that the restriction on the festival is based on a rabbinic decree because of Shabbat. On Shabbat, the wood is certainly unavailable, since one cannot burn it. Therefore, the Sages prohibited its use on the festival as well, to prevent people from confusing the laws of the two days.
The Gemara then asks whether such a decree is made from the festival to Shabbat. One Mishnah appears to show that it is not. If a person has fruit on a roof and fears that the fruit will spoil, he may open the skylight and throw the fruit down through the opening on a festival, even though doing so involves effort and moving the fruit. On Shabbat, however, he may not do so because of the exertion involved. This appears to demonstrate that one does not always impose the restrictions of Shabbat on the festival.
On the other hand, the general relationship between Shabbat and the festival might suggest that such a decree is made. Aside from the laws of food preparation, many activities forbidden on Shabbat are also forbidden on the festival. If an activity is prohibited on Shabbat, one might think that the Sages would prohibit it on the festival as well.
The Gemara answers that the two Mishnayot may reflect the opinions of different Tannaim. One Tanna holds that we do make a decree from the festival because of Shabbat, while another Tanna holds that we do not. There is therefore no contradiction between the case of the wood and the case of moving the fruit.
The Gemara brings a case involving two animals that fell into a pit on a festival. The animals are a mother and its offspring, and one may not slaughter both of them on the same day. Since both animals cannot be slaughtered on that festival, how can one rescue them from the pit?
One opinion says that only one animal may be removed. The other must remain in the pit, because one is not permitted to exert oneself on the festival to rescue an animal that one cannot slaughter. Another opinion permits a person to remove both animals through a form of subterfuge. He takes out the first animal and examines it, saying that it is not suitable. He then takes out the second animal and chooses which one to slaughter. The purpose of the procedure is to rescue both animals without openly performing an unnecessary act.
This dispute may correspond to the broader question of whether one may exert oneself on a festival to prevent a financial loss. The opinion that allows both animals to be removed apparently permits such effort to prevent a loss. The opinion that permits only one animal apparently does not allow such exertion.
However, the Gemara rejects the assumption that these two opinions necessarily correspond to the opinions about decreeing from the festival because of Shabbat. Perhaps the lenient opinion allows the animals to be removed only because there is a way to do so indirectly or through a subterfuge. In a case where no such method exists, it might agree that the animals may not be rescued. Similarly, perhaps the strict opinion prohibits removing both animals in that case only because one can save at least one of them, but would agree that fruit may be moved when there is no alternative to prevent it from spoiling.
Therefore, the case of the animals does not conclusively establish which opinion holds that a decree is made from the festival because of Shabbat.
The Gemara then brings another dispute, between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel. Beit Shammai says that one may not carry a child, a lulav, or a Torah scroll into the public domain on a festival. Beit Hillel permits it. Beit Shammai maintains that carrying on a festival is permitted only for food preparation, and therefore carrying a child, a lulav, or a Torah scroll is not included. Beit Hillel maintains that even carrying that is not related to food preparation is permitted by Torah law.
At first, one might connect this dispute to the question of whether the laws of the festival are treated like the laws of Shabbat. Beit Shammai, who is strict about carrying, might also be the opinion that prohibits exerting oneself to throw fruit down through the skylight. Beit Hillel, who permits carrying that is not connected to food preparation, might be the opinion that permits the fruit to be moved.
The Gemara rejects this as well. The person throwing the fruit is not carrying it through the public domain. He is moving it within a private domain, from the roof through an opening into the house. Why, then, should the dispute about carrying in the public domain affect this case?
The answer is that the restrictions on moving objects may be safeguards designed to prevent a person from eventually carrying in the public domain. The Sages sometimes prohibit a particular form of movement within a private domain because it resembles or may lead to prohibited carrying in the public domain. Thus, the dispute about carrying may still be relevant as a general indication of whether a Tanna creates such safeguards.
The discussion returns to the piece of wood. We began with a piece of wood that is not normally a utensil and asked why it could not be placed under a bed or used as a doorstop on a festival. The answer was that on Shabbat it would be unavailable, and the Sages decreed that the festival should be treated similarly.
The Gemara then examined whether such decrees are made from the festival because of Shabbat, and compared the matter with the positions of Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel. The conclusion is that the issue depends on the particular Tannaitic position involved.
The Gemara next records a case involving a stolen object belonging to a child. Rava permits moving it when necessary to prevent it from being stolen, but not for another purpose. This appears to support the view that an object whose primary use is forbidden may be moved for its physical use or for its place, but not merely without a purpose.
Another case concerns Rav Kahana, who came to Rav. Rav told the members of the household to bring a particular object so that Rav Kahana could sit on it. The Gemara asks why Rav needed to state the reason. If he merely wanted the object brought inside, perhaps the object was being moved to protect it from the sun or from damage. By saying that it should be brought so that Rav Kahana could sit on it, Rav clarified that he was moving it for its physical use.
One version of the story has the object in the middle of the room, where it was blocking the way. Rav then instructed the household to move it aside so that there would be room for Rav Kahana. In that version, the object was being moved for the sake of its place. The precise version of the story determines whether it supports the permission to move an object for its own use or for the place where it is located.
The Gemara also discusses a mattress lying in the sun. A person asks Rav whether he may bring it inside. Rav permits him to do so because it is an object whose primary use is permitted. When the person says that he has another mattress and does not need this one, Rav suggests that it can be used for guests. Rav is thereby clarifying that he is permitting the mattress because it has a use, not merely because he wants to protect it without any other purpose.
If a person insists on following the stricter opinion, he must follow that opinion consistently. One may not ask for a ruling according to the lenient position and then attempt to impose the restrictions of the stricter position in the same case.
The Gemara next discusses brooms. Some brooms had soft bristles and were used to brush crumbs from a table. Other brooms were made from rough branches and were used to sweep dirt floors. The first type was clearly an object whose primary use was permitted. The question concerns the second type, which might fill holes in the dirt floor while it is being used.
One opinion says that the rough broom may not be moved. Another opinion changes the wording and permits it. The difference depends on whether using the broom is considered a permitted act or whether the person is effectively improving the floor by filling its holes.
The Gemara then brings a Mishnah about broken utensils. It states that all utensils, including their broken pieces, may be moved when the pieces still have a use. For example, a broken vessel may be used to cover another container. The question is what status the broken pieces have. Their original function is gone, but they may still serve another purpose.
One possibility is that the broken pieces must be usable for a purpose similar to the original function of the utensil. A vessel that held dough may still be used to hold a thick substance such as porridge, or to hold oil for dipping bread. Alternatively, the broken piece may be used as a cover for a barrel or another container. The Gemara examines whether the new use must resemble the original use or whether any practical use is sufficient.
Rabbi Yehudah and Rabbi Shimon disagree about when the vessel broke. If it broke before Shabbat, it may have required designation for its new purpose. Since it was no longer the original vessel, it could be considered a new object. If it broke on Shabbat, however, it entered Shabbat as a complete utensil and was not unavailable. The question is whether it retains that status after it breaks or whether its new function creates a new object, similar to something that came into being on Shabbat.
Rabbi Yehudah is concerned with the status of the broken piece as a new object. If a complete vessel breaks on Shabbat and the broken piece now has a different purpose, that new status may be considered something that came into being on Shabbat and may be unavailable. Rabbi Shimon does not recognize that concern in the same way and permits the broken piece when it has a use.
Rabbi Nehemiah is more restrictive. He maintains that a utensil may be moved only for its ordinary use. A complete vessel is not considered firewood merely because it could technically be burned. Its primary function is to serve as a vessel. Similarly, a broken piece may be moved only if it has a recognized function as a vessel, not merely because one wishes to use it as fuel.
The Gemara presents three statements about burning utensils and broken utensils on a festival. One statement says that complete utensils may be used as fuel but broken utensils may not. A second statement says that both complete utensils and broken utensils may be used. A third statement says that neither may be used.
The Gemara explains that the first statement follows Rabbi Yehudah, who recognizes the problem of something that came into being on the festival. A complete utensil is not unavailable, but a broken piece that became firewood on the festival has a new status. The second statement follows Rabbi Shimon, who does not treat the broken piece as a newly created object in this way. The third statement follows Rabbi Nehemiah, who says that a utensil may be moved only for its ordinary use and may not be treated as fuel.
The final discussion concerns leftover bricks from a building. Rav Nachman says that bricks remaining from construction may be moved if they are suitable for sitting. If the bricks have been piled up for future construction, however, they retain their status as building materials and may not be moved for another purpose.
The Gemara distinguishes between sitting on a brick and moving it. A person may be permitted to sit on an object without moving it from its place. Sitting on a mattress or on an object in a car, for example, does not necessarily constitute moving the object laterally. The issue here is whether the brick may be picked up and repositioned, not merely whether a person may sit on it where it already is.
Rav Nachman also discusses a small shard of pottery. In a courtyard, such a shard may be moved because people commonly have utensils in a courtyard, and the shard can be used to cover them. The question is whether the same shard may be moved in a public domain or in a karmelit, an intermediate domain.
One opinion says that it may be moved in a karmelit because people sit there and may need such a shard for a practical purpose. In the public domain, however, people do not normally sit and use utensils in the same way, so the shard has no recognized function there.
Another opinion maintains that once an object has the status of a utensil in one place, it retains the status of a utensil everywhere. We do not say that the same piece of pottery is a utensil in the courtyard but not a utensil in the public domain. If it has a valid function as a utensil, it remains a utensil wherever it is located.
There is a story about a rabbi whose clothing became soiled with mud. His attendant took a piece of pottery and began cleaning the mud from the clothing. The rabbi objected that the pottery was unavailable for Shabbat because it was being used in the public domain. The rabbi then explained that it was not enough merely to know the law; one must also avoid teaching an incorrect ruling to others.
If the shard had been in a courtyard, it would certainly have been suitable for covering a utensil. Therefore, once it is recognized as a utensil in that setting, it does not lose that status simply because it is now in the public domain. The principle is that the status of an object as a utensil is not determined anew in every location.
The discussion also returns to the question of carrying in a karmelit. If the object is considered a utensil, one may carry it within the karmelit. If it is not considered a utensil there, it may be unavailable. The distinction depends on whether the object’s function follows it from place to place or is determined by the location in which it is found.
These discussions show that the laws of items unavailable for Shabbat depend on several separate factors: the object’s primary function, whether it was designated for another use, whether it was already a utensil when Shabbat began, whether it has a practical use in its present condition, whether one needs the object itself or its place, and whether the issue is really one of carrying rather than availability.
We also saw that the same object may have different rules at different stages of the development of the law. Before the later leniencies, the poles, sticks, and other objects were treated more strictly. After those leniencies, some became permitted because they were utensils whose primary use was permitted, while others became permitted for their physical use or for their place. Still other restrictions remained because they related to carrying, to the location of the object, or to the special position of Rabbi Nehemiah.
The central distinction between Abaye and Rava remains the final framework. According to Abaye, an object whose primary use is forbidden may be moved for its physical use but not merely for its place. According to Rava, it may be moved both for its physical use and for its place. Even so, neither opinion permits moving an object for no reason at all.
May our learning be accepted, and may we continue to clarify each distinction carefully rather than rushing through the material. There is a great deal of information in this discussion, and the goal is to understand not only the final ruling but also the reasoning that leads to it.