A Yissachar / Zebulun Partnership in Loving Memory of Yishak ben Simcha A"H & Felicia bat Miriam A"H
Rabbi Eli Mansour

Daf Yomi

Bava Metzia 56A - 56B (12th Cycle Daf Yomi Shiur)

Lectured by Rabbi Eli Mansour

Published
January 16, 2007
Duration
59:18

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The Elliot B. Sit edition presents an audio series of the Talmud Bavli, focusing on the text of Bava Metzia, Daf Nun Vav. Today's study is dedicated to the elevation of the soul of Avraham ben Esther, may G-d comfort us in Gan Eden, Amen. We begin our exploration of Daf on Nun He Amud Bet, starting with the term Mativ. To set the stage, let us review the sugya currently in focus.

We learned from the Mishna the position of Rabbi Meir, who states that if a person consumes Terumat Maaser from Demai, he is penalized and must repay the keren (principal) along with a chomesh (fifth). This ruling is significant, as Terumat Maaser from Demai is classified as derabbanan, yet Rabbi Meir adheres to his principle that the sages imposed stringent measures even on rabbinical prohibitions, equating them to biblical ones.

To substantiate this view, we cited a proof from the law of Get. The sages established that when delivering a Get from overseas, one must declare Befanai Nechtav U'Befanai Nechtam. Although this is a derabbanan rule, Rabbi Meir asserts that if this declaration is not made, the Get is rendered pasul (invalid). If the woman remarries based on such a Get, it constitutes adultery, and the children are considered mamzerim. This demonstrates that even a derabbanan prohibition can carry serious consequences, reinforcing the notion that the sages fortified their decrees to reflect the stringencies of the Torah.

However, the Gemara now challenges this premise, questioning whether Rabbi Meir truly maintains a strict stance towards derabbanan prohibitions akin to those of the Torah. Mativ Rav Sheshet presents a case regarding Maaser Sheni that raises doubts. The text states: “You may redeem it with money, exchanging silver for copper or copper for produce, and then redeem the produce.” Here, Rabbi Meir allows the transfer of kesef (money) to nechoshet (copper) coins, which is significant because it concerns Maaser Sheni of Demai, a rabbinical matter.

In contrast, the sages maintain that the produce may be taken directly to Yerushalayim without reverting to money. The Gemara questions this allowance, asking whether one is permitted to transfer kesef to nechoshet. The text references a situation where silver coins of Maaser Sheni became mixed with those of chulin, and in such a case, one must use copper coins to redeem, establishing the procedure for dealing with uncertainty.

It is noted that the sages typically do not favor transferring Maaser Sheni to copper coins unless in dire circumstances. This leniency is only permitted under specific conditions, as Rabbi Meir allows such transfers only under duress, which raises the question of his strictness on derabbanan matters. The Gemara further discusses the rationale behind these rulings, ultimately revealing a tension between Rabbi Meir's leniency in practical cases and his strictness regarding consumption.

In a subsequent discussion, Rabbi Meir reiterates that a wholesaler, or siton, does not need to take ma’aser from Demai when selling, while a retailer does. The rationale is that the wholesaler, who purchases from various vendors, is assumed to have dealt with the issue of ma’aser, whereas the retailer must ensure compliance due to the potential for Demai produce. This distinction emphasizes the responsibility placed on the buyer in transactions involving Demai.

As the Gemara continues, it becomes clear that the discussion around Rabbi Meir's rulings on derabbanan issues, including Maaser Sheni, reflects broader principles of responsibility and accountability in halachic matters. The dialogue illustrates a complex interplay of leniencies and strictures that govern rabbinical law, demonstrating the depth and nuance inherent in these discussions.

In conclusion, the Gemara leaves several questions unresolved, particularly concerning the implications of planting seeds and the applicability of ona’ah in various contexts. The journey through this sugya reveals the intricate legal framework that guides our understanding of Maaser, Demai, and the responsibilities of those engaged in commerce. As we continue to study these texts, we gain insight into the halachic principles that inform our daily lives and the moral imperatives that accompany them.