The Eddie B. Sitt edition, an audio series of the Talmud Bavli, Masechet Yoma, has been dedicated in memory of Mazal bat Esther Baghdadi and Yosef ben Mazal Baghdadi by their family. May the spirit of God grant them rest in Gan Eden, Amen. Today's page has been dedicated by Northfork Bank and its private banking department with Gabriel Safdie. May God protect him and give him life. We'd like to thank Northfork Bank and urge our listeners to patronize this generous financial institution. On a private note, we'd like to thank Mr. Gabriel Safdie for his continued support for all our programs here at Daf Yomi Torah learning resources and the Torah Center. May you merit to perform mitzvot. Today's page has been dedicated in memory of Yosef ben Mazal and Shlomo Refael ben Mazal. May the spirit of God grant them rest in Gan Eden, Amen. Page 74. Today's page is being studied for the elevation of the soul of Avraham ben Esther. May the spirit of God grant him rest in Gan Eden, Amen. We begin today's page on 73b, approximately six lines from the bottom.
Let's review a fundamental dispute between Rabbi Yochanan and Resh Lakish regarding the concept of a "partial measure" (chatzi shiur). We know that the Torah forbids eating certain items, and the standard measure (shiur) for this prohibition is typically a kezayit (the volume of an olive). This is the measure for a forbidden food, such as eating chelev (forbidden fats) or neveila (an animal not slaughtered correctly). Everyone agrees that consuming a full measure of such items is forbidden by the Torah and incurs the punishment of karet (spiritual excision), for example, for eating chelev.
However, what if one eats less than the prescribed measure? This is called a chatzi shiur, which means any amount less than a kezayit, not necessarily exactly half. Here, Rabbi Yochanan and Resh Lakish disagree. Rabbi Yochanan states that a chatzi shiur is forbidden by the Torah. He argues that just as a full measure is forbidden, a partial measure is also forbidden. The practical difference (nafka mina) lies in the punishment: a chatzi shiur is a Torah prohibition, but it does not incur the specific punishment associated with a full measure. For instance, on Yom Kippur, where the Mishnah sets the measure for eating as the size of a large date (k'kotevet hagsa) and its pit, eating that full measure would incur a Torah prohibition and karet. If one eats less than that, according to Rabbi Yochanan, it is still a Torah prohibition, but without karet.
Resh Lakish, conversely, holds that a chatzi shiur is permissible by the Torah. However, the Sages (Chachamim) forbade it. Therefore, if someone eats less than the k'kotevet hagsa measure of food on Yom Kippur, they indeed commit a transgression, but only a rabbinic one (d'rabbanan). This is where we concluded our last lesson.
The Gemara now analyzes these positions. It states that our Mishnah, which says "Yom Kippur is forbidden for eating and drinking," aligns well with Rabbi Yochanan, as he understands "forbidden" to mean a Torah prohibition. But what about Resh Lakish, who says a chatzi shiur is permissible by the Torah? How would he interpret the Mishnah? The Gemara answers that Resh Lakish agrees that it is rabbinically forbidden. Thus, the Mishnah would be read as "Yom Kippur is rabbinically forbidden for eating" if one ate less than the prescribed measure.
The Gemara then challenges Resh Lakish: "If so," meaning if Resh Lakish holds that a chatzi shiur is forbidden, even if only rabbinically, "one should not be liable for an oath offering (korban shevuah) for it." Let's elaborate. There is a rule that if a person takes an oath to do something or to refrain from doing something that is already forbidden by the Torah, the oath has no legal consequence. For example, if someone swears not to eat a kezayit of neveila, they are already "bound by an existing oath" (mushba v'omed) from Mount Sinai not to eat it. Therefore, if they break that oath, there is no obligation to bring an offering, although they still transgress the original prohibition of eating neveila. However, if one swears concerning something that is permissible by the Torah, and then breaks the oath, they must bring an offering to atone for it.
Applying this to Resh Lakish's view: he says a chatzi shiur is rabbinically forbidden. If it's forbidden, even rabbinically, then ostensibly, an oath concerning a chatzi shiur should not obligate an offering, because it's still a forbidden item. The Gemara asks, "According to Resh Lakish, if this is the case, one should not be liable for an oath offering." Rashi clarifies: "If so, that according to Resh Lakish it is forbidden at least rabbinically, one should not be liable for an oath offering." This refers to a case where someone swears not to eat a chatzi shiur of a forbidden item and then eats it. They should not be liable for a verbal oath offering (korban shevuat bituy) because we have a principle in Masechet Shevuot: "One who swears to fulfill a mitzvah and does not fulfill it is exempt," or "one who swears to nullify a mitzvah and does not nullify it is exempt." Why? Because they are already bound by an existing oath.
The Gemara then points out that a Mishnah states otherwise: "If one swore, 'I will not eat,' and then ate, regarding neveilot, treifot (animals with fatal defects), shekatzim and remashim (creeping creatures), one is liable." These are all items forbidden by the Torah. Ostensibly, this Mishnah should pose a question: why is one liable? We just established that oaths only apply to permissible things, not to items already forbidden by the Torah. The Gemara must therefore interpret this Mishnah to explain the liability. The Mishnah adds, "But Rabbi Shimon exempts."
The Gemara analyzes: "Why is one liable? He is already bound by an existing oath from Mount Sinai." Rashi explains: "He is already bound by an existing oath, and it falls under the category of one who swears to fulfill a mitzvah." The Gemara offers two answers to explain the view of the first Tanna (Tanna Kamma) who holds one is liable. The first answer, given by Rav, Shmuel, and Rabbi Yochanan, is: "This applies when one includes permissible things with forbidden things." For example, someone swears, "I will not eat shekatzim and remashim, and also not regular food (like bread)." The oath certainly applies to the bread, which is normally permissible. Since part of the oath is valid, it extends to the forbidden items as well through the principle of "since" (migo). The rule of "bound by an existing oath" only applies when the oath is solely on a forbidden item. Rashi clarifies: "When one includes: 'I swear I will not eat kosher slaughtered meat' (the permissible item) 'and not neveila meat' (the forbidden item). Since it applies to the permissible, it also applies to the forbidden." Rabbi Shimon, however, exempts in this case because he does not accept this concept of "including forbidden things" (issur kolel) and the migo principle. He maintains that one is still bound by an existing oath from Mount Sinai regarding the forbidden items, so the oath does not apply to them.
The Gemara then offers a different interpretation, presented by Resh Lakish: "You will only find an explanation for the Tanna Kamma's liability in a case where one explicitly specified a chatzi shiur, and according to the Sages." This means the person explicitly swore not to eat a chatzi shiur of neveila. According to the Sages, a general oath (stam shvuah) not to eat refers to a full kezayit. Since a full kezayit is already forbidden by the Torah, an oath on it would be invalid due to "bound by an existing oath." However, if one explicitly specifies a chatzi shiur, which Resh Lakish holds is permissible by the Torah, then the oath is valid, and breaking it incurs liability. Rashi explains: "Explicitly: 'I will not eat even a chatzi shiur.' And according to the Sages, who say in Shevuot that one who swears generally not to eat forbids himself with a full measure."
Alternatively, the Gemara states: "Or in a general oath, according to Rabbi Akiva, who says a person forbids himself with any amount (kol she'hu)." Rabbi Akiva believes that even a general oath not to eat neveila applies to any amount, no matter how small. Since a kol she'hu is not the full measure forbidden by the Torah, one is not "bound by an existing oath" concerning it, and therefore the oath is valid. Rashi explains: "Or in a general oath, one can establish the Mishnah where, when he ate, he ate only a chatzi shiur, which he is not bound by an existing oath from Sinai, and through his oath not to eat generally, it became forbidden to him." He adds: "And this is according to Rabbi Akiva, who says in Masechet Shevuot that a person who swears generally not to eat forbids himself with any amount." The Mishnah in Shevuot supports this: "If one swore not to eat and ate any amount, Rabbi Akiva obligates, and the Sages exempt." The Sages exempt because they hold a general oath refers to a kezayit, which is already forbidden. Thus, there are two ways to understand the Tanna Kamma's liability: either an explicit oath on a chatzi shiur according to the Sages, or a general oath on any amount according to Rabbi Akiva.
The Gemara concludes: "Therefore, that which states one is liable, if it is according to the Sages, we establish it as an explicit oath. And if it is according to Rabbi Akiva, we establish it even as a general oath." Regarding Rabbi Shimon, who exempts: "Rabbi Shimon follows his own reasoning, for he says that even any amount is forbidden from Sinai." He believes that even a kol she'hu of a forbidden item is a Torah prohibition, making one "bound by an existing oath." This is supported by a teaching in Masechet Makot: "Rabbi Shimon says: Any amount for lashes, and they only said a kezayit for the purpose of an offering." This means even a tiny amount of a forbidden item incurs lashes, implying it is a Torah prohibition, even if the offering is only for a kezayit.
Now, the Gemara returns to its original question to Resh Lakish: "And if Resh Lakish holds that a chatzi shiur is rabbinically forbidden, how did he establish this Mishnah that states one is liable for eating a chatzi shiur?" If it's rabbinically forbidden, then one should still be "bound by an existing oath" due to the Torah's command "do not deviate" (lo sasur) from the words of the Sages. This command elevates rabbinic prohibitions to a Torah-level obligation to obey. Therefore, even on a chatzi shiur, one would be considered "bound by an existing oath," and an oath on it should not incur liability for an offering. So, how can Resh Lakish explain the Sages' ruling of liability?
The Gemara suggests a possible answer: "And should you say, since it has a Torah permission, an oath offering applies." Perhaps, since on a Torah level, a chatzi shiur is permissible (according to Resh Lakish), the oath is valid on that Torah level, and thus an offering is required. The rabbinic prohibition of "do not deviate" does not negate the Torah's permission for the oath to take effect. Rashi explains: "And should you say, since it has a Torah permission, this is not 'bound by an existing oath from Sinai,' and when he swears concerning it, the oath takes effect and he is liable for it."
However, the Gemara refutes this: "But we learned in a Mishnah: an oath of testimony (shevuat ha'eidus) only applies to those fit to testify." An oath of testimony occurs when someone denies knowledge of a case, and it's later revealed they did. If they were fit to testify, they bring an offering. The Mishnah states that this oath does not apply to women or disqualified witnesses. The Gemara asks why the Mishnah explicitly adds "only applies to those fit to testify," as the initial list already covered many disqualified individuals. It must be excluding other categories. Rav Papa says it excludes a king, who is not fit to testify due to his honor. Rav Aha bar Yaakov says it excludes a gambler (mesachek bekubya). A gambler is disqualified from testifying by rabbinic decree, not by Torah law, because his winnings are considered rabbinic theft (gezel mid'rabbanan) since the loser never truly gives up the money wholeheartedly. By Torah law, a gambler is fit to testify. Yet, the Mishnah states that the oath of testimony does not apply to him because he is rabbinically disqualified.
This presents a challenge to Resh Lakish. If a rabbinic disqualification (as in the gambler's case) prevents a Torah oath (shevuat ha'eidus) from taking effect, then a rabbinic prohibition (like a chatzi shiur, according to Resh Lakish) should also prevent an oath from taking effect. If a chatzi shiur is rabbinically forbidden, then one is "bound by an existing oath" through "do not deviate," and an oath on it should not incur liability. The Gemara states: "But a gambler, by Torah law, is fit to testify, and the Rabbis disqualified him, yet an oath does not take effect on him." This proves that a rabbinic prohibition or disqualification is sufficient to invalidate an oath.
The Gemara answers: "That case is different." The oath of testimony is unique "because the verse says, 'if he does not testify'." This verse implies that the person must be "one who is capable of testifying" (bar hagadah) for the oath to apply. A gambler, even if only rabbinically disqualified, is not considered a "bar hagadah" whose testimony would be accepted. Therefore, the oath does not apply to him due to a specific Torah decree. However, regarding eating a chatzi shiur, there is no such specific Torah decree. By Torah law, a chatzi shiur is permissible (according to Resh Lakish). Therefore, on a Torah level, the oath is valid, and one is liable for an offering, even if it is rabbinically forbidden. The rabbinic prohibition does not negate the Torah's permission for the oath to take effect. Rashi elaborates on "if he does not testify": "It implies one whose testimony is effective for the litigant. And this one's testimony is not effective, and we do not accept it rabbinically." Thus, Resh Lakish's explanation of the Mishnah remains consistent with his position.
The Gemara now returns to an earlier discussion. When the Mishnah states, "Yom Kippur is forbidden for eating," the Gemara previously asked why it uses the word "forbidden" (assur) instead of mentioning the more severe punishment of karet. The Gemara now asks: "And wherever the punishment is karet, does it not state 'forbidden'?" It implies that the word "forbidden" can indeed signify karet. It brings a Braita as proof: "Even though they said it is forbidden for all of them," referring to the five afflictions of Yom Kippur (eating, drinking, bathing, anointing, wearing sandals, and marital relations), "they only said the punishment of karet for eating, drinking, and performing labor." This Braita implies that the word "forbidden" generally suggests karet, and therefore it clarifies that karet specifically applies only to eating, drinking, and labor, not to the other afflictions. This suggests that "forbidden" can imply karet.
The Gemara answers: "This is what the Braita meant: When they said 'forbidden,' they only referred to a chatzi shiur." In this interpretation, the Mishnah's use of "forbidden" refers to eating a partial measure, which does not incur karet. "But for a full measure, the punishment is karet." And then the Braita clarifies that even though a full measure incurs karet, this karet only applies to eating, drinking, and labor. Thus, the word "forbidden" in the Mishnah does not imply karet. Another answer: "Or, if you wish, say: When the Mishnah states 'forbidden,' it refers to the other items." Meaning, the word "forbidden" in the Mishnah refers to bathing, anointing, wearing sandals, and marital relations, for which there is no karet. For eating and drinking, the punishment is karet, but the Mishnah uses a general term to cover all five. Rashi on "Or, if you wish, say": "When the Mishnah states 'forbidden,' it refers to the others, because of bathing and anointing, for which there is no karet, it states 'forbidden'." Therefore, the word "forbidden" does not necessarily imply karet.
The Gemara cites a Braita taught by Rabba and Rav Yosef in "other books of the House of Rav" (shear sifrei devei Rav), referring to Midrashim other than Torat Kohanim. This Braita asks: "From where do we know that on Yom Kippur it is forbidden to bathe, anoint, wear sandals, and engage in marital relations?" The answer: "The verse states 'Shabbaton' (a day of complete rest)." The Torah uses the word "Shabbaton" regarding Yom Kippur, just as it does for Shabbat. Just as the Sages derived additional rabbinic prohibitions (shevut) from the word "Shabbaton" concerning Shabbat, so too they derived these four additional prohibitions for Yom Kippur. Rashi explains that while the Torah states "you shall afflict yourselves" five times, it also says "Shabbaton." Just as "Shabbaton" on Shabbat hinted to the Sages to add other labors not explicitly forbidden by the Torah, so too "Shabbaton" on Yom Kippur hints to add these other afflictions beyond eating and drinking. This implies that for Rashi, these four afflictions are only rabbinically forbidden, while eating and drinking are Torah prohibitions. Other Rishonim disagree, holding all five are Torah prohibitions, with karet only for eating and drinking.
The Gemara then returns to the core dispute regarding chatzi shiur. Rabbi Yochanan states it is forbidden by the Torah. His logic: "Since it is fit to combine," meaning the partial measure, if combined with another partial measure, forms a full measure. If the whole is forbidden, then its constituent parts must also be forbidden. Resh Lakish, however, states it is permissible by the Torah. His logic: "The Merciful One said 'eating'," implying a specific measure of eating, "and there is no eating less than a kezayit."
Rabbi Yochanan challenges Resh Lakish from a Braita concerning chelev. The Torah has two verses regarding chelev: one warning ("you shall not eat any chelev") and one stating the punishment ("whoever eats chelev, that soul shall be cut off"). The warning uses the word "any" (kol) referring to chelev, while the punishment does not. The Braita states: "Resh Lakish said: I only know that whatever is subject to punishment is subject to warning." This refers to a full kezayit of chelev. "But a koy (an animal of uncertain classification, possibly a hybrid of a domesticated animal and a wild animal) and a chatzi shiur, since there is no punishment for them, perhaps there is no warning either?" Meaning, since the punishment verse does not use "any" to include all types of chelev, one might think these are not even forbidden by the Torah. "The verse states 'any chelev'," which comes to include even the chelev of a koy and a chatzi shiur as forbidden by the Torah, though without karet. This is Rabbi Yochanan's proof that a chatzi shiur is a Torah prohibition.
Resh Lakish responds: "What do you want? It is rabbinic, and the verse is merely an asmachta (a textual support, not the source of the prohibition)." He maintains that a chatzi shiur and koy are only rabbinically forbidden, and the word "any" in the verse is merely a hint, not a direct Torah prohibition. He offers a proof: "It is logical: if you think it is a Torah prohibition, would the verse need to include a koy, which is a doubt?" A koy is a "doubtful animal" (safek behemah, safek chayah). Chelev of a domesticated animal (behemah) is forbidden, while chelev of a wild animal (chayah) is permissible. If a koy is a doubt, then by the rule of doubt in prohibitions, its chelev would be forbidden even without a special verse. Therefore, the verse cannot be coming to teach a Torah prohibition for koy, implying it's only rabbinic.
The Gemara refutes Resh Lakish's proof: "If it is for this reason, it is not a difficulty." One can argue that "a koy is a distinct creature" (biryah bifnei atzmah hi), a third species, neither fully behemah nor chayah. In that case, one would indeed need a verse to forbid its chelev. This is supported by a similar discussion regarding the prohibition of blood (dam). Rav Idi bar Avin stated that the verse "you shall not eat any blood" (kol dam lo tochelu) comes to include the blood of a koy. If a koy were merely a doubt between behemah and chayah, its blood would be forbidden anyway, as blood of both is forbidden. Therefore, the verse must be teaching that a koy is a distinct creature whose blood is forbidden. Similarly, regarding chelev, a koy could be a distinct creature, requiring a verse to forbid its chelev. Thus, Resh Lakish's proof that "any chelev" is only an asmachta is not conclusive.
The Gemara then introduces a new topic with a Braita: "You shall afflict your souls." The Torah does not explicitly state that eating and drinking are forbidden on Yom Kippur, only that one must "afflict" oneself. The Braita asks: "Perhaps one should sit in the sun or in the cold to suffer?" The answer: "The verse states, 'and you shall do no labor'." This juxtaposes affliction with labor. "Just as labor is a passive act (shev ve'al ta'aseh), so too the affliction of the soul is a passive act." Sitting in the sun or cold is an active choice. Refraining from eating and drinking is passive. The Gemara challenges: "But say this: if one is already sitting in the sun and is hot, we don't tell him to get up and sit in the shade. And if one is sitting in the shade and is cold, we don't tell him to get up and sit in the sun." This would also be passive. The Gemara replies: "It must be similar to labor. Just as labor has no divisions (it's forbidden in all cases), so too affliction should have no divisions." The suggested passive afflictions like sitting in the sun or cold are conditional; they only apply if one is already in that state. Eating and drinking, however, are universally passive afflictions.
Another Braita on the same subject: "You shall afflict your souls." "Perhaps one should sit in the sun or in the cold and suffer?" "The verse states, 'and you shall do no labor'." "Just as labor is something for which one is liable elsewhere," referring to Shabbat, where labor is forbidden and incurs karet, "so too the affliction of the soul is something for which one is liable elsewhere." This implies that the affliction must be a prohibition that exists and incurs karet in other contexts. "Which is this? This is pigul (an offering invalidated by improper intent) and notar (an offering left over past its time)." Eating pigul or notar incurs karet. Thus, refraining from eating, which is a prohibition with karet in other contexts, is the affliction of Yom Kippur.
Abaye expands on this. If the affliction is limited to things that incur karet elsewhere, then "pigul and notar, which incur karet," would be included. But what about tevel (untithed produce), for which the punishment is "death by the hand of Heaven" (misah biyedei shamayim), not karet? "The verse states 'you shall afflict' and 'you shall afflict your souls' (repeatedly), to include." The repetition of the word "afflict" comes to include tevel. What about neveila, which is a negative commandment (lav) but does not incur misah biyedei shamayim? "The verse states 'you shall afflict' and 'you shall afflict your souls' (repeatedly), to include." What about chullin (ordinary, unsanctified food), which is not forbidden elsewhere? "The verse states 'you shall afflict' and 'you shall afflict your souls' (repeatedly), to include." So, the repeated phrase includes all types of food, even those not forbidden or not incurring karet elsewhere.
The Gemara further refines: "I will bring chullin, which is not an obligation to eat." Meaning, outside of Yom Kippur, there's no obligation to eat chullin. "But I will not bring terumah (heave-offering), which there is an obligation to eat." For a Kohen (priest), eating terumah is a mitzvah. Perhaps eating a mitzvah food on Yom Kippur would not incur karet? "The verse states 'you shall afflict' and 'you shall afflict your souls' (repeatedly), to include." The repetition even includes terumah. "I will bring terumah, for which there is no 'you shall not leave over' (bal totiru)." Terumah is a mitzvah to eat, but it doesn't have the stringency of Kodashim (sacred offerings), where there's a negative commandment not to leave them over past their time. "But I will not bring Kodashim, which has 'you shall not leave over'?" Perhaps eating Kodashim, which is a mitzvah with an additional stringency, would not incur karet on Yom Kippur? "The verse states 'you shall afflict' and 'you shall afflict your souls' (repeatedly), to include." The repetition includes even Kodashim. Thus, the repeated phrase "you shall afflict" is interpreted to mean that eating any food on Yom Kippur, regardless of its status elsewhere, incurs karet.
The Gemara then offers an alternative interpretation: "And if you wish to say," implying a problem with the previous derivation, "the verse states, 'and I will destroy that soul'." This refers to the punishment for not afflicting oneself on Yom Kippur. "Affliction that is a destruction of the soul." What kind of affliction leads to destruction of the soul? "Which is this? Eating and drinking." This derivation directly connects affliction to the absence of eating and drinking, as these are essential for life. The Gemara asks: "What was the 'if you wish to say'? What was the problem with the previous derivation?" The problem was: "From where do we learn to precede affliction to labor?" And further, "And should you say, the verse is speaking of illicit relations (arayot)?" The word "affliction" (innuy) is also used in the Torah regarding marital relations, as when Laban told Jacob, "If you afflict my daughters." Since illicit relations also incur karet elsewhere, one might think the affliction of Yom Kippur refers to abstaining from marital relations. Therefore, the phrase "I will destroy that soul" is needed to clarify that the affliction refers specifically to the destruction of the physical body, which is caused by lack of food and drink.
The School of Rabbi Yishmael taught a different derivation: "It is stated here 'affliction'," referring to Yom Kippur, "and it is stated elsewhere 'affliction'," referring to the manna in the wilderness, where the verse says, "He afflicted you and caused you to hunger." "Just as 'affliction' there was hunger, so too 'affliction' here is hunger." The manna was considered an affliction of hunger even while being eaten because it was not conventional food. The Gemara asks: "And let us learn from the 'affliction' in 'if you afflict my daughters'?" This refers to marital relations. The Gemara replies: "We learn public affliction from public affliction, and we do not learn public affliction from individual affliction." Yom Kippur and the manna were for the entire Jewish people, while Laban's statement to Jacob was individual. The Gemara then asks: "And let us learn from the affliction of Egypt?" The Egyptians afflicted the Jewish people, which was a public affliction. The Gemara replies: "We learn affliction by Heaven from affliction by Heaven, and we do not learn affliction by Heaven from affliction by man." The manna was an affliction from God, and Yom Kippur is a divine commandment. The Egyptian affliction was by human hands.
The Gemara then delves into why the manna was considered an affliction of hunger, despite being food. The verse states, "Who fed you manna in the wilderness, in order to afflict you." Rav Ami and Rav Assi offer two explanations. One said: "One who has bread in his basket is not like one who has no bread in his basket." The people only received manna for one day at a time, so they constantly worried about the next day's food, leading to a feeling of affliction. Rashi explains: "He eats today and worries until tomorrow." The other said: "One who sees what he eats is not like one who does not see what he eats." Even though the manna could taste like anything, it always looked the same. Not seeing the actual food one desires prevents true satiation. Rav Yosef comments on this: "From here is a hint for blind people, who eat but are not satiated." As a blind man himself, Rav Yosef understood that the visual aspect of food contributes to satiation. This is also connected to the mitzvah of Shabbat candles (hadlakat nerot Shabbat), where seeing the food contributes to the enjoyment (oneg) of Shabbat. Abaye concludes: "Therefore, one who has a meal to eat should only eat it during the day," when they can see it. Resh Lakish offers a different twist on the verse "better is the sight of the eyes than the wandering of the soul" (tov mareh einayim mehalach nefesh), stating: "Better is the sight of the eyes regarding a woman than the actual act of cohabitation." He suggests that the pleasure of seeing is even greater than the physical act itself. Blessed be God forever.