The Talmud Bavli, specifically Masechet Yoma, has been dedicated in memory of Mazal bat Ester Baghdadi and Yosef ben Mazal Baghdadi. Today's page has been dedicated by Northfork Bank and its private banking department with Gabriel Safty. We also acknowledge the dedication of today's page in memory of Yosef ben Mazal and Shlomo Refael ben Mazal. We begin today's page, page 83a, on the second line.
The Mishnah states that if a person is sick on Yom Kippur, they may be fed with the consent of experts, meaning two doctors. The Mishnah further concludes that if no experts are available, the sick person may be fed based on their own estimation. Rabbi Yannai presents two teachings. First, if a sick person says they need to eat, feeling they are in danger, but a doctor says they do not, we listen to the patient. The reason, as the Gemara quotes a verse, is that "the heart knows its own bitterness"—a person understands their own suffering best. The Gemara asks, "Isn't this obvious?" It answers that one might think the doctor possesses superior expertise, but Rabbi Yannai teaches that the patient's self-assessment is paramount in this scenario.
Second, if a doctor says the patient must eat, but the patient says they are fine and do not need to, we listen to the doctor. The Gemara explains that in this case, the patient might be delirious from their illness and unable to make a proper assessment. Thus, Rabbi Yannai's two rules establish that we always side with the one who says the patient needs to eat, whether it is the patient against one doctor, or one doctor against the patient.
The Gemara then raises a challenge from our Mishnah. The Mishnah states that a sick person is fed "with the consent of experts." The term "experts" implies two doctors. This suggests that feeding is permitted only with the consent of two doctors, not based on the patient's own word. This contradicts Rabbi Yannai's first statement, which allows feeding based on the patient's word against a doctor. Furthermore, the Mishnah implies that two doctors are required, not just one. This contradicts Rabbi Yannai's second statement, where one doctor's word overrides the patient's. Thus, the Mishnah presents a double problem against both of Rabbi Yannai's rulings.
The Gemara resolves the first contradiction by reinterpreting the Mishnah's case. It suggests the Mishnah refers to a situation where the patient says they do not need to eat. In such a case, two expert doctors are needed to override the patient's assessment and instruct them to eat. However, this still leaves the second problem: why are two doctors needed when Rabbi Yannai implies one is sufficient?
The Gemara further refines its interpretation: the Mishnah's case is not merely the patient saying they do not need to eat, but that another doctor also agrees with the patient, saying they do not need to eat. In this scenario, two doctors are required to say the patient needs to eat to override the combined opinion of the patient and the dissenting doctor. The Gemara then asks, "Isn't this obvious?" since it is a matter of saving a life, and in cases of potential danger, we always rule leniently. What is the novel teaching of the Mishnah?
The Gemara offers an even more nuanced explanation. The Mishnah's case involves the patient plus two other individuals (perhaps other doctors or knowledgeable people) all saying the patient does not need to eat, while only two expert doctors say the patient does need to eat. This presents a numerical imbalance: three opinions against two. The Gemara cites Rav Safra's teaching that in matters of testimony in a court, "two are like a hundred, and a hundred are like two," meaning numerical strength beyond two witnesses does not matter. However, this applies only to testimony. In matters of assessment, such as property valuation, opinions are counted, and the majority prevails. So, if three assessors say one value and two say another, we follow the three.
The Gemara then clarifies that even this distinction, counting opinions in assessments, applies only to monetary matters. However, when it comes to saving a life, the Mishnah teaches a novel principle: even if three opinions say the patient does not need to eat, and only two expert doctors say they do, we follow the two doctors. This is because it is a case of potential danger, and in such situations, we rule leniently, prioritizing the expert medical opinion that advocates for eating. Thus, the Mishnah's teaching, "A sick person is fed with the consent of experts," refers to a complex scenario where the patient and two others say no, but two expert doctors say yes, and their opinion prevails due to the principle of saving a life.
The Gemara then raises another challenge from the latter part of the Mishnah, which states, "If there are no experts there, he is fed based on his own testimony." This implies that the entire Mishnah is discussing a case where the patient says they need to eat. If so, the first part of the Mishnah would mean that even when the patient says they need to eat, their opinion is not trusted unless two doctors confirm it. This would directly contradict Rabbi Yannai's teaching that if the patient says they need to eat, we listen to them even against a doctor's dissent.
The Gemara resolves this by suggesting the Mishnah is missing words and should be read as follows: "When are these words said (referring to the first case)? When the patient says they do not need to eat. But if the patient says they need to eat, and there are not two experts (meaning, only one doctor) who say they do not need to, then they are fed based on their own testimony." According to this interpretation, if the patient says they need to eat, and only one doctor disagrees, we follow the patient, aligning with Rabbi Yannai. However, if the patient says they need to eat, and two doctors disagree, we follow the doctors. This interpretation maintains consistency with Rabbi Yannai's first ruling (patient against one doctor) but implies that if two doctors contradict the patient, the doctors' opinion prevails.
Mar bar Rav Ashi offers an alternative interpretation. He asserts that if a patient says they need to eat, we listen to them even if a hundred doctors say they do not, based on the verse, "the heart knows its own bitterness." To reconcile this with the Mishnah's statement, "If there are no experts there, he is fed based on his own testimony," Mar bar Rav Ashi reinterprets "no experts" to mean that even if experts are present, their opinion is worthless against the patient's declaration of need. Thus, the Mishnah's concluding phrase implies that in a case where the patient says they need to eat, the presence of any number of doctors who disagree does not negate the patient's word. This is the key difference between the two interpretations: in a case where the patient says they need to eat and two doctors say they do not, the first interpretation follows the doctors, while Mar bar Rav Ashi follows the patient.
The Mishnah then introduces the case of someone afflicted with bulmos, a severe illness caused by starvation, characterized by failing eyesight and risk of death. The Mishnah states that such a person may be fed even impure foods until their eyesight returns. The Mishnah then contrasts this with someone bitten by a rabid dog. In such a case, they are not fed from the lobe of the dog's liver, even though this was a known folk remedy. The reason is that this cure is not conclusively proven, and therefore one should not transgress the prohibition of eating forbidden meat for an unconfirmed remedy. Rav Matya ben Herash, however, permits this, believing the remedy to be conclusive.
Rav Matya ben Herash also taught that if someone has a severe throat condition (a life-threatening disease, not a mere sore throat), medicine may be administered on Shabbat. This is because it is a case of potential danger, and any potential danger overrides the laws of Shabbat, even those that are Torah prohibitions, such as grinding medicine.
The Mishnah presents another case: if a building collapses on a person. Even if there is doubt whether someone is there, whether they are alive, or even if they are Jewish, one must still clear the rubble to search for them. If a living person is found, digging continues. If the person is found to be dead, the digging stops, and the body is left there. This is a novel teaching because usually, in a fire, a dead body would be removed to prevent further desecration, but here, since no further harm will come to the body, there is no need to transgress Shabbat for a dead person.
The Gemara returns to the case of bulmos, asking how one knows when the patient's eyesight has returned, especially if it is dark. It answers that it is known when their sense of taste returns, allowing them to distinguish between good and bad food. Rav Yehudah specifies this refers to the sense of taste.
The Talmud teaches that when feeding someone with bulmos, if only forbidden foods are available, one should choose the least severe prohibition. For example, if one has tevel (untithed produce, punishable by divine death) and neveilah (an improperly slaughtered animal, punishable by lashes), one should feed them the neveilah, as its punishment is less severe. Similarly, between tevel and produce of the Sabbatical year after the time of removal (which is a negative commandment), one should choose the Sabbatical year produce. However, when faced with tevel and terumah (sacred offering for priests), both punishable by divine death, there is a dispute among the Sages. One opinion says to feed the tevel, while Ben Teima says to feed the terumah.
Raba clarifies the dispute: if it is possible to separate the tithes from the tevel to create ordinary, non-sacred food (chullin) and still have enough to cure the patient, everyone agrees this should be done. The dispute arises only when the entire amount of food is needed, making it impossible to separate and have enough chullin. One opinion holds that tevel is more stringent because it has no permitted use for anyone, whereas terumah can be eaten by a priest. Therefore, this opinion would advocate separating the terumah, creating chullin and terumah, and giving the patient the terumah (which is less stringent than tevel). The other opinion holds that terumah is more stringent because tevel can be rectified (by tithing), while terumah remains forbidden to non-priests. Therefore, this opinion would advocate leaving the food as tevel and feeding it to the patient.
The Gemara questions the premise that if chullin is available, everyone agrees to use it, asking, "Isn't that obvious?" It answers that the novel teaching applies even on Shabbat. Normally, separating tithes on Shabbat is a Rabbinic prohibition, as it is considered "fixing" the food. However, in a life-threatening situation, one may transgress this Rabbinic prohibition to provide chullin. The Gemara again asks, "Isn't this obvious?" since a Rabbinic prohibition can be set aside to avoid a Torah prohibition. The Gemara explains that the case refers to produce grown in a non-perforated pot. Such produce is Rabbinically considered tevel, but Biblically, it is exempt from tithes. The novel teaching is that we allow transgressing the Rabbinic prohibition of tithing on Shabbat to rectify this Rabbinically forbidden produce, out of concern that if we permit eating it as Rabbinic tevel, people might mistakenly eat Biblically forbidden tevel in other situations without tithing.
The Gemara suggests that this concept—transgressing a Rabbinic prohibition to prevent a potential future transgression of a Torah prohibition—is itself a dispute among the Sages. It cites a Baraita about someone bitten by a snake on Shabbat. In such a dangerous situation, a doctor may be called from anywhere, a hen may be ripped open (a medical remedy), and leeks may be pulled from the ground (a prohibited act on Shabbat) and fed to the patient. Rabbi says there is no need to tithe the leeks. Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Shimon says the patient may not eat until the leeks are tithed. Since tithing vegetables is only a Rabbinic obligation, Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Shimon's position aligns with the idea of transgressing a Rabbinic prohibition (eating untithed vegetables) to prevent a future transgression of a Torah prohibition (eating untithed grain). Rabbi, conversely, does not make this stringency. The Gemara concludes that even Rabbi would agree in the case of grain from a non-perforated pot, because grain is a species that is Biblically obligated in tithes. The distinction is between confusing a Rabbinically obligated vegetable with a Biblically obligated grain (which Rabbi considers far-fetched) versus confusing Rabbinically obligated grain from a non-perforated pot with Biblically obligated grain from the ground (which Rabbi would consider a valid concern).
The Talmud then provides remedies for bulmos. One should feed the patient honey and other sweets, as they restore eyesight. Although there is no explicit proof for this, there is a hint in the verse where Yehonasan said his eyes were enlightened after tasting honey. The Gemara notes that this is only a hint, not a direct proof, because Yehonasan did not have bulmos. Abaye adds that honey and sweets are beneficial only after the patient has eaten regular food; given beforehand, they merely stimulate appetite. This is learned from the story of David's men finding an Egyptian man who had not eaten for three days. They first gave him bread and water, and only then dates and raisins, after which his spirit returned to him.
Rav Huna in the name of Shmuel says that for bulmos, one should feed the fatty tail of a sheep with honey. Rav Huna the son of Rav Yehoshua adds that fine, clean flour with honey is also effective. Rav Papa says even barley flour with honey is helpful. Rabbi Yochanan recounts that he once suffered from bulmos and ran to the eastern side of a fig tree to eat its fruit, which are sweetest due to the morning sun. He considered this an application of the verse, "Wisdom gives life to its possessors." Rav Yosef teaches that to taste the sweetest fig, one should go to the eastern side of the tree, as hinted in the verse, "and from the choicest produce of the sun."
The Gemara recounts a story of Rabbi Yehudah and Rabbi Yossi traveling. Rabbi Yehudah was struck with bulmos and took bread from a shepherd. Rabbi Yossi reproached him for taking all the shepherd's food. Later, when they reached a city, Rabbi Yossi was afflicted with bulmos, and the entire town brought him platters and jars of food. Rabbi Yehudah then remarked to Rabbi Yossi, "I only took from one shepherd, but you have taken from the entire city." This illustrates that while taking food to save a life is permitted, even if it means taking from others with the intention to repay, the extent of need can vary.
Another story involves Rabbi Meir, Rabbi Yehudah, and Rabbi Yossi. Rabbi Meir was known to discern a person's character from their name, while the other two rabbis did not. They sought lodging and were hosted by a man named Kidor. Rabbi Meir immediately suspected him of being wicked, citing a verse that uses "Kidor" in the context of a treacherous generation. On the eve of Shabbat, Rabbi Yehudah and Rabbi Yossi entrusted their money to Kidor for safekeeping. Rabbi Meir, however, hid his wallet at the grave of Kidor's father. That night, Kidor's father appeared to him in a dream, telling him to take the wallet resting on his head. The next day, Kidor recounted his dream to the rabbis. Rabbi Meir dismissed it as an insignificant Friday night dream, but secretly went to the cemetery and guarded his wallet all Shabbat. After Shabbat, when Rabbi Yehudah and Rabbi Yossi asked for their wallets, Kidor denied ever receiving them. Rabbi Meir then admonished his colleagues for not heeding his warning about the name. When asked why he hadn't warned them more explicitly, Rabbi Meir explained that his analysis of names was only a suspicion, not a definitive judgment. The rabbis then tricked Kidor by observing lentils on his beard, then went to his wife, gave her the "sign" of the lentils, and retrieved their wallets. Enraged, Kidor killed his wife. This incident is cited in a Baraita: "The lack of after-meal hand-washing led to the eating of pork; the lack of after-meal hand-washing led to murder." The second part refers to Kidor's wife, whose death could have been avoided if Kidor had washed his hands and face after eating, thus removing the lentils that served as the "sign." The first part refers to a meat vendor who sold both kosher and non-kosher meat. He would give kosher meat to customers who performed ritual hand-washing before eating (mayim rishonim) and non-kosher meat to those who did not. A Jewish customer who neglected mayim rishonim was mistakenly given pork. The Gemara concludes by noting that eventually, Rabbi Yehudah and Rabbi Yossi also adopted Rabbi Meir's practice of analyzing names. They refused to stay in a house belonging to a man named Bala, concluding he must be wicked, based on a verse that uses "Bala" in the context of one worn out by adultery.