We begin our study today on the bottom of the seventh page, second side, with a teaching from the Rabbis. We previously learned that Rabbi Eliezer held a particular view: he praised those who remained at home for the Festival pilgrimage (regal) and did not leave their houses. This was so they could be with their wives on the holiday, unless they were able to travel and return on the same day to be back with their wives. The Gemara indicated this was permissible. The Gemara recounts that Rabbi Eliezer once spent Shabbat or a holiday in the Upper Galilee, in a sukkah in the city of Kisrion. When the sun began to pierce into the sukkah, Rabbi Hanan asked Rabbi Eliezer, "May I place a sheet over the sukkah to block the sun?" Rabbi Eliezer changed the subject, not answering him directly. He stated, "You should know that every single one of the twelve tribes had at least one judge (Shofet) descend from them." These were the leaders of the Children of Israel after the time of Joshua, before the kings. Rashi explains that Rabbi Eliezer digressed to a different subject because he knew the answer to the question. However, he had a tradition or a personal stringency (chumra) that he would never state anything he had not heard specifically from his own teachers. Since he had never heard a ruling on the subject of placing a sheet over a sukkah on Shabbat, he changed the subject to avoid giving an answer not directly from his rabbis.
Rashi clarifies that these judges led the Children of Israel from the death of Joshua until Samuel, and until the first king, Saul. Joshua was from Ephraim; Ehud from Benjamin; Gideon from Manasseh; Hari from the children of Rachel, specifically Manasseh; Samson from Dan; Barak from Naphtali, from the children of Bilhah; Ibsan, Zeboaz, from Judah; Eli from Levi; Tola from Issachar; Alon from Zebulun. These are the explicit ones. However, regarding Othniel, Jephthah, Shamgar, Jair, and Abdon, Rashi states, "I do not know the names of their tribes." And from Reuben, Simeon, Gad, and Asher, he says, "I did not find any men who came from them." But Rabbi Eliezer’s teaching was that every tribe had some form of representation.
The narrative continues: "The sun began to shine over half the sukkah." So, half the sukkah was in sunlight, and the rabbi was getting hot. Rabbi Hanan again asked Rabbi Eliezer, "What is the law if I spread a sheet over the sukkah?" Rabbi Eliezer replied, "You should know that prophets descended from every tribe of Israel. And from the two tribes of Judah and Benjamin, kings emerged from the prophets." The prophet Samuel appointed Saul from Benjamin, and David from Judah. So, either prophets descended from them, or prophets appointed kings from them. By this time, the sun had already reached Rabbi Hanan's feet. He simply took a sheet, put it over his shoulder, and left the sukkah. He left because he did not want to give the impression that by staying there, he agreed with what Rabbi Eliezer had done.
The reason Rabbi Eliezer changed the subject was not to turn Rabbi Hanan away or to disrespect him. He had a rule: he never said anything he did not explicitly hear from his teachers. He had not heard about placing a sheet over a sukkah. The issue here is obviously the prohibition of making a tent (ohel) on Shabbat. While a tent already exists, adding a sheet would be considered "adding to a temporary tent" (mosif al ohel aray) by spreading out a sheet to make a roof. Since he lacked an explicit tradition from his teachers, he did not provide an answer. However, the Gemara asks: How could Rabbi Eliezer have been in someone else's sukkah at all? Rabbi Eliezer himself states that on Sukkot, one must sit in one's own sukkah. And here it says he was in Kisrion, while Rabbi Eliezer lived in Lod. How was he in someone else's sukkah on the holiday? We learned that one must have one's own sukkah to sit in for seven days. The Gemara suggests, "Perhaps it was a different holiday." Just because they were sitting in a sukkah, which was a shady area, doesn't mean it was Sukkot. For example, it could have been Passover. The Gemara counters, "That doesn't answer the question." Rabbi Eliezer praises those who do not leave their homes for any festival. So even if it was Passover, he should have been at home with his wife. The Gemara then suggests, "It was just a regular Shabbat during the year that they were sitting in the sukkah." The question was whether one is allowed to add this sheet (sadin) to provide shade from the sun.
The Gemara then asks, "Forget about needing a tradition from his teachers; Rabbi Eliezer himself discussed this subject in Tractate Shabbat. Why didn't Rabbi Eliezer answer the question from one of his own teachings?" Why wouldn't Rabbi Eliezer cite the case of a "window plug" (pekak achalon) from Tractate Shabbat? In that case, one has an open window in a house and a board (pekak) to block it. If the board is hanging against the wall on a rope, not resting on the floor but dangling in the air, then on Shabbat, one may attach it. The logic is that it is not considered "adding to a tent" (mosif al ohel); it is considered already attached because it is hanging. However, if it is resting on the floor, even if tight, it appears as if one is "adding to a structure" (mosif al ohel), and is therefore forbidden. So, you see that Rabbi Eliezer holds that one is not allowed to add to a tent. He should have told Rabbi Hanan, "You cannot add this sheet over the sukkah." Even though the sukkah is already there, adding the sheet creates a tent. Why did Rabbi Eliezer not answer the question?
Perhaps the sheet was tied to the sukkah? If so, he should have answered based on that. But he didn't stay there; on the contrary, he walked out. First, he didn't answer, and then when Rabbi Hanan acted, Rabbi Eliezer left. So what's the answer? Rashi explains: The window plug case is different. Normally, one leaves the plug in the window. Therefore, Rabbi Eliezer is stringent in the window plug case. If it's not hanging (where it's considered attached), but resting on the floor, one is adding to a tent, and it's considered adding because it's left there as a normal practice. However, a sheet (sadin) is different. Everyone knows you don't leave a sheet on the roof of a sukkah; it will eventually be removed. Therefore, Rabbi Eliezer was not certain if it was considered "adding to a tent." This means that in the case of the window plug, he was sure it was forbidden. But regarding the sheet on the sukkah, it's debatable. Since it's a temporary item and one plans to remove it, perhaps it's not a problem of adding to an existing tent. That's why Rabbi Eliezer did not answer from his existing teaching about the window plug, because there is a major difference between the dynamic of the plug and the sheet on the sukkah. One is left there, giving more reason to say it's forbidden as an addition to a structure, but a sheet is not.
The Gemara recounts another story involving Rabbi Eliezer. He spent Shabbat in the Upper Galilee. They asked him thirty questions on the laws of sukkah. On twelve of them, he said, "I heard" (meaning he had a tradition). On eighteen, he said, "I did not hear." Rabbi Yose said that on eighteen, he said he heard, and on eighteen, he said he didn't hear. No, they told him, "When you say, 'I didn't hear,' and you only say things you heard from your teachers, why can't you give us your own opinion?" He replied, "Did you ask me to say something I didn't hear with my own mouth?" He meant, "Are you forcing me to say something I didn't hear from my teachers, which goes against one of my personal character traits (middot) that I accepted upon myself? You're trying to get me to say something I didn't hear from my teachers? I don't do that. That's one of my personal stringencies."
He then proceeded to tell them, "Who am I? Look at my conduct in the study hall (Beit Hamidrash). You should know that no one ever preceded me into the Beit Hamidrash; I was always the first one in. I never slept in the Beit Hamidrash, neither a permanent sleep nor a temporary nap, even though the Beit Hamidrash is considered a house. I never left anyone in the Beit Hamidrash and departed; I was always the last one out. I never spoke idle chatter (sihat chulin). And I never said something to my teacher that I had not heard." The reason he told them all these things was to convey, "Don't think that I'm not answering you because I haven't studied Torah, or because I'm lazy and haven't delved into the reasons for your questions. I studied Torah from early morning to late at night and never wasted a second. But I have a certain tradition, which we will see he learned from his teachers, that he doesn't say things he hasn't heard from his teachers." Rashi explains that "idle chatter" refers to frivolity and jokes. He never spoke such things. "Don't think I didn't toil in Torah. Furthermore, don't think my teacher said it and I didn't hear it, because I would have heard it. I was always in the Beit Hamidrash, always with them, the first one in and the last one out. The reason I'm not telling it to you is because that's my stringency, my character trait, that I don't say things I haven't heard from my teachers."
They said regarding Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai, who was the teacher of Rabbi Eliezer, and from whom Rabbi Eliezer learned his character traits: "In his life, he never spoke idle chatter. He never walked without learning; as he walked, his mouth was moving, reciting the great Torah. And he always wore his ritual fringes (tzitzit). Nobody ever beat him to the Beit Hamidrash. He never slept there, not a temporary or permanent sleep. And he did not think of the great Torah in unclean places, even though thinking (hirhur) is permissible there (one just cannot verbalize). He was stringent. He never left anyone in the Beit Hamidrash, meaning he was always the last one out. Nobody ever saw Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai just sitting idly; he was always learning. Nobody ever opened the door for their students besides him; he had great respect (kavod) for his students. This also shows he was the first one in the Beit Hamidrash, opening the door for students who came afterwards. And he, Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai, never said anything that he did not hear explicitly from his teacher. And he never said, 'It's time to get up and leave the Beit Hamidrash,' except for two days a year: the eve of Passover and the eve of Yom Kippur. Why these two days? On the eve of Passover, he would say, 'It's time to go prepare the Passover offering (Korban Pesach).' He would also tell them, 'Go put your children to sleep,' because fathers put their children to sleep on the eve of Passover so they can stay up for the Seder. On the eve of Yom Kippur, it is a commandment to eat. So he would tell them, 'Now is not the time to learn; now you must go home and eat.'" As we said, the student followed the example of his teacher.
Hillel the Elder had eighty students. Thirty of them were worthy for the Divine Presence (Shechinah) to rest upon them, like Moses. Not the same presence as Moses, but they deserved the Shechinah. Thirty of them were on such a level that the sun should have stopped for them, like the miracle of Joshua. They were worthy of such miracles. Twenty were in the middle, somewhere between Moses and Joshua. The greatest of Hillel the Elder's eighty students was Yonatan ben Uzziel. Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai was the smallest of Hillel the Elder's students. And they said regarding Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai's greatness that he did not leave out any part of Torah study. He was an expert in the Written Torah (Mikra), which are the verses. He was an expert in Mishnah, which refers to the Mishnah, the Baraita, and the six orders of the Mishnah. He was an expert in Gemara, which in the time of the Tannaim referred to the logical reasoning (Svara) by which later Tannaim explained the teachings of earlier Tannaim, the Baraitot, and the Toseftot. This was their version of Gemara, the logical reasoning of early Tannaitic teachings. He was an expert in "Shas," which refers to the precise derivations (diuk) within the Talmud, the original logic of the interpretations of the six orders. He was an expert in Halachot, referring to the specific halachic principles like Gud, Lavud, Dofen Akuma, Sha'ulim, Hasisin, and Nehisin. He was an expert in Aggadot, which are the Midrashim, such as Midrash Tanchuma and Midrash Rabbah. He was expert in "Torah derivations" (Diktuke Torah), meaning the extra letters (ribuyei otiyot) and missing letters (mi'utim) in the Torah. For example, the Torah says "Ha-Ezrach" (the citizen); it could have said "Ezrach" (citizen). The extra "Heh" is significant. He was an expert in what each letter comes to include or exclude. He was expert in "Scribal derivations" (Diktuke Sofrim), which are the rabbinical decrees (Gezerot) that fenced the Torah law to keep a person away from transgression (avera). For example, the Gemara in Bechorot states that if a convert (Ger) comes to accept Torah except for one item, he is not accepted. Rabbi Yose says, "Even if he accepts all 613 commandments (Taryag Mitzvot) but does not accept one rabbinical ordinance, he cannot be accepted." He was expert in "light and weighty" (Kalim Vachamurim), meaning items learned through a Kal Vachomer (a fortiori argument). He was expert in "verbal analogies" (Gezerot Shavot), where two different passages containing the same word are connected to link their concepts. He was expert in "cycles" (Tekufot), referring to the cycles of the sun and moon. He was expert in Gematriot, which are numerical values of letters, and different styles of learning such as Atbash (transposing letters, e.g., Aleph with Taf, Bet with Shin) used to derive acronyms (Rashot). For example, regarding a Nazirite, the word "Yehiye" (he shall be) is used, and from its Gematria of 30, we learn that a standard Nazirite vow is 30 days. He was expert in the "speech of ministering angels" (Sihat Malachei HaSharet), the "speech of demons" (Sihat Shedim), and the "speech of trees" (Sihat Dekalim). Some commentators explain "speech of trees" as knowing the medicinal values and healing powers of all trees. Knowing the speech of angels or demons implies he knew how to create amulets (kimya'im) by writing names of the Holy One, Blessed Be He, to ward off demons and spirits. He knew the parables of "washers" (Mishlot Kovsim) and "foxes" (Mishlot Shualim). In olden days, they used many examples to illustrate Torah points, often using washers or foxes. He knew all these parables, such as the famous story of a fox that squeezed into a hole to eat grapes, became too fat to exit, and had to starve itself to leave the same way it entered. This teaches that one enters and leaves this world in the same state. He knew the "big items" (Davar Gadol) and the "small items" (Davar Katan). "Big items" refers to the Divine Chariot (Ma'aseh Merkavah) of Ezekiel. "Small items" refers to the give and take (Abayot VeHawayot) of Abaye and Rava. The Gemara explains that Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai knew all the questions and dilemmas of Abaye and Rava, who lived much later than him, and had all their answers. However, by the time of the Amoraim, these laws were forgotten. He was expert in all these cases, which make up much of the Talmud. He was so proficient that the verse "I will bequeath to my beloved ones" is interpreted by commentators to mean that God has destined 310 worlds for all the righteous (Tzaddikim) who study Torah. God says, "I will fill up their treasures." He was filled with all Torah knowledge.
The Gemara then asks, "If this was the smallest of Hillel the Elder's students, can you imagine how great the greatest of his students was?" They said regarding Yonatan ben Uzziel that any bird flying over him while he was studying Torah would burn. The fire of his learning was so powerful it would cause anything above him to burn. Rashi explains this is because angels, who are fire, would surround the Torah, and this would cause the birds to burn. When Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai learned, he would cause that fire to emanate, literally burning birds. This fire was a pleasurable fire, the fire of Sinai, the fire of the Torah.
We now move to the next Mishnah: "If a person has his head and the majority of his body in the sukkah, but his table is extended into his house, Beit Shammai says the sukkah is invalid (pasul), and Beit Hillel says it is valid (kasher)." We discussed this case earlier in the tractate, and the Gemara noted a problem with the language. The case begins with a person sitting in the sukkah, but his table is in the house. The dispute is whether the person has fulfilled his obligation (yotzei). Beit Shammai says he has not fulfilled it, fearing he might be drawn after his table into the house. Beit Hillel says, "No, he is sitting in the sukkah; if his table is in the house, I do not make that decree." The Mishnah's language should have been "he fulfilled his obligation" or "he did not fulfill his obligation," but instead it says "invalid" or "valid," referring to the sukkah itself. The Gemara explained that there are actually two cases here: a large sukkah (sukkah gedolah) and a small sukkah (sukkah ketanah), and Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel argue on both. A small sukkah is one that minimally fits only his body (head and majority). Beit Hillel says such a sukkah is valid, while Beit Shammai says it is invalid because it minimally must fit his head, majority, and an additional handbreadth (tefach) for a table. That is the first case of "invalid" and "valid." Our Mishnah, however, refers to a large sukkah where there is enough room for everything, but the table is extended into the house. This is the second dispute. Beit Shammai says he has not fulfilled his obligation because, while the sukkah is intrinsically valid, the problem is the way he is sitting, as he might be drawn into the house. Beit Hillel says no. So these are the two cases implicitly in the Mishnah.
The Gemara states that Beit Hillel tells Beit Shammai, "Don't you remember the story when the elders of Beit Shammai went to visit Rabbi Yochanan the Hordanite? The rabbi was sitting in the sukkah with his table in the house, and they didn't say anything to him." The rabbis of Beit Hillel were trying to say that Beit Shammai must have retracted their ruling, because their students visited Rabbi Yochanan the Hordanite, saw him sitting this way, and did not object. So Beit Shammai must have retracted. Beit Shammai replied to them, "From this, do you bring a proof? They told him, 'Yochanan, if this is how you conduct yourself, you have not fulfilled the commandment of sukkah your entire life!'" So they did not retract; they rebuked him.
The Mishnah continues: "Women, slaves, and minors are exempt from the commandment of sukkah." We will see why each is exempt. "A minor who no longer needs his mother is obligated in sukkah." We will clarify what "does not need his mother" means. A story occurred: Shammai's daughter-in-law gave birth to an infant. What did Shammai do? He made a hole in the roof directly above the baby and the mother, placing the sukkah covering (schach) over the infant. Seemingly, this contradicts what we just learned, that only a baby of a certain age who no longer needs his mother is obligated. Now you bring a story that Shammai broke the roof and put the schach over the crib. This seems to contradict the earlier statement that small children are exempt. The Gemara asks, "What are we trying to prove here?" How do we know that women are exempt from the commandment of sukkah? We are looking for a biblical source. The verse states, "All the native-born (Ezrach) in Israel shall dwell in sukkot." The Gemara will interpret what "Ezrach" alone would have meant, and then what the prefix "Ha" (the) comes to include or exclude. The Gemara teaches: "Ezrach" refers to everyone, any native of Israel, including men and women. The "Ha" (the) in "Ha-Ezrach" comes to exclude women. Rashi explains that if it just said "Ezrach," it would include all descendants of Israel, men and women. But "Ha-Ezrach" comes to refer to the "choice species" of native-born, which are the men, and automatically excludes women. The Gemara then asks, "Where does 'all' (Kol) come to include?" The verse says, "All the native-born (Kol Ha-Ezrach)." The word "Kol" must come to include someone. It comes to include minors. The Gemara will question this, as the Mishnah just stated that minors are exempt. Now you say a verse comes to obligate minors? We will address this later.
The Gemara now quotes and analyzes the statement: "Ha-Ezrach comes to exclude women." The premise is that "Ezrach" (without the "Ha") refers to both men and women. "Ha-Ezrach" then specifies only men. This is the style of how the word "Ezrach" is used. However, a question arises from Yom Kippur. A Baraita teaches that regarding the verse about Yom Kippur, "You shall afflict your souls, and you shall do no work, the native-born (Ha-Ezrach) and the convert," the term "Ha-Ezrach" there comes to include women. So, in one place, "Ha-Ezrach" excludes women, and in another, it includes them. How can the same word have opposite meanings in different contexts? Abaye comes along and says, "Here is the bottom line: these laws are actually 'a law given to Moses at Sinai' (Halacha L'Moshe MiSinai). However, the Sages connected the law of Sinai to these verses, which are really just mnemonic devices (Asmachtot) to remember the Halacha L'Moshe MiSinai." Rashi explains that these two laws, Sukkah and Yom Kippur, cannot both be derived from the verses simultaneously. If "Ha" is inclusive in one, it must be inclusive in the other; if it's exclusive in one, it must be exclusive in the other. Therefore, one of them is a Halacha L'Moshe MiSinai, and that's why the verses appear contradictory. Meaning, it's not that the verses themselves are contradictory. One of them is a Halacha L'Moshe MiSinai that exempts, so we connect that to one of the verses, and the other verse is genuinely inclusive. For Yom Kippur, "Ha-Ezrach" genuinely includes women. But for Sukkah, it's a Halacha L'Moshe MiSinai that exempts women, and the verse "Ha-Ezrach" is merely a mnemonic. What, then, does "Ha-Ezrach" truly teach us regarding Sukkah? It's just a hint (remez). So, to reiterate Rashi: Abaye said, "Regarding Sukkah, the Halacha L'Moshe MiSinai is to exempt women. If we were only relying on the verse, it would obligate them, because 'Ezrach' means men and women, and the 'Ha' would include them." So, we have two reasons to say women would be obligated: "Ezrach" and "Ha-Ezrach" (if interpreted inclusively), and the fact that it's a positive commandment not bound by time (which is incorrect, it is time-bound). But we also have the Halacha L'Moshe MiSinai against it, and the general rule that women are exempt from time-bound positive commandments (Mitzvat Aseh SheHazman Gerama). Rashi clarifies that Abaye's point is that if we were only relying on the verse, women would be obligated. But the Halacha L'Moshe MiSinai permits us to interpret "Ha-Ezrach" differently here to exclude them. The Gemara then asks, "Why do I need a verse or a Halacha L'Moshe MiSinai at all for these laws?" For Sukkah, it's a time-bound positive commandment, and we have a rule in Tractate Kiddushin that women are exempt from all such commandments. So, it's over. For Yom Kippur, it's a negative commandment. Rabbi Yehuda taught in the name of Rav that a verse states, "A man or a woman who transgresses..." This verse teaches that for negative commandments, men and women are equal. Since Yom Kippur involves a negative commandment ("you shall not eat"), women are obligated. So why do we need any sources? These items should be known on their own. The Gemara responds: For Sukkah, I would have thought that because the Torah says, "You shall sit in sukkot as you sit in your houses," meaning, just as a man lives with his wife in his house, so too he should live with his wife in the sukkah. Therefore, I would have said women are obligated. That's why I need a Halacha L'Moshe MiSinai to tell me no, women are still exempt. Rashi explains that Abaye says, "I would have thought that even though it's a time-bound positive commandment, the unique nature of 'dwelling like in your house' would obligate women. Therefore, I need the Halacha L'Moshe MiSinai to exempt them." So, the verse "Ha-Ezrach" is merely a mnemonic for this Halacha L'Moshe MiSinai.
Rava offers a different perspective: "No, I need the Halacha L'Moshe MiSinai to exempt them." He argues that one might have derived an obligation for women in Sukkah through a verbal analogy (Gezerah Shavah). The term "fifteenth" (Chamisha Asar) is used for Sukkot, and "fifteenth" is also used for Passover. Since women are obligated to eat matzah on the first night of Passover (even though it's a time-bound positive commandment), one might conclude that just as they are obligated in matzah, they are obligated in sukkah. That's why the Halacha L'Moshe MiSinai comes to exempt them. Rava also agrees that "Kol Ha-Ezrach" is only a mnemonic. Why are women obligated in matzah? The verse states, "Seven days you shall eat matzah," and "You shall not eat leavened bread (chametz)." The Gemara derives that whoever is obligated not to eat chametz is obligated to eat matzah. Since women are obligated not to eat chametz, they are obligated to eat matzah. So, Rava's point is that without the Halacha L'Moshe MiSinai, he would have thought women are obligated in sukkah due to the verbal analogy.
The Gemara then asks, "Now that we say Sukkah is a Halacha L'Moshe MiSinai, what does the verse 'Ha-Ezrach' come to include?" It's not coming to include women, as they are exempt. So what does "Ha-Ezrach" come to include? It comes to include converts (Gerim). Why would I think converts are not obligated? Because "Ha-Ezrach" implies "the native-born of Israel," suggesting only those born Jewish. The Torah says "Ha-Ezrach," and one might think it excludes converts, who are not "pure-bred." So, the verse comes to teach that even a convert must sit in the sukkah.
Now, regarding Yom Kippur: "Women are obligated in Yom Kippur." How do we know this? From the statement of Rabbi Yehuda in the name of Rav, which teaches that women are obligated in all negative commandments. So, "no negative commandment" covers it. What then does the verse "Ha-Ezrach" by Yom Kippur teach us? It teaches the law of "adding to the affliction" (Tosefet Inuy). Not only can you not start the fast exactly at sunset, but there is a commandment to add to the fast, starting a little before and ending a little later. This verse teaches that women are obligated in this "addition" as well. You might have thought women are only obligated in the main fast of Yom Kippur, not in the "addition." Why? Because the Torah does not explicitly state a punishment for "addition," nor is it explicitly written as a negative commandment. So, one might have thought women are exempt from this "addition." That's why "Ha-Ezrach" comes to include women, teaching that they are obligated in the "addition" to the fast. There is no negative commandment or punishment of excision (karet) for the "addition" to Yom Kippur, only for eating on the day itself. The Gemara in Tractate Yoma also discusses this, suggesting women might be completely exempt from "addition." That's why "Ha-Ezrach" comes to teach that women are obligated even in the "addition."
Let's review the interpretations of "Ezrach" and "Ha-Ezrach": For Sukkah: How do we know women are exempt? Bottom line: Halacha L'Moshe MiSinai. Why do we need this Halacha L'Moshe MiSinai? Because one might have thought that due to the "dwelling like in your house" aspect, women are obligated. The Halacha L'Moshe MiSinai comes to exempt them. So, what does "Ha-Ezrach" come to include? It's not including women, as they are exempt. It comes to include converts, as one might think converts are exempt because the verse says "Israel." The verse teaches that even converts are obligated. For Yom Kippur: Women are obligated. How do we know this? From Rabbi Yehuda's statement that women are obligated in all negative commandments. This covers the main fast. What does the extra "Ha-Ezrach" verse teach us? It includes women in the "addition" to Yom Kippur. You might have thought women are only obligated in the main part of Yom Kippur, where the punishment and negative commandment are written. But "Ha-Ezrach" comes to include women even in the "addition."
The Gemara then addresses the word "Kol" (all) in the verse "Kol Ha-Ezrach in Israel." The Mishnah stated that minors are exempt. The Gemara explains that the Mishnah refers to very young children. The verse "Kol" comes to include children who have reached the age of training (Chinuch), meaning they have an obligation to sit in the sukkah. The Gemara asks, "A child who has reached the age of training—is he obligated from the Torah?" No, children are not obligated from the Torah until they reach maturity (thirteen for a boy, twelve for a girl). So how can the Torah include a seven-year-old? The Gemara says, "You are right; they are only obligated by rabbinic decree (DeRabbanan)." And the word "Kol" is only a mnemonic device. The Rabbis mandated it, and the word "Kol" serves as a hint that they must sit in the sukkah, but it is only a rabbinic obligation.
Finally, the Mishnah states, "When is a minor obligated to sit in the sukkah? As long as he doesn't need his mother anymore." What does this mean? How old is a child who doesn't need his mother? It means he can go to the bathroom and clean himself without his mother's help. That is considered old enough to sit in a sukkah. Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says, "He wakes up in the middle of the night and doesn't call 'Mommy.'" That's when he's old enough to go into the sukkah. Even older children might call "Mommy" when they're scared, but then fall back asleep. A younger child calls "Mommy, Mommy" repeatedly until the mother comes and calms them down. If a child only calls "Mommy" once, it's already enough to go sit in the sukkah. The Mishnah concluded with the story of Shammai. His daughter-in-law gave birth, and he built a sukkah for the infant in the house by chiseling out the roof and placing schach. The Gemara asks, "Is this story meant to contradict? You just told me little children are exempt. Then you tell me Shammai built a sukkah for an infant. Make up your mind: are they exempt or not?" The Gemara answers, "The Mishnah is missing words." It should read, "And Shammai is stringent (machmir) even on an infant." The story is brought to explain Shammai's stringency. Rashi explains that the elders' statement, "If he doesn't call his mother," implies that as long as a child calls "Mommy," he needs his mother. But this cannot be the criterion, because even an older child who doesn't need his mother still calls "Mommy." Therefore, the criterion must be the repeated calling, as explained above.