The Eri B. Sitt Edition and Audio Series of the Talmud Bavli, Tractate Sukkah, has been dedicated by Celia and Isaac Jamal, may they live, for the success of their dear children. May they derive much satisfaction from all of them; may they all grow up, marry at the proper time, and have healthy, happy children with blessing and success. May Celia and Isaac see descendants and the descendants of their descendants, until the coming of the righteous redeemer. Amen.
The tractate has also been dedicated for the elevation of the soul of Sarah, daughter of Adel, may her soul be bound in the bond of life, and may she rest in the Garden of Eden. Amen. This dedication was also made by Celia and Isaac Jamal. May they merit to do many good deeds.
Today’s page has been dedicated by Mr. Isaac Shehabat in honor of his parents, Jack and Marilyn. May they live. Today’s page is being studied for the elevation of the soul of Avraham ben Esther. May his soul rest in the Garden of Eden. Amen.
Today’s page is also being studied for the elevation of the soul of the righteous woman who passed away at a young age, Mazal bat Frida. May her soul rest in the Garden of Eden. Amen. It is also being studied for the elevation of the soul of the righteous man, Yosef ben Gurjiya. Amen.
We begin today’s page on 41b, at the bottom line: “Rabbi Yosef says: Yom Tov.” This is actually a quotation from our Mishnah. We learned that if the first day of the festival falls on Shabbat, and someone mistakenly carries his lulav into the public domain, Rabbi Yosef says that he is exempt from bringing a sin-offering.
Since the person was occupied with a mitzvah, Rabbi Yosef considers him to have been engaged in a mitzvah. Because of that involvement, he made a mistake and performed an act that would ordinarily make him liable for a sin-offering. Rabbi Yosef’s opinion is that he is nevertheless exempt.
The Gemara asks: When do we consider a person to be mistaken while engaged in a mitzvah and therefore exempt? It would seem to be before he has fulfilled the mitzvah. Once he has fulfilled the mitzvah, he is no longer occupied with the mitzvah. In this case, however, the person fulfilled the mitzvah before he carried the lulav out. As soon as he picked up the lulav, he fulfilled the mitzvah. Therefore, the moment he picked it up in order to take it outside into the public domain, he had already fulfilled the mitzvah. Why, then, is he exempt?
The Gemara answers that we are dealing with a case in which he picked up the lulav upside down. We learned that one fulfills the mitzvah of the four species only when holding them in the manner in which they grow. Since he was holding them upside down, he had not yet fulfilled the mitzvah. He was therefore still occupied with a mitzvah when he carried them out.
The Gemara challenges this answer: Give us a case in which he had not fulfilled the mitzvah. The lulav can be taken outside only by carrying it, and as soon as he carried or lifted it, he should have fulfilled the obligation. The Gemara therefore offers another possibility: He held the lulav with the upper part of the bundle below and the lower part above. In other words, he tied the bundle upside down and carried it in that manner. Since the species were not being held in the way they grow, he had not fulfilled the mitzvah.
The Gemara offers another answer: Perhaps he took the lulav out in a vessel. He did not carry the lulav directly in his hand; rather, he carried it through another object. Since he was not holding it directly, he had not fulfilled the mitzvah.
The Gemara asks: We learned previously from Rava that there is no interposition with regard to a lulav. For example, Rava said that if a person wraps his hand in a cloth and holds the lulav with the cloth, he nevertheless fulfills the mitzvah. If so, what difference is there between holding the lulav with a cloth and carrying it in a vessel? He should still fulfill the mitzvah.
The Gemara answers that there is a distinction. When we say that an object does not constitute an interposition, we are referring to something that is used out of respect for the lulav, such as a cloth. If, however, a person carries the lulav in a vessel, such as a plate or another type of utensil, the vessel is not being used as an expression of respect for the lulav. It may therefore constitute an interposition, and he does not fulfill the mitzvah.
Rashi gives the example of carrying the lulav in a plate or bowl. The Gemara then gives another example of a person who is mistaken while engaged in a mitzvah and is therefore exempt: a bird-offering.
Suppose a person has a bird burnt-offering among a group of birds, and he mistakenly thinks that it is a bird sin-offering. A burnt-offering is not eaten; the entire offering is placed on the altar. A bird sin-offering, by contrast, is eaten by the priests. The person thought that the bird was a sin-offering, and he ate it, believing that he was fulfilling the mitzvah of eating a sin-offering. In reality, it turned out to have been a burnt-offering.
Nevertheless, he is exempt from bringing a guilt-offering for misusing consecrated property. Normally, if someone intentionally benefited from consecrated property, he would have to bring such an offering. Here, however, he was mistaken while engaged in a mitzvah, and the ruling teaches us that he is exempt.
What is the novelty of this statement? If the principle is that a person who is mistaken while engaged in a mitzvah is exempt, why do we need this additional case? We already know it from the case in the Mishnah, in which a person carried a lulav out on Shabbat.
The Gemara explains that the case of the lulav might have been understood differently. There, the person ultimately performed a mitzvah: He took the lulav. It is a mitzvah to take and shake the lulav on the first day of the festival, even when the first day falls on Shabbat, at least in the Temple. One might therefore say that a person who is mistaken while engaged in a mitzvah and ultimately performs the mitzvah is exempt.
The case of the bird-offering teaches something additional. Here, the person was mistaken while engaged in a mitzvah, but he did not perform the mitzvah. There is no mitzvah to eat a burnt-offering. One might therefore have thought that, in such a case, he should not be exempt. The statement teaches us that even when a person is mistaken while engaged in a mitzvah and does not ultimately perform the mitzvah, he is still exempt.
Let us read Rashi. Rabbi Yosef is referring to a bird burnt-offering found among birds designated for sin-offerings. The expression “among the wings” means among other birds. The question is how it was possible to confuse the two offerings. A bird sin-offering is performed through pinching, in which the priest cuts through the bird’s neck with his thumbnail, and the head falls off. A bird burnt-offering, however, is slaughtered in the regular manner, so its head remains attached.
The Gemara must therefore explain how someone could confuse a bird burnt-offering with a bird sin-offering. The answer is that the birds had just been slaughtered and were still moving around on the altar. Sometimes both types of birds were slaughtered in the same corner of the altar, even though normally they were not. As a result, they could become mixed together.
There were several different procedures performed on the southwestern corner of the altar. Three things were done on the lower part of that corner, and three were done on the upper part. On the lower portion, they performed the offerings and dealt with the remaining blood. On the upper portion of the southwestern corner, the water libation was performed.
When there was too much traffic on the eastern side, the bird offerings were brought to the southeastern corner. The blood of one offering was sprinkled below the line on the altar, while the blood of another was sprinkled above the line. In any event, the birds could become mixed together, and the person mistakenly ate a burnt-offering.
Although he benefited from consecrated property, he is exempt because he found the bird among the birds designated for sin-offerings. There is a mitzvah to eat a sin-offering, and he was therefore occupied with a mitzvah when he made his mistake.
Again, the Gemara asks why this case is necessary. We already learned from the case of the lulav that a person who is mistaken while engaged in a mitzvah is exempt. The Gemara explains that the case of the lulav involves someone who ultimately performed the mitzvah, whereas the case of the bird involves someone who did not.
The Gemara then asks about another statement of Rabbi Yosef. Normally, a sacrificial animal must undergo a process of examination for four days to ensure that it has no blemish. Suppose that on Shabbat, people saw a regular communal offering that had not undergone the required examination. Someone mistakenly slaughtered it, thinking that it was a valid offering, and another animal had to be brought in its place. Rabbi Yosef says that he is liable to bring a sin-offering.
Why is he liable? He was mistaken while engaged in a mitzvah. He did not slaughter the animal intentionally on Shabbat; he thought he was slaughtering a valid offering and made a mistake. Why, then, does Rabbi Yosef say that he is liable? According to the principle we have just learned, even if he did not ultimately perform the mitzvah, he should be exempt.
The Gemara answers that this case is different. A statement was transmitted in the name of Rabbi Shmuel bar Hita, in the name of Rav Minona the Elder, in the name of Rabbi Yitzhak bar Ashian, in the name of Rav Huna, in the name of Rav, that we are dealing with a case in which the person intentionally took the animal from a chamber containing animals that had not been examined.
He therefore cannot be described as someone who was mistaken while engaged in a mitzvah. He should have known that the animals in that chamber had not been examined. Although he did not act intentionally with regard to the desecration of Shabbat, the case falls outside the category of a person who is mistakenly preoccupied with a mitzvah. He took the animal from a place where the animals were known not to have been examined.
Let us read Rashi. The person took an animal from the chamber containing animals that had not been examined and slaughtered it on Shabbat. There is no claim here that he was occupied with a mitzvah, and there is no mitzvah that overrides the prohibition of Shabbat in this case.
What does this imply? If a person was mistaken while engaged in a mitzvah but did not ultimately perform the mitzvah, he should be exempt. Here, however, the person was not truly mistaken while engaged in a mitzvah. He took the animal from a chamber in which the animals had not been examined, and such an act is not considered an error arising from preoccupation with a mitzvah.
In the case of the birds, the birds could become mixed together in the area of the altar. There was traffic in that area, and the offerings were sometimes placed on the southwestern corner. The person was therefore occupied with taking the correct bird, but he took the wrong one. We can understand why that is considered a mistake while engaged in a mitzvah.
In the case of the unexamined animal, however, there was no such confusion. The person was in the wrong chamber. There was no reason for him to become flustered or preoccupied with a mitzvah. Nor can we say that he was rushed because there was a particular time by which the offering had to be brought. He simply took an animal from the chamber of animals that had not been examined. If anything, his action is closer to intentional negligence than to a mistake while engaged in a mitzvah.
We now come to the next Mishnah: A woman may receive the lulav from her son or from her husband and return it to the water.
The case is that a man comes home with his lulav on the festival. His wife is permitted to receive the lulav from him or from their son and return it to the water on Shabbat. One might have thought that because a woman is not obligated in the mitzvah of lulav, she is not permitted to carry it. The Mishnah teaches that she may receive it and return it to the water so that it does not wilt.
The Gemara will discuss the details of returning the lulav to water. On Shabbat, one may return it to water that is already in the vase. One may not add water, and certainly may not replace the water, because doing so would involve unnecessary effort. On the festival, one may add water to the vase, but one may not replace the water, because replacing it is considered an excessive exertion on the festival. On the intermediate days of the festival, one may even replace the water.
The Mishnah then teaches that a minor who knows how to shake the lulav must be trained by his father in the mitzvah. Rashi explains that if the lulav was removed from a vase of water on Shabbat, it may be returned to the water, but the water may not be changed. Changing the water would be considered an act of repairing or improving the vessel, because the person is attempting to preserve the lulav and prevent it from wilting. This is the purpose of the Mishnah’s discussion of returning the lulav to water.
The Gemara asks: Is it not obvious that a woman may receive the lulav from her husband or her son? What is the novelty of the Mishnah?
The Gemara answers that one might have thought that she should not receive it because the lulav is considered an object set aside for a mitzvah, and she is not obligated in that mitzvah. The Gemara teaches that since the husband is obligated in the mitzvah of lulav, the lulav is not considered set aside for him. It is therefore not set aside for her either, and she may receive it and return it to the water.
Another possibility is that because men are associated with the mitzvah of lulav, it is considered an object that may be carried by everyone. The lulav is therefore not treated as something prohibited for a woman to handle.
The Gemara continues: A minor who has reached the age of education and knows how to perform the shaking of the lulav must be trained by his father in the mitzvah.
The point is not merely that the child knows how to pick up the lulav. Anyone can take a lulav and lift it. The mitzvah includes the movements in the various directions—backward and forward, upward and downward—and the child must know how to perform those movements. Once he understands how to perform them, his father is obligated to train him in the mitzvah.
Furthermore, if a child knows how to wrap himself in a garment, his father must provide him with ritual fringes. This refers to wrapping the garment over the head and around the body, in the manner described as the wrapping of the Ishmaelites.
If the child knows how to safeguard the phylacteries, his father must provide him with phylacteries. Rashi explains that this means the child knows how to bring them into the bathroom when necessary. In this case, the language indicates that the father must purchase phylacteries for him. In the other cases, the Mishnah does not use the language of purchasing, apparently because phylacteries are more expensive. Ritual fringes, by contrast, are less expensive.
When the child knows how to speak, his father teaches him Torah and the recitation of the Shema. What part of Torah does he teach him? Rabbi Menuna says that he teaches him the verse, “The Torah that Moses commanded us is an inheritance for the congregation of Jacob.” That is the first verse the father teaches his son.
What part of the recitation of the Shema does he teach him? He teaches him the first verse, “Hear, Israel.”
The Gemara continues with another stage. If a child knows how to safeguard his body from ritual impurity—if he understands that he must avoid coming into contact with impurity, coming under the same roof as it, or carrying it—then certain foods that he touches may still be considered pure.
For example, if a person is eating ordinary food in a state of ritual purity and the child touches the food, one may rely on the child’s known care with regard to his body, assuming that he is careful not to come into contact with impurity. The food remains permitted for the person to eat.
Rashi explains that this applies when the child’s body comes into contact with objects of uncertain purity, but not necessarily when his hands touch them. There are children who know how to protect their bodies from impurity, but it is more difficult for them to protect their hands. Their hands are constantly moving, and it is therefore more difficult for a child to be careful with them.
If, however, the child knows how to safeguard his hands from impurity, then one may eat food that he touched, because it can be assumed to remain pure. The discussion here concerns the child’s body and hands separately: One may rely on the child with regard to his body before one relies on him with regard to his hands.
If the child knows that he must wash his hands when there is a doubt as to whether they came into contact with impurity, one may also rely on him. The child understands that when he may have touched something questionable, he must wash his hands again.
The next case is a child who knows how to answer questions. If he is asked whether he came into contact with impurity, he knows how to answer yes, no, or “I do not know.” In that respect, he is treated like an adult.
The general rule is that when there is uncertainty about ritual impurity, the ruling depends on the domain in which the uncertainty arose. If it arose in a private domain, the uncertainty is treated as impure. If it arose in a public domain, the uncertainty is treated as pure.
The source of this rule is the case of a woman suspected of adultery. A woman becomes a suspected adulteress when she was secluded in a private place with a man other than her husband. We do not know what occurred between them, but she becomes prohibited to her husband because of the uncertainty. Since the seclusion occurred in a private domain, the uncertainty is treated stringently.
If, however, they were in a public domain, she does not become prohibited to her husband on that basis. This is the basis for applying the rules of uncertainty in a private or public domain to the child. If the child is intelligent enough to answer properly, we follow the regular rules. If he was in a private domain and says, “I do not know whether I came into contact with impurity,” the uncertainty is treated as impure. If he was in a public domain, the uncertainty is treated as pure.
Rashi explains that in a public domain, an uncertainty regarding impurity is treated as pure. If the child says, “I do not know,” then in a private domain the uncertainty is treated as impure. This is the rule that was derived from the case of the suspected adulteress.
The next case is a child who knows how to raise his hands for the priestly blessing. If he is a priest, he may receive a portion of the priestly gifts in the granary.
Rashi gives a novel interpretation. If the child knows how to raise his hands for the priestly blessing, he may receive the priestly portion in the granary, where all the other priests are standing. Before he knows how to raise his hands, however, he may not receive it publicly in the granary. Instead, it may be sent to his home, provided that he is known to be trustworthy and careful with the priestly portion.
There are ten categories of people to whom the priestly portion is not distributed publicly in the granary. In all those cases, it is sent to their homes. The reason is that distributing it to them publicly would be degrading to the priestly portion. Everyone is standing there and sees that the recipient is a minor or otherwise unsuitable to receive it publicly. Not everyone knows that the person is worthy of receiving it, even if those who know him understand that he is trustworthy.
Once the child is old enough to perform the priestly blessing publicly, however, everyone knows that he is mature. The fact that he performs the priestly blessing serves as an indication that he is no longer a minor. People see him standing publicly and raising his hands for the blessing, and word spreads that he is an adult. He may then receive the priestly portion in the granary, because no one will say, “Why are they giving the priestly portion to a minor?” Everyone knows that he is the person who performs the priestly blessing.
If he does not yet perform the priestly blessing, the priestly portion should not be distributed to him publicly in the granary. People will not know whether he has reached maturity or whether he has developed the physical signs of adulthood, and they may think that the priestly portion is being given to a minor. Those who know that he is mature may send it to him privately.
This is why this case differs from the other cases. In the other cases, the child remains a minor: He knows how to shake the lulav, wear ritual fringes, begin learning the Shema, or observe the laws of ritual purity. Here, however, the fact that he performs the priestly blessing indicates that he is an adult. According to Rashi, he must be an adult, not merely a minor who has reached the age of education.
Tosafot disagrees with Rashi’s interpretation. Tosafot says that the Gemara’s statement that a minor does not perform the priestly blessing refers only to a case in which he is the only priest present. If there are other priests present, even a minor may raise his hands and participate in the blessing. Tosafot is therefore compelled to explain that a minor may receive a portion of the priestly gifts in the granary. The case does not necessarily require him to be an adult, as Rashi understands it.
The Gemara then discusses a child who knows how to perform ritual slaughter. One may eat from an animal slaughtered by the child, provided that an adult is supervising him.
Rashi explains that the child does not necessarily have to be an expert in all the laws of ritual slaughter. His hands must be practiced and capable, and he must know how to perform the slaughter properly. The adult must supervise to ensure that the child does not pause during the slaughter or press the knife into the animal’s neck in a manner that invalidates the slaughter.
The adult’s supervision helps only when the child himself is known to be practiced. The child must be familiar with the physical procedure and know how to perform it. If he is not adept with his hands, the fact that an adult watches him does not by itself make the slaughter valid. The adult can supervise only when the child already knows how to perform the slaughter, even if he is not yet fully expert in all its laws.
We now come to the next case. Once a child is old enough to eat an olive-sized amount of grain, his excrement is considered excrement that has a significant odor. One must therefore distance oneself from it by four cubits when reciting the Shema or praying, and the same applies to his urine.
Rashi explains that the reference is to any of the five species of grain: wheat, barley, spelt, oats, or rye. Once the child has eaten an olive-sized amount of one of these grains, his excrement has the odor of excrement for the purposes of the laws of the Shema and prayer.
It should be emphasized that according to this explanation, the child must actually have eaten one of these foods. If he has not eaten them, one does not need to be concerned about his excrement in the same way.
Tosafot understands the matter differently. According to Tosafot, once the child reaches the age at which he is capable of eating these foods, one does not necessarily need to know that he actually ate them. His excrement is already considered sufficiently odorous for the laws of the Shema and prayer. This differs from an infant, whose excrement is not considered sufficiently odorous for those purposes.
There is also an additional qualification. It is not enough that the child be able to eat the grain; he must be able to eat the required amount within a particular period of time.
The term “the time required to eat a portion” literally refers to half. The loaf discussed by the Gemara is a loaf containing eight eggs’ volume, which is the amount corresponding to two meals for purposes of an eruv. Half of that amount is four eggs’ volume. The period required to eat four eggs’ volume is described as ranging from approximately two minutes to perhaps as long as nine minutes, depending on the calculation.
Therefore, if the child can eat that amount within the relevant period, his excrement is considered sufficiently odorous to require distancing for the recitation of the Shema and for prayer. In the case of an adult, however, the matter is different. Even if an adult is unable to eat grain, his excrement still presents the relevant problem. The greater a person’s intellect, the greater his troubles; as a person matures, his excrement becomes more odorous. The child’s level of intellectual development is therefore also relevant to this subject.
Rashi explains that once the child can eat an olive-sized amount of roasted meat, he may be included in the group for the Passover offering. The verse states that the offering is to be eaten according to one’s ability to eat. The child must therefore be able to eat the required amount of roasted meat.
Tosafot discusses a child who can eat an olive-sized amount of cooked meat but cannot eat an olive-sized amount of roasted meat. Since the Passover offering is roasted, the relevant measure is whether the child can eat roasted meat, not merely whether he can eat cooked meat.
The child must also be old enough to distinguish between food and something that is not food. If one gives him a stone, he understands that it is a stone and throws it away. If one gives him a nut, he recognizes it as food and eats it. This ability to distinguish and select between food and non-food is another indication of maturity for purposes of including him in the group for the Passover offering. Thus, the measure involves not only whether he can eat the roasted meat, but also whether he can recognize and select food as food.