The Eddie B Sit edition of the audio series on Talmud Bavli, specifically focusing on Masechet Zvachim, has been dedicated by our esteemed friend and student of the Shiur Daf Yomi, Binyamin HaKohen, affectionately known as Benny C. We express our gratitude and wish him success, with the hope that, as a kohen, he will serve in the Beit HaMikdash alongside other kohanim when Moshiach arrives. This Masechet particularly discusses the avodah of the kohanim in the Beit HaMikdash concerning the korbanot. Today, we study Daf Mem-Vav, dedicating our learning to the elevation of the soul of Avraham ben Ester, may his soul be at rest in the Garden of Eden, and for the complete recovery of Binyamin Mordechai ben Ester. We begin on Mem-Vav Amud Rishon, focusing on the second line, Chutz min HaDam.
In the Mishnah, we learn that if a person consumes blood, he is not liable for notar if there is an expiration date on the korban, nor is he liable for tumah. This means that if he ate it while in a state of tumah, he does not incur the usual punishment associated with consuming korbanot, such as kareth. The Gemara inquires, “What is the source for this?” Ula responds with a verse: “And I have given it to you.” The Torah refers to the blood, stating that it is designated for you for the mizbeach, indicating that it is yours and akin to chullin, meaning there is no me'ilah involved. Since it belongs to you, it is not subject to the laws of notar or tumah.
Rashi explains that the verse indicates that one is not liable for blood concerning notar. If one mistakenly consumed blood and it became notar, he is not liable for two transgressions but only one. Similarly, if he ate it in a state of tumah, he is not liable for two transgressions. Ula clarifies that this verse pertains specifically to me'ilah, as we learn in Masechet Me'ilah, where it states that there is no me'ilah for blood. The implication is clear: blood used for personal consumption does not incur me'ilah. We also see that Rabbi Yishmael offers a similar interpretation, emphasizing that blood is given for atonement but not for me'ilah.
Rabbi Yochanan further elucidates that the blood retains its status before and after atonement. After atonement, it has no further purpose, and thus, it is clear that there is no me'ilah associated with the blood before atonement either. This establishes that blood is not subject to tumah, notar, or me'ilah, categorizing it as chullin. The Gemara then poses a question regarding the necessity of three verses concerning blood. Each verse serves to exclude it from me'ilah, notar, and tumah, confirming that blood is treated as chullin.
However, the Gemara raises a concern: could there be me'ilah after atonement? The innovation here is that before atonement, me'ilah is not applicable. The Gemara considers an alternative perspective, suggesting that just as there is me'ilah before atonement, perhaps there is also me'ilah afterward. Rabbi Yochanan counters this, stating that once the commandment is fulfilled, there is no me'ilah. The Gemara then highlights two exceptions: the trumat ha-deshen and the garments of the kohen gadol, both of which retain their prohibitive status even after their respective services are complete.
The Gemara explains that these exceptions do not set a precedent for other cases, as they are unique. The discussion leads to an exploration of the implications of trumat ha-deshen and the garments of the kohen gadol, establishing that while these items cannot be used after their designated service, they do not apply universally to all korbanot.
Next, the Gemara introduces a new topic concerning the intentions required during the slaughter of korbanot. The six intentions include: for the sake of the korban, for the owner, for the sake of Hashem, to produce a pleasing aroma, and to fulfill the wishes of Hashem. Rabbi Yosi adds that even if one lacks any specific intention, the korban is still valid because the Beit Din ensures that the kavanah is correct.
This principle emphasizes that the intentions of the person performing the service are what truly matter, and external thoughts do not affect the validity of the korban. The Gemara further clarifies that the slaughtering of a chatas or pesach must be done with the proper intention, and any deviation from that intention renders the korban invalid. The Gemara concludes by reiterating the importance of intention in the performance of mitzvot and the implications of kavanah in the context of korbanot.