The discussion begins by examining the validity of a meal offering if certain preliminary stages are performed by a non-Kohen. The verses state, "And he shall pour oil upon it, and place frankincense upon it, and bring it to the sons of Aaron the Kohen, and he shall take a fistful." The initial understanding is that the phrase "Aharon the Kohen" applies specifically to the act of taking a fistful, and subsequent actions like receiving and placing. This would imply that earlier stages, such as pouring oil and mixing, are valid even if performed by a non-Kohen.
Rabbi Shimon, however, presents a different interpretation. He argues that the phrase "sons of Aaron" is positioned in the middle of the verse. He derives from this placement that the requirement for a Kohen applies not only to the actions mentioned *after* it, like taking a fistful, but also to those mentioned *before* it, such as pouring oil. Therefore, according to Rabbi Shimon, pouring oil by a non-Kohen invalidates the offering. This exegetical teaching, however, prompts a question: Rabbi Shimon does not consistently apply this "backwards and forwards" derivation in other contexts.
The lecture then shifts to the handling of sacrificial blood. The Torah describes the Kohen taking and placing the blood, stating "with his finger." This juxtaposition teaches that both the receiving of the blood and its subsequent placing on the altar must be performed with the right hand. Nebuchadnezzar, in a contrasting view, interprets "with his finger" as applying only to the subsequent action of placing the blood, not the preceding act of receiving it. Thus, for Nebuchadnezzar, receiving blood could be done with the left hand, but placing it on the altar must be with the right. The speaker clarifies that Rabbi Shimon, whose initial ruling on pouring oil was discussed, does not employ his "backwards and forwards" derivation in this context of blood handling, which explains the distinction in his approach.
Returning to Rabbi Shimon's ruling regarding pouring oil, an alternative derivation is presented. Rabbi Shimon learns that pouring oil by a non-Kohen invalidates the offering from the letter *Vav* in the phrase "And he shall bring it." This *Vav* connects the bringing of the offering to the Kohen's actions, implying that just as the taking of a fistful must be performed by a Kohen, so too must the pouring of oil.
Next, the discussion addresses the validity of slaughtering an offering by a non-Kohen. Generally, the involvement of the sons of Aaron begins from the receiving of the blood onwards, implying that the slaughtering itself, if performed by a non-Kohen, is valid. A counter-argument is raised from the juxtaposition of the verses "And he shall lay his hand" and "and he shall slaughter." Since laying of hands by a non-Kohen is invalid, one might infer that slaughtering by a non-Kohen is also invalid. However, this inference is rebutted. The laying of hands must be performed by the owners of the offering, not necessarily a Kohen. An a fortiori argument is then considered: if a *Zelika* (a specific offering that is not integral to the offering itself, like the Red Heifer's ashes) does not require the owners, then slaughtering, which is also not integral, certainly would not. This a fortiori argument is ultimately rejected as flawed, because the reason *Zelika* does not require owners is that it specifically requires a Kohen, making it an inapt comparison.
The definitive proof that slaughtering by a non-Kohen is valid comes from the laws of **Yom Kippur**. The Torah states that on **Yom Kippur**, the Kohen slaughters *his* bull. This implies that only on **Yom Kippur** is the owner required for the slaughter; in general, slaughtering does not require the owner. Therefore, the conclusion is that while pouring oil must be performed by a Kohen (derived from the *Vav* in "And he shall bring it"), slaughtering by a non-Kohen is valid, as taught by the special exegetical teaching of "And he shall lay his hand and he shall slaughter."
A new halachic principle is introduced concerning the significance of the words "Torah" and "Chukah" (statute) in a biblical verse. The general rule is that if a verse uses both "Torah" and "Chukah," it signifies that all services mentioned in that section are indispensable, meaning their omission invalidates the offering. An example of this is the **Parah Adumah** (Red Heifer) procedure, where the repetition of these terms teaches that every step is indispensable.
This principle is then challenged with several questions. First, regarding the **Nazir** (Nazarite) offering, only "Torah" is mentioned, yet the waving of the offering is indispensable. Furthermore, by the **Nazir**, the phrase "so shall he do" implies indispensability for the four types of bread, even though only "Torah" is written. Similarly, by the Thanksgiving Offering (**Todah**), only "Torah" is written, yet it is indispensable, a connection made to the **Nazir** through the word "peace offerings." The same applies to the **Mitzorah** (leper), where only "Torah" is written, but the four items required for purification are indispensable.
Conversely, cases where only "Chukah" is mentioned are considered. For example, regarding **Yom Kippur**, it states "it is a statute," and indeed, the two goats of **Yom Kippur** are indispensable to each other. This leads to a revised principle: it is sufficient for *either* "Torah" *or* "Chukah" to be present for the services in that section to be indispensable. However, this revised principle faces further difficulties, as many other offerings have "Torah" or "Chukah" mentioned, yet some of their services are *not* indispensable. For instance, in an **Asham** (guilt offering), if the sacrificial parts were not brought to the altar, the offering is still valid. Similarly, if the bringing of the meal offering to the altar was omitted, the offering remains valid.
This leads to a further refinement of the rule: for "Torah" to imply indispensability, it must be accompanied by "Chukah." However, "Chukah" alone is sufficient to imply indispensability. The question then arises concerning the meal offering, where "Chukah" is mentioned, suggesting indispensability, yet the rule for meal offerings is that only repeated services are indispensable. The answer is that the "Chukah" mentioned in the context of the meal offering refers to the *eating* of the offering, not its *service*. Therefore, the rule for the meal offering service remains that repetition implies indispensability.
A counter-question is posed: regarding **Lechem HaPanim** (showbread), "Chukah" is written in relation to its eating, yet it makes the entire service indispensable (e.g., the two rows of bread and two basins are indispensable). Why is the meal offering different? The explanation is that the meal offering is unique. Even though "Chukah" is written regarding the meal offering, it does not teach indispensability for its service. This is because there is a special exegetical teaching that specifically states that the flour and oil of the meal offering are indispensable. This implies that the general mention of "Chukah" for the meal offering is *not* intended to teach indispensability for its service. Instead, the Torah's repetition of the flour and oil teaches their indispensability.
This brings us to a dispute between Rav and Shmuel. Rav holds that anything repeated in the Torah is indispensable. Shmuel initially appears to disagree, stating that only the flour and oil of the meal offering are indispensable. However, it is clarified that both Rav and Shmuel agree that repetition generally implies indispensability. Their dispute centers on the "fistful" of the meal offering. Rav argues that the repetition of "his fistful" in the inaugural meal offering of Aaron and the regular meal offering for generations teaches that the Kohen's own hand is indispensable for taking the fistful, and a measuring utensil cannot be used. Shmuel, however, contends that the inaugural meal offering was a unique, one-time event, and one cannot derive laws for all generations from such an event. Therefore, according to Shmuel, a measuring utensil *can* be used for the fistful.
Shmuel's position is challenged by the example of the **Mizrak** (sprinkling basin). The Torah describes the offerings of the princes during the twelve days of the dedication of the **Mishkan**, stating that the **Mizrak** (a vessel typically for liquids) contained dry items and still sanctified them. This was also a unique, one-time event, yet Shmuel learns a law from it. Shmuel defends his position by explaining that the offerings of the princes were repeated twelve times, which constitutes sufficient repetition for him to derive a law for all generations.
Finally, a question is raised against Rav's principle that repetition implies indispensability. The bringing of the meal offering to the altar is written twice in the Torah, yet it is not an indispensable service. This appears to contradict Rav's rule. The resolution is that the second mention of bringing the offering is not a mere repetition; rather, it provides specific details about *where* the service must be performed: the southwestern corner of the altar. This location is derived from two seemingly contradictory verses: one stating "before Hashem" (implying the west side, facing the Holy of Holies in the **Beit HaMikdash**), and another stating "to the face of the altar" (implying the south side, where the ramp of the **Mizbe'ah HaGadol** was located). The southwestern corner of the **Mizbe'ah HaHitun** fulfills both requirements. Since the second verse adds new information by specifying the location, it is not considered a repetition for the purpose of teaching indispensability. Thus, the bringing of the offering to the altar is not indispensable, and Rav's rule remains consistent.