A Yissachar / Zebulun Partnership in Loving Memory of Yishak ben Simcha A"H & Felicia bat Miriam A"H
Rabbi Eli Mansour

Daf Yomi

Menachot 67A - 67B (12th Cycle Daf Yomi Shiur)

Lectured by Rabbi Eli Mansour

Published
November 27, 2007
Duration
73:59

This transcript was auto-generated and polished for readability. While we aim for accuracy, errors may occur. If you notice a mistake, please click to submit corrections.

We begin our study with the concept of dough that was consecrated as Hekdesh (sacred property) and subsequently redeemed. The Tashbetz addresses the obligation of separating challah from such dough. If Hekdesh prepared the dough, even if it was later redeemed, it is exempt from challah. This is because the dough was prepared while it was under the ownership of Hekdesh, and thus the obligation of challah does not apply. This principle is derived from the Gemara, which states that dough prepared by Hekdesh is exempt.

The Gemara brings a proof from a Mishnah, which presents several cases. In the first case, dough was consecrated as Hekdesh before it was kneaded (before the obligation of challah took effect), and then it was redeemed. In this scenario, the dough is obligated in challah because the kneading, which triggers the obligation, occurred after it was no longer Hekdesh. In the second case, the dough was kneaded first, then consecrated as Hekdesh, and subsequently redeemed. Here too, it is obligated in challah because the obligation arose before it became Hekdesh. Both these initial cases involve kneading that took place while the dough was in the possession of a common person (non-sacred ownership), either before it became Hekdesh or after it was redeemed from Hekdesh.

The third case in the Mishnah is crucial for our understanding: If the dough was consecrated as Hekdesh before kneading, and then the kneading was performed by Hekdesh or its administrator (a gizbar), and only afterward was it redeemed, the dough is exempt from challah. This is because at the time the obligation of challah would normally arise (during kneading), the dough was in the possession of Hekdesh. This case directly supports the principle that dough kneaded by Hekdesh is exempt from challah.

Rava then poses a question: What is the law regarding dough kneaded by a non-Jew? This question builds upon three previously learned rules. First, if Hekdesh smooths a pile of wheat (a process called miruah), it is exempt from tithes. Second, there is a Tannaitic dispute about whether a non-Jew who smooths a pile of produce grown on his property in Israel makes it obligated in tithes. Third, as we just learned, dough kneaded while in the possession of Hekdesh is exempt from challah.

Based on these, Rava asks: If a non-Jew kneaded dough, and then a Jew purchased it, is the Jew obligated to separate challah from it? The obligation of challah arises at the time of kneading. Since the kneading occurred while the dough was in the possession of the non-Jew, Rashi suggests it should be exempt. The Yom HaRash, however, cites a Mishnah that seems to offer an answer: If a convert had dough that was kneaded before his conversion, it is exempt from challah. If he kneaded it after his conversion, it is obligated. If there is a doubt about when it was kneaded, it is considered obligated due to the doubt. The Mishnah clearly states that dough kneaded by a non-Jew is exempt from challah.

The question then becomes, according to which opinion in the Mishnah is this exemption stated? Is it a universal opinion, meaning even Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda, who obligate non-Jewish produce in tithes, would agree that non-Jewish dough is exempt from challah? This distinction could be explained by the scriptural wording. Regarding tithes, the Torah uses the word "daganikha" (your grain) twice, which some interpret as a double exclusion, allowing for an inclusion of non-Jewish produce in certain cases. However, regarding challah, while the Torah says "arisotechem" (your dough), these words are already accounted for in establishing the minimum quantity for challah (the "shiur") – specifically, the amount of an Omer. The phrase "arisotechem" (your dough) is then contrasted with "arisot oved kochavim" (the dough of non-Jews) and "arisot hekdesh" (the dough of Hekdesh). Therefore, even the rabbis who obligate non-Jewish produce in tithes might exempt non-Jewish dough from challah.

Alternatively, perhaps the exemption for non-Jewish dough is only according to Rabbi Yose and Rabbi Shimon, who exempt non-Jewish produce from tithes. But Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda, who obligate non-Jewish produce in tithes, might also obligate non-Jewish dough in challah. This could be derived through a gezeira shava (a textual analogy) from the word "reishit" (first portion), which appears in both the context of tithes and challah. If non-Jewish produce is obligated in tithes, then by analogy, non-Jewish dough would also be obligated in challah. Rava, unsure of the answer, expressed a wish for a dream to reveal the solution.

Later, Rava declared that the two matters are intrinsically linked: "Whoever says that miruah by a non-Jew is exempt, will say that kneading by a non-Jew is exempt. Whoever says that miruah by a non-Jew is obligated, will say that kneading by a non-Jew is obligated." They work hand in hand. If one is exempt, the other is exempt; if one is obligated, the other is obligated.

The Gemara then challenges this assertion with a case involving the redemption of a firstborn donkey (Peter Chamor). If a non-Jew owned a donkey that gave birth to a Peter Chamor, and he separated a sheep to redeem it, and then converted, the sheep is not sacred and the Peter Chamor is not sacred. Similarly, if he kneaded dough as a non-Jew, it is not subject to challah, and can be eaten by non-Kohanim. This indicates that a non-Jew's Peter Chamor and challah are exempt.

However, the Gemara makes a deduction: "His tithes and terumah are forbidden." This implies that even though his challah and Peter Chamor are exempt, his tithes and terumah are obligated. This contradicts Rava's assertion that the laws work "hand in hand," because here we see an exemption for challah and Peter Chamor alongside an obligation for tithes and terumah. The Torah's use of "daganikha" (your grain) twice is understood to include non-Jewish produce for tithes and terumah, but not for challah or Peter Chamor.

A suggestion is then offered: Perhaps from a Torah perspective, both challah and tithes are exempt when performed by a non-Jew. Rava's statement that they work hand in hand would then be true on a Torah level. The obligation for tithes on non-Jewish produce, where it exists, might only be a rabbinic decree (gezeirat derabanan). This decree was instituted due to "ba'alei kisim" (wealthy individuals) who, to avoid giving tithes, would sell their produce to a non-Jew just before the miruah (smoothing) process. Since miruah by a non-Jew would exempt the produce, the rabbis decreed that even non-Jewish miruah would obligate the produce in tithes, to prevent this circumvention.

Rashi offers three interpretations for this rabbinic decree. One is that people might mistakenly buy produce from non-Jews thinking it's already tithed. Another is the concern about wealthy individuals selling their produce to non-Jews to avoid tithes, as mentioned. A third interpretation (not fully elaborated in the transcript) also relates to preventing circumvention. The Tosafot further debates whether this rabbinic decree applies only to produce grown on Jewish land or also to produce grown on non-Jewish land. The Beit Yosef opposed efforts to be stringent on this matter, arguing against imposing new stringencies that would imply previous generations of great rabbis were remiss in not requiring tithes from non-Jewish produce.

The Gemara then asks: Why didn't the rabbis make a similar decree for challah? Perhaps a Jew would sell his dough to a non-Jew to avoid challah. The answer is that a person already has a simple way to be exempt from challah: by kneading less than the prescribed minimum quantity (shiur). Since one can easily avoid the obligation by making small batches, there's no need for a rabbinic decree to prevent selling to a non-Jew. However, for tithes, there is no such easy loophole; one must give tithes regardless of the quantity of produce. Therefore, the concern about selling to a non-Jew was relevant for tithes.

The Gemara further asks: Why not apply this logic to terumah as well? One can avoid the obligation of terumah by bringing the produce into the house with its chaff (mots) still on, making it animal food, which is exempt from tithes and terumah. Alternatively, if it is brought into the house without "seeing the face of the house" (pnei bayit), for example, through a back entrance, it might also be exempt. The Gemara explains that while these methods exist, they are considered "zilzul" (disrespectful or demeaning) because people would notice and say, "Look, so-and-so is trying to avoid tithes." Selling to a non-Jew secretly ("betzana'ah") is also a form of zilzul. However, making a small batch of dough for challah is not considered a zilzul; it's a common practice and doesn't draw public criticism. Therefore, the rabbis did not need to make a decree for challah.

The discussion then shifts to the Omer offering. After the Omer is brought on the second day of Pesach, new produce becomes permissible for consumption. The Mishnah states that after the Omer, the market would be filled with roasted flour from the new crop. Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda prohibited this, while the Sages permitted it. Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda were concerned that people might have preemptively harvested and prepared flour from the new crop before the Omer was brought. This would violate the prohibition against consuming new produce before the Omer. The Sages, however, permitted it, trusting that people would only consume what was permissible.

The Gemara then brings a Mishnah in Pesachim where Rabbi Yehuda states that if one did not check for chametz on the night before Pesach, one should not check for it in the morning. Rashi explains that Rabbi Yehuda's concern is that if one finds chametz in the morning, one might be tempted to eat it. This is a rabbinic decree to prevent transgression. However, this concern does not apply to the harvesting of the Omer. The harvesting (ketzirah) of the Omer was done in a unique way, making it distinct and memorable, so people would not mistakenly eat from the new crop before the Omer was brought. The grinding (tehinah) and sifting (arkadah) of the new grain were also done in a unique manner (e.g., using a hand grinder instead of a water mill, or turning the sieve upside down), further emphasizing the special nature of the Omer process and preventing people from mistakenly consuming new produce.

The Gemara further notes that certain fields (betashnachim), which require irrigation and yield an inferior crop, are permitted to be harvested regularly, even before the Omer. This is because their produce is not suitable for the Omer offering. The concern about eating new produce before the Omer is not present here because people are accustomed to not eating new produce throughout the year. This contrasts with chametz, where people are accustomed to eating it, and thus there's a concern they might fall back into their habit on Pesach. Therefore, no rabbinic decree was necessary for these fields. This principle is analogous to the halakha regarding non-kosher food: we are not concerned that someone might mistakenly eat non-kosher food (like pork) if it is in their house, because they are not accustomed to eating it. However, with chametz, the concern is real because it is a food people regularly consume.

The reason these inferior fields are permitted to be cut early is to prevent the crop from drying up and being lost. This is an exception to the general rule that one should not make piles of wheat before the Omer, as this might lead to premature consumption. But in this case, the necessity of preserving the crop outweighs the concern.