A Yissachar / Zebulun Partnership in Loving Memory of Yishak ben Simcha A"H & Felicia bat Miriam A"H
Rabbi Eli Mansour

Daf Yomi

Menachot 73A - 73B (12th Cycle Daf Yomi Shiur)

Lectured by Rabbi Eli Mansour

Published
December 2, 2007
Duration
33:07

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In our examination of the *Gemara* on *Ayin Gimmel Amud Bet*, we encounter a significant discussion surrounding the laws of *Nzirut*, or the Nazirite vow. The text begins with an important distinction regarding exclusions made for *Goyim*, or non-Jews, in relation to their obligations and offerings. The phrase *V'hai prat linzirut mehacha nafka* indicates that this exclusion is derived from a specific verse. Earlier, we learned that a *Goy* does not bring a *Korban* for *Nzirut*. This is supported by a verse that states only a Jew brings an *Olah* for *Nzirut*, while a *Goy* does not have this obligation.

The *Gemara* questions whether this exclusion is solely based on that verse. It refers to another verse, *Daber el Bnei Yisrael v'amarta aleihem ish ki yafli lindor neder nazir lehazir*, which explicitly addresses the Jewish people. From this, the *Gemara* concludes that *Bnei Yisrael* can take on the *Neder* of *Nzirut*, while *Goyim* cannot. The question arises: why do we need two verses to convey this message? The *Gemara* explains that if we only had the first verse regarding the *Korban*, one might think that while a *Goy* does not bring a *Korban*, the *Nzirut* could still apply to them. Therefore, the second verse clarifies that not only is there no *Korban*, but the *Nzirut* itself does not take effect upon them at all.

The discussion progresses as the *Gemara* seeks to align this interpretation with a previous teaching from *Masechet Shekalim*. Here, Rabbi Shimon lists seven decrees established by the *Beit Din* concerning *Korbanot*. One of these decrees notes that a *Goy* may send an *Olah* from overseas, and if he includes the necessary funds for the accompanying wine, it is accepted. If not, the community covers the cost. This leads to a further inquiry regarding the views of Rabbi Yossi HaGlili and Rabbi Akiva on the acceptance of offerings from *Goyim*.

According to Rabbi Yossi HaGlili, we accept not only the *Olah* but also the wine, as indicated by his interpretation of the verse. Rabbi Akiva, however, allows only for the acceptance of the *Olah* without explicitly stating that wine is included. The *Gemara* posits that the teaching from *Masechet Shekalim* aligns with Rabbi Yossi HaGlili's view, as it supports the acceptance of wine from *Goyim*.

Continuing, the *Gemara* suggests that even if one were to follow Rabbi Akiva, his statement about the *Olah* could imply that all accompanying items, including wine, are accepted. This indicates that while Rabbi Akiva does not explicitly mention wine, it is understood to be included when the *Olah* is brought.

The *Gemara* then shifts focus to a *Braitah*, questioning its author. It cites a verse that states, *Kol ha'ezrach ya'aseh kacha et eleh*, indicating that a Jew can bring *Nesachim* without a *Korban*, while a *Goy* cannot. The *Gemara* raises the possibility that when a Jew brings a *Korban*, he may still not be able to bring *Nesachim* on their own. The verse clarifies that the proper way to offer sacrifices includes the requisite *Nesachim*. This leads to the conclusion that the *Braitah* cannot align with either Rabbi Yossi HaGlili or Rabbi Akiva, as both have differing views on the acceptance of offerings from *Goyim*.

Ultimately, the *Gemara* resolves that the *Braitah* can be interpreted in a way that accommodates both opinions. If one follows Rabbi Yossi HaGlili, the conclusion would be that *Goyim* cannot bring wine alone; they must do so alongside their *Korbanot*. Conversely, if following Rabbi Akiva, it can be understood that the *Olah* encompasses all accompanying offerings, including wine. This nuanced discussion highlights the complexity of halachic rulings regarding offerings and the distinctions between the obligations of Jews and non-Jews.

In conclusion, the *Gemara* intricately weaves together various perspectives on the laws of *Nzirut* and the acceptance of offerings, emphasizing the importance of precise language and interpretation in halachic discourse. The dialogue not only clarifies these laws but also illustrates the broader implications of community and individual responsibilities within the framework of Jewish law.