A thanksgiving offering became mixed up with its substitute. What is a substitute? The owner committed a transgression by declaring, “This animal is the substitute for the thanksgiving offering.” One is not supposed to make such a substitution, but the substitute nevertheless becomes sanctified.
There are now two sanctified thanksgiving offerings, and one of them dies. We do not know whether the original thanksgiving offering died or whether the substitute died. The remaining animal has no remedy; there is no way to determine how it may be offered. The Gemara explains why there is no solution.
A thanksgiving offering is brought with bread—forty loaves. Why not simply bring the remaining animal with forty loaves? That is impossible, because perhaps the remaining animal is the substitute, and a substitute is not brought with bread. Conversely, perhaps it is the original thanksgiving offering, in which case it does require bread. Therefore, bringing bread with it does not solve the problem.
The case is one in which the owner originally said, “This is a thanksgiving offering,” and afterward declared another animal to be its substitute. Why can he not bring another animal with bread? Let him say: If the animal that remains is the substitute, then this new animal is the thanksgiving offering, and the bread belongs to it. If the animal that remains is the original thanksgiving offering, then let the bread belong to that animal, while the new animal serves as a backup offering.
When a person makes a vow to bring a thanksgiving offering, he may designate a second animal as its backup. He can say, “This is a thanksgiving offering, and if the first one is lost or something happens to it, this animal will replace it.” In that case, the second animal is a valid backup offering. Thus, if the original statement was, “I am obligated to bring a thanksgiving offering,” there would be no problem: the owner could bring a second animal with bread and designate it as the backup.
The Gemara answers that the case is different. The owner said, “This is a thanksgiving offering,” rather than, “I am obligated to bring a thanksgiving offering.” Once he says, “This is a thanksgiving offering,” he cannot bring another animal as a backup, because a backup offering applies only when one makes a vow—“I am obligated to bring a thanksgiving offering.” It does not apply when one designates a specific animal by saying, “This is a thanksgiving offering.”
Therefore, the situation remains unresolved. There are two animals: the original thanksgiving offering and its substitute. One has died, and we do not know which one. If the remaining animal is the thanksgiving offering, it requires bread; if it is the substitute, it does not. The owner cannot bring another animal as a backup, because he did not say, “I am obligated to bring” the offering. This is why Rabbi Chiya stated that there is no remedy.
The Gemara now raises eight questions against Rabbi Chiya’s ruling. Each question asks why he said that there is no solution when, seemingly, a solution is available. The Gemara gives a mnemonic for remembering the eight questions; we will skip the mnemonic and proceed directly to the first question.
They said to Rabbi Yehudah HaNasi in the name of “the Learned One”—Rashi explains that this was Levi, who was called “the Learned One”: Let the owner bring bread and make a condition. If the remaining animal is the thanksgiving offering, these forty loaves will be its bread. If the remaining animal is not the thanksgiving offering, then the bread will remain unconsecrated.
Why not simply separate forty loaves conditionally? If the remaining animal is the thanksgiving offering, the animal and the bread form one offering. If the remaining animal is the substitute, the bread remains unconsecrated. The Gemara answers: Are unconsecrated items brought into the Temple courtyard? One may not bring unconsecrated bread into the courtyard. Therefore, that is not a solution.
Another possibility is that he should bring a new animal together with bread and make the following condition: If the remaining animal is the substitute, then this new animal is the thanksgiving offering, and the bread belongs to it. If the remaining animal is the thanksgiving offering, then the bread belongs to that animal, and this new animal should be treated as a peace offering.
What is the problem with that proposal? A peace offering may be eaten for two days and the intervening night, whereas a thanksgiving offering may be eaten only for one day and the intervening night. Since we do not know what the new animal is, it might be a peace offering, which would normally have a longer period of consumption, or it might be a thanksgiving offering, which has a shorter period. If one treats it as a thanksgiving offering and burns the leftovers after only one day, perhaps one has reduced the permitted eating period of a peace offering.
It is not permitted to shorten the period during which a peace offering may be eaten. One might suggest bringing the offering at night, so that the remaining time will be reduced in any event, but that does not help. The point is that the sanctified meat might be a peace offering, and burning it before the full time has elapsed would be prohibited. If the entire offering were eaten, there would be no issue; the concern is what happens if some remains. One could bring many people to eat it, but one may not deliberately create a situation in which the permitted period of a peace offering is minimized. Therefore, this proposal is also rejected.
Levi then offers another possibility: Bring an animal and bread. If the remaining animal is the substitute, this new animal is the thanksgiving offering and the bread belongs to it. If the remaining animal is the thanksgiving offering, let the bread belong to that offering, and let the new animal be designated as the surplus of a thanksgiving offering.
The new animal would not be consecrated as an ordinary thanksgiving offering. It would be brought as surplus associated with the thanksgiving offering. More than one animal can, in certain circumstances, be brought in connection with a thanksgiving offering, and the additional animal does not require its own bread. Thus, if the remaining animal is the thanksgiving offering, the bread can accompany it, while the new animal is the surplus. If the remaining animal is the substitute, the new animal and the bread constitute the thanksgiving offering.
That appears to solve the problem: in either case, the animal reaches the altar, and the bread is associated with the proper thanksgiving offering. But Levi is rebuked for suggesting it. How can an animal be consecrated initially as surplus? The concept of surplus applies only in an existing situation. For example, if a person designated money for a thanksgiving offering and there is money left over, the remaining money can be treated as surplus. Similarly, if a person designated a pregnant animal as a thanksgiving offering and it gave birth, the offspring may be treated as surplus. Or, if a person designated a thanksgiving offering, it was lost, and he brought another animal in its place, and then the original animal was found, the original can be treated as surplus.
But one cannot simply designate an animal from the outset as surplus without an underlying circumstance that creates surplus. This new animal cannot be called surplus merely to resolve the uncertainty. Therefore, that option is rejected as well.
Another suggestion is to bring an animal and bread and say: If the remaining animal is the substitute, this is the thanksgiving offering and the bread belongs to it. If the remaining animal is the thanksgiving offering, then this bread belongs to it, and the new animal will be made its substitute.
This would seem to work because a substitute also becomes sanctified and can be brought on the altar. But there is a serious problem: making a substitute is prohibited. The Torah says that one may not exchange an animal for another sanctified animal. Although the animal designated as a substitute becomes sanctified, the person who makes the substitution receives lashes. How, then, can this be presented as an acceptable solution? One cannot tell a person to receive forty lashes in order to resolve the uncertainty. This option is rejected too.
Rabbi Ila became ill, and the Rabbis came to visit him. They raised another possibility based on a teaching of Rabbi Yohanan that had been discussed earlier. Rabbi Yohanan said that even if the bread of a thanksgiving offering is outside the Temple courtyard, it can still become sanctified when the offering is slaughtered. The bread does not necessarily have to be inside the courtyard at the moment the animal is slaughtered. It may be outside the courtyard, within the walls of Jerusalem.
Based on Rabbi Yohanan’s view, let the owner bring forty loaves and leave them outside the Temple courtyard. He can say: If the remaining animal is the thanksgiving offering, these loaves are its bread. If it is not the thanksgiving offering, the loaves will remain unconsecrated. This avoids the earlier problem, because the unconsecrated bread is not being brought into the courtyard. If the animal is the thanksgiving offering, the bread can become sanctified even though it is still outside.
However, only thirty-six of the loaves can remain outside. From each group of ten loaves, one loaf must be taken as the portion given to the priest. There are four groups of ten, so four loaves must be taken and brought into the courtyard, where they are waved. The verse says that the priest takes a portion from the entire offering and waves it before God. What, then, is to be done with those four loaves? If they are unconsecrated, they may not be brought into the courtyard. If they are brought inside, one has again brought unconsecrated items into the courtyard. Therefore, this option is also rejected.
The Gemara now presents another possibility from Hezekiah. Hezekiah said that if a person brings a thanksgiving offering, he may bring eighty loaves instead of forty. Forty of the loaves become the bread of the thanksgiving offering, while the other forty serve as its backup. The additional forty are sanctified in a general sense, but they are not part of the required bread of the thanksgiving offering.
Accordingly, let the owner bring another animal with eighty loaves. If the remaining animal is the thanksgiving offering, then the new animal may also be a thanksgiving offering, with forty loaves for each animal. If the remaining animal is the substitute, then the new animal is the thanksgiving offering. Forty loaves belong to it, and the other forty are its backup. In either case, the animals and the bread can be brought.
The Gemara objects that this may reduce the permitted period of eating. If the remaining animal is the substitute, the new animal is a thanksgiving offering, and only forty of the eighty loaves are the required bread of that offering. The other forty are the backup loaves. The required bread must be eaten within the shorter period applicable to a thanksgiving offering, while the backup loaves would have a longer period. Since we do not know which forty are the required loaves and which forty are the backup, all eighty may have to be treated as though they must be eaten within the shorter period.
That creates a concern that the permitted eating time of the forty backup loaves will be reduced. Although the owner can bring many people to eat the loaves, he may not minimize their permitted period. Rashi explains the matter in another way. Since eighty loaves are present, one must take eight loaves as the priestly portion—one from each group of ten. If all eighty loaves are treated as the bread of thanksgiving offerings, all eight may be sanctified as the priestly portion. But if only forty are actually the required bread, then only four of the eight are truly required. The owner will nevertheless have to take eight, in case all eighty are sanctified.
The concern is that he may not find enough priests to eat all eight loaves. The other thirty-six loaves can be eaten by Israelites, so there is less concern about finding people to consume them. But the eight loaves designated for the priests may not be eaten by Israelites. If sufficient priests cannot be found, four of those loaves may be left over and have to be burned. For this reason as well, the proposal involving eighty loaves is not accepted.
The Gemara then considers a proposal based on another teaching of Rabbi Yohanan. Rabbi Yohanan said that if a person designates a pregnant animal as a thanksgiving offering, he has an option: after the animal gives birth, he may use the mother as the offering, or he may use the offspring. This assumes that the mother and the offspring are treated as two separate entities. If so, one could bring a pregnant animal, designate the mother as the offering, wait until it gives birth, and bring eighty loaves.
The owner could say: If the animal that remains is the substitute, then the mother is the thanksgiving offering and the offspring is also a thanksgiving offering, with the eighty loaves divided between them. If the animal that remains is the original thanksgiving offering, then that animal is the thanksgiving offering, while the mother can be designated as another thanksgiving offering and the offspring can be treated as its surplus. In this way, there would be two thanksgiving offerings and eighty loaves, with no difficulty.
But who says that this is the logic of Rabbi Yohanan? Perhaps Rabbi Yohanan’s reasoning is based on the principle that an unborn offspring is considered a limb of its mother. If the offspring is merely part of the mother, then when the mother is sanctified, the offspring automatically receives the same sanctity. It is not a separate entity that may be assigned a different status. Just as one does not need to sanctify an animal’s leg separately from the animal, the offspring would not need to be sanctified separately from its mother.
According to that understanding, once the mother becomes a thanksgiving offering, the offspring automatically becomes part of that thanksgiving offering. One could not make a condition that the offspring should be either another thanksgiving offering or its surplus. Therefore, the proposal based on the pregnant animal is also rejected.
Ravina went to the town of Meḥulya and offered another solution. Let the person bring an animal and say, “I am obligated to bring a thanksgiving offering.” This is a vow, and when a person makes such a vow, he may designate a second animal as a backup in case the first is lost. Let him bring another animal as well, together with eighty loaves.
He can make the following condition: If the animal that remains is the substitute, then the animal designated by the vow is the thanksgiving offering, and the eighty loaves are divided between the two thanksgiving offerings. If the remaining animal is the original thanksgiving offering, then the eighty loaves belong to that offering, and the second animal is its backup. A backup offering does not require its own bread. This would appear to solve the problem.
The difficulty is that one should not make unnecessary vows. The tractate Nedarim teaches that it is preferable not to make a vow than to make one and fail to fulfill it. The verse in Kohelet says that it is better not to vow than to vow and not fulfill. We do not want a person to place himself in a position where he may violate a vow. In this case, the person already has a complicated situation involving the first animals; why should we instruct him to create an additional obligation by making another vow?
Therefore, this proposal is rejected as well. The Gemara returns to Rabbi Chiya’s original ruling: once the two animals became mixed up and one of them died, the remaining animal cannot be brought on the altar. There is no way to resolve the uncertainty. Although the Gemara offers eight possible solutions, each one is ultimately rejected.
The next Mishnah discusses a different case. A person says, “I am obligated to bring a thanksgiving offering.” The principal offering is the animal, but the bread is included as well, because a thanksgiving offering is brought together with its forty loaves. The Mishnah teaches that when a person says, “I am obligated to bring a thanksgiving offering,” he may not purchase it with second-tithe funds. The obligation of the offering must be fulfilled with non-sacred funds; one obligation cannot be fulfilled with money that is itself subject to another obligation.
The animal and the bread must therefore be brought from unconsecrated funds rather than from second-tithe money. The handwritten version of the text explains that once the person says, “I am obligated to bring a thanksgiving offering,” he has accepted a personal obligation. Since the offering is obligatory, it must come from ordinary funds.
There is a distinction, however, when the person states explicitly that the thanksgiving offering is to come from second-tithe money, while the bread is to come from ordinary funds. In that case, the Mishnah says that he brings the offering according to his words. The animal may be purchased with second-tithe money, and the bread must be purchased with unconsecrated funds.
Why is that permitted? By explicitly saying that the animal is to come from second-tithe money, he has indicated that he is not accepting the animal as a personal obligation. If it were a true obligation, he could not use second-tithe money. Therefore, the animal may be purchased with those funds, while the bread is brought from ordinary funds, as he stated.
If he says that both the animal and the bread are to come from second-tithe money, then both are brought according to his words. The statement indicates that he is bringing the entire offering voluntarily rather than accepting an independent obligation. The rule is to follow the way he expressed his intention.
The Mishnah adds that even when second-tithe funds may be used, one may not take second-tithe grain, grind it, and use that grain itself to make the bread. One may use second-tithe money to purchase the grain, but one may not use the grain in its original form for the loaves. The reason for this will be discussed by the Gemara.
The Gemara begins with the statement: A person says, “I am obligated to bring the bread of a thanksgiving offering.” He must bring a thanksgiving offering as well, because one cannot bring the bread without the offering. The question is why the Mishnah mentions the bread by itself. If he wants both the animal and the bread, why does he not simply say, “I am obligated to bring a thanksgiving offering and its bread”?
We learned in the Mishnah that if a person says, “I will bring the thanksgiving offering from second-tithe funds and the bread from ordinary funds,” he brings them according to his words. The animal comes from second-tithe money, while the bread comes from unconsecrated money.
The Gemara challenges this ruling. If the bread is necessarily connected to the thanksgiving offering, then once the person says that he is bringing the bread from ordinary funds, should that not mean that the thanksgiving offering itself must also come from ordinary funds? The bread cannot be brought without the offering, so perhaps the two should be treated as one obligation.
The Gemara answers that the two statements are treated as separate. When the person begins by saying, “The thanksgiving offering will come from second-tithe money,” he is speaking about the principal item, the animal. He is explicitly indicating that he is not accepting it as an obligation. When he then says that the bread will come from ordinary funds, that is a separate statement concerning the bread.
It is comparable to two people: one person says, “I am bringing a thanksgiving offering,” and another says, “I am bringing the bread for that offering.” We do not necessarily treat the two statements as one person accepting one complete obligation. In this case as well, the animal may be purchased with second-tithe funds, while the bread comes from ordinary funds.
The Gemara distinguishes between the two directions. It is understandable that the bread may be used to fulfill the obligation of the thanksgiving offering, because the bread accompanies and completes the offering. But the reverse is not necessarily true. The thanksgiving offering is the principal item, while the bread is an accompanying item. Therefore, when a person says that the principal offering will come from ordinary funds, the bread follows it; but when he says that the bread will come from ordinary funds, that does not necessarily determine the status of the animal.
Rav Huna raises a related question. Suppose a person says explicitly, “I am bringing a thanksgiving offering without bread,” or, in a parallel case, “I am bringing an offering without its wine libations.” Should we understand him as retracting his statement, or should we compel him to bring the complete offering?
The Mishnah teaches that he is compelled to bring the thanksgiving offering together with its bread, and an offering together with its required libations. The word “thanksgiving offering” includes the bread, because a thanksgiving offering cannot be brought without it.
One might have thought that when a person says only, “I am obligated to bring the bread,” he should be required to bring the animal as well, because the bread cannot be brought independently. But that is not necessarily parallel. A wine libation can sometimes be brought independently, without the offering. Therefore, if someone says, “I am bringing libations,” we cannot automatically understand him to have accepted an animal offering too. By contrast, the bread of a thanksgiving offering and the animal are inseparable.
The Gemara asks why the Mishnah does not reverse the order in the first case. If saying “thanksgiving offering” includes the bread, then saying “bread of a thanksgiving offering” should also include the animal. The answer is that the first case cannot be reversed in the same way as the case of libations. The animal and the bread of a thanksgiving offering are inherently linked, whereas libations may be brought separately. Since the second case cannot be reversed, the Mishnah does not formulate the first case in a reversed form either.
The Gemara then asks why the person is compelled to bring the complete offering. Perhaps we should interpret his words as a retraction. He first said, “I am obligated to bring a thanksgiving offering,” which includes the bread, and then added, “without bread.” Maybe he means, “I changed my mind. I do not want to fulfill the vow in that way.” Why force him to bring it?
Hezekiah answers that this reflects the general position of Bet Shammai: We follow the first expression that came out of a person’s mouth. The first statement is decisive. The later qualification does not erase it.
The Mishnah in Nazir discusses a person who says, “I am a nazirite from pressed grapes, figs, and dried figs.” Bet Shammai says that he is a nazirite, because the first significant expression he used was “I am a nazirite.” Bet Hillel says that he is not a nazirite unless he completes the statement in a way that creates that obligation. Bet Shammai’s principle is that one follows the first expression.
According to Hezekiah, the Mishnah’s ruling would therefore follow Bet Shammai. When the person first says, “I am obligated to bring a thanksgiving offering,” he has accepted the offering together with its bread. We hold on to the first statement and do not allow the later words to remove the obligation.
Rabbi Yohanan, however, says that the ruling can even be consistent with Bet Hillel. This would be the case if the person says explicitly, “If I had known that one is not permitted to make such a vow—to bring a thanksgiving offering without its bread—I would not have made the vow in that form. I would have said it differently.” His intention is not to retract the vow. He merely thought that he was permitted to bring the offering without the bread. Once he learns that this is not permitted, he agrees to bring the complete offering.
According to that interpretation, even Bet Hillel can agree that he must bring the offering with its bread. The later statement is not a withdrawal. It means, “I made a mistake about the law; I would have worded the vow differently had I known. I still intend to fulfill the obligation properly.” Therefore, he is compelled to bring the thanksgiving offering with the bread.
The Gemara challenges this explanation from a case in which the person says plainly, “If I had known this, I would not have made the vow.” That sounds like an explicit retraction, not merely a clarification that he would have formulated the vow differently. Such a case cannot easily be attributed to Bet Hillel, because the person is saying that he never wanted to accept the obligation in the first place.
According to Hezekiah, the difficulty is resolved: The ruling follows Bet Shammai, who always follows the first expression. Once the person said, “I am obligated to bring a thanksgiving offering,” the obligation was established, and he must bring the bread as well.
But according to Rabbi Yohanan, who wishes to explain the ruling according to Bet Hillel, the explicit statement that “if I had known, I would not have made the vow” presents a problem. In the earlier explanation, the person was not retracting; he was saying that he had misunderstood the requirements and would have stated his intention differently. Here, however, he says that he would not have vowed at all. That sounds like a genuine attempt to withdraw.
The Gemara nevertheless emphasizes the requirement to fulfill one’s word. Once the obligation has been expressed, the person must be told to complete it properly. The teaching is not to place oneself in such a situation in the first place. One should not make unnecessary vows or create complicated conditions that may lead to an unfulfilled obligation. As Kohelet says, it is better not to vow than to vow and fail to fulfill it.
The practical conclusion is that a person should be careful with vows and should not place himself in a situation where he may have to rely on a later qualification or attempt to withdraw. Once he has made the initial declaration, he may be required to fulfill it in its complete form, including all elements that the offering entails.