The discussion on today's page begins with a review of yesterday's lesson. According to the view of Rabbi Meir, if a man betroths a woman with an item that was consecrated (hekdesh), and he does so unintentionally (b'shogeg), the betrothal is not valid. The question then arises: do the funds become deconsecrated (holin) in this scenario, meaning is there a transgression of misuse of consecrated property (me'ilah)?
The Gemara questions this, asking how there can be me'ilah if the betrothal is invalid. If the woman is not betrothed, she has not benefited from the item. Perhaps, the Gemara suggests, the husband's attempt to perform the betrothal is enough to cause the item to become holin, thereby incurring me'ilah. However, the Gemara rejects this, stating that an item only becomes holin through me'ilah if there was an intention for it to be deconsecrated. Since the betrothal is not valid, the item remains hekdesh, and no me'ilah occurs. If the betrothal were valid, the item would become hers, and then me'ilah would apply.
This leads to another question: what if a person uses hekdesh by mistake to make a purchase? Is a sale different from a betrothal? In a betrothal, the woman might not want to accept hekdesh because she doesn't want to commit me'ilah. But perhaps a seller would be happy to receive any payment for his item, even hekdesh, and therefore me'ilah would occur. The Gemara answers that in a sale, just like in a betrothal, the transaction is invalid if hekdesh is used, even unintentionally. The seller does not want to accept hekdesh as payment, so there is no acquisition (kinyan) and no me'ilah. The money is returned, and the transaction is void.
Before proceeding, we must consult Rashi, who provides an introduction to the next question by referencing a mishnah in Tractate Me'ilah. This mishnah discusses a treasurer (gizbar) who gives money to a money changer (shulchani). If the money is tied in a bundle, indicating it's not for immediate use, and the shulchani doesn't know it's hekdesh, he should not use it. If he does, the gizbar is absolved, but the shulchani is guilty of me'ilah. However, if the money is untied, it implies the gizbar permits its use. If the shulchani then uses it unintentionally, the gizbar is guilty of me'ilah because he gave permission for its use. In contrast, if the gizbar gives money to a householder (ba'al habayit), regardless of whether it's tied or untied, the householder is not permitted to use it, as it's assumed to be for safekeeping. If the householder uses it, he is guilty of me'ilah.
This mishnah establishes a distinction between a shulchani, who needs money for transactions, and a ba'al habayit, who typically does not. The Gemara then introduces a third figure: a shopkeeper (hanvani). The question is whether a hanvani is considered like a shulchani or a ba'al habayit regarding me'ilah. Rabbi Meir holds that a hanvani is like a ba'al habayit because a shopkeeper often extends credit and doesn't always need immediate cash, implying money given to him is for safekeeping. Therefore, if he uses hekdesh money, he is guilty of me'ilah. Rabbi Yehuda, however, considers a hanvani like a shulchani, as a shopkeeper also constantly needs money for goods and transactions. Thus, if the gizbar gives him untied hekdesh money, the gizbar would be guilty of me'ilah if the hanvani uses it unintentionally.
The Gemara clarifies that everyone agrees that me'ilah can occur unintentionally (b'shogeg) in these cases. This poses a challenge to Rabbi Meir's earlier stance that if one betroths a woman with hekdesh unintentionally, the betrothal is invalid and there is no me'ilah. Similarly, in a sale using hekdesh unintentionally, there's no acquisition and no me'ilah. Yet, in the cases of the shulchani, ba'al habayit, or hanvani, someone is always guilty of me'ilah even when acting unintentionally. The Gemara resolves this by stating that Rabbi Meir's view that there is no me'ilah b'shogeg applies to him consistently. However, Rabbi Yehuda, who believes there is me'ilah b'shogeg, should at least agree that a hanvani is like a ba'al habayit, meaning the hanvani himself is guilty of me'ilah if he uses the money, not the gizbar.
The Gemara then presents a new understanding of Rabbi Meir's position. Up until now, we understood that Rabbi Meir held there is no deconsecration (hilul) of hekdesh b'shogeg. This means if a person betroths a woman with hekdesh b'shogeg, the item remains hekdesh, and the betrothal is invalid. However, Rav states that this is not Rabbi Meir's general rule. Rav asserts that Rabbi Meir actually holds that hekdesh can be deconsecrated (methalel) even unintentionally (b'shogeg), just as it can intentionally (b'mezid). If so, when one betroths a woman with hekdesh b'shogeg, the item should become holin, making the betrothal valid. This contradicts the mishnah.
To reconcile this, Rav reinterprets the mishnah's case. The mishnah, when stating that Rabbi Meir invalidates betrothal with hekdesh b'shogeg, refers specifically to a Kohen's tunic (ketonet kehunah) that has not yet worn out. One is generally not allowed to benefit from priestly garments (bigdei kehunah) for personal use. However, the Torah was not given to angels, meaning there is some flexibility for human needs. A Kohen wearing his tunic after finishing the Temple service is not immediately considered to be committing me'ilah, as it's impractical to remove it instantly. This shows a leniency regarding me'ilah with such garments. Rabbi Meir extends this leniency: if one uses such a tunic unintentionally for betrothal, there is no me'ilah, and thus the item remains consecrated, invalidating the betrothal. However, with regular hekdesh, Rabbi Meir agrees that hilul occurs both intentionally and unintentionally.
Rashi clarifies that if there is no betrothal, the item remains consecrated. The tunic, still usable for service, is subject to a built-in condition that allows for some incidental personal use without me'ilah. This leniency extends to unintentional use for betrothal, preventing me'ilah and keeping the item consecrated. Therefore, the betrothal is invalid. In contrast, Rabbi Yehuda holds that me'ilah b'shogeg does occur, even with priestly garments, unless it's the Kohen himself using it for a brief, unavoidable period. Thus, for Rabbi Yehuda, if a regular person uses a Kohen's tunic for betrothal, it would be me'ilah, the item would become holin, and the betrothal would be valid. Both Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda agree that if one acts intentionally (b'mezid) to deconsecrate hekdesh, hilul occurs, and the item becomes holin, making a betrothal valid.
The Gemara then presents a challenge from a braita that states if a Kohen's tunic has worn out (shebalu), one is liable for me'ilah if they use it. This seems to contradict the idea that worn-out tunics are not subject to me'ilah. The Gemara clarifies that the braita must be referring specifically to worn-out tunics, implying that tunics that are still usable (shelo balu) are indeed exempt from me'ilah in cases of unintentional use, as explained by Rav. This means the leniency only applies when the tunic is still viable for its priestly purpose.
Next, the Gemara brings another challenge regarding the laws of shekalim. It is taught that me'ilah applies to new shekalim (hatim) but not to old shekalim (atikim). New shekalim are designated for communal offerings (korbanot) and thus have the sanctity of offerings. Using them for personal use constitutes me'ilah. Old shekalim, however, are remnants from previous years' budgets, used for the maintenance of Jerusalem's walls and streets. Since these are not earmarked for offerings, they do not have the same sanctity, and using them for personal use does not incur me'ilah.
A braita states that Rabbi Meir is stringent, holding that me'ilah applies even to old shekalim (atikim), which are the leftover funds from the chamber (shirei al-lishka). The Gemara asks: how can Rabbi Meir hold this? The rule is that if benefit from an item is unavoidable, like benefiting from the shade of Jerusalem's walls, then there is no me'ilah b'shogeg. Since the old shekalim are used for the walls, and benefiting from the walls is unavoidable, there should be no me'ilah b'shogeg. This contradicts Rabbi Meir's stance in the braita. The Gemara resolves this by stating that the name Rabbi Meir in this braita should be corrected to Rabbi Yehuda. Rabbi Yehuda would be stringent, as he might allow leniency for direct, unavoidable benefit from the walls themselves, but not for using the shekalim for other personal purposes.
The Gemara then presents a similar challenge: if bricks from Jerusalem's walls fall, and one uses them, is there me'ilah? Again, the same logic applies: benefiting from fallen bricks is unavoidable, so there should be no me'ilah b'shogeg. The Gemara gives the same answer: the name Rabbi Meir should be changed to Rabbi Yehuda. However, a new difficulty arises: in Tractate Nedarim, Rabbi Yehuda holds that bricks from Jerusalem do not have sanctity (kedusha). If so, how can there be me'ilah on them at all? The Gemara resolves this by positing that there are two different Tannaim who hold by Rabbi Yehuda's opinion: one who believes Jerusalem's bricks do have sanctity and are subject to me'ilah, and another who believes they do not.
Returning to Rabbi Yehuda's general rule regarding hekdesh: if one uses hekdesh intentionally (b'mezid), it is deconsecrated (methalel). This means if a man betroths a woman with hekdesh intentionally, and she accepts, the item becomes holin, and the betrothal is valid. However, if one uses hekdesh unintentionally (b'shogeg), it is not deconsecrated (ein methalel). This would mean that if a man betroths a woman with hekdesh b'shogeg, the item remains hekdesh, and the betrothal is invalid. The Gemara clarifies that statements implying me'ilah b'shogeg only refer to the obligation to bring an offering (korban) for misuse, not to the item itself becoming holin. An item only becomes holin if it is consumed or destroyed. In the case of betrothal, the item remains in existence, so it does not become holin, and the betrothal is invalid according to Rabbi Yehuda as well.
Finally, the Gemara returns to the mishnah's discussion of betrothal with second tithe (ma'aser sheni). Rabbi Meir held that if one betroths a woman with ma'aser sheni, whether intentionally or unintentionally, the betrothal is invalid. This is because ma'aser sheni is holy to God, and therefore cannot be used for personal betrothal. Rabbi Yehuda, on the other hand, held that ma'aser sheni is private property and can be used for betrothal. The Gemara seeks to establish which opinion is followed. It cites a stam mishnah (an anonymous mishnah, which usually indicates accepted halacha) in Tractate Kerem Reba'i, which discusses fourth-year fruits. This mishnah states that these fruits are holy and are not subject to the laws of gleanings (leket) for the poor, as they are meant to be eaten by the owner in Jerusalem. This aligns with Rabbi Meir's view that ma'aser sheni (which is compared to kerem reba'i) is holy and not private property. Therefore, we follow Rabbi Meir's view that ma'aser sheni is holy, and betrothal with it is invalid.
The Gemara then seeks to prove Rabbi Yehuda's position regarding hekdesh: that intentionally using hekdesh causes hilul (deconsecration), while unintentionally using it does not. A braita describes a case where a gizbar sends hekdesh money with an intelligent person (pike'ach) to a shopkeeper (hanvani). If the gizbar remembers the money is hekdesh before it's spent, he is absolved. If the pike'ach also realizes it's hekdesh before spending it, he too is absolved. If the hanvani then uses the money unintentionally, he is the one guilty of me'ilah. This implies that the hanvani's unintentional use caused the me'ilah, but the money itself did not become holin, as the gizbar and pike'ach were absolved by their knowledge. This supports the view that me'ilah b'shogeg incurs liability (a korban) but does not cause the item to become holin, unless it is consumed or destroyed. In the context of betrothal, where the item remains, if it was done unintentionally, the item remains hekdesh, and the betrothal is invalid. This aligns with Rabbi Yehuda's rule regarding hekdesh.