The Eri B. Sitt Edition and Audio Series of the Talmud Bavli, tractate Bava Batra—the longest tractate in the Talmud by page count—has been dedicated by our good friend and pioneering Daf Yomi student, Yehuda Adam Azra, in memory of his loved ones. May it be for the success of his dear children, that they grow up to give him much nachas, with wisdom, understanding, and knowledge, and that, with the help of God, they should be blessed at the proper time with their appropriate marriage partners. May he, his wife, and his entire family be blessed. Amen.
On the previous folio, the Gemara quoted Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav Yirmiyah, who were explaining the Mishnah. The Mishnah said that if a person leaves over any amount of land, even the smallest amount, and gives all his other property as a gift, he cannot retract the gift.
The explanation was that the person left some land for himself because he obviously expected to continue living. Therefore, the gift that he gave was a complete gift. When the Mishnah says that he left over “any amount,” however, it does not necessarily mean the smallest imaginable piece of land. It means an amount sufficient to support himself.
The Gemara then quoted the teaching of the students of the academy: “You have spoken accurately.” Rav Yosef objected: Why is this accurate? The Mishnah says “any amount,” whereas you are explaining it to mean an amount sufficient for his support. How did you derive that interpretation from the words “any amount”? Rav Yosef therefore said that whenever the Mishnah uses the expression “any amount,” it does not necessarily mean an infinitesimal amount. It means that the Sages established some defined measure.
The Gemara challenges this from a Mishnah concerning the mitzvah of the first shearing. According to Torah law, a person must take the first of his sheep’s wool and give it to a priest. The question is: What is the minimum amount of wool that creates this obligation?
There is a dispute. One opinion says that the obligation applies when a person has five sheep, each of which can produce a measure of one maneh and one half-maneh of wool. That is the required amount according to that opinion. The Sages, however, say that as long as the five sheep together produce one maneh and one half-maneh of wool, the obligation applies. The amount does not have to be produced separately by each animal; it may be divided equally among the five sheep.
The Mishnah uses the expression “any amount.” What does that mean in this context? Does it mean that the priest receives even a single strand of wool? Rav answers that it means one maneh and one half-maneh, provided that the amount is divided equally among the five animals.
Thus, when the Mishnah says “any amount,” it clearly means a defined measure rather than the smallest possible quantity. Similarly, one might argue that when our Mishnah says that a person left over “any amount” of land, it means an amount sufficient to support himself.
The Gemara rejects this proof. There, the expression “any amount” was used in response to the first opinion. The first opinion required a very large amount: five animals, each producing one maneh and one half-maneh of wool. The Sages then said that a much smaller amount was sufficient—one maneh and one half-maneh in total among all five animals. They used the expression “any amount” relative to the first opinion. They meant that one does not need such a large amount; a smaller measure is sufficient.
That is not necessarily the meaning when the expression appears by itself in an ordinary case. Perhaps when the Mishnah simply says “any amount,” it means literally any amount. Therefore, Rav Yosef’s question remains: How do we know that the land left over must be enough to support the person? Perhaps the words mean precisely what they say—any amount of land.
The Gemara continues with another case. A person says, “My movable property should go to so-and-so,” without adding the word “all.” In that case, his statement includes movable property but does not include wheat and barley, because those are regarded as food rather than ordinary movable property.
If, however, he says, “All my movable property should go to so-and-so,” then the word “all” comes to include even the wheat and barley. It also includes the upper millstone. A mill has an upper stone and a lower stone. The upper stone is considered movable because it can be lifted and removed when the mill requires repair.
The lower millstone, however, is not included. Although technically it can be moved, it is extremely heavy, and when it breaks, it is repaired in its place. It is therefore not regarded as an item that is ordinarily moved. Thus, when a person says “all my movable property,” the upper millstone is included, but the lower millstone is not.
The Gemara then discusses several levels of language: movable property, all movable property, and everything that can be moved. Each expression can include additional items. When a person says “everything that can be moved,” even the lower millstone is included, because although people do not ordinarily move it, it is capable of being moved.
This leads to the well-known question concerning a Canaanite slave. Is a slave considered like land, or is he considered like movable property? One might say that a slave is like land, because the Torah compares a Canaanite slave to land. Just as land is inherited by a person’s children, a Canaanite slave is also inherited by the children. This would indicate that a slave has the status of land.
On the other hand, one might say that a slave is like movable property, because he moves. A slave is alive and can walk from place to place. The question is therefore: When a person says, “I am giving you all my movable property,” does that include his slaves?
The Gemara brings a case that appeared earlier. A person sells a city. The sale includes the houses, cisterns, wells, bathhouses, and the facilities in the fields used for pressing olives. It includes the permanent property connected to the city, but it does not include the movable property.
If the seller stipulates, “I am selling you the city and everything within it,” then even the slaves are included. The Gemara attempts to analyze this ruling. If a slave is like land, why is he not included when a person sells the city? The houses, bathhouses, fields, and all other permanent property are included. If the slave is also like land, he should be included as well.
This would seem to indicate that a slave is like movable property. But if a slave is movable property, why does the Mishnah say that when the seller says “everything within it,” even the slaves are included? It should simply say that the slaves are included. Why does it use the word “even”?
The Gemara answers that there are two types of movable property: movable property that moves on its own and movable property that does not move on its own. A box, for example, is movable, but it does not move independently. A slave is movable in a different sense: he can move by himself.
Therefore, the word “even” is appropriate. Once the Mishnah tells us that a slave is a type of movable property, it still needs to teach us that he is included despite being a unique type of movable property—one that moves independently.
The Gemara concludes that this case does not prove whether a slave is considered land or movable property. Perhaps he is like land that moves, or perhaps he is like movable property that moves independently. Since he has a distinct status, the Mishnah does not provide a definitive answer.
The Gemara then brings another attempt. A person writes all his assets to his slave. Since the slave himself is included among the assets, the slave becomes free and receives the rest of the property. If the owner leaves over even a small piece of land, however, the slave does not become free. Rabbi Shimon says that the slave becomes free in either case.
This appears to show that a slave is considered like land. If the owner leaves over land, the slave remains under his ownership because the slave is compared to land. The Gemara, however, continues with the wording of the case. If a person says, “I am giving all my assets to my slave except for one ten-thousandth of them,” the slave does not become free.
We had previously learned a statement attributed to Rav Yosef in the name of Ben Azai: Movable property can serve as the amount left over with respect to a slave, but movable property does not serve as the amount left over with respect to a woman’s marriage settlement.
What does this mean? If a person gives all his assets to his slave but retains either land or movable property, the slave does not become free. This indicates that, with respect to a slave, movable property can also constitute the property that the owner retained.
This differs from the law of a marriage settlement. If a husband gives land to his children and also gives his wife land, we say that by accepting the land and remaining silent, she relinquishes her claim to the marriage settlement. But if he gives her movable property, she does not relinquish that claim. The Sages established that a marriage settlement is collected from land, and therefore she does not waive her rights merely because she received movable property.
Thus, with respect to a slave, either land or movable property that the owner retains prevents the slave from becoming free. With respect to a woman’s marriage settlement, however, only land has that effect.
The Gemara now appears to have a clear proof that a slave is considered movable property. But the Gemara rejects the proof. Perhaps the reason the slave does not become free when the owner retains part of the property is unrelated to the classification of the slave. A slave is freed through a document. Since the owner did not give the slave the entire document, the slave is not freed.
The law is comparable to the law of a woman receiving a bill of divorce: the document must be given completely. If the owner retained part of the document, then he did not give the slave a complete document of emancipation. The fact that the owner retained some property may therefore indicate only that the document was not given fully, not that the slave is considered movable property.
The Gemara therefore does not establish whether a slave is land or movable property. The question remains unresolved.
Rav Nahman now presents five cases in which a person gives a gift of his property, and the law depends on whether he gives away all his assets or retains some of them. The five cases are a person who is dangerously ill, a slave, a wife, his children, and a person who transfers property in order to conceal it from a future spouse.
We already know the first case. A person who is dangerously ill writes all his assets to someone else. If he leaves over any land, the gift is valid and he cannot retract it. If he gives away everything, he may retract the gift if he recovers, because we understand that he gave it only because he believed he was about to die.
The second case is the slave. As we just learned, a person who writes all his assets to his slave causes the slave to become free and to receive the assets. If he leaves over even a small amount of land, the slave does not become free.
The third case concerns a wife. A person writes all his assets to his wife. This does not necessarily mean that he intends to give her the assets for herself. It may mean that he is appointing her to control the property so that she will distribute it to the children. He gives her this authority so that the children will respect her.
The fourth case concerns the children. A person writes all his assets to his children and gives something to his wife. As we learned earlier, if she receives land and remains silent, she relinquishes her claim to her marriage settlement. She is satisfied that she received land and does not protest. But if she receives only movable property, she does not relinquish her claim, because the Sages established that the marriage settlement is collected from land.
The fifth case is the person who transfers property in order to conceal it. This is the case of a widow who owns assets and wants to remarry. She is concerned that if she marries and later dies, her new husband will inherit her property. Alternatively, if she marries and is later divorced or widowed, she does not want the property to become part of the marriage.
Before the marriage, she therefore writes all her assets to another person. Since she did not leave anything for herself, we understand that she did not truly intend to give the assets away. She transferred them only in order to prevent them from entering the new marriage. After she marries, she returns to the recipient and asks for the property back.
If she transferred all her assets, we assume that the transfer was not a genuine gift, and she can reclaim the property. If she left something for herself, however, the fact that she retained property demonstrates that she truly intended to give the rest as a gift. In that case, she cannot retract it.
The Gemara teaches that in all these cases, movable property can serve as the amount that a person leaves over. It makes no difference whether he retained land or movable property. The exception is the law of a marriage settlement. If a husband gives his wife land and gives land to his children, her silence indicates that she relinquished her claim. If he gives her movable property, however, she does not relinquish the claim.
The reason is that the Sages established the marriage settlement as a lien on land. The primary intention of the wife is to receive the security of the marriage settlement from land. Therefore, even if she received a gift of movable property, she can still say that she is relying on the land given to the children, because her marriage settlement is attached to that land.
There is one qualification. Sometimes the husband writes movable property into the marriage settlement itself. If the movable property is explicitly included in the marriage settlement and he gives it to her, then her silence has significance. Since that movable property is already part of the marriage settlement, it can serve as the amount she received and retained.
The Gemara now asks what is included in the general term “assets.” The first answer is that a slave is called an asset. We know this from the Mishnah in which a person writes all his assets to his slave. The slave becomes free and receives the other assets. Thus, a slave is included in the term “assets.”
Land is also called an asset. We know this from a Mishnah that refers to property with responsibility. This is a technical expression for land, because land can be subject to a lien. If a person owed money and the creditor had a lien, the creditor could collect from land that had been transferred to someone else.
The Mishnah says that property without responsibility is acquired through pulling. Property with responsibility is acquired through money, a document, or taking possession. Property without responsibility refers to movable property, which is acquired by pulling. Thus, movable property, including clothing, is also called an asset.
Money is also called an asset. The Gemara brings the story of Rav Pappa, who had twelve thousand zuz in a place called Huzai. He needed to bring the money back but could not travel there himself. He could not simply send an agent, because no one would give the money to an agent unless the agent accepted responsibility for it.
Rav Pappa therefore devised another method. He approached Rav Shmuel bar Acha and asked him to acquire a particular piece of land in his house. The land would then acquire the money that Rav Pappa had in Huzai. Rav Shmuel bar Acha made the acquisition of the land, and through that acquisition he also acquired the money. He then went to Huzai, took possession of the money, and returned it to Rav Pappa.
When Rav Pappa saw him returning with the money, he was so happy that he went out to greet him in the city of Tavach. Some say that Tavach means halfway, because Rav Pappa met him halfway. In any event, the story demonstrates that money is also called an asset. The money was acquired through the acquisition of land, because movable property can be acquired together with land.
This is known as acquisition through attachment to land. If a person wants to acquire movable property that is located elsewhere, he can acquire a piece of land, and the movable property is acquired together with it. Thus, money is included in the general term “assets.”
The Gemara next asks whether a document is also called an asset. Rabbah bar Yitzchak said that there are two types of documents. A person may tell his friend, “I am giving this field to someone else,” even though the recipient is unaware of it, provided that the gift is entirely to the recipient’s benefit. One person can acquire the field on behalf of the recipient.
For example, Reuven wants to give a field to Levi. Reuven can make a symbolic exchange with Shimon and instruct Shimon to acquire the field on Levi’s behalf. Shimon acquires the field for Levi, and the acquisition is complete through the symbolic exchange.
Reuven may also instruct Shimon to write a document for Levi as proof of the transfer. The document is not the act of acquisition. The acquisition was completed through the symbolic exchange; the document merely serves as evidence that Reuven gave the field to Levi.
The law is therefore that the giver can retract the document but cannot retract the acquisition. He may say that he no longer wants the document to be written, because the document is only proof. He cannot, however, retract the symbolic exchange, because the field has already been acquired.
If he made the symbolic exchange on the condition that a document would also be written, then he can retract both. Since the acquisition was made subject to the writing of the document, the failure to write the document means that the condition was not fulfilled. In that case, the symbolic exchange and the document are linked.
Rav Huna, however, said that there are three types of documents. The first two are the cases just described. The third case is one in which the seller writes the document before the sale has actually taken place.
Sometimes a person needs money urgently and wants to sell a field. He asks a scribe to prepare the document of sale in advance so that when a buyer appears, the document will be ready immediately. The seller can say, “Write the document for me now, so that when I find a buyer, I will be able to complete the sale without delay.”
This is the case in which the seller came forward and wrote the document before the actual acquisition. We learned that a document of sale may be written for the seller even before the buyer is present. Once the buyer actually acquires the land through possession, the document belongs to him as well.
The reason is that a document is property without responsibility, while land is property with responsibility. Once the buyer acquires the land, the document is acquired together with it.
This arrangement is generally disadvantageous to the seller because the document is dated from the earlier time. If the actual sale occurs in March, but the seller wrote the document in January, the document may show that the sale took place in January. That could affect liens and other transactions connected to the land during the intervening period.
Normally, it would be to the seller’s disadvantage to date the document earlier, because transactions that occurred after the earlier date might be treated differently. Nevertheless, the seller is willing to accept that disadvantage because he needs the document prepared in advance and wants to be able to sell the property immediately.
Once the buyer takes possession of the land, the seller cannot refuse to give him the document. He cannot say, “I will prepare a new document,” because the original document is already included with the land. When the buyer acquired the land, he acquired the document together with it.
This proves that a document is also called an asset. It is property without responsibility, and it is acquired together with property that has responsibility.
The Gemara then says that animals are also called assets. A person who consecrates all his assets may have among them animals suitable for the altar. Male animals may be suitable for burnt offerings, while female animals may be suitable for peace offerings. Such animals are included in the assets that he consecrated.
The animals can be sold to people who need them for peace offerings, and the money is then given to the Temple treasury. Thus, animals are also included in the general term “assets.”
The Gemara next discusses birds. Birds are also called assets, because they can be consecrated and used as offerings. Therefore, when a person consecrates his assets, birds are included as well.
Phylacteries are also referred to as assets. A Mishnah in tractate Arakhin teaches that when a person consecrates all his assets, the value of his phylacteries must be assessed. He does not give the phylacteries themselves to the Temple; rather, he pays their assessed value.
The Gemara asks whether a Torah scroll is also called an asset. If it is considered an asset, then when a person consecrates all his assets, the value of the Torah scroll should be assessed and paid to the Temple. But perhaps a Torah scroll is not included, because it is not ordinarily sold.
There are, however, limited circumstances in which a Torah scroll may be sold: in order to study Torah or in order to marry. The Gemara therefore asks whether those limited possibilities are enough to classify a Torah scroll as an asset, or whether the fact that it is generally not sold means that it is not included.
The Gemara leaves the question unresolved.
May the Holy One, blessed be He, grant us the merit of understanding these matters clearly and fulfilling the Torah properly. Amen.