We begin our study on the first page, first side of the tractate, starting ten lines down with the statement, "Amar Rav." In the previous section, we discussed the laws of slaughtering an animal and its offspring on the same day, known as "slaughtering it and its child on the same day." The Mishnah, we noted, does not align with the view of Rabbi Shimon. The Gemara now returns to this topic.
There is no prohibition against slaughtering an animal and its offspring on the same day when dealing with consecrated animals, known as Kodashim. Why is this so? As Rabbi Shimon states, any slaughtering that does not render the meat permissible for consumption is not considered a valid slaughtering. Therefore, the slaughtering of Kodashim, even if performed correctly within the Temple courtyard, is not considered a valid slaughtering because it does not render the meat permissible for consumption. What renders Kodashim permissible? The sprinkling of the blood. Thus, if one slaughters a consecrated animal, and then slaughters its offspring on the same day, the first act of slaughtering is not deemed a valid slaughtering because it did not render the meat permissible. Consequently, the second animal, the offspring, is not considered subject to the prohibition of slaughtering an animal and its offspring on the same day. This is the novel ruling of Rabbi Shimon. The Gemara questions this, but the principle remains: if the first act is not considered a valid slaughtering, the prohibition does not apply. Even if the slaughtering was performed with a kosher knife and all the proper intentions, if it doesn't render the meat permissible, it's not a valid slaughtering for this prohibition.
The Sages, however, dispute this. They argue that the sprinkling of the blood is irrelevant; if the animal was slaughtered correctly, it is a valid slaughtering. The question arises: are we discussing a case where both the mother and the offspring are consecrated animals? Yes, that is the case. Even if only the mother was consecrated and slaughtered, and then the unconsecrated offspring was slaughtered, the principle remains: if the first slaughtering is not considered valid, the prohibition is not transgressed until the blood is sprinkled. This is the core of the dispute.
Now, Rava raises a challenge from a Baraisa. This Baraisa presents several cases, each with its own specific ruling and reasoning. We will examine them one by one. The first case involves two consecrated animals, both slaughtered outside the Temple courtyard. The second person who slaughters transgresses a negative commandment and receives lashes. Why? Because he slaughtered a consecrated animal outside the Temple courtyard. However, he does not receive the punishment of spiritual excision (Karet) because this animal was not fit to be brought as an offering at that specific time. Rabbi Shimon maintains that if a consecrated animal, at the time of its slaughter, could eventually become fit to be brought inside the Temple courtyard, then slaughtering it outside incurs lashes, but not Karet. If the animal would never be kosher to be brought inside, then slaughtering it outside would not incur any penalty at all. In our case, the second animal would eventually be fit to be brought inside, as there is nothing inherently wrong with it. The first animal was slaughtered outside, but Rabbi Shimon holds that the prohibition of slaughtering an animal and its offspring on the same day does not apply to consecrated animals. So, the second animal could have been brought inside. Therefore, it should be liable for Karet. This is a question we must keep in mind.
The Sages, on the other hand, state that any consecrated animal that does not incur Karet also does not incur lashes. They do not differentiate; it's all or nothing. If there's no Karet, there are no lashes either. Rabbi Shimon, however, distinguishes: no Karet, but still lashes for transgressing a negative commandment. The question from before resurfaces: if the first animal was slaughtered outside, and Rabbi Shimon considers that not a valid slaughtering, then the second animal is not subject to the prohibition of slaughtering an animal and its offspring on the same day. Therefore, the second animal could be brought inside immediately and should incur Karet if slaughtered outside. The Baraisa, as presented, seems to be missing some distinctions. Let's clarify the cases.
Case number one: Two consecrated animals, both slaughtered outside. According to the Sages, the first slaughtering is considered valid, and thus the second animal is subject to the prohibition of slaughtering an animal and its offspring on the same day. Since it is forbidden to bring it on the altar, there is no transgression of slaughtering outside, and therefore no lashes. However, according to Rabbi Shimon, the first slaughtering is not considered valid because it did not render the meat permissible. Therefore, the second animal is not subject to the prohibition of slaughtering an animal and its offspring on the same day, meaning it could have been brought to the altar immediately. Thus, if slaughtered outside, it incurs Karet, not just lashes. This contradicts the initial statement of the Baraisa. The Gemara clarifies that the Baraisa meant that the first animal was slaughtered outside, which incurs Karet. But since Rabbi Shimon does not consider it a valid slaughtering for the purpose of the prohibition, the second animal is not subject to the prohibition. Therefore, it could have been brought to the altar immediately. If it is then slaughtered outside, it also incurs Karet. So, both would incur Karet. This is the understanding of Rabbi Shimon's position in this case.
Case number two: One animal slaughtered outside, and the second inside. According to the Sages, the first animal slaughtered outside incurs Karet. The second animal, slaughtered inside, is valid. There is no prohibition of slaughtering an animal and its offspring on the same day because it was slaughtered inside. One receives lashes for the prohibition, but not Karet for slaughtering outside. According to Rabbi Shimon, the first animal slaughtered outside incurs Karet. The second animal, brought inside, is valid. There is no prohibition of slaughtering an animal and its offspring on the same day because, as stated, Rabbi Shimon does not consider the first slaughtering valid for that prohibition. So, the second animal is perfectly kosher and its slaughtering inside is a Mitzvah.
Case number three: One animal slaughtered inside, and the second outside. According to the Sages, the first animal slaughtered inside is valid, and there is no penalty. The second animal, slaughtered outside, is invalid because it is subject to the prohibition of slaughtering an animal and its offspring on the same day. It was slaughtered prematurely. Therefore, one receives lashes. However, one is exempt from Karet for slaughtering outside, because the Sages hold that if an animal is not fit to be brought to the altar at that time, slaughtering it outside does not incur Karet. According to Rabbi Shimon, the second animal incurs lashes. Why? Because the first animal was slaughtered inside. However, Rabbi Shimon does not consider that a valid slaughtering because it does not render the meat permissible for consumption. Only the sprinkling of the blood does. So, if the first slaughtering is not a valid slaughtering, the second animal is not subject to the prohibition. Therefore, it could be brought to the altar immediately. If so, why does Rabbi Shimon only say lashes, and not Karet, for slaughtering it outside? This is the core question. If the first slaughtering is not a valid slaughtering, then the second animal is not subject to the prohibition of slaughtering an animal and its offspring on the same day. It could be brought now. Therefore, slaughtering it outside should incur Karet, not just lashes.
The Gemara explains that the previous statement, "There is no prohibition against slaughtering an animal and its offspring on the same day for Kodashim," was not meant literally. Rather, Rav Menashya taught that there are no lashes for slaughtering an animal and its offspring on the same day for Kodashim. This means the prohibition itself does apply to Kodashim, but the specific punishment of lashes is not administered. Why? Because the slaughtering of Kodashim only renders the meat permissible for consumption after the blood is sprinkled. Until then, the meat is not considered permissible. For lashes to be administered, a proper warning (hatra'ah) must be given. One cannot warn a person about the transgression of slaughtering an animal and its offspring on the same day if the act of slaughtering itself does not definitively complete the transgression. Since the transgression is only completed with the sprinkling of the blood, and the person might not sprinkle the blood, a proper warning cannot be given at the time of slaughtering. Therefore, one transgresses the negative commandment but is exempt from lashes. This clarifies the Baraisa: the first animal was slaughtered inside, and it is a valid slaughtering. The second animal is indeed subject to the prohibition of slaughtering an animal and its offspring on the same day, which is why it cannot be brought now. Since it is not fit to be brought now, slaughtering it outside incurs lashes but not Karet. The exemption from lashes is due to the lack of a proper warning, not the absence of the prohibition itself.
Rava further clarifies this principle. He presents a case where the mother is an unconsecrated animal (Chullin) and the offspring is a peace-offering (Shlamim). If one slaughters the Chullin first, and then the Shlamim on the same day, one is exempt from lashes for the prohibition of slaughtering an animal and its offspring on the same day. Why? Because the slaughtering of the Shlamim is not considered valid until the blood is sprinkled, and thus a proper warning cannot be given. However, if one slaughters the Shlamim first, and then the Chullin, one is liable for lashes. Why? Because the slaughtering of the Chullin is a complete act that renders the meat permissible for consumption immediately, without needing a subsequent act like sprinkling blood. Therefore, a proper warning can be given. This demonstrates that the issue is indeed the ability to give a proper warning.
Now, let's consider a case with Chullin and a burnt-offering (Olah). If the mother is Chullin and the offspring is an Olah, and one slaughters the Chullin first and then the Olah, one is exempt from lashes. This is for the same reason: the slaughtering of an Olah is not considered valid until the blood is sprinkled, and thus a proper warning cannot be given. However, if one slaughters the Olah first and then the Chullin, there is a difference of opinion. According to the first opinion, one is exempt from the prohibition of slaughtering an animal and its offspring on the same day entirely, not just from lashes. Why? Because the slaughtering of an Olah never renders the meat permissible for consumption, even after sprinkling the blood, as Olah offerings are entirely consumed on the altar. Therefore, it is never considered a valid slaughtering that renders meat permissible. Consequently, the second animal is not subject to the prohibition. This differs from Shlamim, where the meat is permissible for consumption by the Kohanim after sprinkling.
Rabbi Yaakov, in the name of Rabbi Yochanan, disputes this. He maintains that the consumption by the altar is also considered "eating" for halachic purposes. He cites a verse that speaks of two types of consumption: human consumption and altar consumption. Therefore, if a Kohen intended to consume the offering after its designated time, or to offer it on the altar after its designated time, it is considered Pigul (invalidated). This shows that altar consumption is indeed considered "eating." Thus, according to Rabbi Yochanan, the case of an Olah is the same as a Shlamim: if one slaughters the Olah first (inside the Temple courtyard) and then the Chullin (outside), one is liable for lashes for the prohibition of slaughtering an animal and its offspring on the same day. This is because the Olah's slaughtering is considered valid through its "consumption" on the altar. So, there is a fundamental disagreement regarding the nature of Olah slaughtering.
The Gemara then lists several other cases where the slaughtering does not render the animal permissible for eating: an animal that is a Terefah (non-kosher due to an internal defect), an animal slaughtered for idolatry, a Red Heifer (Parah Adumah), an ox condemned to be stoned, or a calf whose neck is to be broken (Eglah Arufah). In all these cases, the slaughtering does not render the animal permissible for eating. Rav Nachman, in the name of Rav Misheya, rules that there is no prohibition of slaughtering an animal and its offspring on the same day in such cases, because the first slaughtering is not one that renders the animal permissible for consumption. Rabbi Shimon also rules this way, stating that it is a slaughtering that is not fit to render the animal permissible. The Sages, however, rule that one is liable, because even if the slaughtering does not render the animal permissible for eating due to an external reason (e.g., it was already a Terefah), it is still considered a valid slaughtering for the purpose of the prohibition. This is the core of their disagreement.
Rashi clarifies that if one deliberately pressed against the vital signs during slaughtering, making the animal a Nevilah (carcass), then even the Sages would agree there is no prohibition of slaughtering an animal and its offspring on the same day, because no valid slaughtering occurred at all. In the previous cases, a valid slaughtering was performed, but the animal was forbidden for other reasons. Here, the act of slaughtering itself was flawed.
The Gemara then discusses a case where the Sages rule that one is liable for the prohibition of slaughtering an animal and its offspring on the same day if the mother was slaughtered for idolatry. This applies specifically if the first animal was slaughtered for idolatry, and the second for one's own table. In this scenario, one is first judged for the prohibition of slaughtering an animal and its offspring on the same day and receives lashes. Then, one is judged for the idolatry. This raises a question: how can one receive two punishments, especially when the first act (idolatry) carries the death penalty? The general rule is that one receives the stricter punishment and is exempt from the lighter one. Reish Lakish explains that this case refers to two separate individuals: one who slaughtered for idolatry, and another who slaughtered for his own table. Therefore, each receives their respective punishment. However, if the same person performed both acts simultaneously, one would only receive the death penalty for idolatry and be exempt from lashes for the prohibition of slaughtering an animal and its offspring on the same day.
Rabbi Yochanan challenges Reish Lakish, stating that "even schoolchildren know" that one does not receive two punishments (death and lashes) for a single transgression. The novel point of the Mishnah, according to Rabbi Yochanan, is that sometimes, even if one slaughters the first animal for one's own table and the second for idolatry, one is still liable for lashes for the prohibition of slaughtering an animal and its offspring on the same day. This applies when the person was not warned about the idolatry. In such a case, even though the act of idolatry potentially carries the death penalty, since no warning was given for it, the death penalty is not administered. Therefore, the person is liable for the lashes for the prohibition of slaughtering an animal and its offspring on the same day. Rabbi Yochanan holds that the potential for a severe punishment does not exempt one from a lighter punishment if the severe punishment is not actually administered due to lack of warning. Reish Lakish, however, maintains that even the potential for a severe punishment exempts one from a lighter punishment, regardless of whether a warning was given for the severe punishment.
The Gemara then discusses a similar dispute between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish regarding a person who transgresses an act that incurs both lashes and a monetary payment. If the person was not warned about the lashes, Rabbi Yochanan says they are liable for the monetary payment. Reish Lakish says they are exempt, because the act potentially incurs lashes. The Gemara asks why we need both cases to teach this principle. It answers that if we only had the idolatry case (death penalty vs. lashes), one might think Reish Lakish's position (potential severe punishment exempts lighter punishment) only applies when both punishments are "on the body" (death and lashes). But in the case of lashes and monetary payment, where the punishments are of different categories, one might think Reish Lakish would agree that the monetary payment is due if lashes are not administered. Conversely, if we only had the lashes and monetary payment case, one might think Rabbi Yochanan's position (actual administration of punishment matters) only applies there. But in the idolatry case, where both punishments are "on the body," he might agree with Reish Lakish. Therefore, both cases are necessary to fully understand their disagreement.
Finally, the Gemara returns to the statement, "He slaughtered for idolatry, Rabbi Shimon exempts, and the Sages obligate." Rabbi Shimon exempts because the slaughtering for idolatry is not considered a valid slaughtering that renders the animal permissible. Therefore, the second animal is not subject to the prohibition of slaughtering an animal and its offspring on the same day. The Gemara then questions the ruling regarding the Red Heifer, which is mentioned as one of the cases where Rabbi Shimon exempts. The Red Heifer does not have offspring. The Gemara clarifies that the Red Heifer's meat is considered "foodstuff" (okhel) for the purpose of ritual impurity, even though it is forbidden for consumption. Rabbi Shimon states that the Red Heifer's meat is considered "foodstuff" and can impart ritual impurity. The problem is that for something to be considered "foodstuff," it must be permissible to eat, even if only by a non-Jew. However, the Red Heifer is forbidden for any benefit, even for a non-Jew. So, how can Rabbi Shimon consider it "foodstuff"? The answer is that at one point, it was fit to be given to a non-Jew, before it became consecrated in a specific way.