Today's discussion begins with a re-examination of a teaching from Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Shimon. He taught that if a person eats an entire live bird, even if the bird does not contain a full olive-sized portion of meat, the person is liable for eating a limb from a living animal. The rationale provided by commentators is that since a bird is typically cut into parts for consumption, it is viewed as if it already consists of separate limbs, even when whole. This concept is encapsulated by the principle: "An animal, in its lifetime, is designated for its limbs."
Rava introduces a novel idea: if one posits that Rabbi Elazar b'Rabbi Shimon holds that a person's intention can designate something as food (which has implications for ritual impurity, for example), then a further distinction arises. If a person intended to eat a bird only after it died, but then consumed it while it was still alive, they would be exempt from the prohibition of eating a limb from a living animal. This is because their intention to eat it dead indicates that they did not consider it destined to be cut into limbs while alive, thereby removing it from the category of a limb from a living animal. The individual's intention changes its status.
Abaye challenges this, asking if there is any other area of Jewish law where an action is forbidden for one person but permissible for another, based solely on intention. Rava responds that yes, such a distinction exists, as the ruling depends entirely on the individual's intention. One person's intention to eat it alive (and thus cut into limbs) makes them liable, while another's intention to eat it dead removes that liability, even if they ultimately eat it alive.
The discussion then shifts to the scriptural sources for the prohibition of eating a limb from a living animal. Rabbi Yochanan states that the verse "You shall not eat the soul with the flesh" is the source for eating a limb from a living animal. Here, "soul" refers to a living limb, because once a limb is cut off, it does not regenerate, much like life itself. He also identifies the verse "And flesh in the field that is torn you shall not eat" as the source for eating flesh from a living animal, and also for eating meat from a torn animal (a "treifah"). Thus, according to Rabbi Yochanan, there are two distinct prohibitions: eating a limb from a living animal and eating flesh from a living animal, in addition to the prohibition of eating a treifah.
Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish offers a different interpretation. He maintains that the first verse, "You shall not eat the soul with the flesh," encompasses both the prohibition of eating a limb from a living animal and eating flesh from a living animal. He understands the phrase "you shall not eat" to apply to both "soul" (limbs) and "flesh." Consequently, for Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, the verse "And flesh in the field that is torn you shall not eat" serves only as the source for the prohibition of eating meat from a treifah.
These differing interpretations lead to practical distinctions regarding the number of lashes (malkuyot) one incurs for violating these prohibitions. According to Rabbi Yochanan, if one eats both a limb from a living animal and flesh from a living animal, they incur two sets of lashes because these prohibitions stem from two distinct verses. Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, however, holds that only one set of lashes is incurred, as both prohibitions are derived from a single verse. Conversely, if one eats flesh from a living animal and meat from a treifah, Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish would say they incur two sets of lashes (as these come from two separate verses), while Rabbi Yochanan would say only one (as the treifah verse covers both flesh from a living animal and treifah meat).
However, there is a consensus: if one eats a limb from a living animal and meat from a treifah, everyone agrees that two sets of lashes are incurred. This is because, regardless of their individual interpretations, both a limb from a living animal and meat from a treifah are universally understood to originate from different scriptural prohibitions.
A challenge is then raised against the last case, where everyone agrees to two sets of lashes. If one eats a limb from a living animal that is also a treifah, Rabbi Yochanan says two sets of lashes, while Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says only one. This contradicts the earlier consensus. Rabbi Yosef resolves this by distinguishing between eating from one animal versus two animals. The consensus for two sets of lashes applies when the limb from a living animal and the treifah meat come from two separate animals. However, the dispute between Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish arises when both the limb from a living animal and the treifah status originate from the same animal.
The Gemara then explores the nature of this dispute concerning a single animal. Abaye suggests it concerns a case where the animal became a treifah at the moment the majority of its body emerged from the womb. According to Rabbi Yochanan, who maintains that an animal, even when alive, is designated for its limbs, the prohibition of eating a limb from a living animal and the prohibition of treifah apply simultaneously from the moment of birth. Since these prohibitions arise concurrently, they are considered two distinct violations, leading to two sets of lashes. Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, however, argues that an animal is not considered designated for its limbs until it is slaughtered. Therefore, the prohibition of eating a limb from a living animal only applies once a limb is actually severed. Since the animal became a treifah at birth, the prohibition of treifah preceded the prohibition of eating a limb from a living animal. In such a scenario, the principle of "one prohibition does not take effect upon another prohibition" applies, resulting in only one set of lashes.
An alternative explanation for the dispute is proposed: everyone agrees that an animal, when alive, is not designated for its limbs, meaning the prohibition of eating a limb from a living animal only applies after severance. The dispute then centers on whether the prohibition of eating a limb from a living animal can take effect upon an existing prohibition of treifah. Rabbi Yochanan holds that it can, particularly if the second prohibition is more stringent (e.g., eating a limb from a living animal applies even to non-Jews). Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, however, does not differentiate based on stringency and maintains that one prohibition cannot take effect upon another.
A third explanation suggests that everyone agrees an animal, when alive, is designated for its limbs, meaning the prohibition of eating a limb from a living animal applies from birth. The dispute then arises when the animal becomes a treifah at a later point. The question becomes whether the prohibition of treifah can take effect upon the existing prohibition of eating a limb from a living animal. Rabbi Yochanan would say it can, while Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish would say it cannot, based on the general principle of whether one prohibition can take effect upon another.
Rava offers a fourth explanation: the animal became a treifah precisely by the act of severing a limb that renders an animal a treifah. In this case, the prohibitions of eating a limb from a living animal and treifah occur simultaneously. Rabbi Yochanan, holding that an animal is not designated for its limbs until severed, would say both prohibitions arise at the same instant, leading to two sets of lashes. Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, who believes an animal is designated for its limbs even while alive, would argue that the prohibition of eating a limb from a living animal already existed. When the limb was severed, the treifah status was added, but since a prior prohibition was already in effect, the principle of "one prohibition does not take effect upon another" applies, resulting in only one set of lashes.
Rabbi Chiya bar Abba, in the name of Rabbi Yochanan, states that if one eats forbidden fat from an animal that is both living and a treifah, they are liable for two sets of lashes. Rabbi Ami questions this, suggesting they should be liable for three: for eating a limb from a living animal, for eating forbidden fat, and for eating treifah meat. The Gemara then explores the basis of this dispute, again using the scenario where the animal became a treifah at the moment the majority of its body emerged from the womb.
The opinion that holds for three sets of lashes maintains that an animal, even when alive, is designated for its limbs. Therefore, the prohibitions of eating a limb from a living animal, forbidden fat, and treifah all take effect simultaneously at birth, leading to three distinct violations. The opinion that holds for two sets of lashes argues that an animal is not designated for its limbs until severed. Thus, at birth, only the prohibitions of forbidden fat and treifah apply. The prohibition of eating a limb from a living animal would only apply later, upon severance, but by then, the principle of "one prohibition does not take effect upon another" would prevent it from adding a third liability.
Another explanation for the dispute is offered: everyone agrees that an animal, when alive, is not designated for its limbs. The dispute arises regarding whether the prohibition of eating a limb from a living animal, which takes effect upon severance, can then take effect upon the existing prohibitions of forbidden fat and treifah. The opinion holding for three sets of lashes argues that it can, especially because the prohibition of eating a limb from a living animal is a more stringent prohibition (applying even to non-Jews). The opinion holding for two sets of lashes maintains that it cannot, even if it is a more stringent prohibition, because two prohibitions (forbidden fat and treifah) already existed simultaneously.
A third explanation suggests that everyone agrees an animal, when alive, is designated for its limbs. In this scenario, the prohibitions of eating a limb from a living animal and forbidden fat apply from birth. The dispute then concerns a case where the animal became a treifah at a later point. The question is whether the prohibition of treifah can take effect upon the existing prohibitions of eating a limb from a living animal and forbidden fat. The opinion holding for three sets of lashes argues that it can, drawing a parallel to the case of forbidden fat from a carcass or a treifah animal. The Torah explicitly states that the forbidden fat of a carcass or treifah, while permissible for other uses, is forbidden for consumption. This is understood as an exception to the rule of "one prohibition does not take effect upon another," demonstrating that the prohibition of treifah can be added to an already existing prohibition of forbidden fat. This principle is then extended to allow the prohibition of treifah to apply even when the prohibitions of forbidden fat and eating a limb from a living animal are already present. The opposing opinion, holding for two sets of lashes, argues that this exception only applies to forbidden fat, which is "loosened from its generality" (meaning it is not forbidden in all circumstances, e.g., fat from a wild animal is permissible). However, the prohibition of eating a limb from a living animal is not "loosened from its generality" (it applies to all animals), and therefore the prohibition of treifah cannot take effect upon it.
The discussion shifts to the quantity of food required for liability. Rav Dimi, arriving from the Land of Israel, relates that Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish asked Rabbi Yochanan about a case where one divides an olive-sized portion of a limb from a living animal externally (before eating it) and consumes the two halves within the requisite time for eating. What is the ruling? The question arises because while generally, consuming a full measure of forbidden food in parts within the requisite time makes one liable, eating a limb from a living animal has a unique stringency: the measure includes bones and sinews, which are not typically considered food. This unique stringency might imply that the entire olive-sized portion must be eaten in one gulp. Rabbi Yochanan responded that one is exempt. This implies that due to the unique stringency of including non-meat parts in the measure, the act of eating must be a single, complete gulp.
The Gemara then asks: what if the division occurs internally? That is, one places the entire olive-sized portion in their mouth but swallows it in two gulps. Rabbi Yochanan states that in this case, one is liable. This indicates that while external division matters, once the food is in the mouth, the benefit derived from the throat by the entire olive-sized portion is sufficient for liability, even if swallowed in parts.
Ravin presents a slightly different version of the exchange. He agrees that if divided externally, one is exempt. However, for internal division, Rabbi Yochanan says one is liable, while Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says one is exempt. Rabbi Yochanan's reasoning is that the throat benefited from an olive-sized portion, implying that the sensation of eating in the throat is paramount. Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, however, argues that liability requires the food to reach the stomach as a complete olive-sized portion, which does not happen if swallowed in parts.
The Gemara challenges Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish: if one must swallow an entire olive-sized portion in one gulp for it to reach the stomach, how could anyone ever be liable for eating a limb from a living animal, since food is typically chewed and swallowed in smaller portions? Rav Kahana responds that liability would only occur in a specific case: if one swallows a small bone (like a small bone from the hip) that has a small amount of meat and sinews attached, and this entire piece, including the non-meat parts, constitutes an olive-sized portion. Since such a bone cannot be chewed, it would be swallowed whole, thus fulfilling Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish's requirement for a single, complete ingestion into the stomach.
A third opinion is offered by Rabbi Elazar, who states that even if the limb from a living animal is divided externally, one is liable. His reasoning is that "lacking closeness is not like lacking action." The mere separation of the pieces does not negate the fact that a complete act of eating an olive-sized portion occurred within the requisite time.
Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish then states that the olive-sized portion for which one is liable does not include food caught between the teeth. Rabbi Yochanan, however, asserts that it does. This reflects their underlying dispute: whether the benefit derived from the throat/mouth is sufficient (Rabbi Yochanan) or if the food must reach the stomach (Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish). Rav Pappa clarifies that regarding food stuck between the teeth, everyone agrees it does not count, as no benefit is derived. The dispute, he says, is concerning food stuck in the gums or palate. Rabbi Yochanan counts it because the throat benefits, while Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish does not, requiring the food to reach the stomach for liability.
Rabbi Assi, in the name of Rabbi Yochanan, presents a case: if one eats half an olive-sized portion, vomits it, and then eats another half an olive-sized portion (of different food) within the requisite time, they are liable. The Gemara asks why, and the answer is that the throat benefited from an olive-sized portion in total. Rabbi Elazar then asks Rabbi Assi: what if one eats half an olive-sized portion, vomits it, and then eats the *same* half an olive-sized portion again? What is the ruling?
The Gemara clarifies that Rabbi Elazar's question is not about whether vomited food is still considered food (it is), but rather whether we follow the benefit to the throat or the stomach. If we follow the throat, one would be liable, as the throat benefited from a full olive-sized portion. If we follow the stomach, one would be exempt, as a full olive-sized portion never simultaneously resided in the stomach. The Gemara suggests that Rabbi Elazar should have been able to deduce the answer from Rabbi Assi's previous teaching (eating half, vomiting, then eating a different half and being liable). Since in that case, the stomach never had a full olive-sized portion simultaneously, but one was still liable, it must mean that the ruling follows the benefit to the throat.
The Gemara then re-frames the entire exchange. It suggests that Rabbi Assi had forgotten a specific detail from Rabbi Yochanan's teaching, and Rabbi Elazar came to remind him. Rabbi Elazar essentially asked Rabbi Assi why, when quoting Rabbi Yochanan, he presented the case with two *different* half-olive-sized portions. Rabbi Elazar argued that by presenting the case with the *same* half-olive-sized portion being eaten, vomited, and re-eaten, two important principles would be learned: that vomited food is still considered food, and that liability follows the benefit to the throat. Rabbi Assi remained silent, acknowledging the validity of the point. Rabbi Elazar then reminded Rabbi Assi that he himself had asked Rabbi Yochanan this very question many times (about eating the same half-olive-sized portion twice), and Rabbi Yochanan had consistently ruled that one is liable because the throat benefited from an olive-sized portion. This concludes the discussion, reminding Rabbi Assi of Rabbi Yochanan's established ruling.