The discussion begins with the laws concerning a Chaver, an individual who accepts upon themselves the strict observance of the laws of Tumah v'Taharah (ritual purity and impurity). If a Chaver initially upholds these standards but then reverts to their old ways, the question arises whether they can ever regain their status.
One opinion states that such an individual is permanently disqualified; they are given one chance, and if they break their word, they can never again become a Chaver because their trustworthiness is compromised. However, Rabbi Yehuda distinguishes between different forms of backsliding. If they were careful in public but not in private (referred to as b'matmoniyot), meaning they were lax when no one was watching, then they are not readmitted. But if their transgression was not in private, then they can be accepted back, allowing them to perform Teshuvah (repentance).
Some argue differently: if they maintained their private observance, that is considered better, and they can be readmitted. If their transgression was public, then their status as a Chaver is lost. The general principle is that individuals are always accepted back for Teshuvah. This is akin to the pair of rabbis who taught that Teshuvah is always possible. We learn that if someone accepts all the practices of a Chaver except for one, they are not accepted. This rule is universally upheld. However, if their lapse was not public, the rabbis allow them to perform Teshuvah, whether their actions were public or private. They can retract their past behavior and return to Teshuvah.
The discussion then shifts to the case of a Chaver who became a tax collector. In those days, tax collectors were often considered thieves. Therefore, if a Chaver chose to become a tax collector, it indicated a disregard for their status as a Chaver, leading to its forfeiture. The question then arises: what if such a person left their tax-collecting job and wished to regain their Chaver status? Initially, the rabbis said that if he left his job, he is like anyone else and can become a Chaver again. The rabbis needed his expertise because he knew the answers to many questions. They sent 400 pairs of rabbis to ask him questions. Upon hearing of their arrival, he prepared 400 chairs for them. However, when the rabbis learned he had been a tax collector, they sent back a message: "Go to the place you chose. If you think being a tax collector is important, go there." This meant they would not come to ask him questions; his status as a tax collector rendered him unacceptable.
He sent back a message saying he was no longer collecting taxes. But the response was, "Too late. What did you want in the tax-collecting business?" A Braitah states that if he left his job, he is accepted. However, another Braitah explicitly says that once someone enters the tax-collecting business, even if they stop, they are not accepted back. Rabba, however, disagrees, citing the end of a Braitah that states, "If he left, he is like any other person." Therefore, we follow the latter part of the Braitah, which implies acceptance.
The discussion then moves to the laws of inspecting animals for blemishes. A person is permitted to inspect an animal belonging to someone else to determine if it has a blemish that would render it unfit for sacrifice, thereby allowing it to be slaughtered and eaten. However, one cannot inspect their own animal for such blemishes due to potential bias, lacking objectivity. Yet, if an animal in one's flock has a blemish, one can inspect it to see if it allows for its redemption (Pidyon). Similarly, if one has a tenth animal that is Kodesh (sanctified) and it develops a blemish, one is permitted to inspect it. Likewise, a person can investigate their own produce to determine if it has become Tameh (ritually impure).
The Gemara then asks: what is the case where one cannot check their own Bechor (firstborn animal)? This applies if the owner is a Yachid (an individual, not a court of three rabbis). The owner stands to benefit because if the animal is deemed to have a permanent blemish (Moom), he doesn't have to bring it to the Beit HaMikdash (Holy Temple). So, is he believed? The Gemara suggests that perhaps he wouldn't even be believed when inspecting someone else's animal. If he cannot inspect his own, how could he inspect another's? For significant blemishes, such as a blind eye or a broken leg, three rabbis are required for inspection. Thus, it cannot be referring to a single individual, as one individual would not be trusted for such a ruling, whether it's his own animal or someone else's. So, it must be referring to three rabbis.
The Gemara then questions: if it's three rabbis, why would they be suspected of making a wrong ruling? We know that a Beit Din (rabbinical court) is not suspected of impropriety. For example, if a Beit Din permits a woman to remarry through Mi'un (a rabbinic annulment) or Chalitzah (a ceremony releasing a widow from levirate marriage), one of the rabbis from that Beit Din can marry her. We do not suspect that he performed the ceremony with the intention of marrying her himself. Therefore, if three rabbis are involved, they should be able to inspect a Bechor without suspicion.
The Gemara answers that it is indeed referring to one individual, but specifically a Yachid Mumcheh (an expert individual). While normally three rabbis are needed, an expert can rule alone in certain cases, such as annulling vows (Nedarim). So, if he is the owner of the Bechor, he cannot inspect it. But for others' animals, a Yachid Mumcheh would be permitted. The Gemara clarifies that just as a Yachid Mumcheh can annul Nedarim, he can also permit Bechorot and other consecrated animals (Kadashim) if they have a blemish.
Why can he check his own Korban (sacrificial animal) if it has a blemish? Because if he truly wanted to remove the animal from its sanctified status, he could perform Hatarat Nedarim (annulment of vows) on the original dedication, thereby completely removing its sanctity. Since he has the ability to remove the sanctity entirely, we trust him to rule on whether it has a permanent blemish. We do not suspect him of falsely declaring a temporary blemish to be permanent. Why would he lie? If he wanted to remove the animal from its sanctity, he could simply go to a rabbi. Therefore, we trust his halachic ruling.
Similarly, regarding Ma'aser Behemah (tithed animal), if he wanted to save the animal from its sanctified status before it was designated as Ma'aser, he could have intentionally put blemishes on all his animals in a permissible way (b'heter) before the designation. Since he had a permissible way to prevent it from becoming Ma'aser, we trust him to rule on it after it has become Ma'aser. The same logic applies to checking for Tumah (impurity) on his own produce. We do not consider him biased because even if he rules his items are Tameh, he can still eat them when he himself is Tameh. He doesn't lose the item; he simply consumes it in a state of impurity. There is no loss, so there is no bias.
The Mishnah then presents a case: if an animal consecrated for a sacrifice (Korban) develops a blemish, rendering it unfit for the altar, it is sold, and the profit goes to Hekdesh (the Temple treasury). These animals can be sold in the regular meat market (Itlis). Normally, an animal that was Kodesh, even after Pidyon, retains a certain sanctity, and it is not preferred to sell it in a regular market alongside other meats. However, since the profit from this blemished animal goes to Hekdesh, it is permitted to sell it in the marketplace to fetch the best price. If the profit were to go only to the owner, it would be sold privately, with more respect. But for Hekdesh, it can be treated like regular meat, even slaughtered in the marketplace, and used as a weight on a scale to measure other meat. This is because the profit benefits Hekdesh.
The next case in the Mishnah concerns a Bechor or Ma'aser Behemah that develops a blemish. If these are sold, the owner gets the profit, not Hekdesh. Since the owner benefits, we are not lenient regarding its sale. It must be treated with respect: it cannot be sold in the market, nor weighed on a scale; it must be sold by estimation. However, if a blemished consecrated animal (Mukdashim) is sold, and the profit goes to Hekdesh, there is a leniency. Even though it cannot be weighed directly on a scale, if a piece of meat has already been weighed (e.g., three pounds), that weighed meat can be used as a counterweight against the blemished animal. It's a step removed: not the weight against the Bechor, but weighed meat against the Bechor.
The Gemara clarifies the first case: when the profit goes to Hekdesh. This refers to a situation where Pidyon has already been made on the animal. The novelty is that even after Pidyon, a certain degree of sanctity remains, prohibiting shearing or benefiting from its offspring. The extra money from the sale, beyond the Pidyon amount, goes to Hekdesh. But if Pidyon was made, the owner gets the money from the sale, as the Pidyon money already went to the Beit HaMikdash. So, how can the Mishnah say the money goes to Hekdesh?
It must be referring to before Pidyon, meaning the sale itself acts as the Pidyon. However, Pidyon must be performed on a living animal. The Mishnah implies the animal is slaughtered. If one argues that Pidyon does not require the animal to be alive, then the question is resolved: the animal is slaughtered, and the sale itself is the Pidyon, with the money going to Hekdesh. But if Korbanot must be alive for Pidyon, then it must be referring to after Pidyon, in which case the owner should get the money.
Rav Ashi explains that "the profit goes to Hekdesh" means the *extra* profit from the Pidyon. Since we allow the animal to be sold in the marketplace at a normal price, the owner will initially perform Pidyon with a little extra money. This extra money, the "profit" of the Pidyon, goes to the Beit HaMikdash. The money from the sale of the animal itself, after Pidyon, goes to the owner. So, the novelty is that allowing a market sale generates more Pidyon money for Hekdesh. When it comes to Bechor and Ma'aser Behemah, where the owner gets the profit, they cannot be sold in the marketplace.
The Gemara then asks: regarding Bechor, it's understandable that it's not sold in the marketplace, but it can be sold privately by the Kohen (priest). But for Ma'aser Behemah, it sounds like it cannot be sold at all, neither in the market nor privately. The verse states regarding a Bechor, "You shall not redeem it," implying it is simply sold, even alive. There is no Pidyon for a Bechor. However, for Ma'aser, it says, "You shall not redeem it," and implies it cannot be sold in any way. So how can the Mishnah imply that Bechor and Ma'aser are similar in that they are not sold in the Itlis, but can be sold privately (for Bechor)? It sounds like Ma'aser cannot be sold at all.
Rav Shishat pondered this question at night and found an answer in a Braitah in the morning. The Braitah explains that the Mishnah is referring to Ma'aser Behemah belonging to Yetomim (orphans). Regular Ma'aser Behemah cannot be sold at all, neither privately nor publicly. But for Yetomim, the Sages made an exception after the animal was slaughtered, allowing its meat to be sold. This was because the Yetomim might not be able to consume all the meat, and we don't want them to incur a loss. So, Ma'aser Behemah belonging to Yetomim can be sold.
Rav Idi, Rav Shishat's attendant, heard the answer and went to the Beit Midrash (study hall) to share it, but he presented it as his own, not in Rav Shishat's name. Rav Shishat was angered and cursed him, saying, "May the one who bit me be bitten by a scorpion," implying a form of excommunication (Nidui). Why was Rav Shishat so upset? It is taught that when one quotes another's Torah in this world, it is as if the original speaker's lips move in the grave, allowing them to exist in "two worlds." Rav Shishat wanted his lips to move in the grave, and by not quoting him, Rav Idi denied him this.
The Braitah states that one can sell the blemished Ma'aser Behemah, even after slaughter. It also states that one can sell the inedible parts, such as horns and hide. The Braitah then says that one can "package" the deal: sell the inedible parts and include the meat, charging for the inedible parts. The Gemara asks why this packaging (Havla'ah) is necessary. The beginning of the Braitah implies one can sell it any way, but the end restricts it to this packaging method. The answer is that it's one case: Ma'aser Behemah of Yetomim, which can only be sold this way. So, you sell the inedible parts and include the meat.
But if it's not Yetomim, a regular person cannot use this package deal. Why is this different from the law of Lulav and Etrog during Shevi'it (Sabbatical year)? One can buy a Lulav and receive an Etrog as a gift, because one cannot conduct business with Shevi'it produce. If the seller doesn't want to give the Etrog as a gift, one can perform Havla'ah: charge extra for the Lulav and include the Etrog. Just as Havla'ah is permissible for Shevi'it produce, why not for Ma'aser Behemah?
Rav Ashi explains the difference: in the case of the Etrog, the Havla'ah is not noticeable because an Etrog is relatively inexpensive. When you pay a bit extra for the Lulav, it's not obvious that you're paying for the Etrog. However, when selling the inedible parts of an animal, which are almost worthless, and you greatly inflate their price, it is clear that you are charging for the meat. This Havla'ah is noticeable, and therefore forbidden for a regular person's Ma'aser Behemah.
The Braitah mentioned Ma'aser Behemah twice. If it's all one case (Ma'aser Behemah of Yetomim), why the repetition? The Gemara answers that it is indeed two cases. "Ma'aser Behemah of Yetomim" can be sold in the normal way, even the meat directly, because we don't want the Yetomim to lose out. "Ma'aser Behemah of an adult" that has been slaughtered can only be sold through Havla'ah, by packaging it with its hide, fat, and sinews.
How do we know this distinction? The verse "You shall not redeem it" juxtaposes the laws of Ma'aser with Temurah (exchanging a consecrated animal for a non-consecrated one, which also becomes holy). Temurah applies only when the animal is alive. Similarly, the prohibition against selling Ma'aser Behemah applies only when it is alive, according to Torah law. However, after slaughter (Shechitah), Torah law permits selling it. The rabbis, though, enacted a decree (Gezerah) against selling it even after Shechitah, fearing that it might lead to selling it while alive. But this rabbinic decree only applies to items forbidden while alive, specifically the meat. Other parts of the animal, which are permissible while alive, are not included in this decree. Therefore, the rabbis only decreed against selling the meat directly.
So, for Yetomim, the rabbis did not extend their decree, allowing them to sell the meat directly, following the Torah law. But for adults (Gedolim), the rabbis maintained the decree, permitting sale only through Havla'ah. This is because the decree on the meat was due to its prohibition while alive, whereas the other parts were permissible. Another rabbi, Rabbi Yitzchak ben Nasi, agrees that Ma'aser Behemah of Yetomim can be sold regularly, without Havla'ah.
The verse "as your heart desires, slaughter the meat" refers to a blemished animal. It says, "like the blessing that God gave you." This implies that there is no blessing in life, only after Shechitah. What type of item receives a blessing only after Shechitah and not before? A blemished Ma'aser Behemah. Other animals can be redeemed while alive, allowing one to benefit from them. But for Ma'aser Behemah, the only way to benefit is after Shechitah. Therefore, one cannot sell it alive. But after Shechitah, it says, "you can sell it," and "you get a blessing." This means the blessing that you cannot get while it's alive, you can get after Shechitah. Thus, the prohibition against selling it alive is a rabbinic decree, from which orphans are exempt.