A Yissachar / Zebulun Partnership in Loving Memory of Yishak ben Simcha A"H & Felicia bat Miriam A"H
Rabbi Eli Mansour

Daf Yomi

Bechorot 61A (12th Cycle Daf Yomi Shiur)

Lectured by Rabbi Eli Mansour

Published
February 29, 2008
Duration
46:52

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The Eddie B. Sit Edition presents an audio series of the Talmud Bavli, focusing on מסכת בכורות Masechet Bechorot, דף Daf Samech Aleph. Today's דף Daf is sponsored by אברהם בן אסתר Avraham ben Ester לעילוי נשמת le-iluy nishmat רבי משה בן נון Rebbe Moshe ben Nun. May the spirit of Hashem rest upon them in Gan Eden, Amen.

In our exploration today, we delve into a statement from the previous דף Daf attributed to רב אשי Rav Ashi. The discussion revolves around the case of calling the tenth animal the eleventh, or removing the designation of the tenth from it. When one refers to the tenth animal as the eleventh, this is considered an עקירה akirah. The Gemara notes that when the animal sticks its head out, and one calls it eleven, it is indeed an עקירה because the tenth is being referred to incorrectly.

The Gemara raises a crucial question: whose opinion does this reflect? It cannot align with רבי Rabbi, who asserts that calling the tenth animal eleven does not constitute an עקירה. The reasoning behind this is not immediately clear, but it establishes a significant distinction in halachic interpretation. Thus, the assertion from רב אשי Rav Ashi must be reconciled with רבי Rabbi's stance.

The Gemara proposes that even if we accept רבי Rabbi's view, it can still hold true in a case where there are many animals present. In such situations, when one says אחד עשר achad asar, it could imply 'one of the ten' rather than indicating eleven. This interpretation is critical as it mitigates the claim of עקירה, allowing for a broader understanding of the term used in context.

However, in a case where the individual has only one animal, calling the tenth one eleven cannot be interpreted as 'one of the ten.' Therefore, in this scenario, it must be considered an עקירה. The Gemara then seeks to substantiate רבי Rabbi's position by referencing a ברייתא braita that states if one calls the tenth animal eleven, it does not attain קדושה kadosh status. This reinforces the idea that the act of calling it eleven does not change its sanctity.

In contrast, רבי יוסי ברבי יהודה Rabbi Yose b'Rebbe Yehuda holds that the eleventh animal does become קדוש kadosh. He asserts that so long as the designation of the tenth has not been removed, the eleventh does not attain sanctity. The Gemara challenges this by pointing out a contradiction in רבי Rabbi's statements. If he claims that calling the tenth animal eleven does not constitute an עקירה, how can he then say that the eleventh is not קדוש kadosh?

The response clarifies that רבי Rabbi is discussing a situation where there are many animals, thus allowing for a different interpretation of the terms used. In this context, the use of אחד עשר achad asar does not imply an actual עקירה since it could refer to one of many animals designated for giving as a מעשר ma'aser.

Returning to the case discussed by רבא Rava, where two animals emerge simultaneously and are both called ten, the Gemara explains that while one is a מעשר ma'aser, the other becomes a שלמים shlamim. The lack of an עקירה in this instance means that both animals attain sanctity, but they cannot be offered together on the מזבח mizbeach due to their differing statuses.

As the discussion unfolds, we encounter a מחלוקת machloket regarding the fate of these two animals. One opinion suggests allowing them to graze until they develop blemishes, while another proposes bringing them both as שלמים shlamim. A third opinion, however, recommends letting them die, as they cannot be offered on the מזבח mizbeach.

The Gemara reconciles these opinions by noting that the first opinion, which allows grazing, is rooted in the principle that one cannot bring sanctified animals in a manner that leads to their disqualification. This is particularly relevant when considering the differing consumption times of מעשר ma'aser and שלמים shlamim. The former can be consumed over a longer period, while the latter has strict limitations.

Ultimately, the discussion leads to the conclusion that while both animals are indeed permitted for consumption, one must treat them with the stringency applicable to the שלמים shlamim. This ensures that they do not inadvertently become disqualified due to the differing rules governing their sanctity.

The Gemara continues to explore the implications of רבי Rabbi's statements, particularly focusing on the nature of תמורה temurah. If the eleventh animal is viewed as a תמורה due to the erroneous designation of the tenth, this raises questions about its status and whether it can be offered. The discussion emphasizes the importance of understanding the nuances of each case, as the halachic implications can significantly alter the outcome.

Through this intricate discourse, we see the depth of halachic reasoning and the careful consideration given to each scenario. The distinctions made, whether regarding the number of animals, their designations, or the implications of their sanctity, reflect a profound engagement with the principles of Jewish law. As we conclude our examination, we appreciate the rich tapestry of thought woven into the fabric of the Talmud, reminding us of the ongoing journey of learning and understanding within our tradition.