The previous **Mishnah** taught that a firstborn could sometimes be considered a firstborn for two distinct purposes: for inheritance and for the redemption by a priest. This occurs in cases where the initial issue from the mother's womb is not considered a viable birth. Examples include a sack filled with water or blood instead of an embryo, or containing faulty colored matter, or resembling fish, grasshoppers, or other creatures. Similarly, a miscarriage occurring before forty days is not considered a birth, as the embryo is still forming. In all these scenarios, since the initial expulsion is not deemed a birth, the subsequent child born is considered the firstborn for both inheritance and the obligation of redemption by a priest.
A different case arises with a Caesarian birth. If a child is delivered via Caesarian section, the womb is not opened in the natural way. If a second child is then born naturally after this Caesarian, neither child is considered a firstborn for either inheritance or redemption. The **Gemara** immediately questions this ruling. While it is understandable that the first child, born by Caesarian, might not be a firstborn for redemption because it did not emerge from the womb naturally, why would it not be a firstborn for inheritance? And why would the second child, born naturally from the womb, not be considered a firstborn for either purpose?
**Rabbi Shimon** offers a different perspective: the first child, born via Caesarian, is a firstborn for inheritance, and the second child, born naturally, is obligated in the redemption of the firstborn son. He argues that the first child, despite being born by Caesarian, is indeed the first issue. As for the second child, **Rabbi Shimon** holds that one can be a partial firstborn, meaning one can be a firstborn for the purpose of redemption even if not a firstborn in all aspects. Since this second child is the first to open the womb naturally, it incurs the obligation of five sela'im for redemption.
The **Gemara** then delves into the reasoning behind the initial ruling that the Caesarian-born child is not a firstborn for inheritance. It states that the Torah requires a "birth" (כילדו), and a Caesarian delivery is not considered a natural birth. Therefore, the first child is not a firstborn for inheritance. Regarding the second child, even though it is born naturally, it is not the "first of his strength" (פטר רחם) as there was already a child that preceded it. The **Gemara** explains that to be a firstborn of the womb, one must also be the firstborn overall. Since a child preceded it, even by Caesarian, the second child is not considered the firstborn of the womb and thus does not obligate the father to redeem it.
**Rabbi Shimon**, however, interprets the term "she gives birth" (תלד) in the Torah differently. Citing a teaching from **Tractate Nida**, **Rashi** explains that the Torah uses "she gives birth" even in the context of a Caesarian. Thus, **Rabbi Shimon** considers the first child, born by Caesarian, to be a regular birth for inheritance purposes. As for the second child, he maintains that one can be a firstborn for one specific law without being a full firstborn in all areas. Since this child is the first to emerge naturally from the womb, it is a firstborn regarding the redemption by a priest, even though it is the second child overall.
The **Mishnah** then presents another case: a woman who has never had children gives birth to two sons, and it is unknown which one is the firstborn. In this situation, the father must give five sela'im to the priest. The novel point here is that for the redemption of the firstborn son, one does not need to identify the exact firstborn, unlike for inheritance where the Torah uses the word "recognize" (יכיר). The payment is simply made for one of the two. If one of the children dies within thirty days, the father is exempt. This is because he can claim to the priest, "Perhaps the firstborn is the one who died." The principle here is that the burden of proof is on the priest, who is seeking to extract money. This exemption extends to the surviving child as well; when he grows older, he can claim that his deceased brother might have been the firstborn.
The **Mishnah** then discusses a scenario where the father dies, but the children are still alive. **Rabbi Meir** rules that if the redemption money was paid before the inheritance was divided, it is valid. However, if the priest comes to collect after the inheritance has been divided, the children are exempt. **Rabbi Yehuda**, disagreeing, states that regardless of whether the inheritance was divided or not, the children are obligated to pay, as the father's assets were already subject to the obligation of redemption. The **Gemara** will later explore the intricate laws underlying these differing opinions.
Finally, the **Mishnah** states that if the woman gives birth to a boy and a girl, and it is unknown which is the firstborn, the priest receives nothing. This is straightforward: the priest cannot claim the redemption money because the children can argue that the girl was the firstborn, and a girl does not obligate redemption. As **Rashi** notes, the priest's claim is weak, and the burden of proof is on him.
The **Gemara** now begins its analysis, focusing on **Rabbi Meir's** ruling regarding the father who died, leaving two sons of unknown firstborn status. **Rabbi Meir** differentiated between before and after the inheritance division. The **Gemara** first clarifies the timing of the father's death. If the father died *after* thirty days, he was already obligated to pay the five sela'im. This obligation would be a debt on his assets, regardless of whether the inheritance was divided. Therefore, **Rabbi Meir's** distinction would make no sense in this case; the children should always be obligated. Thus, the **Mishnah** must be discussing a case where the father died *within* thirty days, before the obligation for redemption fully materialized on him.
The **Gemara** then questions **Rabbi Meir's** distinction further. If the father died within thirty days, there was no prior obligation on him. So, if the priest approaches the sons *after* they have divided the inheritance, each son can deflect the claim by saying, "I am not the firstborn; go to my brother." This would exempt them. But why should this be different *before* the inheritance is divided? Even then, they could similarly push the priest back and forth, as there was no obligation on their father. The **Gemara** asks, what changes when the inheritance is divided?
In response, **Rabbi Yirmiya** explains that this **Mishnah** implies a principle from a different case: two individuals named **Yosef ben Shimon** living in the same city, who became partners in a field. If a creditor holds a debt document against "Yosef ben Shimon," he might be deflected by each one claiming to be the *other* **Yosef ben Shimon**. However, if they are partners in a field, the creditor can seize property from the shared field, declaring, "If you are the debtor, I am taking what is mine. If your partner is the debtor, I am still taking from the shared property, and you can sort it out amongst yourselves later." This principle applies to our **Mishnah**: before the inheritance is divided, the assets are like a shared field. The priest can claim the five sela'im from this joint fund, regardless of which brother is the firstborn. Once the inheritance is divided, the brothers are no longer partners; each has his distinct share, and they can then deflect the priest's claim.
**Rava** challenges this explanation. He states a fundamental principle: "A person's assets are their guarantor." This means that one only pursues the guarantor if the primary debtor is obligated but cannot pay. If the primary debtor is not obligated, one cannot pursue the guarantor. In our case, if the sons themselves can deflect the priest's claim (by each saying "I'm not the firstborn"), then their assets, which are like a guarantor, should also be immune. Therefore, **Rava** argues, you cannot claim that before the inheritance is divided, the priest can take from the assets, if he cannot take directly from the sons themselves. This contradicts the very idea that one does not go to the guarantor first if the principal is not obligated.
The **Gemara** acknowledges **Rava's** difficulty and proposes a different explanation for the **Mishnah**, one that requires three preliminary concepts. First, it assumes that the father died *after* thirty days. This means the father *was* obligated, and his assets bear this debt. However, if the father died after thirty days, why would **Rabbi Meir** distinguish between before and after the inheritance division? There should always be an obligation. The **Gemara** then refines the case: the *entire* inheritance was only five sela'im. This introduces complexity. If the inheritance is exactly five sela'im, and it's split between two brothers, how does the priest collect?
This leads to the three introductions. First, the opinion of **Rav Asa** from **Tractate Baba Batra** on how inheritance works for brothers. **Rav Asa** holds that when brothers divide an inheritance, it's not simply that each retroactively receives their specific share (a concept called retroactive selection). Rather, half of each brother's share is considered direct inheritance, and the other half is considered as if it were purchased from the other brother. So, if five sela'im are divided, each brother gets two and a half. But of that two and a half, one and a quarter is pure inheritance, and one and a quarter is considered acquired property. Second, the **Gemara** establishes that a loan stipulated in the Torah, like the redemption of the firstborn son, is considered a verbal loan, not a documented loan. Third, everyone agrees with **Rab Papah** that a verbal loan cannot be collected from acquired property, only from direct assets. Therefore, in our case, the priest can only collect from the "inheritance" portion of the money, which amounts to two and a half sela'im (one and a quarter from each brother).
Given these three principles, the dispute between **Rabbi Meir** and **Rabbi Yehuda** hinges on whether a partial redemption of the firstborn son is valid. **Rabbi Meir** holds that it's "all or nothing"—either five sela'im or nothing. Since the priest can only collect two and a half sela'im from the inheritance portion, and partial redemption is invalid, he gets nothing. **Rabbi Yehuda**, however, holds that one can collect a partial redemption, and thus the priest can collect the two and a half sela'im. The **Gemara** notes that **Rabbi Yehuda's** language in the **Mishnah** ("the assets are obligated") seems to imply a full obligation, not a partial one, which contradicts this explanation.
Furthermore, the **Gemara** presents a **Baraita** where **Rabbi Yehuda** discusses brothers who divided an inheritance of ten zuzim each. The **Gemara** explains that if this means ten zuzim total (five sela'im), and each brother received five zuzim (two and a half sela'im), then according to **Rav Asa's** view, only one and a quarter sela'im from each brother would be considered direct inheritance. If **Rabbi Yehuda** allowed partial redemption, why would he specify a case of ten zuzim? He could have chosen a smaller amount. The fact that he chose ten zuzim (which, if it means ten zuzim *of inheritance* for each, totals five sela'im of inheritance) implies that he believes the priest must receive the full five sela'im. This suggests that **Rabbi Yehuda** also believes it's "all or nothing," contradicting the previous explanation of their dispute.
The **Gemara** therefore concludes with a final answer: everyone agrees that it's "five sela'im or nothing." The dispute between **Rabbi Meir** and **Rabbi Yehuda** lies in either the first or second of the three introductions. Either they dispute **Rav Asa's** view (that inheritance is half direct, half acquired property) or **Rab Papah's** view (that a verbal loan cannot be collected from acquired property). According to one interpretation, **Rabbi Meir** agrees with **Rav Asa** and **Rab Papah**, and since the loan is verbal and cannot be collected from acquired property, and only two and a half sela'im are available from the direct inheritance, the priest gets nothing (because it's "all or nothing"). **Rabbi Yehuda**, however, might disagree with **Rav Asa**, holding that the entire inheritance is considered direct inheritance, allowing the priest to collect the full five. Alternatively, **Rabbi Yehuda** might disagree with **Rab Papah**, holding that even a verbal loan *can* be collected from acquired property, again allowing the priest to collect the full five sela'im.
The **Gemara** offers a second version of this entire discussion, which applies the same concepts to explain **Rabbi Yehuda's** position in the **Mishnah**. In this version, the focus is on understanding why **Rabbi Yehuda** always obligates payment. The questions and answers mirror the previous discussion, exploring the timing of the father's death (before or after 30 days), the concept of "a person's assets are their guarantor," and the analogy of the two **Yosef ben Shimon** partners. The conclusion remains that the core of the dispute lies in the mechanics of inheritance, the nature of a Torah-stipulated loan, and the ability to collect from acquired property, with everyone agreeing that the redemption is "five sela'im or nothing."