This is the Eri B. Sitt Edition, an audio series on the Talmud Bavli.
The question is whether the price of meat can be included in the price of the bones. Yesterday, we discussed the principle of including the price of one item in the price of another. Can the price of the meat be included in the price of the other parts of the animal? What about the bones themselves—just the bones? Can someone sell the bones, charge an inflated price for them, and include the price of the meat?
When we say that this is possible, we may be referring to a small animal. In that case, the bones are worthless, and since the bones have no real value, the price of the meat cannot be included in their price. However, bones can be used to make utensils, handles, or similar items. Therefore, when we are discussing a large animal, whose bones have a function and value, we can include the price of the meat in the price of the bones.
It may be that both teachings are discussing large animals, and that each rabbi was describing the custom in his respective location. In one place, the custom was to include the price of the meat in the price of the bones, while in the other place, the custom was not to do so.
Now, regarding the firstborn animal: We learned that the verse says there is no redemption for it. Nevertheless, we said that it may be sold. When a priest receives the firstborn animal, he may do whatever he wishes with it. Even while the animal is alive, he may sell it. The verse says that there is no redemption, and from that wording we derive that it cannot be sold under any circumstances—not while alive, not after death, not when it is intact, and not even when it has a blemish.
How do we know that an animal tithe cannot be sold? The verse says that it cannot be redeemed. How do we know that it cannot be sold? We derive it from the wording of the verse.
When a person consecrates an item, intending, for example, to give it to the Beit HaMikdash, there are two types of consecration. One is consecration for the sake of the Temple treasury. In that case, the asset becomes sacred, it is given to the treasurer of the Temple, and he sells it and uses the money for the Temple treasury.
There is another type of consecration: an item can be designated for the priests. In that case, it is given to a priest, and once the priest receives it, it belongs to him and he may do whatever he wishes with it. Nevertheless, the verse says that it cannot be sold.
Therefore, just as the verse concerning consecrated items uses the expression “it shall not be sold,” and we know that such an item cannot be sold, so too, the same expression concerning the animal tithe teaches that it cannot be sold. The owner cannot redeem it, and he cannot sell it. Just as it cannot be sold in the case of consecrated items, it cannot be sold in the case of the animal tithe.
In order to make this comparison, the words must be available for a verbal analogy. If the words are not available, the verbal analogy can be challenged. We therefore said that one of the words must be extra. Look again: one of the words is extra.
The word “redeem” is not extra. This is because consecrated items apply more broadly. Even if a person says that an animal that is already sacred should be consecrated, he can impose an additional consecration on an animal that is already sacred, and then he must pay the priest its value.
Normally, one cannot impose the animal-tithe sanctity on an animal that has already been designated as an animal tithe. Once it is an animal tithe, it is an animal tithe; one cannot designate it again as another animal tithe. Consecrated items are stricter, because this consecration applies even to animals that are already sacred.
Perhaps that is why the wording concerning the animal tithe cannot be used to teach that consecrated items cannot be sold. The Gemara says that one of the words must nevertheless be extra. If no word were available, the verbal analogy could be challenged by this distinction. Since there is an extra word, the verbal analogy can still be made despite the challenge.
The Gemara responds that one need not say that the expression “it shall not be redeemed” is extra in the case of consecrated items. It could have written only “it shall not be sold.” I could have learned the prohibition of redemption from the animal tithe: The animal tithe is sacred and cannot be redeemed, and consecrated items are also sacred and cannot be redeemed. Why, then, did the Torah also write that it shall not be redeemed? That wording is available for the verbal analogy.
The Gemara rejects this. The expression is not extra, because it is needed to teach that there is a difference between consecrated items and the animal tithe. In the case of the animal tithe, there is an additional stringency: not only can the tenth animal become sacred, but the ninth or the eleventh animal can also become sacred if a person made a mistake and marked the wrong animal. When the sanctity of the animal tithe falls upon it, it becomes sacred.
Perhaps this additional stringency is the reason that the animal tithe cannot be redeemed. Therefore, one cannot learn the law of consecrated items from the animal tithe.
The Gemara then suggests the opposite approach. Do not derive the prohibition from the wording “it shall not be redeemed.” Instead, use the word “pass over” in the case of the animal tithe and compare it with the same word in the case of the firstborn animal. The firstborn animal is sacred, and there is no redemption for it. Perhaps the same should apply to consecrated items.
But this also does not work. The firstborn animal is sacred from birth, whereas consecrated items do not become sacred from birth. Therefore, the wording concerning the firstborn animal cannot be used to derive the law of consecrated items.
It follows that we must use the expression “it shall not be redeemed” in the case of the animal tithe and compare it with the same expression in the case of consecrated items. Just as the verse concerning consecrated items says that they shall not be sold, so too, the verse concerning the animal tithe teaches that it shall not be sold.
The Gemara then asks why one should not derive the law concerning the firstborn animal from the wording “redemption” in the case of consecrated items. The firstborn animal may be sold, but perhaps it should not be. The verse uses the expression “redemption” concerning the firstborn animal, and the same expression concerning consecrated items teaches that consecrated items cannot be sold. Perhaps, then, the firstborn animal also cannot be sold.
The Gemara responds that the wording concerning the animal tithe is available, while the wording concerning the firstborn animal is not. In the case of the animal tithe, the expression “redemption” is extra, so it can be used to derive the law concerning consecrated items. In the case of the firstborn animal, however, the expression is needed for itself: It teaches that one cannot perform redemption on the firstborn animal. It is not available for the verbal analogy.
The Gemara asks: If the expression “it shall not be redeemed” is needed for itself in the case of the firstborn animal, why is the same expression considered extra in the case of the animal tithe? Why should the wording in one case be available and the wording in the other case not be available?
The answer is that we prefer to make an analogy using identical words. The verse concerning the animal tithe says “it shall not be redeemed,” and the verse concerning consecrated items also says “it shall not be redeemed.” Since the words are exactly the same, we make a verbal analogy between them. We do not make the analogy from the word “redemption” in the case of the firstborn animal, because that is not the identical expression.
The Gemara challenges this principle. There are cases in which the Gemara makes a verbal analogy using different words. For example, the expressions “when he returns” and “when he comes” are used to compare the laws governing the priest’s visits to examine a person. The first visit has certain laws, and the second visit, when he returns, has corresponding laws. Although the words are different, the concepts are the same, and a verbal analogy is made.
The response is that different words can be compared when there is no alternative. In that case, there are no other words available, so the concepts are compared despite the difference in wording. Here, however, there is an alternative. We have the expression “redemption” in the case of the animal tithe and the same expression in the case of consecrated items. Since we have the option of making an analogy between identical words, we do that rather than comparing different words.
The Gemara then asks: If so, why not say that the firstborn animal cannot be sold? We could make a verbal analogy using the word “pass over” from the animal tithe to the firstborn animal. We already learned that the animal tithe cannot be sold through the comparison with consecrated items. The animal tithe uses the word “pass over,” and the firstborn animal also uses the word “pass over.” We could therefore derive that the firstborn animal cannot be sold.
The answer is that the law of consecrated items is more stringent. The verse says that consecrated items are especially sacred, and from there we derive that they cannot be sold. The firstborn animal, however, does not have that same level of stringency. Therefore, the comparison cannot be extended in that direction.
The Gemara explains that when it says “it shall not be redeemed” concerning consecrated items, the expression means that one cannot redeem them. Normally, when a person has a sacred item, the owner can redeem it. But when a person consecrates an item for the priests or for the Temple, it must be given to the priests or to the Temple treasury, and there is no redemption.
The Gemara asks: In whose possession is the consecrated item when the Torah says that it cannot be redeemed? If it is still in the owner’s possession, it is already sacred and must be given to the priest. Why would I think that the owner could redeem it? If it is in the Temple’s possession, there is also no question: It has already been consecrated, and it must be given to the Temple treasury.
Perhaps the case is when it is already in the priest’s possession. Once the priest receives it, it belongs to him, and he can do whatever he wishes with it. Why would I think that redemption is possible? It is sacred, but it is no longer in the owner’s possession.
What case, then, is the verse addressing when it says that consecrated items cannot be redeemed? The Gemara answers that the expression is not needed for consecrated items themselves. The principle of “an unnecessary word is used to teach something else” allows us to apply it to another context. The expression “it shall not be redeemed” in the case of consecrated items teaches that the animal tithe cannot be redeemed.
The Gemara objects: Why use that expression to teach that the animal tithe cannot be sold? The animal tithe itself contains the word “redemption,” and we could derive the law from the identical expression. Since the animal tithe says “it shall not be redeemed,” it can be linked directly to the same wording concerning consecrated items.
Again, the Gemara offers another source. How do we know that an animal tithe cannot be sold? Abaye says that the verse states, “It shall not be redeemed,” which means, simply, “It shall not be sold.” The wording does not mean only that it cannot be redeemed; it means that it cannot be sold.
How do we know this? The Torah places this law near the law of substitution. When does a person perform substitution? While the animal is alive. The sanctity does not transfer to another animal after the original animal has been slaughtered. Substitution applies only while the animal is alive.
Therefore, when the verse says that the animal tithe shall not be redeemed, perhaps it is referring to the time while the animal is alive. After slaughter, perhaps it could be redeemed. The Gemara rejects this. We know that when redemption is performed, the animal must be brought alive before the court so that it can be assessed. Therefore, the expression cannot be referring to redemption in the ordinary sense.
Rather, when the verse says “it shall not be redeemed,” it must mean “it shall not be sold.” The animal tithe cannot be redeemed at all. The comparison with substitution teaches that the restriction applies while the animal is alive, but the requirement of bringing the animal alive for assessment teaches that redemption cannot be performed after slaughter either.
The Gemara then asks: Perhaps the verse is only teaching that redemption cannot be performed while the animal is alive, but after slaughter it may be redeemed. The answer is that this cannot be correct, because redemption requires assessment while the animal is alive. Once it has been slaughtered, it cannot be brought before the court for assessment.
Therefore, redemption is not possible at all. Why, then, does the verse use the expression “it shall not be redeemed”? It is coming to teach that the animal cannot be sold while it is alive, because selling a sacred animal while it is alive is degrading. After slaughter, however, the law is different. Once the animal has been slaughtered, its sanctity is reduced. It may be eaten, and even an ordinary Israelite may eat it; it does not need to be eaten by a priest. Therefore, after slaughter, the meat may be sold.
The law is consequently as follows: Redemption cannot be performed either before or after slaughter. Before slaughter, redemption cannot be performed because the Torah says that it cannot be redeemed. After slaughter, redemption cannot be performed for a technical reason: assessment requires the animal to be alive. The prohibition against selling, however, applies only while the animal is alive. After slaughter, the meat may be sold.
One might ask how we know that the expression refers to selling rather than redemption. According to the opinion that things associated with the altar must be alive, it is understandable why the verse cannot be interpreted as referring to redemption: Redemption requires assessment, and that category must be alive. But according to the opinion that sacred items of this type do not need to be alive when redemption is performed, what prevents us from interpreting the verse as prohibiting redemption while the animal is alive but permitting redemption after slaughter?
The answer is that we do not find any other item for which redemption is prohibited while it is alive but permitted after death. We have no precedent for an item that cannot be redeemed while alive but can be redeemed after it dies. Therefore, when the verse says “it shall not be redeemed,” it cannot be teaching only that redemption is prohibited while the animal is alive.
It must be teaching two separate laws. While the animal is alive, it cannot be sold because selling a live animal tithe is degrading. After slaughter, it can be sold because its sanctity is reduced and it may be eaten. Redemption, however, cannot be performed at all.
Perhaps one could still argue that redemption is impossible because the sanctity of the animal tithe is not sufficiently strong to be transferred to money. To transfer sanctity to money through redemption, a stronger form of sanctity is required. The sanctity of the animal tithe is not strong enough to transfer to money.
Accordingly, when the Torah says “it shall not be redeemed,” the wording teaches that the animal cannot be sold while it is alive, because selling the animal tithe while it is still standing is degrading. After slaughter, that degradation no longer exists, and the meat may be sold.
One could ask why the Torah did not simply write, “It shall not be sold.” Why does it say, “It shall not be redeemed”? If the Torah had written only “it shall not be sold,” I would understand that it cannot be sold because it is degrading to sell something sacred. But perhaps redemption would still be permitted, since the money is being given in exchange for the sacred item and is ultimately going to the sacred domain.
That is why the Torah uses the expression “it shall not be redeemed.” It teaches both laws: The animal may not be sold while alive because that is degrading, and it may not be redeemed either. There is neither a sale nor redemption.
Perhaps the verse is referring only to redemption. The answer is no. If it were referring only to redemption, the comparison with substitution would not work. Substitution applies only while the animal is alive. One might then conclude that redemption is prohibited while the animal is alive but permitted after slaughter. That is not true, because redemption requires assessment, and assessment requires the living animal.
Therefore, the verse cannot be referring only to redemption. It must be teaching something else as well: It teaches that the animal may not be sold while alive. The expression is therefore understood as teaching both that there is no redemption and that there is no sale while the animal is alive.
After slaughter, however, the meat may be sold. Redemption is never possible, but the prohibition against selling applies only while the animal is alive.
May the merit of this learning stand for us. Amen.