The discussion begins with a case from the Talmud Bavli concerning a convert who had children when he was a gentile and subsequently converted. Rabbi Yochanan states that such an individual has no firstborn son for purposes of inheritance, because his first son born after conversion is not truly his first "seed." He had children already as a gentile, and the Torah refers to "the first of your seed." Therefore, the son born after conversion does not receive the double portion of a firstborn.
Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, however, contends that the son born after conversion is indeed considered the firstborn. His reasoning is that a convert is akin to a newborn; everything that occurred in his gentile state is considered non-existent. Consequently, his first children as a Jew are considered his true first children.
This dispute between Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish follows their established positions found in a discussion in Gemara Yevamot regarding the commandment of "be fruitful and multiply." There, the case is presented of a man who had children as a gentile and then converted. Rabbi Yochanan rules that he has fulfilled the commandment of "be fruitful and multiply" because the children he had as a gentile are considered his children. God did not create the world for emptiness, but to be inhabited, and he has already inhabited the world with offspring. Conversely, Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish maintains that he has not fulfilled the commandment, because what happens in a convert's life beforehand is nullified upon conversion. He is "reborn," and therefore his previous children are irrelevant to this commandment.
The Gemara notes that Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish have argued twice: once regarding the laws of a firstborn for a convert, and once regarding the commandment of "be fruitful and multiply." The Gemara asks why both disputes are necessary if they stem from the same fundamental argument. It suggests that if the dispute were limited to the firstborn case, one might assume that Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish's position is due to the fact that gentile children are not subject to the laws of inheritance, which apply only to Jews. In such a scenario, Rabbi Yochanan might agree that for the commandment of "be fruitful and multiply," the gentile children count, as the world has indeed been inhabited. Thus, both cases are necessary to fully delineate their disagreement.
The Gemara then introduces a Mishnah that discusses a woman who did not have children before marrying a man who also had no children. Or, she married a man who had no children, and she herself had children when she was a slave and was later freed, or when she was a gentile and later converted. Then, as a Jewess, she gave birth to a child with her new husband. The Mishnah states that this child is considered a firstborn for inheritance but not for a priest, meaning it is not a firstborn that requires redemption, because her womb had already been opened.
The Gemara questions this Mishnah. If the case is a woman who married a man who never had children, why specify a female convert or a freed slave? A regular Jewish woman who had children from a previous relationship and then married a man who had no children would also have a firstborn for inheritance (from the father's side) but not for a priest (as her womb was already opened). The Gemara answers that the Mishnah is discussing a specific scenario: a convert woman who married a convert man, and they had children together as gentiles. After both converted and married, their first child born as Jews is considered a firstborn for inheritance. This poses a challenge to Rabbi Yochanan, who holds that gentile children are counted, meaning there should be no firstborn for inheritance in this case. However, according to Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, who considers the gentile past nullified, this ruling is understandable.
The Gemara refutes this interpretation, stating that the Mishnah refers to a convert woman who married a regular Jew who had no children. The novelty of this case is that even though it is the man's first child, it is not a firstborn for a priest. This is because Rabbi Yosef held that for a child to be considered a firstborn for a priest, the mother's womb must have opened for the first time *as a Jewess*. Since her womb opened when she was a gentile, this child is not a firstborn for a priest, even though it is her first child as a Jewess. This clarification addresses why the convert case is necessary, as one might have thought it would be a firstborn for a priest as well.
The Gemara then brings another challenge to Rabbi Yochanan from a Baraita, which states that if a gentile had children, converted, and then had more children, the first child born after conversion is a firstborn for a priest. This contradicts Rabbi Yochanan's view that gentile children are counted. The Gemara responds that this Baraita follows the logic of Rabbi Yosef, who holds that just as a convert woman's womb opening as a gentile does not count for a firstborn for a priest, so too for a convert man, his children born as a gentile do not count for a firstborn for a priest. The Gemara clarifies that the dispute between Rabbi Yochanan and Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish is not regarding a firstborn for a priest, as both agree that the womb having opened previously, even as a gentile, prevents a child from being a firstborn for a priest. Their dispute is solely regarding a firstborn for inheritance.
The Gemara then discusses a case presented by Rav Adda bar Ahavah: a Levite woman gave birth to a firstborn son who is exempt from the redemption of the firstborn. The Gemara asks how this is possible, as lineage for redemption follows the father. If the father was a Jew, the child should require redemption unless the father was also a priest or a Levite. The Gemara explains that the Levite woman became pregnant by a gentile. In this scenario, since the father is a gentile, the child's lineage does not follow him. Instead, it follows the Jewish mother, who is a Levite, thus exempting the child from redemption. This holds true even according to opinions that consider the child of a Jewish mother and gentile father to be a mamzer, as the child is still connected to the mother's Levite status, even if flawed.
A further question arises: if a Levite woman marries a Jew and has a child, would that child require redemption? The Gemara implies yes, as the exemption only applies when the father is a gentile. This leads to the clarification that while lineage generally follows the father, for the purpose of redemption, it also considers the mother's womb. If the child emerges from the womb of a Levite, there is no redemption.
The Gemara then presents a reverse case from a Mishnah: a man who had children married a woman who had never given birth, or a convert woman who had not yet given birth, or a freed slave woman who had not yet given birth. She then gave birth. The Mishnah also discusses cases where children were mixed up in a hospital, such as a child of a priestess (who is exempt from redemption) mixed with a child of a non-priestess (who requires redemption). Or, a woman divorced and remarried without waiting three months, then gave birth seven months later, creating doubt as to the father. In all these cases, the Mishnah rules that the child is a firstborn for a priest (requiring redemption) but not a firstborn for inheritance. Redemption is required because the child is certainly a firstborn from the mother's womb. However, for inheritance, the firstborn status depends on knowing the father, which is uncertain in these cases.
From this Mishnah, the Gemara infers that children of a priestess or a Levite woman are exempt from redemption. This implies that the Levite woman in the Mishnah must have given birth to a child by a Jew, as if she had given birth by a gentile, the child would be exempt regardless of the father's status. However, the Gemara questions whether a priestess who has relations with a gentile would also be exempt. Rabbi Abba taught that while a Levite woman who has relations with a gentile remains a Levite, a priestess who has relations with a gentile becomes profaned and is no longer a priestess. Therefore, her child by a gentile would require redemption. This means the Mishnah's example of an exempt priestess cannot refer to one who had relations with a gentile.
The Gemara concludes that the Mishnah's case of the Levite woman refers to one who married a Jew, and her child is exempt from redemption. The case of the priestess refers to a Jewish woman who married a priest. Although she is not a priestess by birth, she is called a "priestess" because she gives birth to priests. Thus, her child by a priest is exempt from redemption. This interpretation resolves the apparent contradiction and aligns with the view that a Levite woman married to a Jew, or a priestess married to a Jew, would have children requiring redemption, unless the father is a priest or Levite. The only case of exemption for a Levite woman is when she marries a gentile, as previously discussed.
The Gemara then discusses a case where a priest died, leaving a son who is a "profaned" priest (a Halal), meaning the priest had married a divorcee. This Halal son, being like a regular Israelite, would normally require redemption. The question is whether he has to redeem himself. The dispute centers on whether the father died before or after 30 days of the child's birth. If the father died after 30 days, the obligation for redemption had already fallen upon the father. Since a priest cannot be compelled to redeem his own child, and the coins would remain with him, the son is considered to have inherited this exemption. However, if the father died within 30 days, the obligation never fully materialized for the father, and thus the son may not inherit this "exemption."
The Gemara then brings a similar claim from the Mishnah's case of a pregnant gentile woman who converted and then gave birth. Her child must redeem himself. Why? Because the father is a gentile, and there is no obligation on the mother for redemption. The child cannot claim to be exempt based on his gentile father, because lineage does not apply to gentiles; one cannot claim an exemption from such a source. This highlights the distinction: a priest's son inherits the father's "strength" of exemption, but a gentile's son cannot.
Returning to the Mishnah's case of a woman who remarried without waiting three months and gave birth seven months later, the child is a firstborn for a priest but not for inheritance. This is because the child's paternity is uncertain. The Gemara questions this, noting that one of the two potential fathers must be the true father. Therefore, one of the two children (the uncertain one or a subsequent sibling) must be the firstborn for inheritance. The Gemara proposes that the two potential firstborns could make a partnership agreement, a "power of attorney," to claim the double portion of the firstborn and split it. This would ensure that at least one of them receives the firstborn's share, benefiting both.
However, Rabbi Yanai teaches that such a power of attorney is only effective if the paternity was initially known and then became uncertain. For example, if two women gave birth, and it was known which child belonged to which father, but then the children got mixed up. In such a case, a power of attorney can be written. But if the paternity was never known from the outset, like in the Mishnah's case of the seven-month and nine-month babies, then no power of attorney can be written. The Mishnah, therefore, refers to a case where paternity was never known, and thus the first child receives nothing for inheritance, and the subsequent child is not considered a firstborn either, because the true firstborn's identity remains unknown.