The Talmud Bavli brings the view of Rabbi Meir, who says that if someone is suspected regarding one matter, he is disqualified from judging or testifying about that matter. For example, priests are suspected of intentionally inflicting a blemish on a firstborn animal. Therefore, they cannot testify in such a case, nor can they judge it.
Rabbi Meir also says that someone suspected regarding one matter of Torah law is suspected regarding everything. According to this, a priest could never serve as a judge, because once he is suspected regarding one matter, he should be disqualified from judging any matter. Yet the Torah clearly says that according to the laws of the priest, one brings all his disputes to the priest. This indicates that priests can serve as judges. How do we reconcile these statements?
The answer is that we did not say that the priests actually inflict blemishes. Therefore, they are not considered people who have transgressed a matter for which they would be disqualified from judging every case. It is only a suspicion. When we say that someone is suspected regarding a matter, we mean that we know he is doing it, or that we know he is inflicting the blemish. Here, however, we merely suspect that he may be doing so.
The discussion then turns to testimony transmitted from one witness through another. Normally, testimony must be heard directly from the witness himself. The question is whether we can be lenient and accept a witness who says that he heard from another witness that the blemish was not inflicted intentionally.
The Gemara answers that we are lenient in this regard when the testimony is needed to permit a woman to remarry. If a man says, “I heard from someone else that her husband died,” we would normally not accept that testimony. Nevertheless, in the case of permitting a woman to remarry, we do accept it.
Likewise, wherever a woman is believed, a witness who testifies through another witness is believed. If a woman is believed to testify about a firstborn animal, then testimony transmitted from one witness through another is also acceptable. A priest may therefore testify indirectly that the blemish occurred on its own.
Rav Yemar permitted such testimony regarding a firstborn animal. Mar objected to him and called him “the one who is lenient regarding firstborn animals,” because he permitted testimony transmitted from one witness through another. Nevertheless, the halakha is that such testimony is permitted.
Consider the case of an animal whose status as a firstborn is not known. A priest comes and tells us that it is a firstborn animal and that it has a blemish that occurred on its own. He now wants to bring it before a Torah scholar to determine whether the blemish is a permanent, valid blemish.
Normally, we would not believe the priest. Perhaps he inflicted the blemish himself. But this case is different, because we would not have known that the animal was a firstborn at all if the priest had not told us. He could have remained silent and kept the animal for himself. Instead, he tells us that it is a firstborn animal and that it has a blemish that occurred naturally. He is therefore believed.
The principle is that the same person whose statement created the prohibition can also be the person whose statement removes it. The mouth that prohibited something is the mouth that permits it. Since he could have said nothing and simply kept quiet, his statement is accepted.
We already know this principle from the case of a woman who says, “I was married, and I was divorced.” She is believed, because if she wanted to marry, she could have said nothing. The court regarded her as a single woman, and she could have married without reporting that she had previously been married. Since she voluntarily says that she was married and then says that she was divorced, she is believed.
Perhaps, however, the case of the firstborn animal is different. In the case of the woman, she did not have to say anything. In the case of the priest, he has to say something. He must tell the scholar that this is a firstborn animal with a blemish, because a consecrated firstborn animal may not be eaten outside the Temple. If it is eaten outside the Temple while unblemished, the punishment is severe. Therefore, he has no choice but to identify the animal as a firstborn and bring it to a scholar for a ruling.
If so, perhaps his credibility does not result from the principle that the mouth that prohibited something is the mouth that permits it. Perhaps he is believed because he is not suspected of eating a completely unblemished consecrated animal outside the Temple. He must obtain a ruling before eating it, and therefore he has to tell the scholar that it is a firstborn animal.
The Gemara answers that this is not a case of an ordinary monetary claim. A partial admission in monetary law applies when one person claims, “You owe me one hundred,” and the other admits, “I owe you fifty.” That is a partial admission. Here, however, there is no monetary claim against him at all.
The Gemara continues to analyze why the priest is believed. It cannot simply be because of the principle that the mouth that prohibited something is the mouth that permits it, because here he had to identify the animal as a firstborn. The answer is that if he wanted to deceive us, he could have inflicted an obvious blemish that would not require him to bring the animal to a scholar at all. He could have done so before anyone knew that the animal was a firstborn. Since he nevertheless brings it to a scholar, he is believed regarding the blemish.
This is not the classic case of the mouth that prohibited something and then permitted it. In the classic case, the woman did not have to say anything; she could have married without revealing that she had once been married. Here, the priest had to say that the animal was a firstborn in order to obtain a ruling. Nevertheless, since he could have avoided the entire issue by creating an obvious blemish, he is believed in this particular situation.
The Gemara challenges this reasoning from the case of a person who rented a donkey. The owner told him, “Do not take the donkey through the river of Pekod, because there is a great deal of water there and the animal may be damaged. Take it by the other road, where there is no water.” The renter later admits that he took the donkey through the prohibited route but says that on that day there was no water there.
He did not have to tell us that he had taken the donkey through that route. If he wanted to lie, he could have said that he took the permitted road. Nevertheless, the Gemara says that we do not believe him when he claims that there was no water in the river of Pekod.
The reason is that it is known that there is water in that river. When something is an established fact, it is as though witnesses had testified to it. We do not say that since the person could have made a different claim, he should be believed. The presence of water there is obvious.
The Gemara asks why the same principle should not apply to a priest. Priests are known to inflict blemishes on animals. Since they are suspected of doing so, why should we believe a priest who says that the blemish occurred naturally merely because he could have created a more obvious blemish?
The Gemara answers that the cases are not comparable. The presence of water in the river of Pekod is certain. The fact that priests inflict blemishes is only a suspicion. We cannot say with certainty that a priest inflicted the blemish. Since this is only a suspicion, and since in this case no one even knew that the animal was a firstborn, we can be lenient.
Had the status of the animal as a firstborn already been known, we might not believe the priest’s statement that the blemish occurred naturally. But here, no one knew that it was a firstborn, and he could have avoided the entire matter. That is why he is believed.
The Gemara records another discussion in the name of Rabbi Tzadok, who was a priest. He had a firstborn animal and fed it from a basket made of willow branches. The branches had been peeled and were sharp. As the animal ate from the basket, the sharp branches cut its lip and created a blemish.
Rabbi Tzadok was trying to establish that the blemish occurred naturally. Since he was a priest, he was not automatically believed. He asked whether there was a distinction between an ordinary person and a Torah scholar: perhaps an ordinary person is not believed to say that the blemish occurred on its own, but a Torah scholar is believed.
Rabbi Yehoshua told him that there was a distinction and that he was believed. Rabbi Tzadok then went to Rabban Gamaliel and asked him the same question. Rabban Gamaliel said that there was no distinction between an ordinary person and a Torah scholar.
Rabbi Tzadok told Rabban Gamaliel that Rabbi Yehoshua had ruled differently. Rabban Gamaliel told him to wait until the scholars entered the study hall, where the matter could be clarified publicly.
The person who had asked the question stood up and asked whether there was a distinction in the laws of firstborn animals between an ordinary person and a Torah scholar. Rabbi Yehoshua laughed and said that there was no distinction. He did not actually hold that view, but he was afraid of Rabban Gamaliel, because he knew that Rabban Gamaliel disagreed with him. Therefore, he retracted his original ruling in public.
Rabban Gamaliel said to Rabbi Yehoshua, “I have just been told in your name that you said there is a distinction.” He then became angry and told Rabbi Yehoshua, “Stand on your feet and let them testify against you.”
Rabbi Yehoshua responded that he could not lie. He said that if Rabbi Tzadok had been alive and he himself had been dead, he might have been able to deny the report, because the living could contradict the dead. But since they were both alive and Rabbi Tzadok was standing before him, he could not deny what had happened. He therefore admitted that he had told Rabbi Tzadok that he was believed.
Rabban Gamaliel never told Rabbi Yehoshua to sit down again. Rabbi Yehoshua remained standing while Rabban Gamaliel continued speaking. The people began murmuring, and they told the interpreter, who was translating Rabban Gamaliel’s discourse, to stop. They felt bad for Rabbi Yehoshua and wanted to intervene on his behalf.
This was one of the disputes between Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Yehoshua. The tractate Berakhot tells us that there were three such disputes. One concerned whether the evening recitation of the Shema or the evening prayer was mandatory. Another concerned Yom Kippur. The third was this incident involving firstborn animals.
The Mishnah states that a priest is believed to say that a Torah scholar ruled that the blemish is valid, provided that there are witnesses that the priest himself did not inflict the blemish. The priest is not believed to say that the blemish occurred naturally. However, if witnesses establish that he did not create it, he is believed to say that he brought the animal to a Torah scholar and received a ruling that the blemish is valid. Based on that ruling, the animal may be slaughtered.
The logic appears to be that something that will eventually be revealed is not something about which a person will lie. If the priest says, “I showed the animal to Rabbi so-and-so, and he ruled that the blemish is valid,” anyone can go to that scholar and verify what happened. Since the statement can be checked, the priest is believed. This is called something that is destined to be revealed.
The Mishnah gives another case. A priest is believed to say that an Israelite gave him the firstborn animal with its blemish already present. Again, the apparent reasoning is that the matter can be checked. We can ask the Israelite whether he gave the priest the animal in that condition. Since the priest knows that his statement can be verified, perhaps he will not lie.
The Gemara rejects that explanation. In the first case, the priest is believed because he is not suspected of eating a consecrated firstborn animal outside the Temple. If he had not received a ruling permitting the animal, he would not slaughter it. The severity of the matter is what makes him trustworthy.
In the second case, however, the priest says that the Israelite gave him the animal with the blemish already present, and there are no witnesses that the priest did not create the blemish. Since priests are suspected of inflicting blemishes, perhaps this priest inflicted the blemish himself and is now falsely claiming that he received the animal that way.
Rabbah explains that the two cases are different. In the first case, witnesses have already established that the priest did not inflict the blemish. The only remaining question is whether he will eat the animal without obtaining a ruling. Because he will not risk eating a consecrated animal outside the Temple, he is believed to say that he received a ruling.
In the second case, however, there are no witnesses that the priest did not create the blemish. He is trying to avoid that issue by claiming that the Israelite gave him the animal in that condition. Since priests are suspected of creating blemishes, we suspect that he himself did so and is attributing it to the Israelite.
The Gemara challenges this from the case of a person suspected of improperly handling tithes. An ordinary person is not considered reliable regarding tithes, and there is uncertainty about whether he separates them properly. Nevertheless, if someone asks such a person to purchase produce from a trustworthy individual—someone known to separate tithes properly—and the person returns saying that he bought the produce from that individual, he is believed.
Why is he believed? The matter can be checked. We can ask the person from whom he claims to have purchased the produce. This seems to demonstrate that even someone suspected regarding the matter is believed when his statement can be verified.
The Gemara answers that this case is different because he can evade responsibility by saying, “I thought that person was trustworthy. I did not know that he was not.” Since he has an excuse even if the matter is investigated, it is not a true example of something destined to be revealed.
The Gemara then offers another explanation. In the case of the produce, the person was appointed as an agent. Someone sent him to purchase from a particular individual. Because the person who appointed him can investigate whether he fulfilled his instructions, he is afraid to lie. In the case of the priest, however, no one is necessarily going to investigate the Israelite and ask whether he gave the animal with a blemish. Therefore, the priest may lie.
The first line of the Gemara said that the priest is believed to say, “This firstborn animal was given to me by an Israelite with its blemish.” The Gemara initially thought that he was believed because the matter could be checked. It then rejected that explanation, saying that the first case of the Mishnah is based on the severity of the prohibition, not on the possibility that the statement might be verified.
Rabbi Yehudah is then cited as saying that an Israelite is believed to say, “I gave this animal to the priest with its blemish.” There is no reason for the Israelite to be suspected in this matter. The Gemara asks why this teaching was necessary. Of course an Israelite is believed; what interest would he have in lying?
The Gemara answers that the teaching is needed when the animal was small when the Israelite gave it to the priest and is now large. Perhaps we would suspect that the Israelite no longer recognizes the animal and is merely claiming that it is the one he gave away. Nevertheless, he is believed to identify it as the same animal.
There are two versions of the teaching. According to one version, only the Israelite is believed to say that he gave the animal to the priest with a blemish. According to the other version, even the priest is believed to say that he received the animal from an Israelite with the blemish already present. The reasoning in that version is that the statement can be checked, and a person will not lie about something that may be exposed.
The Gemara tells a story about Rav Avraham of Pumpedita. He had a firstborn animal and gave it to a priest without a blemish. The priest later inflicted a blemish on the animal. One day, Rav Avraham’s eyes were hurting him and his vision was poor. The priest, who was looking for an opportunity to deceive him, brought the same animal to Rav Avraham and claimed that he had received it from an Israelite with the blemish already present.
Rav Avraham opened his eyes and recognized that the priest was lying. He said, “Was I not the one who gave you this animal?” The priest had thought that because Rav Avraham’s eyes were not functioning properly, he would not recognize it.
Nevertheless, Rav Avraham did not change the general halakha and declare that priests are never believed. The Gemara explains that this priest was exceptionally brazen. We do not change the law because one particular person behaved in such a brazen manner. Rav Avraham knew that this priest was lying because he personally had given him the animal, but this does not prove that every priest will act in the same way.
The Gemara tells another story about an animal whose two eyes were different: one was large and one was small. This was clearly a natural condition, and therefore a blemish. The animal was brought before Rav Ashi for a ruling before it was slaughtered.
In this case, it should not matter whether the person bringing the animal was an Israelite or a priest. Since the blemish was natural and obvious, the person who brought it should be believed. Nevertheless, there is a general concern that an Israelite might take a firstborn animal for himself after receiving a ruling that it has a valid blemish. Therefore, ordinarily, an Israelite should not bring such an animal to a scholar without a priest being present.
The concern is not that the Israelite will eat an unblemished consecrated animal outside the Temple, since that severe punishment applies to consecrated animals in that condition. Rather, we are concerned that he may take the animal for himself instead of giving it to the priest. For this reason, a priest should normally be present when an Israelite brings an animal with an ordinary blemish for a ruling.
Why, then, did Rav Ashi issue a ruling in this case when no priest was present? The answer is that the person did not really need a ruling. The blemish was natural and obvious. He brought the animal only to honor the Torah scholar and hear the ruling from him. Since he was so careful to honor the scholar, we do not suspect that he would violate the protocol of the scholars by taking the animal for himself.
The final teaching states that everyone is believed to say that a tithe animal developed a blemish. An Israelite must separate the animal tithe. If the tenth animal has a blemish, he may slaughter and eat it; he does not need to bring it to Jerusalem. The novelty is that he is believed to say that the blemish occurred naturally, even though he benefits from that claim.
Perhaps he created the blemish himself. If he wanted to avoid the problem, he could have inflicted the blemish before the animals were counted and before the tenth animal became consecrated. The Gemara asks how he could know which animal would be the tenth one.
He could have inflicted blemishes on all the animals before the counting began. The Torah does not allow a person to select the good animal or the bad animal intentionally as the tenth animal; the animals must pass through naturally. Therefore, if he had a herd of twenty animals, he could have created blemishes on all of them in a permissible manner before the animal tithe was designated.
Since he could have created the blemishes before the animals became consecrated, he is believed to say that the blemish occurred on its own after the animal became consecrated. The Gemara’s conclusion is that because he had a permissible way to achieve the same result before the animal was tithed, we do not suspect that he created the blemish afterward.