The Eri B. Sit edition and audio series of the Talmud Bavli. In the merit of Shmuel, Abraham, and Shaul ben Simcha, may the parents who have given them find favor in the eyes of people and God, and may the Holy Spirit fill their hearts with goodness for their work. Amen and amen.
We begin today’s page, page 24b, with “Abaye said,” five lines down, after the wide space.
Yesterday, the Gemara taught a halachah concerning a person of indeterminate sex and an androgynous person: they are assessed according to their vital part. This means that if someone makes a vow concerning their monetary value, they do not have an official Torah valuation, but they do have a market value. If a person says, “The value of my head is upon me,” the head is a vital organ, and therefore the statement is treated as though he had said, “My entire value is upon me.” He must pay his full worth, even though he does not have an official valuation.
The novelty of the Torah’s law is that even though such a person does not have an official valuation, he is nevertheless assessed according to his vital part. If he says, “My monetary value is upon me,” that is the discussion of the Gemara.
Abaye challenges this. Does having an official valuation and being assessed according to one’s vital part always go together? Are you suggesting that even where there is no official valuation, the law of assessment according to the vital part still applies? Is that possible?
The Gemara brings a case. A person says concerning his Canaanite servant, “The head of this servant is consecrated.” The ruling is that the servant’s value is divided: half of the value goes to the Temple treasury, and half remains with the owner. If he says, “The head of this servant is sold to you,” the value of the servant is calculated and the money is divided equally. The same law applies if he says, “The head of this donkey is consecrated,” or, “The head of this donkey is sold to you.” The value is calculated and divided.
Why, in these cases, does saying “the head” mean half rather than the entire animal or servant? Since it is not customary to sell the head of a servant or donkey separately, the speaker meant half of the servant or half of the donkey. By using the word “head,” he meant one half.
However, if he says, “The head of this cow is sold to you,” he has sold only the head. He has not sold the rest of the cow. Likewise, if he says, “The head of this cow is consecrated,” only the head becomes consecrated. The reason is that the head of a cow is customarily sold separately in a butcher shop. Since it is an item that stands on its own and is sold independently, the speaker’s words are understood literally: he meant the head alone.
Abaye says that this proves the rule cannot be that even where there is no official valuation, the person is assessed according to his vital part. The Torah grants official valuations only for human beings, and the law of being assessed according to one’s vital part does not necessarily apply elsewhere. If that law did apply, then whenever a person said “the head,” the entire body would follow the head.
Consider the case of the donkey. There is no official valuation for a donkey, yet when the person says, “The value of the head of this donkey is upon me,” he does not have to give the value of the entire animal. The value is divided; he gives half. Thus, there is no official valuation, and there is also no rule that the entire animal is assessed according to the vital part. It appears that the two laws work together. Where there is an official valuation, there can be assessment according to the vital part; where there is no official valuation, there is no such assessment.
The Gemara responds that there is a difficulty with the teaching itself. The teaching says that a Canaanite servant has an official valuation—he is male and has an age—but nevertheless the law of assessment according to the vital part does not apply to him. If the head of the servant is consecrated, the value is divided. This demonstrates that the issue is not simply whether an official valuation exists. There must be another distinction.
The Gemara answers that the cases of the donkey and the servant are referring to consecration for the altar. The speaker consecrated the head of the donkey in order to use its value to purchase an offering. This type of consecration does not have the law of assessment according to the vital part. That law applies when a person makes a donation for the Temple’s general repairs, but it does not apply to consecration for the altar.
Therefore, when the person says, “The head of the donkey is consecrated,” the value is divided because he is consecrating it for the altar. He does not consecrate the entire animal. The law of assessment according to the vital part applies only in the context in which we learned it—official valuations connected with the word “vow,” where the person says, “My monetary value is upon me for the Temple’s repairs.” It does not apply to consecration for the altar.
Abaye asks another question. You have explained the teaching as referring to consecration for the altar, but what will you do with the final clause? The teaching says that if a person says, “The head of this cow is consecrated,” only the head becomes consecrated. Why should the sanctity remain confined to the head? A verse teaches that when part of an animal is consecrated, the sanctity can spread to the entire animal. The verse states that whatever is given from it to God shall be sacred, which is understood to include the entire animal.
The Gemara explains that if a person says, “The leg of this animal shall be an offering,” the sanctity can spread through the entire animal. Since only part of the animal has been consecrated, the animal cannot be brought as it is, because only the leg is consecrated. Nor can the animal simply be redeemed in the ordinary way. What is done? It is sold to someone who needs an animal for an offering, and the money received for the unconsecrated portion is ordinary money. The leg, however, remains consecrated and is not included in the sale as ordinary property.
There is a question about how the purchaser can bring the leg as part of the offering if the leg does not belong to him. That question is discussed later. For now, the point is that the consecration of one limb can spread throughout the animal.
Rabbi Yosef and Rabbi Shavuot respond that when a person says, “The leg of this animal is an offering,” the sanctity spreads to the entire animal. How do they know this? The verse says, “Whatever is given from it to God shall be sacred.” The novelty of the verse is that when a person consecrates part of the animal, the sanctity applies to the whole animal.
This is a dispute regarding a limb that is not a vital organ. Even Rabbi Yosef agrees that if a person consecrates a vital organ, the sanctity can spread through the entire animal, because the organ is fit to be offered. If so, the Gemara returns to the teaching. If the person says that the head of the cow is consecrated for an offering, why does only the value of the head go to the offering? Since the head is a vital organ, the sanctity should spread through the entire animal, just as it does in the case of the consecrated leg.
The Gemara answers that there is a distinction between consecration of the animal itself and consecration of its monetary value. When the person consecrates the animal itself for the altar, the sanctity spreads throughout the animal. But the case of the cow is referring to consecration of monetary value. He did not say that he wanted to bring this animal itself as an offering. He said that the value of the head should be used for an offering. In such a case, the sanctity of the money does not spread to the entire animal.
Rabbah himself, however, had stated elsewhere that when a person has a male animal fit for an offering and says, “I consecrate the value of this animal for an offering,” the entire animal becomes consecrated with the sanctity of the body. If the animal itself is fit to be offered, the consecration applies to the animal rather than merely to its monetary value.
That creates another difficulty. The cow in the teaching was fit to be an offering, so why does only the head become consecrated? Since the animal itself is fit to be offered, even if the person intended only to consecrate its value for an offering, the sanctity should apply to the entire animal. This is the same principle Rabbah taught concerning a male animal: if a person says that its value is to be used for an offering, the money does not simply go toward purchasing another animal. Since this animal itself is fit to be offered, the consecration applies to it.
The Gemara answers that Rabbah’s statement was referring to a complete, unblemished animal. In the teaching under discussion, the cow had a blemish. Since it was not fit to be brought as an offering, the consecration of its monetary value remains limited to the head. The donkey in the teaching is likewise not fit to be brought as an offering. Therefore, only the value of the consecrated portion is affected.
Rabbah had asked a question elsewhere that appears to be exactly this case. If a person consecrates the head of a cow for the monetary value of an offering, does the sanctity spread to the entire animal, or does it remain on the head? The reasoning behind the question is as follows: perhaps, since the head is a vital organ, the sanctity spreads through the entire animal. Moreover, since the animal is fit to be offered, perhaps the consecration of monetary value is treated as consecration of the animal itself.
Why did Rabbah ask that question? The Gemara challenges him: answer it from the teaching we have just explained. According to the way you are explaining the teaching, when a person consecrates only the head, the sanctity remains limited to the head. Why, then, did you have a question?
The Gemara responds that Rabbah’s question concerned a complete, unblemished animal. The teaching, by contrast, concerns a blemished animal. That is another restriction. In the teaching, the cow was blemished, like the donkey in the same teaching. Since the animal could not itself be brought as an offering, the person had to give the value of the head for the purchase of an offering. In the case of a complete, unblemished animal that is fit for an offering, there is a question whether the sanctity spreads throughout the animal.
Rabbah’s question was also framed differently. He was not simply saying, “The head is consecrated.” He said, “The value of my head is for the altar.” Even though a person himself is not fit to be brought as an offering, he was saying that the value of his head should be used for the altar. The question is whether the law of being assessed according to the vital part applies. If it does, he must give his entire value; if it does not, he gives only the value of his head.
This is a particularly strong case of a blemish, since a human being cannot be brought as an offering at all. Nevertheless, Rabbah asked whether the sanctity would spread through the entire person’s value. The question concerning the animal can therefore be understood: perhaps even in the case of a blemished animal, when the person says, “The value of this cow is for an offering,” the entire value is included.
The Gemara explains that Rabbah’s question was raised before he saw the teaching. Once he saw that, in the case of the cow, only the head becomes consecrated, his question was answered. The teaching establishes that when only the head is designated, one does not automatically say that the entire value follows the head.
Thus, the case of the cow is a case of a blemished animal, and the person’s statement concerns the value of the head for an offering. Because of these factors, only the value of the head is involved. If the animal were not blemished, and the animal itself were fit to be offered, then because it is fit for an offering, the consecration could apply to the entire animal.
All of this discussion began with yesterday’s teaching about a person of indeterminate sex and an androgynous person. When one says, “My monetary value is upon me,” he must pay his full value because the head is a vital organ, even though such a person has no official valuation. Abaye challenged this by bringing cases in which there is no official valuation and yet the law of assessment according to the vital part does not apply, and cases in which there is an official valuation but the law still does not apply. The Gemara therefore had to distinguish between the different types of consecration, between the animal itself and its monetary value, and between a complete animal and a blemished one.
The Gemara now returns to the original question. If a person says, “The value of my head is for the altar,” is he assessed according to his vital part, requiring him to give his entire value, or not? We have found cases involving monetary value in which the law of assessment according to the vital part does not apply, and cases involving consecration for the altar in which it does apply. But we have not found a clear case of monetary value designated for the altar. Perhaps the word “value” is enough to apply the law, or perhaps the fact that the money is designated for an offering changes the law. The question remains unresolved. This is a case of uncertainty.
The Gemara then presents a new case. A person makes an official valuation and says that he wants to give that valuation for an offering. Ordinarily, an official valuation is given to the Temple treasury, but here he is directing it to the altar. Does the law of limited means apply?
The Torah discusses a person who makes an official valuation but does not have enough money to pay it. The Temple officials assess his financial ability, and if he is poor, he pays according to what he can afford. The question is whether that law applies when a person makes an official valuation for the altar. On the one hand, it is still an official valuation, and the Torah’s law of limited means should apply. On the other hand, we have never found the law of limited means in a case where the official valuation is directed to the altar rather than to the Temple treasury.
Which side prevails? Is it the side of official valuations, where the person pays according to his means, or is it the side of offerings, where he must pay the full cost of the offering? Since the matter is uncertain, money cannot be extracted from him without proof. Perhaps he pays only one shekel, and if someone wants to demand more, he must prove that more is required. It is also possible that the money is ordinary money and is not obligated at all until the issue is resolved.
The Gemara presents another case. A person consecrates ancestral property for an offering. The property must eventually be redeemed. The Torah provides a formula for calculating the value of ancestral land when it is consecrated for the Temple treasury. The question is whether that same formula applies when the land is consecrated for the altar. We know the formula for land consecrated for general Temple use, but we have not found a clear precedent for applying it when the consecration is for an offering. Once again, we must determine whether the law follows the rules of consecrated property or the rules of offerings. The question is how the redemption price should be assessed.
We now turn to the next Mishnah. A child who is less than one month old has no official valuation. The Torah’s official valuations begin at one month of age. Nevertheless, such a child has a monetary value. There is a market price for the child, even though the value will increase as the child grows. Someone would pay a certain amount for that child, and that is the child’s monetary value.
What is the law if a person says, “The official valuation of this child who is less than one month old is upon me”? Rabbi Meir says that he must pay the child’s monetary value. The Sages say that he pays nothing.
The reasoning of the Sages is understandable. Since there is no official valuation for a child less than one month old, when a person says “valuation,” his words have no halachic effect. Therefore, he pays nothing.
Rabbi Meir reasons that a person does not speak without intending his words to have an effect. He knows that his vow should be valid. Since he must have intended something, and since there is no official valuation for a child of this age, he must have intended the child’s monetary value. His words therefore apply to the child’s market value.
This is the principle that Rabbi Meir follows: a person does not want his words to be meaningless. Even when he uses an incorrect expression, we try to find something to which his words can apply. The Sages disagree and say that sometimes a person does say something that has no effect. Since there is no official valuation for a child less than one month old, we do not reinterpret his words as referring to the child’s monetary value.
The Gemara compares this to the statement of Rav Gidal in the name of Rav: if a person says, “The valuation of this utensil is upon me,” he must give its monetary value. Who does that statement follow? It follows Rabbi Meir. The Torah does not assign an official valuation to a utensil, but the utensil does have a monetary value. Since a person does not speak without intending his words to be effective, when he says “valuation” concerning a utensil, he must mean its monetary value.
The Gemara initially suggests that perhaps the Sages would agree in the case of a utensil. In the case of a child less than one month old, the person may have made an understandable mistake. He may have thought that just as there are official valuations for older children, there is also an official valuation for a child less than one month old. If so, his statement was based on an error.
In the case of a utensil, however, he knows that utensils do not have official valuations. When he says “the valuation of this utensil,” perhaps everyone would agree that he intended its monetary value.
The Gemara rejects this possibility. That is why Rav’s statement must be identified specifically as the view of Rabbi Meir. Even in the case of a utensil, the Sages say that the person’s words have no effect. The fact that he knows that a utensil has no official valuation does not permit us to reinterpret his words as referring to its monetary value.
Why would Rabbi Meir say that the person pays in the case of a child less than one month old? Perhaps his reason is not simply that a person does not want his words to be meaningless. Perhaps there is a special decree designed to prevent confusion. If we allow a person to avoid payment when he says, “The valuation of a child less than one month old is upon me,” he may also avoid payment when he says, “The valuation of a child who is one month old is upon me.” The rule regarding the younger child would then lead people to disregard their words in the case of the older child as well.
The Gemara therefore asks: if Rabbi Meir’s reason is this decree, perhaps it applies only to a child less than one month old and not to a utensil. There is no comparable concern regarding a utensil. This is why the Gemara must tell us that Rav’s statement follows Rabbi Meir: Rabbi Meir’s reason is that a person does not want his words to be meaningless, not merely the special decree concerning children.
The Gemara brings another case. A person consecrates his friend’s animal and says that its official valuation is upon him. He must give the animal’s monetary value. The reasoning is that a person knows he cannot consecrate an animal that does not belong to him. Therefore, when he says that the animal’s valuation is upon him, he must have intended to give its monetary value. Again, this follows Rabbi Meir, who maintains that a person does not speak without intending his words to take effect.
The Gemara asks why Rav needed to teach both the case of the utensil and the case of the animal belonging to someone else. If he had taught only the case of the utensil, we might have thought that the result is obvious: everyone knows that a utensil has no official valuation, so “its valuation” must mean its monetary value. The case of the animal is different. A person might know that he cannot consecrate someone else’s animal, but perhaps he intended that the animal should become consecrated if he later persuaded its owner to sell it to him.
In other words, he may have been thinking: “I want this animal to become consecrated. If I can convince the owner to sell it to me, then the consecration will take effect.” If the owner refuses to sell it, perhaps he does not intend to give the animal’s monetary value. Therefore, we might have thought that in this case the person’s statement does not automatically mean that he accepts liability for the value.
Rav therefore teaches that even in this case, the ruling follows Rabbi Meir. The person knows that he cannot consecrate the animal as it presently belongs to someone else. When he says that its valuation is upon him, he means that he accepts responsibility for its monetary value.
Rav Ashi adds a qualification. This ruling applies only when the person says, “The animal of my friend is upon me,” using language that places the responsibility upon himself. The words “upon me” create a vow that can be interpreted as an obligation to pay money. But if he says, “This animal is consecrated,” the statement refers explicitly to the animal itself. Since he does not own the animal, he cannot consecrate it, and there is no remaining obligation.
Even according to Rabbi Meir, we interpret a person’s words only when the interpretation is reasonably close to what he said. If he says that the monetary value of the utensil is upon him, the word “value” can refer to monetary value rather than an official valuation. If he says that the animal is consecrated, however, interpreting that as an obligation to pay money would be too far removed from his actual words. Therefore, even Rabbi Meir requires the wording “upon me” in order to impose a monetary obligation.
We now turn to the law concerning a non-Jew and official valuations. A Jewish person can say, “The valuation of this non-Jew is upon me,” and he must pay the appropriate amount based on the person’s age and gender. However, if the non-Jew says, “My valuation is upon me,” he has no official valuation. Both a Jew and a non-Jew can be the subject of a vow concerning monetary value, because both have a market value. A person can say, “I am giving the value of this individual,” and that obligation takes effect.
Regarding official valuations, however, the Mishnah says that Jews can make valuations, but non-Jews cannot make valuations. The verse introducing the laws of valuations says, “Speak to the Children of Israel.” The law therefore applies to the Jewish people: Jews can make official valuations, but non-Jews cannot make official valuations.
One might have thought that non-Jews cannot be the subjects of official valuations either. The verse says “the Children of Israel,” which appears to exclude them entirely. The Mishnah therefore emphasizes that the limitation applies to making a valuation, not to being valued. A Jewish person can say, “The valuation of this non-Jew is upon me,” even though the non-Jew himself cannot say, “My valuation is upon me.”
Why interpret the verse in this way? The word “person” is inclusive and can include non-Jews. The phrase “the Children of Israel” limits who can make the valuation, while the word “person” allows a non-Jew to be the subject of the valuation.
The Gemara explains that there are more people who can be valued than people who can make valuations. A deaf-mute, a minor, and a person of diminished mental capacity cannot make a valuation, but they can be the subjects of valuations. Therefore, it is reasonable to place non-Jews in the category of those who can be valued but cannot make valuations.
The Mishnah also teaches that a person of indeterminate sex and an androgynous person can make official valuations but cannot be the subjects of official valuations. Rabbi Meir says that the law is the reverse: they can be the subjects of valuations but cannot make valuations.
Each rabbi is reading the Mishnah from a different perspective. According to the first view, the more reasonable arrangement is that those who cannot make valuations may nevertheless be valued, while a person of indeterminate sex or an androgynous person can make a valuation but cannot be valued. Rabbi Meir reverses the logic. The law may be clear, but the particular reasoning used to explain it is not necessarily compelling.
The Gemara says that Rabbi Meir’s reasoning is more compelling. Why? The non-Jews came to help build the Second Temple. Zerubbabel rejected their assistance and said, “It is not for you and for us to build a Temple for our God.” The non-Jews wanted to donate to the Temple, but their money was not accepted.
Where does the money from official valuations go? It goes to the Temple treasury. Since the money of official valuations goes to the Temple, it makes sense that a non-Jew cannot make an official valuation. The non-Jews were rejected from donating to the Temple, and therefore they cannot say, “My valuation is upon me.” They may have a monetary value, but they cannot donate an official valuation.
Rabbi Meir’s law therefore makes sense, but the reason originally given for it does not. The explanation that there are more people who can be valued than people who can make valuations does not prove anything about non-Jews. A deaf-mute, a minor, and a person of diminished mental capacity cannot make valuations because they lack the relevant capacity, whereas a non-Jew is a different category. The law may be correct, but that explanation is questionable.
The Gemara then considers the opposite view. Perhaps Rabbi Yehuda’s reasoning is more compelling. A person of indeterminate sex and an androgynous person are comparable to a non-Jew in this respect: they can make valuations but cannot be the subjects of valuations. The verse concerning the non-Jews who were rejected from donating to the Temple would support the general rule.
What, then, will Rabbi Yehuda do with the verse? The verse says that the non-Jews were not accepted as donors to the Temple, but perhaps it refers only to that particular situation. The question is: for how long were their donations rejected?
Perhaps the money was not accepted because the non-Jews wanted to use their contributions to gain influence. They wanted to pay their way into the project and have a say in the construction. Zerubbabel therefore said that their assistance could not be accepted.
There is another possible explanation. Perhaps the concern was that once the non-Jews began contributing, the Jews would stop contributing. The Jews would rely on the non-Jews, and if the non-Jews later stopped giving, the building would remain incomplete. Their contributions could weaken the Jews’ own support for the Temple.
The first explanation is that the Jewish leaders did not want the non-Jews to have influence over the project, since they might later pressure the authorities to stop the construction. The second explanation is that accepting their money would cause the Jewish people to stop contributing properly.
The Gemara discusses a related question concerning the laws of misuse of consecrated property. Ordinarily, if a person uses consecrated funds improperly, he must repay the principal and add an additional amount. But perhaps that applies only to money that the Temple would eventually have used. If the Temple would never have used the money, perhaps misusing it does not create the same obligation.
There are certain offerings that cannot be used and are left to die. For example, if an animal was designated as a sin offering and its owner died, the animal cannot be brought on the altar. It is allowed to remain until it dies. There are also cases in which money was designated for an offering, but the offering can no longer be brought. That money is thrown into the Dead Sea. The money is consecrated, but it cannot be used for any benefit.
In such a case, one is not permitted to benefit from the money, but there is no standard liability for misuse of consecrated property. Since the Temple would not have benefited from the money in any event, using it does not necessarily require repayment.
The Gemara challenges this from a clear teaching: with regard to the consecrated property of non-Jews, the distinction is that the rule applies to consecration for the altar, whereas with consecration for the Temple’s general repairs, misuse does create liability. If the money was never going to be used, why should there be liability?
The Gemara answers that these non-Jews were not merely giving money. They were trying to gain influence. They wanted to contribute and then use that contribution to participate in the decisions concerning the construction. The verse says that the people of the land weakened the hands of the Jews and troubled them in the building.
Thus, the reason the money was rejected was not necessarily that money from non-Jews can never be accepted. The problem was that these particular donors wanted to weaken the Jews’ hands and gain influence over the construction. They might have pressured the authorities to stop the project, or their participation might have caused the Jews to stop contributing.
According to Rabbi Yehuda, this was a separate circumstance. In general, non-Jews can be the subjects of official valuations and can make monetary-value vows, but they cannot make official valuations whose funds go to the Temple treasury. The rejection of the non-Jews’ donations in the time of Zerubbabel was because of the danger of their influence and the weakening of Jewish support, not because every donation from a non-Jew is inherently unacceptable.