The Eddie B. Sitt edition and audio series of the Talmud Bavli, Massechet Chullin, has been dedicated by our good friends Mr. Joey Jamal and his wife in honor of their son Jack’s engagement to Shirley Sutton. May Hashem grant that they marry and that the merit of this Torah learning bring them much nachat, peace, prosperity, and every blessing. Amen.
Today’s daf is being studied in honor of this dedication. We begin today’s daf toward the bottom of the first amud, six lines from where the lines become wider.
The question is whether fifty percent is considered a majority, or whether it is not considered a majority. We know from the Mishnah that, in the case of a bird, one must slaughter at least a majority of one of the required slaughtering organs. What is considered a majority? Is fifty percent considered a majority, or must one slaughter more than fifty percent?
Rav Avar said, “Half is not like a majority.” Rav Kahana said, “Half is not like a majority.” The verse states, “Do not leave a majority of the organ uncut.” This is what the Creator told Moshe Rabbeinu: once you reach half, you have fulfilled the requirement. Rav Kahana, however, said that half is not like a majority, and that one must slaughter a majority of the organ.
What is the practical difference between these opinions? The Gemara brings several questions.
We learned in the Mishnah: If one slaughtered half of one of the required organs of a bird, or half of each of the two required organs of an animal, the slaughter is invalid. If half is like a majority, why is it invalid? If half is considered a majority, why does the Mishnah say that slaughtering half of the organ of a bird is invalid?
Rav says that the Mishnah is referring to a rabbinic prohibition. You are correct that, according to Torah law, half should be sufficient. However, the Sages were concerned that if they permitted one to slaughter exactly half, a person might slaughter slightly less than half. They therefore established a decree requiring one to slaughter a majority.
The practical difference would be that, if one slaughtered exactly half of the organ, the animal would not be considered a carcass by Torah law. It would still be prohibited to eat because the Rabbis decreed that one must slaughter a majority, but according to the Torah and according to the opinion that half is like a majority, it would not have the status of a carcass.
What is this discussion referring to? Look at Rashi, who discusses a pottery oven. If a pottery oven becomes impure, the only way to purify it is to break it, as the verse says, “The oven and the stove shall be broken.” Rashi explains that an oven whose majority remains intact has not been broken sufficiently, because the verse requires it to be broken. If the majority of the oven is still intact, it has not been broken.
Now the Gemara says that if one could divide the oven into two precisely equal parts, each side would be pure. Ordinarily, however, it is impossible to divide it with absolute precision. One side may be slightly larger. If one side is fifty-one percent, that side is still the majority of the oven, and the oven has not lost its impurity. Therefore, one must break it until no majority remains intact.
But what would happen if it were possible to divide the oven precisely into two equal parts? If half is considered a majority, then one side is a majority and the other side is also a majority. Yet the Gemara says that the oven would be pure. This appears to contradict the opinion that half is like a majority.
The Gemara answers that we do not apply the principle of two majorities within one vessel. One cannot say that one side is a majority and that the other side is also a majority, because one vessel cannot contain two majorities. One side cannot be fifty-one percent and the other side also fifty-one percent. Therefore, in the case of the oven, if the two sides were precisely equal, neither side would be considered a majority.
Rashi explains that this principle applies to the oven because it consists of two separate pieces. In one vessel, one cannot say that both pieces are majorities. The case of slaughter, however, is different. The requirement is simply that one cut the required organ. Once one has cut half, and half is considered equivalent to a majority, the requirement has been fulfilled. There is no conflicting majority on the other side of the organ; the other side is simply what remains after the required cut.
We previously discussed the case of half of the windpipe. One slaughtered half of the windpipe and paused, and then continued and completed the slaughter. If half is considered a majority, why should the continuation be valid? Once one has slaughtered half, one has already slaughtered a majority. If one then pauses and returns to complete the slaughter, the animal should be considered non-kosher because an interruption occurred in the middle of the slaughter.
Rav answered: Who told you that the case is referring to an animal? Perhaps it is referring to a bird. In the case of a bird, only one organ needs to be slaughtered. If half is like a majority, the slaughter is already complete. If half is not like a majority, then nothing has yet been accomplished, and one may return and complete the slaughter.
There is a dispute regarding which organ must be slaughtered in the case of a bird, but that is a separate dispute. We do not need to determine here which organ must be slaughtered. Regardless, if half is like a majority, the slaughter is complete; and if half is not like a majority, one may return and finish the slaughter.
Perhaps the person wanted to slaughter both organs, or perhaps he wanted to complete the entire organ. That is acceptable. The law of slaughter does not state that he must return. The point is that, in the case of a bird, once he has slaughtered enough of the organ for it to be considered complete, there is no difficulty.
Come and hear another case. Suppose half of the windpipe was already defective, meaning that it already had a hole in it. The animal could still be kosher. One then added even the slightest amount and completed the slaughter. The slaughter is valid.
If half is considered a majority, why is the animal not already non-kosher? Even in the case of a bird, a majority of the windpipe would be invalid.
Rav answers that, when an animal becomes non-kosher because of a defect, the majority must be a visible majority. The majority must be apparent to the eye. Therefore, when half of the windpipe is missing, that is not yet a visible majority. Once one adds even a slight amount and thereby reaches more than half, the majority is apparent, and the slaughter is valid.
Abaye objected: Is this not a logical inference? In the laws of defects that render an animal non-kosher, there are cases in which even the smallest amount is disqualifying, such as a hole in the lungs or in the food pipe. Yet, when the law requires a majority, you say that it must be a visible majority. If even a tiny hole can render an animal non-kosher, then certainly, in the case of slaughter, where a majority is always required, should it not also have to be a majority visible to the eye?
The Gemara rejects this distinction between defects and slaughter. One cannot distinguish between the two in this manner. In both cases, where a majority is required, it must be a visible majority.
In truth, this discussion is not referring to slaughter at all. It concerns the law of the communal Passover offering. If the majority of the Jewish people are impure on the first Passover, they bring the offering on the first Passover. If only individuals are impure, they wait until the second Passover.
Rav said that if the people are exactly half impure and half pure, the impure individuals are considered a majority, and they bring the offering on the first Passover. Rav Kahana said that half is not considered a majority, and therefore those who are impure must wait until the second Passover.
What is Rav’s reasoning? The verse says, “Any individual who will be impure because of a corpse.” Rav understands this to mean that an individual is sent to the second Passover. The term “individual” applies only as long as the impure people constitute less than half of the community. Once they reach half of the community, they are no longer classified as individuals; they are considered a collective group. A community does not get deferred to the second Passover.
Rav is not necessarily saying that half is always considered a majority. Rather, this is a question of classification: who is considered an individual and who is considered a community? He holds that up to half of the community, each person is treated as an individual. Once they reach half, they are already considered a collective group, and the collective group brings the offering on the first Passover.
The Gemara continues with another discussion. We learned in the Mishnah that a majority of one organ is considered like the entire organ. At the end of the Mishnah, it says that if one slaughtered a majority of the organ of a bird, the slaughter is valid. But this seems obvious. If the Mishnah already taught that a majority is like the entire organ, why does it need to repeat that slaughtering a majority of the organ of a bird is valid?
Rav Oshaya answered that one statement refers to ordinary animals and birds, while the other refers to sacrificial animals and birds. The Gemara has not yet established which statement refers to ordinary animals and which refers to sacrifices, and it analyzes the matter in detail.
If the Mishnah had taught only the law of ordinary animals, I might have thought that the reason a majority is sufficient is that, in an ordinary animal, the blood is not required. The purpose of slaughter is simply to remove the animal’s life. In the case of a sacrifice, however, the purpose of slaughter is to obtain the blood. I might therefore have thought that, in the case of sacrifices, slaughtering only a majority would not be sufficient, and that the entire organ would have to be slaughtered so that the blood could be collected. This is why the Mishnah must teach both cases.
Which statement in the Mishnah refers to ordinary animals, and which refers to sacrifices? Rav Kahana said that it is more logical to say that the first part refers to ordinary animals and the second part refers to sacrifices.
What is the proof? The first part of the Mishnah says, “One who slaughters.” If it were referring to sacrificial birds, it should have used the term for pinching the neck, since sacrificial birds are killed through pinching rather than ordinary slaughter. The fact that the Mishnah says “one who slaughters” indicates that it is referring to ordinary birds.
But perhaps the second part refers to sacrifices. That is not a difficulty, because the Mishnah also mentions an animal. Since an animal is mentioned in the second part, it can use the language of slaughter even when discussing sacrifices, because sacrifices from animals are slaughtered.
We can therefore say that the first part refers to an ordinary bird, while the second part refers to sacrifices. If the first part referred to sacrifices, it should have said that one who pinches the majority of the organ is valid. The fact that it says “one who slaughters” indicates that the first part refers to an ordinary bird.
The Gemara raises a difficulty: How can the second part refer to sacrifices when it says that the majority of one organ of a bird is sufficient? In the case of the burnt offering of a bird, both organs must be severed. The statement that the majority of one organ is sufficient appears not to apply to a sacrificial bird.
The Gemara answers that when the Mishnah says “the majority of one,” it means the majority of each one. In other words, it refers to the majority of each individual organ. The Mishnah should really have said “the majority of both,” since the burnt offering of a bird requires both organs.
However, because there is also the sin offering of a bird, for which one organ is sufficient, the Mishnah could not use language that specifically required two organs. It therefore used language that could apply to both offerings. In the case of the sin offering, “the majority of one” means the majority of one organ. In the case of the burnt offering, it means the majority of each of the two organs.
Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish also maintained that the first part refers to ordinary animals and birds, while the second part refers to sacrifices. He asked: Since we already learned that a majority of one organ is like the entire organ, why did the Mishnah need to teach that the majority of one organ in a bird is valid, and that the majority of both organs in an animal is valid?
The priestly service on Yom Kippur provides the answer. As described in Massechet Yoma, the High Priest brings the daily offering on Yom Kippur. He begins slaughtering it, and another miracle occurs: the slaughter is completed by his hand. When the High Priest slaughters the offering on Yom Kippur, he must slaughter a majority of the two organs, but he does not complete the entire slaughter. The service is performed by the High Priest alone, and the blood begins to flow. He cannot remain occupied with the entire slaughter, because he must take the vessel and collect the blood. He leaves the slaughter, takes the vessel, and another priest comes and completes it.
Another priest would place a cloth over the High Priest’s hand, and the High Priest would continue with the service. Before they would sleep there, the appointed person would ask whether the cloth had become torn. The arrangement was that a cloth would be brought, placed over his hand, and another priest would come along and complete the slaughter.
That is why the Mishnah must teach in its second part that a majority is valid. We have a Mishnah in Yoma that appears to indicate that a second priest must come and complete the majority. If the High Priest did not complete it, there might be a problem because the slaughter would still need to be completed. The Mishnah therefore teaches us that it is acceptable even when only a majority was slaughtered by the first priest.
What is the practical difference? Suppose the second priest did not complete the remaining portion. One might think that the offering would be invalid, because all the services on Yom Kippur must be performed by the High Priest. If completing the slaughter were an essential part of the service, how could another priest perform it?
The very fact that another priest is permitted to complete the slaughter demonstrates that this is not an essential part of the service. Nevertheless, one might have thought that the Rabbis imposed a rabbinic disqualification if it was not completed. The Mishnah therefore teaches that there is no such rabbinic disqualification.
Why, then, does another priest complete the slaughter? The Gemara suggests that it might be for the sake of removing all the blood. The more people involved in the sacrificial service, the better, and another priest can complete the slaughter so that all the blood will flow out. The Gemara rejects this as the reason. It is not simply that every service should have a second priest perform an additional task.
Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, in the name of Levi the Elder, presents a well-known dispute. One opinion is that slaughter has no validity until the end of the slaughter. Rabbi Yochanan says that slaughter applies from the beginning through the end.
We must understand the practical difference between these opinions. Does slaughter begin only at the end, or does it begin from the moment the slaughter starts? One practical difference would be the case in which a gentile began the slaughter and a Jew completed it. If slaughter exists only at the end, perhaps it does not matter who began the process, since the act of slaughter is determined only by its completion. If slaughter begins at the beginning and continues through the end, however, there would be a problem when a gentile began the slaughter.
Rava said that everyone agrees in the case of a gentile. If a gentile slaughtered one of the two organs and a Jew then slaughtered the second organ, the animal is non-kosher. The gentile’s act is considered nothing, so by the time the Jew begins, one entire organ remains uncut. The act of slaughter has therefore not been performed properly. Even though one opinion maintains that slaughter takes effect only at the end, something has already occurred before the Jew’s act. It is no better than a hole in the animal’s food pipe or windpipe, which renders the animal non-kosher.
The same principle applies to the burnt offering of a bird. In the case of a burnt offering, the pinching is performed above the red line on the altar. In the case of a sin offering, it is performed below the red line.
Suppose that, in the case of a burnt offering, the priest performed one organ below the line and the other organ above the line. The offering is invalid, even though the priest ultimately completed the required act. The reason is that performing one organ below the line is an act associated with the sin offering, which is performed below the line. Since one organ is significant in the case of a sin offering, one cannot say that the first organ is meaningless in the case of a burnt offering. Therefore, even according to the opinion that slaughter takes effect only at the end, the offering is already invalid.
Where, then, is the dispute? The dispute concerns a case in which the priest slaughtered a minority of each of the two organs outside the designated area and completed the slaughter inside.
According to the opinion that slaughter applies from the beginning through the end, the slaughter began outside the designated area, and the offering is invalid. According to the opinion that slaughter takes effect only at the end, the decisive act occurred inside, and the offering is valid.
What is meant by “a minority” in this case? It could mean forty-nine percent, or any amount less than a majority. Even fifty percent would still be considered a minority for purposes of this dispute, because the dispute above established that everyone agrees that once one reaches a clear majority, the slaughter has been completed. The case here is that fifty percent of each organ was slaughtered outside, and the priest then entered and completed the slaughter inside.
According to the opinion that slaughter begins at the beginning, the offering is invalid because part of the slaughter was performed outside. According to the opinion that slaughter does not take effect until the end, the offering is valid because the decisive portion of the slaughter was performed inside.
We will stop here, with the help of Hashem.