The AB set edition of the audio series of the Talmud Bavli, Masechet Chullin, has been dedicated by our good friend Mr. Joey Jamal and his wife in honor of their son Jack's engagement to Shirley Sutton. May they, with God's help, marry at a good and successful time, and may the merit of the learning we will engage in over the next several months in Masechet Chullin bring them much joy, peace in the home, prosperity, and all blessings. Amen.
Today, we begin on Daf kuf mem aleph, in memory of Avraham ben Esther and Rabbi Moshe ben Luna. May their souls be at rest in the Garden of Eden. Amen. We also pray for a complete recovery for Yosef ben Sabot. Please, God, heal him. May his healing be close at hand, and may it be God's will, and we say Amen.
We start today's daf at the bottom two dots, five lines down. The Mishnah states, "There is no chick there." It then mentions that the birds in the nest had wings and were able to fly. Or let’s say you had beitzim muzarot, which refers to eggs that do not produce chicks. In this case, we said one is exempt from sending away the mother bird, as indicated by the term patur mi-shiluach.
A scholar asked Rava, "If that is the case, why don’t you say the exact opposite? Say like this: 'There is no chick, but rather one egg,' and thus one would be exempt from sending it away because we require chicks or eggs, as the verse states in plurality, 'chicks or eggs.' You do not have that; you have one. In such a case, the Mishnah states one is liable. Why? Perhaps one should be exempt because we said 'chicks or eggs.' In the second case, if there were chicks that were hatching or beitzim muzarot, one would be obligated to send them away. Why do you say in the second case one is liable instead of exempt? The verse states 'kan'—a nest—of any type. I do not care what type of nest it is, whether the eggs are muzarot or they have wings. What is the difference? Who told you to say 'exempt' where you said 'exempt' and 'liable' where you said 'liable'? Perhaps it is the reverse?"
The Gemara responds, "If that is the case, the verse should have said, 'and the mother is sitting on them.'" Why does it use the term efrochim and beitzim? To make a comparison between chicks and eggs, and eggs to chicks. And what is that comparison? Rashi explains that we compare chicks to eggs, meaning just like eggs are not alive, so too chicks must also be alive. Therefore, from the fact that the Torah wrote 'chicks and eggs,' we can make a comparison between the two in Torah and halacha. Why did it say that in plurality? Rashi states that when it said 'kan,' it meant any type of nest, even if there is one egg in it. The Torah speaks of many chicks and many eggs in many nests, but it does not mean in one nest. Hence, the halacha is that even one egg makes one liable because 'kan' applies in every case. Chicks and eggs are not specifically required to have wings to make one exempt.
The Mishnah continues: "If you sent it away and it returned, even four or five times, one is liable, as it says, 'You shall send away the mother.'" You sent the mother away, and it came back. You sent it and it came back. You keep on doing this, even four or five times, until it goes away for good. The double language of 'send away' indicates that one must send away the mother. Even if you took the mother, it does not matter; you must eventually send her away. The verse states, "You shall send away the mother." If you took the chicks before sending away the mother and then returned the eggs, and afterward the mother returned to them, you are exempt from sending her away because it is too late. Once you took the eggs, they belong to you, and therefore you do not fulfill the mitzvah. Rashi notes that if you took the eggs and then the mother returned to them, you are exempt from sending her away because you have already prepared the nest. It must be something that occurs naturally, as the verse states, 'when a bird's nest happens to be before you.' However, when you put the eggs back, you created the nest, and therefore you cannot fulfill the mitzvah.
The Gemara asks, "The scholars said to Rava, 'You told me that what? It is 'You shall send away.' So what does 'You shall send away' teach me? Even four or five times means limitless. You must keep doing the mitzvah over and over again. So the Gemara asks: 'Perhaps 'You shall send away' means once and 'You shall send' means twice?' Who told you four or five times? 'Send' is once; 'send' is twice." No, he answered: "The word 'send' means even a hundred times. Keep on sending, sending, sending, a hundred times. What does the second 'send' teach me? It only teaches me that you may send the mother bird away if you do not need it, but how do I know that if you need the bird for a mitzvah, you must also send the mother bird away?" The Gemara answers: "The verse states, 'You shall send away' from anywhere, meaning even if you need it for a mitzvah, you must send the mother bird away." The first 'send' teaches me it is a hundred times, and the second 'send' teaches me even for a mitzvah.
Rabbi Abba, son of Rabbi Yosef, asked Rava, "But isn't the reason that the verse states 'You shall send away' only because it says the word 'send'? I would have thought that without the written law, for a mitzvah you do not have to send the mother away; you could take the mother and use it." The Gemara explains that 'You shall send away the mother' is a commandment that is both a positive and a negative commandment. Since it is a positive commandment, it does not override a negative commandment. The sending away of the mother bird is a positive commandment, and you shall not take the mother with the chicks. Since it is both a positive and a negative commandment, how can a positive commandment override a negative commandment? The Gemara clarifies that we are discussing a case where he took the mother without fulfilling the mitzvah, and thus he is in violation of the prohibition. Now, what remains is just the positive commandment of sending away the mother. If he took the mother with the chicks, he is in violation of the prohibition. Therefore, he has only the positive commandment of sending away the mother. I would have thought that a positive commandment could override a negative commandment, but this is why we need the verse of 'You shall send away' to tell us no.
The Gemara continues, "It is not simple the way you understood it. This is a dispute we saw in Masechet Makkot: 'If you have a negative commandment that can be turned into a positive commandment, how do we understand it? The prohibition of not taking the mother with the chicks is a positive commandment, and 'You shall send away' is a positive commandment. If I took the mother, I am violating the prohibition of not taking the mother with the chicks. If I did not send it away, I would have thought I am still in violation of the prohibition, but if I sent it away within three seconds, then I was able to fix it because I can still fix it; the bird is still here. So what is the difference if I was in violation of the prohibition? As long as I can still fix it, I can say the case is talking about this: he took it, he waited three seconds, and now he is in violation of the prohibition. Now it is only a positive commandment of 'You shall send away.' I would have thought that a positive commandment overrides a negative commandment, but this is why we need the verse of 'You shall send away' to tell us no." The Gemara explains that the case is about where he took it with the intent to send it away. In that case, he is not in violation of the prohibition because at the time he took it, his intention was to send it away. Therefore, he is not in violation of the prohibition.
The Gemara further states, "But if he did not send it away, he is in violation of the prohibition, and therefore he cannot take the eggs because of the mitzvah of sending away the mother bird. The prohibition does not apply here because he has not fulfilled the mitzvah." The Gemara concludes that we are discussing a case where he took the mother bird with the intent to send it away, and thus he is not in violation of the prohibition.
As we continue in Masechet Chullin, we arrive at the Mishnah on kuf mem aleph: "If one takes the mother bird with the chicks, Rabbi Yehuda says he receives lashes and does not send it away." Rabbi Yehuda states that one is liable for transgressing the prohibition and cannot fulfill the mitzvah anymore. The Rabbis say that one may send the mother away but does not receive lashes. Why? Because of the following rule: "This is the general rule: any negative commandment that has a positive commandment associated with it does not incur lashes." This is known as a negative commandment that can be turned into a positive commandment. If you have a negative commandment that you can fix by doing a positive commandment, you do not receive lashes. You committed a transgression, but you can fix it. The verse states, "You shall not take the mother with the chicks." What do you do? "You shall send away the mother." Therefore, you do not receive lashes.
The Gemara then poses a question: "Rabbi Abba bar Mamal asks: Is the reason of Rabbi Yehuda because he holds that a negative commandment that can be turned into a positive commandment incurs lashes, or perhaps he simply holds that a negative commandment that can be turned into a positive commandment does not incur lashes?" The Gemara presents the two sides of Rabbi Yehuda's reasoning. Perhaps Rabbi Yehuda holds that a negative commandment that can be turned into a positive commandment incurs lashes, and therefore he does not care if you fix it. The bottom line is that you have violated the prohibition and are liable for lashes. Or perhaps he agrees with the Rabbis that a negative commandment that can be turned into a positive commandment does not incur lashes. So why does he receive lashes? Because here the Torah states, "You shall send away," indicating that he must send it immediately. Once he did not send it, there is no mitzvah anymore. He lost the mitzvah. This presents the two sides of Rabbi Yehuda.
The Gemara then proves this: "Come and hear: A thief and a robber are included in the category of lashes, according to Rabbi Yehuda. In the case of a thief and a robber, even though you can fix it, Rabbi Yehuda still says you receive lashes." The Gemara explains that in the case of a thief and a robber, you can fix it as the verse states, "You shall not steal and return the stolen item." Rabbi Yehuda still holds that you receive lashes. This implies that Rabbi Yehuda believes that a negative commandment that can be turned into a positive commandment incurs lashes.
The Gemara continues, "Rabbi Zeira said to him, 'Did I not tell you that any teaching not taught in the schools of Rabbi Chiya and Rabbi Oshaya is mistaken?' Any teaching that is not authentic should not be brought into the study hall for questions or proofs." The Gemara asserts that maybe the true text of the teaching is that you do not receive lashes. Rabbi Zeira emphasizes that if the teaching is not authentic, it should not be brought into the study hall.
The Gemara then states, "Come and hear: Rabbi Oshaya and Rabbi Chiya taught: 'You shall not return until morning.' If you forgot something, you cannot go back; you must leave it for the poor. This is the rule: 'You shall not return,' but he went back. 'You shall not cut the corners of the field,' but he cut. According to Rabbi Yehuda, they are included in the category of lashes." Even though you can fix it, you still receive lashes. The Gemara concludes that this proves Rabbi Yehuda holds that a negative commandment that can be turned into a positive commandment incurs lashes.
The Gemara then challenges this proof, stating, "Perhaps there the reason is that the Torah wants you to leave it initially. Once you did not leave it initially and you took it, you cannot fix it. The Torah wants you to leave it initially." The Gemara continues to explore the implications of this reasoning.
Rabbi Abba then tells a story about Levi bar Simon, who transferred ownership of the fruit from his dovecote to Rabbi Yehuda. Levi bar Simon came before Shmuel, who instructed him to shake the nest so that the birds would rise and fall, thus allowing for a valid acquisition. The Gemara questions the necessity of this action, suggesting that a simple verbal declaration would suffice. The Gemara concludes that the mother had never sat on the eggs, meaning that Levi bar Simon could not transfer ownership to Rabbi Yehuda because the conditions for valid acquisition had not been met.
In summary, the discussion revolves around the intricacies of commandment fulfillment, particularly regarding the mitzvah of sending away the mother bird. The halachic distinctions regarding liability, the nature of ownership, and the implications of intention are explored in depth, leading to a comprehensive understanding of the responsibilities and prohibitions involved in these scenarios.