The Talmud Bavli, Masechet Ketubot, has been dedicated by Mr. Elliot Shasho. May the merit of studying this tractate bring him a good and blessed year, wealth, honor, peace in his home, and success in all his endeavors. May he continue to support Torah and all holy projects, amen. Today's page, Daf Peh Bet, is studied in honor of Musa and Sheila Gindi, dedicated by Yossi. May he merit to perform many mitzvot. This Daf is also studied for the elevation of the soul of Avraham ben Esther, may the spirit of Hashem grant him rest in Gan Eden, amen. And for the complete recovery of Yosef ben Sarah and Sarah bat Rachel, may G-d heal them among the sick of His people Israel, amen.
We begin today's Daf on Peh Bet Amud Rishon, eight lines down, where the Gemara opens with a case: There was a man in the city of Matai Machseya whose brother passed away, leaving him with the obligation of yibum. Another brother, desiring to prevent the yavam from inheriting the deceased's property alone, sought to disqualify the yevamah from yibum by issuing her a get. As we learn in Masechet Yevamot, once a yevamah receives a get from any of the brothers, she becomes disqualified for yibum to all of them, leading to an equal division of the deceased's property among the brothers. This was the younger brother's strategy.
The older brother, the yavam, asked him, "What is your intention? If it is because of the money, I will split the inheritance with you." This situation echoes a similar story from yesterday's Daf in Pumbedita. The younger brother responded, "I am concerned that you will do to me what the trickster in Pumbedita did." In that story, the brother promised to split the inheritance, but Rav Yosef ruled that such an offer was meaningless. Just as a yavam cannot sell the inheritance even after acquiring it, he also cannot give it away. Thus, the younger brother feared the deal would be nullified, leaving him with nothing.
To address this, the older brother proposed, "If you wish, I will give it to you from now." This meant performing an act of acquisition now for the assets, on the condition that if he performs yibum and takes the yevamah as his wife, the younger brother would acquire half of the assets. The brothers were aware of Rav Yosef's ruling in the Pumbedita case, believing the problem there was that the acquisition was made before the assets were in the yavam's possession. They thought this new arrangement, where the acquisition was pending until the yavam acquired the assets, would work. The Gemara explains that this would be an act of acquisition made now, to take effect later, once the yavam marries and the money enters his possession, then transferring to the younger brother.
The Gemara then quotes Mar bar Rav Ashi, who cites Rav Dimi in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: If a person tells his friend, "Go and pull this cow, but I do not want the acquisition to take effect until after thirty days," then after thirty days, the acquisition takes effect. This is true even if the cow is in a swamp where an immediate acquisition would be impossible. This case seems to suggest that a delayed acquisition is valid.
However, the Gemara distinguishes: In the case of the cow, the acquisition works because it was "in his hand," meaning the recipient could have acquired the cow immediately if he wished, even though he chose to delay it. But in the yibum case, the assets were "not in his hand" at the time of the acquisition, as they were not yet in the yavam's possession. Therefore, the acquisition would not work. This implies that a delayed acquisition is only valid if the item could have been acquired immediately.
The Gemara then raises a contradiction: When Ravin came from Eretz Yisrael to Bavel, he said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan that in the cow case, a delayed acquisition does not work. The Gemara resolves this contradiction by distinguishing between two scenarios: one where the person explicitly states, "Acquire it from now," meaning the act of acquisition happens now but its effect is delayed, and another where he does not say "Acquire it from now," implying the acquisition itself is entirely delayed. The former, where it works retroactively from the time of the physical act of acquisition, is valid. The latter, where nothing happens at the time of the act of acquisition and it is entirely delayed, is not valid. The Gemara's point is that the act of acquisition must have some immediate, even if conditional, effect. The yibum case, where the assets are not yet in the yavam's possession, falls into the invalid category.
The Gemara's entire discussion here assumes there was no lien on the assets for the ketubah. If there were a lien, the yavam could not sell the properties even after marriage. This discussion aligns with the opinion that there is no lien on movable property for the ketubah. However, the Gemara concludes that the delayed acquisition in the yibum case does not work because a complete acquisition cannot be made immediately, as the assets are not yet the yavam's.
The Gemara continues by quoting a question asked to Ulla: If a brother performed yibum, and only afterward divided the assets, what is the ruling? Ulla replied that he did nothing, meaning the division is invalid. This is based on the opinion that the assets are frozen due to the ketubah lien. A follow-up question was posed: What if he divided the assets before performing yibum? Ulla again replied that he did nothing. Rav Sheshet challenged this, arguing that if dividing assets after yibum (when they are technically in his possession) is invalid, it is self-evident that dividing them before yibum (when they are not yet his) would also be invalid. Why state both cases?
The Gemara clarifies that these were two separate incidents, two distinct questions posed to the Sages, not a sequential legal exposition. Each question was asked by a different rabbi who might not have been aware of the other case. The final ruling, however, is clear: whether the division occurs before or after yibum, it is invalid. This is because, as we learn, there is a lien on the properties for the ketubah, preventing the yavam from selling or giving them away, even after marriage.
The Mishnah states, "The fruits attached to the ground belong to him." This refers to the husband's right to the fruits of the land that came with the yevamah. The Gemara questions this: Why should this be so? Are all assets not obligated for the ketubah? And fruits attached to the ground are considered like the ground itself. Therefore, how can the Sages say the husband can take these fruits, when they should be mortgaged for the ketubah?
Rashi clarifies the Gemara's question by distinguishing this case from the laws of nichsei milog (usufruct property). In nichsei milog, the Rabbis decreed that the husband eats the fruits because the principal remains for the wife, and the fruits are considered his once they are picked. However, in our case of yibum, the husband inherits both the principal and the fruits. The Rabbis, however, imposed a lien on these properties for the ketubah. Since anything attached to the ground is considered like the ground, the lien applies to the fruits as well. Therefore, the Gemara asks, how can the Sages permit the husband to take these fruits?
Reish Lakish responds by suggesting an emendation to the Mishnah: "Change it to 'they belong to her.'" This means the fruits are also subject to the ketubah lien, and the husband cannot touch them. Rashi explains that the Sages only dispute Rabbi Meir regarding movable property and cash, on which Rabbi Meir holds there is a lien, while the Sages hold there is none. But regarding fruits attached to the ground, there is no dispute; everyone agrees they are considered like land, and thus subject to the ketubah lien.
The Mishnah further states, "If he married her, she is like his wife." The Gemara asks, "For what law is this a novelty?" What practical difference does it make to state that a yevamah, once married through yibum, is considered a regular wife? Rabbi Yosei bar Hanina explains that it means he can divorce her with a get and remarry her. The novelty is that she no longer requires halitzah (the ceremony of removing the shoe) to dissolve the yibum bond; a get is sufficient. The Gemara questions this, saying it is obvious that a get is needed for a regular marriage. It suggests that one might have thought that since the Torah says "v'yibmah" (he shall perform yibum), she remains a yevamah even after marriage, requiring both a get and halitzah. The Mishnah teaches us that a get alone suffices.
The Gemara then questions the statement "and remarry her," arguing this is also obvious for a regular wife. It suggests that one might have thought that since the yibum was a mitzvah that overrode the prohibition of marrying a brother's wife, once divorced, the prohibition of "eshet ach" (brother's wife) would revert, preventing remarriage. The Mishnah teaches us that this is not the case. The Gemara further challenges this, asking, "Perhaps that is indeed the case?" It then answers that the verse states, "and he shall take her to him as a wife," implying that once he takes her, she becomes a full-fledged wife, with all the laws pertaining to a regular wife, including the ability to remarry her, as the prohibition of "eshet ach" is permanently waived once yibum is performed. Tosafot notes that the Gemara does not consider the possibility that she would immediately revert to "eshet ach" after the first marital act, as the Torah intends for a normal marriage.
The Mishnah continues, "Provided that her ketubah is on the assets of her first husband." This means the yavam is not obligated to pay the ketubah from his own assets; it comes from the deceased brother's estate. The Gemara asks for the reason. It answers, "A woman was given to him from Heaven." Since he did not choose this marriage but was obligated by divine law, he is not personally liable for the ketubah. He relies on the deceased's assets. However, if the first husband's estate is insufficient, the Rabbis decreed that the yavam must provide for her ketubah from his own assets. The reason for this is "so that she should not be light in his eyes to divorce her," meaning to deter him from divorcing her easily if he has no financial stake. The Rishonim explain that if the estate is sufficient, the yavam's enjoyment of the fruits of the inherited property serves as a deterrent.
The Mishnah states, "He may not say to her, 'Here is your ketubah.'" This means a yavam cannot designate specific funds for her ketubah and then sell other properties, as all properties are subject to the lien. The Mishnah adds, "And similarly," meaning this applies even in an ordinary marriage. The Gemara asks, "Why 'similarly'?" Why would one think an ordinary marriage is different? It suggests that in a yibum case, the yavam does not write a ketubah pledging his own present and future acquisitions, making the wife more insecure. To alleviate this "eiva" (strife) and ensure her reliance, the Rabbis froze the properties. However, in a regular marriage, the husband pledges his own assets, so one might think the wife would feel secure, and there would be no need to freeze properties. The Mishnah teaches us that even in a regular marriage, this practice is forbidden, as it creates "eiva," making the wife feel her husband is already preparing for divorce.
The Mishnah states, "If he divorced her, she only has her ketubah." This means if the yavam divorces the yevamah, the properties become unfrozen, and he pays her the ketubah. The Gemara infers that if he divorces her, yes, but if he does not divorce her, no, the properties remain frozen. This supports the opinion of Rabbi Abba, who stated that if a yavam wishes to unfreeze the properties to sell them without his wife's permission, he must divorce her and then remarry her. The Mishnah confirms that as long as they are married, the properties are locked.
The Mishnah continues, "If he remarried her, she is like all other women," meaning she only receives one ketubah (the original one from the first marriage). The Gemara asks, "What is this teaching us?" We already know from a later Mishnah that if a man divorces his wife and remarries her, it is on the condition of her original ketubah. Why is the yibum case specifically mentioned? The Gemara suggests that one might have thought that in a regular marriage, the husband writes the ketubah, so it can carry over to a second marriage. But in yibum, the original ketubah comes from the deceased's estate, not from the yavam. Therefore, one might think that upon remarriage, the yavam would have to pledge a new ketubah from his own assets, resulting in two ketubot. The Mishnah teaches us that this is not so; she still only receives the original ketubah, even in a yibum case.
Rav Yehuda states that originally, they would write 200 zuz for a virgin and 100 zuz for a widow in the ketubah, and these specific funds were set aside, with no lien on other properties. However, this led to women growing old without marrying, as they feared that if their husband died or divorced them, they would not be able to collect their ketubah, as the heirs could hide the money. This deterred marriages. Then Shimon ben Shetach instituted that all the husband's properties would be liable for the ketubah, restoring the incentive to marry.
A Baraita supports this: Originally, they would write 200 for a virgin and 100 for a widow. But women grew old and did not marry because they did not trust they would receive their ketubah, fearing heirs would hide the money. So, they instituted that the money be kept in her father's house. But this was still problematic, as the husband could easily tell her, "Go to your ketubah," making divorce too simple. Then they instituted that it be kept in his father-in-law's house (where they often lived). Wealthy women would use the money to buy silver and gold baskets, while poorer women would use it for copper vessels. Tosafot clarifies that these were copper vessels for grapes, not urinals, and that Rashi explains wealthy women had larger ketubot. Even this was not ideal, as the ketubah was still too accessible, allowing the husband to easily say, "Take your ketubah and leave." Finally, Shimon ben Shetach instituted that all the husband's properties would be liable for the ketubah, and they stopped designating specific movable funds for it, thereby alleviating these problems.