The Eri B. Sit edition and audio series of the Talmud Bavli, Massechet Ketubot, has been dedicated by our dear friend Mr. Elliot Shasho. May Hashem sustain him and grant him merit through the study of Massechet Ketubot, and may he have, with Hashem’s help, a good and blessed year, wealth, honor, peace in the home, and success in all his endeavors. May he continue to support Torah and all holy projects. Amen.
Today’s daf is being said for the complete recovery of Yosef ben Zara, the Sarah of Batrachel. Amen.
We begin today’s daf on page 91a, at the bottom of the page, three lines from the bottom. Rami bar Hama says: Reuven sold a field to Shimon without accepting liability. This means that if there was a lien on the field and the creditors came to take it from Shimon, Reuven would not have to compensate Shimon for the loss. That is what it means to sell without liability.
Shimon then sold that exact same field back to Reuven, accepting liability upon himself. In other words, if creditors came and took the field, Shimon accepted responsibility for compensating Reuven. Subsequently, one of Reuven’s creditors came and took the field as payment for a debt that Reuven owed him. What is the law? Rami bar Hama holds that Shimon must come to Reuven’s aid and compensate him. Since Shimon sold the field back to Reuven with liability, he must protect him.
The Gemara brings Rava’s opinion. Rava says that Shimon does not have to compensate Reuven in this case. Rava understands that when Shimon accepted liability, he accepted liability only for a preexisting lien on the field. If a creditor comes to collect a debt that had already been secured by that field, Shimon will protect Reuven. However, he did not accept responsibility for paying Reuven’s personal debts.
Normally, when a person borrows money, all of his assets are available for collection. If a creditor comes and says, “You owe me money,” the creditor may collect from the borrower’s assets. In this case, however, the field itself was not specifically liened to secure that loan. It was simply one of Reuven’s assets, and the law is that a creditor may collect from a borrower’s assets. Shimon can therefore say, “I did not accept responsibility for this field so that I would have to pay any personal loan that Reuven owed. I accepted responsibility only if there had been a lien on the land from before.”
We must understand Rami bar Hama’s reasoning. Rami bar Hama says that Shimon did accept responsibility and therefore has to save Reuven from the creditor. His explanation would be as follows: Let us say that Shimon had sold the field to someone else, not back to Reuven, and had sold it with liability. If Reuven’s creditors then came and took the field from that third party, Shimon would have had to compensate the purchaser. In that case, Shimon would have had to pay for Reuven’s debt. Therefore, if he sold the field back to Reuven, he must also accept responsibility for the debt.
In other words, if Shimon had sold the field to a third party, Reuven’s creditors could have come to that third party and said, “Reuven owes us this money, and we are taking the field.” Shimon would then have had to stand behind the sale and pay the third party. Since Shimon would have had to pay when he sold the field to someone else, he must also pay when he sold it back to Reuven himself.
Rava agrees that there is a certain case in which Shimon must compensate Reuven. Suppose Reuven inherited the field from his father, Yaakov. Reuven sold it to Shimon without accepting liability, and Shimon then sold it back to Reuven while accepting liability. If a creditor of Yaakov, Reuven’s father, now comes and takes the land, even Rava agrees that Shimon must stand by his commitment and compensate Reuven.
In this case, the creditor of Yaakov is considered an outside creditor. It is not viewed as Reuven’s personal debt. Although there is a principle that a son stands in the place of his father, one might have thought that Yaakov’s debt is effectively Reuven’s debt, allowing Shimon to say, “I did not accept responsibility for Reuven’s debts.” Nevertheless, this creditor is considered an outside creditor. Therefore, when Yaakov’s creditor comes, Shimon has accepted responsibility to defend Reuven and compensate him for the field.
The Gemara presents another case. Reuven sold a field to Shimon with liability, but Shimon did not have the money to pay for it. Reuven therefore converted the purchase price into a loan: “You owe me the money for the field.” Reuven later died, and one of Reuven’s creditors came to Shimon and attempted to take the field.
Shimon settled with the creditor by paying him the money that he owed Reuven for the field. Let us follow the case carefully. Reuven sold the field to Shimon, but Shimon did not pay immediately. He therefore owed Reuven the purchase price. Reuven then died. One of Reuven’s creditors came to collect the debt and attempted to take the field from Shimon. Shimon said, “I owe Reuven a thousand dollars for this field in any event. I will pay you the thousand dollars and settle Reuven’s debt.” He paid the creditor and assumed that he was now free to keep the field, since he had paid the money that he owed Reuven.
The law, however, is that Reuven’s children can come to Shimon and say, “Our father left money with you. You owe us the purchase price for the field. The movable property that orphans inherit is not subject to a lien for their father’s debts.” In other words, although Shimon paid one of Reuven’s creditors, that payment does not necessarily release him from the money that he owes Reuven’s children.
Normally, Shimon would have to pay Reuven’s heirs. He may claim, “I paid your father’s creditor. I took care of his debt.” The children can respond, “We did not inherit land from our father. You owed our father money, and money is movable property. There was no lien on that money in favor of his creditor. You therefore had no right to use the money that you owed us to pay our father’s creditor. You still owe us the money.”
Let us restate the case. Reuven sold the field to Shimon, and Shimon did not pay, so he owed Reuven the money. Reuven died. Reuven’s creditors came to Shimon and claimed that Reuven owed them money and that they therefore wanted to take the field. Shimon said, “Reuven sold me this field with liability. He would have been required to protect me, and I owe him a thousand dollars in any event. I will use that money to pay his creditors.” He paid the creditors and thought that he was now even with Reuven.
Reuven’s orphans then came and said, “You still owe us the money for the field.” Shimon answered, “I already paid.” They responded, “Who asked you to pay? You owed us the money. The law is that movable property is not subject to a lien for the father’s debts. You paid the creditor, but that does not remove your obligation to us.”
The Gemara confirms that this is indeed their claim, and Shimon must pay them. The movable property that children inherit from their father is not subject to collection for their father’s debts. The father’s debts can be collected only from land. This is part of the general rule that movable property is not subject to liens.
Since Reuven left his children no land, the creditor had no claim against them. The money that Shimon owed their father was not subject to collection by the creditor, because money is movable property. Shimon therefore had no right to use that money to pay the creditor. Consequently, he still owes the children the money.
Technically, one might ask whether the children must reimburse Shimon, since he did pay their father’s debts. If they had inherited land, they would have been obligated to reimburse him. Since they did not inherit any land, however, they have no land subject to a lien, and they are not obligated to reimburse him.
The Gemara says that if Shimon is clever, this is what he will do: He should give Reuven’s children land as payment of the debt. He owes them the money that he owed their father, so he can give them a piece of land. He already paid a thousand dollars to the creditor. He can now say to the children, “I am giving you this land in payment of the money that I owe you.” Once he gives them the land, he can then reclaim it based on the liability that Reuven accepted when he sold the original field to him.
Reuven guaranteed the field, and that liability applies to land. If Shimon can take the land back, the payment can effectively return to him. This follows the teaching of Rav Nachman: When orphans collect land because of their father’s debt, and the creditor had previously taken that land, the creditor may later collect it from them again.
The novelty here is that the land is still considered an inheritance, even though Shimon gave it to the children in exchange for the money that he had paid. The land came to them because of their father, and it is therefore still regarded as part of the inheritance. The inheritance is subject to the lien for their father’s debts.
Shimon can then say, “Your father sold me a piece of land and accepted liability. I had to pay a thousand dollars because of that liability. I therefore have a lien against your father’s estate for that money.” The land is present, and he can take it back. That is the clever procedure described by the Gemara.
The Gemara continues with another case. Reuven sold all of his fields to Shimon, and Shimon then sold one of those fields to Levi. Reuven’s creditor came and wanted to collect the debt. Since Reuven no longer had money, the creditor wanted to collect from the land. The law is that the creditor may collect from whichever of the two purchasers he chooses. He may go to Shimon, or he may go to Levi, because the lien that was on Reuven’s fields follows the land to the purchasers.
The Gemara qualifies this ruling: This applies only when Levi purchased intermediate-quality land. There are three categories of land: superior land, intermediate-quality land, and inferior land. A creditor generally collects from intermediate-quality land. Therefore, if Levi has intermediate-quality land, the creditor may collect from Levi as well.
If Levi purchased superior land or inferior land, however, Levi can say, “I went out of my way to purchase this particular land because I knew that a creditor could not collect from it. You cannot come to me.” The creditor may therefore be pushed away from Levi unless Levi has intermediate-quality land.
Even when Levi has intermediate-quality land, this applies only if Shimon does not have comparable intermediate-quality land. If Shimon has comparable intermediate-quality fields, Levi can say, “I left you a place from which to collect. Why are you coming to me?”
Let us review the case. Reuven sold all of his fields to Shimon, and Shimon sold one of the fields to Levi. Reuven’s creditor came to collect. Levi had no money, so the creditor could collect the land from either Shimon or Levi. The Gemara gave two qualifications. The creditor can collect from Levi only if Levi has intermediate-quality land, not if he has only superior or inferior land. Furthermore, even if Levi has intermediate-quality land, this applies only when Shimon does not have comparable intermediate-quality land. Otherwise, Levi can say, “Why are you coming to me? Go to Shimon.”
Rashi explains that when the Gemara says Reuven sold all his fields to Shimon, it means that he sold them in one transaction, with one document. If Reuven sold some fields to Shimon, retained some fields himself, and later sold additional fields to Shimon, the creditor cannot necessarily collect from Levi. The creditor may do so only if the field that Levi purchased from Shimon was the last field that Shimon had purchased from Reuven.
The reason is that if Reuven sold all his properties to Shimon, and Shimon subsequently sold one of them to Levi, then Shimon effectively took Reuven’s place with regard to the entire debt. When Shimon later sells one of those properties to Levi, the creditor may collect from Levi as well. But if Reuven sold the fields to Shimon at separate times and still retained fields when Shimon sold one of them to Levi, the creditor can say, “Why are you coming to me? You can collect from Shimon.”
Rashi explains that the law is that a lender collects from intermediate-quality land. If no intermediate-quality land remains in Shimon’s possession because Shimon sold everything, the lender may collect from Levi if he wishes. In this respect, purchasing the field from Shimon is different from purchasing it directly from Reuven.
If Levi had purchased the intermediate-quality land directly from Reuven while Reuven retained inferior land, the creditor would not have been able to collect from Levi. The law is that a creditor may not collect from a purchaser as long as any property remains in the debtor’s possession, even if the remaining property is inferior land. As long as Reuven still possessed anything, the creditor would have to collect from Reuven before going to the purchasers.
That rule was enacted by the Rabbis to protect purchasers. If a person buys property and it can immediately be taken away by the seller’s creditor, people will be reluctant to purchase property. Therefore, as long as the original debtor still has any property, the creditor must collect from him first. This enactment applies only to land purchased directly from the debtor.
Levi cannot insist that the creditor collect from Shimon rather than from him, because Shimon is also a purchaser. When there are two purchasers, Levi cannot push the creditor away by saying, “Go to the other purchaser.” If Levi had purchased directly from Reuven, he could have directed the creditor back to Reuven. But since Levi purchased from Shimon, there are two purchasers, and Levi cannot push the creditor toward Shimon.
Therefore, if the creditor wants to collect intermediate-quality property from Levi while the property remaining in Shimon’s possession is all inferior, the creditor may do so. Conversely, if the creditor wishes to collect from Shimon and Shimon has superior-quality property, he may collect from Shimon. By purchasing all of Reuven’s land, Shimon effectively took Reuven’s place as the primary source of collection. Just as the creditor could have collected superior land from Reuven, he can collect superior land from Shimon.
The creditor may therefore say, “As long as Shimon still has any of Reuven’s land, I do not wish to trouble Levi. Levi did not purchase all of the land; he left some land in Shimon’s hands from which I can collect.”
We can now understand why the Gemara must be speaking about a case in which Shimon purchased all of Reuven’s fields at one time. If Shimon purchased them at different times, the creditor could collect from Levi only if the field that Levi purchased from Shimon was the last field that Shimon had purchased from Reuven.
If Levi purchased one of the earlier fields, he could claim that when Shimon sold him that field, other fields were still in Reuven’s possession. Since Reuven still had free property at that time, the lien shifted to those other fields and away from the field that Shimon sold to Levi. That is why the timing of the purchases is significant.
The Gemara’s qualification regarding intermediate-quality land applies again. The creditor may collect superior land from Shimon, but from Levi he may collect only intermediate-quality land. Even then, he may collect from Levi only when Shimon does not have comparable intermediate-quality land.
Rashi explains that Levi purchased intermediate-quality land from Shimon, and the creditor’s lien applies to it. If Shimon has no comparable intermediate-quality land, the creditor may collect superior land from Shimon if he wishes. Shimon says, “You purchased all of Reuven’s fields and entered into Reuven’s position with respect to the debt. As long as I can find all of Reuven’s fields in your possession, why should I go to Levi? Levi left me a place from which to collect.”
On the other hand, if Shimon has only inferior land and Levi has intermediate-quality land, the creditor may collect from Levi. Levi cannot say, “Go to Shimon,” because the creditor is entitled to intermediate-quality land, and Shimon has only inferior property. Even if Levi had purchased directly from Reuven, he would have been able to direct the creditor to Reuven only because Reuven still had inferior land remaining. As long as Reuven had free assets of any kind, the creditor had to go to Reuven first, because Reuven was the debtor.
That was an enactment made to protect purchasers. If purchasers could always be forced to surrender property while the debtor still had land, people would stop purchasing property. In this case, however, Shimon is considered to have taken Reuven’s place because he purchased all of Reuven’s property. Levi, who purchased from Shimon, is one step removed. Therefore, the creditor may collect superior land from Shimon, but from Levi he may collect only intermediate-quality land, and only when Shimon does not have comparable intermediate-quality land.
This applies only when Reuven sold all of his properties to Shimon in one transaction. If the sales took place through two separate documents and at separate times, Levi may say that when he purchased his field, free property still remained in Reuven’s possession. The lien therefore shifted to the property that remained with Reuven, and Levi can direct the creditor elsewhere.
The Gemara now presents another case. Abaye says: Reuven sold a field to Shimon with liability. That means that if one of Reuven’s creditors came and took the field, Reuven accepted responsibility to protect Shimon and reimburse him. A creditor of Reuven then came and seized the field from Shimon, saying, “Reuven owes me money, and I am taking this field.”
The law is that Reuven may go to the creditor and attempt to interfere with the collection in order to save the field for Shimon. Shimon cannot say, “I am not speaking with you. I am dealing with the creditor. Why are you involving yourself in my business?” Reuven can answer, “If the creditor takes this field, I will have to reimburse you. I sold you the field with liability, so I am directly affected by what happens here.”
Reuven may therefore present claims against the creditor. He may say, “You owe me money, and this debt should be considered against the debt you are asserting. Alternatively, swear to me that I have not already paid you.” He is entitled to delay the process and raise any legitimate claim that he has.
Reuven cannot be told, “I am not taking anything from you. I am taking it from Shimon.” Reuven is a party to the matter because if the field is taken from Shimon, Reuven will have to pay Shimon. He therefore has the right to intervene, raise claims, request an oath, and attempt to prevent the creditor from taking the field.
The Gemara brings another opinion. Some say that even if Reuven sold the field without liability, so that he is technically no longer responsible for the field, he may still intervene. He can say to the creditor, “Do not take the field until you swear that I have not paid you.”
The creditor cannot say, “Why are you becoming involved? You are not responsible. I am taking the field from the purchaser.” Reuven can respond, “I know that I am not technically liable to the purchaser. Nevertheless, I sold him a field, and I do not want him to come to me afterward and say, ‘You sold me a field, and the next day your creditor took it from me.’ Even if the creditor is legally entitled to take it, I do not want to be placed in that position. This matter affects me, and I therefore have the right to intervene.”
Accordingly, Reuven may raise claims, request an oath, and create delays in order to prevent the creditor from taking the field or to establish whether the debt has already been paid.
May Hashem grant us success in understanding the words of the Gemara. Amen and amen.