The Eri B. Sitt Edition, an audio series on the Talmud Bavli. Tractate Ketubot has been dedicated by our dear friend Mr. Elliot Shasho. May Hashem sustain him and grant him life. May the merit of studying Tractate Ketubot stand for him. May he have a good and blessed year, with happiness, wealth, honor, and peace in his home. With Hashem’s help, may he continue to support Torah and all holy projects. Amen.
Today’s page has been dedicated by Mr. Uri Nidam in honor of all the members of the minyan, all the members of the daily Talmud study group, and in honor of the rabbi. May he be blessed to perform many mitzvot and may he continue to succeed, with Hashem’s help. Amen.
Today’s page, page 104, is being started for the elevation of the soul of Avraham ben Esther. May his soul rest in the Garden of Eden. Amen. It is also being started for the complete recovery of Yosef ben Sara and Sara bat Rachel. May Hashem send them a complete recovery among all the sick of Israel. Amen.
We begin today’s page on 104a, at the top line.
The Gemara relates that on the day that Rabbeinu HaKadosh passed away, the rabbis declared a fast and prayed. They announced that anyone who said that Rabbeinu HaKadosh had died should be slain by the sword. The question is: Why should someone be slain merely for saying that Rabbeinu HaKadosh had died?
The reason was that the rabbis wanted everyone to continue praying. Even if he had already died, they wanted the people to continue praying in case there was still some possibility that he could return to life. Therefore, they did not want anyone to say that he had died, because if people heard that he had truly died, they would stop praying. This is what the Shittah Mekubetzet explains.
In any event, Rabbeinu HaKadosh’s maidservant went up to the roof and said, “The angels in heaven want Rabbeinu HaKadosh, and the rabbis here on earth also want Rabbeinu HaKadosh. May it be the will of God that those below—the people on earth—overpower those above, in heaven.”
However, once she saw how many times Rabbeinu HaKadosh had to enter the bathroom, she changed her prayer. He suffered from intestinal problems, and every time he went to the bathroom, he had to remove his phylacteries and put them down. This caused him tremendous anguish. Each time he had to enter the bathroom, he had to remove his phylacteries and then put them back on.
When she saw how much pain the rabbi was enduring, she said, “I hope that those in heaven will overpower those below.” In other words, she prayed that Rabbeinu HaKadosh should die.
Tosafot points out that although someone who has intestinal problems normally cannot wear phylacteries, Rabbeinu HaKadosh was able to control himself in a state of holiness. Therefore, despite his intestinal problems, he was not prevented from wearing phylacteries.
Rav Shmuel ben Nachmani says that although the maidservant prayed for Rabbeinu HaKadosh to pass away, the rabbis did not stop praying. The rabbis continued praying that he should live. As long as the rabbis were praying, Rabbeinu HaKadosh continued to hold on to life.
She therefore took a small earthenware jug and threw it from the roof. It fell to the ground and shattered, making a loud noise. Because of the sudden noise, the rabbis stopped praying for a moment. At that instant, Rabbeinu HaKadosh passed away.
The rabbis then told Bar Kappara to go and determine whether Rabbeinu HaKadosh had indeed died. He saw that he had passed away, so he tore his clothing. He turned his shirt around so that the tear would be in the back, because he did not want the people to know that Rabbeinu HaKadosh had died. He did not want to say it explicitly, and when someone passes away, one is not supposed to announce it explicitly. If the tear had been in the front, everyone would have understood what had happened, so he put it in the back.
He then opened the discussion by saying, “The angels and the righteous ones are tugging at the holy ark.” Some explain that “the righteous ones” refers to the righteous people on earth, namely the rabbis. The angels in heaven were pulling Rabbeinu HaKadosh upward, while the righteous people on earth were pulling him toward them and wanted him to remain in this world. The angels overcame the righteous ones, and the holy ark was captured.
After hearing this, the rabbis said to Bar Kappara, “Does this mean that Rabbeinu HaKadosh died?” He responded, “You said it; I did not say it.” Once again, Bar Kappara did not want to be the bearer of bad tidings, as the verse says. Alternatively, he did not want to violate the rabbis’ original instruction that no one should explicitly say that Rabbeinu HaKadosh had died.
At the time of Rabbeinu HaKadosh’s passing, he extended his ten fingers toward heaven and said: “It is known and revealed before You that I toiled in Torah with my ten fingers. I studied with all my strength, and I did not benefit from worldly pleasures, even to the extent of the work of my smallest finger. I had no enjoyment from the pleasures of this world. May it be Your will that there be peace in my eternal resting place.”
A heavenly voice emerged and said, “He will come in peace; they will rest upon their resting places.” The Gemara now asks about the plural expression, “their resting places.” It should have said, “You will rest upon your resting place.” Why does the verse use the plural?
When a righteous person leaves this world, the angels come and announce, “This righteous person is coming.” The righteous people also emerge from their resting places to greet him. When they come out, they say to the new arrival, “He will come in peace,” and then they return to their resting places. This is why the verse says, “They will rest upon their resting places.”
We learned in another passage in Berachot that when someone speaks to a deceased person as he is leaving, he says, “Go in peace,” whereas when one speaks to a living person, one says, “Go toward peace.” Why is the wording different?
“Go in peace” means: Go with your wholeness, with all the accomplishments you achieved in this world, to your final resting place. A living person, however, is told, “Go toward peace,” because he is still alive and still has the opportunity to elevate himself and accomplish more. That is why the heavenly voice said, “He will come in peace”—with all his accomplishments—and why the righteous ones then return to their resting places.
When a righteous person leaves this world, three groups of angels go out to greet him. One of them says, “Come in peace.” This refers to the person who walked on a straight path and lived his life properly. Another says, “He will come in peace, and they will rest upon their resting places”—meaning that the righteous people who came to greet him will return to their resting places.
When a wicked person leaves this world, three groups of destructive angels go out to greet him. One of them says, “There is no peace.” Hashem says regarding the wicked person that he will lie down in sorrow and descend to lie down with those who are blocked—those of hardened hearts who did not serve Him. Thus, there is a clear difference between the greeting of the righteous and that of the wicked. The righteous are greeted by groups of angels who speak of peace and their final resting place, while the wicked are greeted by destructive angels who announce their punishment.
The Mishnah now teaches: As long as a widow remains in her father’s house after her husband’s death, she retains the right to collect her marriage settlement indefinitely. However, if she chooses to remain in her husband’s house, she may claim her marriage settlement only for twenty-five years. If she does not claim it within twenty-five years, she loses the right to collect it.
This is the position of Rabbi Meir. Why? During the twenty-five years that she lives in her husband’s house, the neighbors normally come to borrow things from her. She lends them salt, bread, water, and other items. The rabbis calculated that over the course of twenty-five years, the value of what she lent to the neighbors would amount to the value of her marriage settlement. Therefore, she is considered to have already received it. If she claims it within twenty-five years, she receives it, but after twenty-five years, she no longer does.
This applies specifically when she lives in her husband’s house, because the items she lends come from the husband’s estate. When she lives in her father’s house, even if she lends items to the neighbors, they come from her father’s property and not from her husband’s estate. Therefore, she does not lose her marriage settlement.
The Sages disagree. They say the opposite: As long as she lives in her husband’s house, she may claim her marriage settlement forever. As long as she lives in her father’s house, she may claim it only for twenty-five years.
We now have to understand the reasoning of the Sages. Their position has nothing to do with the favors she performs for the neighbors or with the value of the items she lends them. The twenty-five-year period is based on a different principle. We might have assumed that if she remained silent and did not claim her marriage settlement for all those years, her silence demonstrated that she had waived it. The Mishnah therefore teaches that as long as she is in her husband’s house, her silence is not considered a waiver.
Why did she remain silent? Because the inheritors are honoring her, feeding her, and taking care of her. Since she is being supported by the estate, she is embarrassed to ask for her marriage settlement. Therefore, her silence cannot be interpreted as a waiver. In her father’s house, however, she is being supported by her father. She has no reason to feel embarrassed about claiming the marriage settlement from her husband’s estate. If she remains silent for twenty-five years, we can assume that she waived it.
Let us review the disagreement. Rabbi Meir says that specifically when she is in her father’s house, she can claim her marriage settlement forever. When she is in her husband’s house, she has only twenty-five years, because of the value of everything she lends to the neighbors over that period. The Sages say the opposite: When she is in her husband’s house, she can claim her marriage settlement forever, because we assume that she was embarrassed to ask for it while she was receiving support. When she is in her father’s house, she has only twenty-five years, because if she remained silent for that long, we assume that she waived it.
If the widow dies, her heirs may claim her marriage settlement for twenty-five years. The clock continues from the time the husband dies, and the heirs have until twenty-five years have passed to claim the marriage settlement.
The Gemara challenges the idea that twenty-five years is a standard measure. What about Marta bat Baitos, who was one of the wealthiest women in Jerusalem? If a poor woman has a small marriage settlement and a wealthy woman has a much larger one, can we say that both have the same twenty-five-year period? If the reasoning is that the value of what she lends to the neighbors depletes the marriage settlement, a wealthy woman’s marriage settlement should take much longer to deplete.
The answer is based on the principle that the load corresponds to the strength of the camel carrying it. A wealthy woman who has a larger marriage settlement also lends her neighbors more valuable items. She is not lending only salt and bread; she lends items of greater value. Therefore, the twenty-five-year period applies equally to each woman according to her circumstances.
The Gemara then asks according to Rabbi Meir: What about dividing the marriage settlement proportionally? Suppose she did not waive it, but she claimed it after twenty years. Should we deduct from the marriage settlement the amount corresponding to twenty years? In other words, if the reasoning is that each year she lends items to the neighbors and one twenty-fifth of the marriage settlement is thereby deducted, perhaps we should deduct one twenty-fifth for every year that she remained silent. Or do we say that the rule is fixed: As long as she claims it within twenty-five years, she receives the entire marriage settlement?
The Gemara leaves this question unresolved for Elijah the Prophet.
The Sages say that as long as she is in her husband’s house, she may claim her marriage settlement forever. Suppose she comes one minute before sunset on the final day of the twenty-fifth year. She receives the marriage settlement because she came within the twenty-five-year period. If she comes one minute after sunset, she does not receive it. Are we really saying that in that tiny amount of time she waived the marriage settlement? One minute earlier she had not waived it, and one minute later she had?
The Gemara answers that this is indeed the law. Whenever the Sages establish a measure, they must establish a precise cutoff point. They cannot continue adding another minute, another minute, and another minute. The cutoff is twenty-five years. If she arrives one minute after the twenty-five years, she loses the claim; if she arrives one minute before, she receives it. This reflects the precision of the measurements established by the Sages.
For example, if a person goes to a ritual bath, the rabbis require forty measures of water. If he enters a bath containing 39.999 measures, he has not fulfilled the requirement of immersion. What makes the difference? One drop. Nevertheless, the rabbis established the measure at forty units, and anything less than forty—even by one drop—is insufficient.
The Gemara then says that all of this applies only when the actual marriage-settlement document is not in her possession. If the document is in her possession, she may collect her marriage settlement forever.
The reasoning is that if she had waived it, she would have returned the document to her husband or to his heirs. Returning the document would have been the clearest indication of waiver. Therefore, as long as she is holding the marriage-settlement document, this opinion maintains that she may claim it forever. The Mishnah’s twenty-five-year rule applies only when she does not have the actual document.
Rabbi Elazar disagrees and says that even if she has the marriage-settlement document, the twenty-five-year rule still applies. We therefore have a disagreement over whether the twenty-five-year limitation applies only when she does not have the document or even when she does.
One might ask: If she does not have the document, how can she collect the marriage settlement? The Gemara will address that question later. At this point, we can say that she might have witnesses who testify that her husband died. Once there are witnesses that the husband died, that may be sufficient for her to collect the marriage settlement.
The Gemara presents the disagreement as follows. One opinion, that of Rabbi Yehuda in the name of Rav, says that as long as she has the marriage-settlement document in her hand, she may collect forever and is not subject to the twenty-five-year limitation. Rabbi Elazar says that even when she has the document, she may collect only within twenty-five years.
Rav Sheshet challenges the first opinion with a baraita: A creditor may collect his debt without having to mention it for twenty-five years. In other words, there is no twenty-five-year limitation on a debt. Even if the creditor says nothing for twenty-five years, he may still claim what he is owed.
What is the case described by the baraita? If the creditor does not have a document, how can he collect the debt? It must be that he has the document. We therefore see that even after twenty-five years, the creditor does not waive the debt, because he lent the money and wants it returned.
One could distinguish between the two cases. A creditor who is holding a document is not presumed to have waived his debt, because he lent money and wants it back. A widow who is holding a marriage-settlement document, however, might still be presumed to have waived the marriage settlement after twenty-five years because she benefited from the support provided by the heirs.
The Gemara answers: Who motivated her, and who caused her to remain silent? If you ask this question, I will answer it. The creditor is motivated and satisfied because he is owed money; there is no reason for him to waive it. The widow, however, may have remained silent because she was being supported by the heirs.
The Gemara then offers another explanation. The baraita may be discussing a creditor who does not have a document. How can he prove that the money is owed to him? It is a case in which the borrower admits that he borrowed the money. Therefore, even after twenty-five years, the creditor may collect, and we do not say that he waived the debt. By contrast, when a widow does not have a marriage-settlement document, after twenty-five years we do say that she waived it.
According to this explanation, at least at this point, the rule concerning a creditor without a document is that he may collect forever because the borrower admits that he owes the money. In the case of the widow, however, if she does not have the document, the twenty-five-year rule applies.
The Gemara challenges this answer. We learned in a baraita that a divorced woman has the same status as a creditor. What is the case? If she does not have a marriage-settlement document, how can she collect her marriage settlement? It must be that she does have the document. The baraita is therefore saying that a divorced woman who has the document may collect her marriage settlement even after twenty-five years, just like a creditor.
What is the reasoning? A divorced woman is never presumed to have waived her marriage settlement. She hates her husband, and therefore we can assume that she would not voluntarily waive what he owes her. She is like a creditor, who is not presumed to have waived a debt.
The Gemara objects: You previously said that a widow who has the document may collect forever. Now you are saying that only a divorced woman who has the document may collect forever, whereas a widow is subject to the twenty-five-year rule. The Gemara answers that the case of the divorced woman may also be one in which she does not have a document. How, then, can she collect? The husband admits that he owes her the marriage settlement. Since he admits the debt, she can collect it.
Thus, when the baraita compares a divorced woman to a creditor, it is discussing a case in which there is no document but the husband admits that he owes the money. In such a case, she may collect forever. If there were a document, then, according to the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, the twenty-five-year rule would apply to a widow.
Let us review the discussion. We brought a question from the case of a creditor. A creditor has no statute of limitations; he can claim the money even after twenty-five years. We initially thought that the creditor must be holding a document, because otherwise how could he collect? We then said that a creditor holding a document is not presumed to have waived the debt, because he is owed money, whereas a widow holding a marriage-settlement document might be presumed to have waived it after twenty-five years because she benefited from the support of the heirs.
The Gemara answered that the case of the creditor may involve no document, because the borrower admits that he owes the money. We then learned that a divorced woman is like a creditor. We initially thought that this must refer to a divorced woman who has a document, because otherwise how could she collect? The answer is that the husband admits that he owes her the money. In the same way, a widow who has a document may collect her marriage settlement forever, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda in the name of Rav.
We then learned in the baraita of Rav Yehuda bar Ketzura that if a woman claims her marriage settlement within twenty-five years, the clock begins again. Even if she was not paid immediately, once she has made a claim, she has demonstrated that she did not waive the marriage settlement. A new twenty-five-year period begins from the time she made the claim.
The same baraita teaches that if she has the marriage-settlement document in her possession, she may collect forever, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda in the name of Rav.
We therefore learned two laws. First, once a woman makes a claim for her marriage settlement, the clock stops and begins again. The case is one in which she made a claim but, for some reason, was not paid immediately. She then has a new twenty-five-year period from the time she made the claim. Second, if she is holding the marriage-settlement document, she may claim the marriage settlement forever.
Rav Nachman bar Chisda sent a question to Rav Nachman bar Yaakov: When the woman is holding the marriage-settlement document, is that document the reason she may collect forever? Or is the twenty-five-year rule referring only to a case in which there is no marriage-settlement document?
Rav Huna sent an answer: The disagreement about the twenty-five-year period applies when the marriage-settlement document is not in her possession. If the document is in her possession, she may collect the marriage settlement forever, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda in the name of Rav. As long as she is holding the document, she is not presumed to have waived it, because if she had waived it, she would have returned the document to her husband or to his heirs.
The law follows the Sages’ opinion regarding the location of the widow. When she is in her father’s house, the twenty-five-year rule applies. When she is in her husband’s house, she may collect the marriage settlement forever, even if she does not have the document, because we assume that she was embarrassed to claim it while she was receiving support.
All of this applies only to the basic marriage settlement—one hundred dinars for a widow or two hundred dinars for a virgin. However, regarding the additional amount that the husband added to the marriage settlement, the first opinion says that she did not waive it. She will receive that amount regardless. In other words, the twenty-five-year rule applies to the basic marriage settlement but not to the additional amount.
Rabbi Abba in the name of Rabbi Yohanan says that even the additional amount is waived. Just as she waives the basic marriage settlement, she also waives the additional amount.
The additional amount is another way of referring to the added portion of the marriage settlement. Since it has the legal status of the marriage settlement, when she waives the marriage settlement, she also waives the additional amount.
It was stated in the name of Rav that the twenty-five-year rule applies only to the one hundred or two hundred dinars, meaning the basic marriage settlement, but not to the additional amount. When Rabbi Abba heard that this was Rav’s opinion, he said, “Indeed, say that this is what Rav said.”
Rabbi Abba then questioned him: “Are you asking me to be silent? When you ask whether Rav really said this, are you challenging me because you disagree with the opinion, or are you pleased that Rav said it because you agree with it?” In other words, was he asking for clarification in order to silence him, or was he asking because he wanted to offer him a cup of wine in appreciation of the ruling?
The Gemara says that he was trying to silence him because he disagreed with Rav’s opinion. He followed the opinion of Rabbi Yohanan, who says that there is no distinction between the basic marriage settlement and the additional amount. Both are waived after twenty-five years.
The Gemara then relates that the mother-in-law of Rav Chiya Arikha was also the wife of his brother. Rav Chiya’s brother died, and she became a widow. She returned to her father’s house. There were no children, so Rav Chiya inherited the estate.
The heirs are responsible for supporting the widow. Therefore, Rav Chiya was required to support his sister-in-law, who was also his mother-in-law. He supported her for twenty-five years while she was living in her father’s house. At the end of the twenty-five years, she said to him, “Continue giving me support.” He replied, “You no longer receive support.” She then said, “I have a marriage settlement. Pay me my marriage settlement.” He answered, “You receive neither support nor a marriage settlement.”
Rashi explains that Rav Chiya’s brother had died without children, and Rav Chiya inherited him. According to the Sages of the Mishnah, when a widow returns to her father’s house, she may collect for only twenty-five years. After that, she loses both the right to support and the right to collect the marriage settlement if she did not claim it earlier. Since she only made her claim after twenty-five years, Rav Chiya said that she was entitled to nothing.
She therefore went to the court of Rabbah bar Shila. Rabbah bar Shila said to Rav Chiya, “Tell me, my beloved one, tell me the facts of the case so that we can judge it properly.” Rav Chiya replied, “I supported her for twenty-five years while she was living in her father’s house. I carried the food to her on my shoulders. I personally delivered the food and fulfilled my responsibility to support her.”
Rabbah bar Shila said, “If that is the case, consider the reason the Sages said that when she lives in her husband’s house, she may collect her marriage settlement forever. What is the reason? She is embarrassed to claim it. Since she is receiving constant support, she feels embarrassed to ask for the marriage settlement. The same reasoning applies here. You supported her in such a distinguished manner, personally delivering the food to her. The reason she did not claim the marriage settlement within twenty-five years is that she was embarrassed. Since you supported her so well, the factor of embarrassment still applies. Go and pay her the marriage settlement.”
Rav Chiya did not accept the ruling. He took the matter to the next level and wrote an execution document. The document gave her the right to seize property. It stated that she could locate property in Rav Chiya’s estate and seize it in payment of the marriage settlement.
Rav Chiya then came before Rava and said, “Look at how Rabbah bar Shila ruled against me. He said that I must pay her.” Rava replied that the ruling had been correct. Once the woman heard this, she said that she wanted not only the money from the field but also the produce that had grown on it from the time the execution document was written. Since the document gave her a claim to the field, she argued that all the produce generated from that point onward belonged to her.
She was not asking for something extra. She was saying that from the time the document was written, she had a claim on the property. Therefore, she wanted the property together with the produce dating back to that time. She asked that the produce be given to her from the day the execution document was written, because from that day the field was considered to be in her possession.
The Gemara then discusses when the person who acquires the field begins to consume its produce. One possibility is that once the document is in her possession, she begins receiving the produce. Another opinion is that the document must first be signed by the court. A further opinion says that the court must announce the field for sale for thirty days so that it can obtain the best price. The woman does not necessarily receive the field itself; she may be paid from its value. After the court announces the sale for thirty days, the produce begins to be attributed to her.
She was therefore claiming, “I want the produce from the day the document was written.” If Rava agreed that the judgment was correct, she argued, then she should receive the field and the produce from that date.
Rava said, “Show me your execution document.” He examined it and saw that it had not been written correctly. The document did not state that the field belonged to the deceased. This distinction is important because which fields are encumbered for the marriage settlement? The fields belonging to the deceased husband. The widow has no claim on Rav Chiya’s personal fields. Her claim is against the property that came from her deceased husband’s estate.
The proper way to write the execution document would have been to specify that the property was inherited by Rav Chiya from his deceased brother and that it came from the deceased husband’s estate. Then the claim would have been valid. However, Rabbah bar Shila wrote that all of Rav Chiya’s fields were available for seizure. That was not correct. Rava therefore said that the document was invalid and that she could not collect anything on its basis.
The woman then said, “We know that the fields being seized are the fields of the deceased.” Rava replied that the document had still not been written correctly, and therefore she was entitled to nothing.
She then said, “Forget about the execution document. Assume that the document does not exist. I should at least be paid from the time that the court began the process.” When an execution document is written, the property is not collected immediately. The court announces it for thirty days in order to obtain the highest possible price. After thirty days, the property can be transferred to the woman.
She argued that the court had already carried out the process. She had brought a document to the court, identified a field belonging to her late husband, and the court had announced the field for thirty days. Therefore, even if the document itself was defective, she should receive the produce from the time the court went through that process.
She said, in effect, “I agree that the document was not written correctly, but I should still receive the produce. I identified one of the fields and told the court that it was my late husband’s field. The court accepted that field, announced it for thirty days, and evaluated it based on the document. Even according to the strictest opinion, after thirty days I should begin receiving the produce.”
Rava replied that this would be true only if the execution document had been written correctly. In this case, however, it had not been. She had brought the document to court and identified one field as belonging to her deceased husband, but the document itself permitted her to seize any of Rav Chiya’s fields. Since the document was defective, the court could not rely on the process that followed it.
The woman then argued from the principle that a scribe’s error is treated as an unintended omission. Normally, when a loan document is written, the lender ensures that it states that if the borrower cannot pay, the lender may collect from property the borrower sold after the loan was made. Such purchasers are called subsequent purchasers. No sensible lender would lend money without ensuring that this provision appears in the document.
If the document was written without mentioning subsequent purchasers, the law is that the lender may still collect from them, because we assume that the scribe simply forgot to include the provision. She therefore said to Rava: “You accept the principle that a scribe’s error is treated as an unintended omission. Apply the same principle here. The execution document was written incorrectly, but assume that the scribe made a mistake. Let everything else remain valid.”
Rava answered that the principle of a scribe’s error could not be applied in this case. Here, it was not the scribe who made the mistake. The judge presiding over the case himself believed that the execution document should be written in that manner. The judge had made the error, and we do not say that a judge’s mistaken ruling can be corrected by attributing the error to the scribe.
The Gemara asks what Rabbah bar Shila had been thinking. He reasoned that ultimately the money for the marriage settlement had to come from Rav Chiya’s estate. What difference did it make whether the payment came from Rav Chiya’s personal field or from the field belonging to the deceased? Since Rav Chiya would have to pay the same amount either way, Rabbah bar Shila did not distinguish between the properties. That is why he originally wrote the document in that manner.
The Gemara explains why this was nevertheless a serious error. If the widow is permitted to seize any of Rav Chiya’s fields, she may set her sights on a particular field and begin working it, improving it, and collecting its produce. Meanwhile, she may neglect the field that actually belonged to her deceased husband and was properly encumbered for her marriage settlement.
Later, Rav Chiya could say to her, “Take your field and give me back mine.” He could insist that she take the field that belonged to her husband and return the other field. By then, however, she may have neglected the field belonging to the deceased. She would lose out, and the court would have caused her difficulty instead of protecting her.
People would also speak negatively about the court. The court is supposed to protect a widow, yet by writing the document in this way, it placed her at a disadvantage. If the document specifies the field that was identified and determined to be property of the deceased, then no problem will arise. Even if she improves that field and collects its produce, she will ultimately receive that field because it was properly encumbered for her marriage settlement.
But if she is allowed to choose any field, she may work one field while intending to claim it, and Rav Chiya may later say, “That field is mine. Take the field that belonged to your husband.” The field belonging to her husband may have been neglected in the meantime. This would make it appear that the court failed to protect the widow.
For this reason, the execution document was invalid. Rava could not invoke the principle that a scribe’s error is treated as an unintended omission, because the error had been made by the judge himself. Rabbah bar Shila thought that there was no practical difference between the fields, since Rav Chiya would have to pay the same amount either way, but that reasoning was incorrect. Therefore, the judgment was that the document was invalid and that, in this case, she could not collect the marriage settlement on its basis.