The Eri B. Sitt Edition and Audio Series of the Talmud Bavli, Massechet Yevamot, has been dedicated and sponsored by our dear friend Mr. Isaac Jamal and his wife, in honor of his family and for his success and prosperity in all his endeavors. May he merit to raise his children in the ways of the Torah, may they give him much satisfaction, and may he be blessed with many more children, with health and happiness. May he have blessing, together with his entire family. Amen.
We are holding seven lines from the bottom of the page. The first case concerns a Kohen Gadol. Let us say that he rapes a woman. The law is that he may not marry her, because a Kohen Gadol may marry only a virgin. However, if he did marry her, the marriage is effective. We still have to understand how that is possible: if he is not permitted to marry her, why does the marriage remain valid?
The Mishnah then discusses the case of a woman raped or seduced by another man. The Kohen Gadol may not marry her. The difference is that if he did marry her, the child’s status will be discussed. In the case of rape, the Mishnah says that he may not marry her, but if he married her, the marriage is legally effective and he must divorce her with a bill of divorce.
The Gemara sees an apparent contradiction. How can you say that if he married her, the marriage remains in effect, and then say that he must give her a bill of divorce? Does he remain married, or must he divorce her?
The answer is that the two cases involve different monetary consequences. When a man seduces a woman, the Torah imposes a fine on him. However, if he marries her, the fine is waived. That is the novelty of the statement, “If he married her, the marriage is effective”: it means that he no longer has to pay the fine of one who seduced a woman, but he must divorce her immediately, because he is not permitted to remain married to her.
In the case of rape, however, he must pay the fine whether or not he marries her. Therefore, when the Mishnah says that if he married her, the marriage is effective, it is not saying that he may remain married. It means only that the marriage exempts him from no fine; he still has to divorce her. This is the explanation of Rashi: in the case of seduction, the marriage is effective for the purpose of exempting him from the fine, whereas in the case of rape, the fine remains due even if he marries her.
This was said in the name of Rav Huna, who said it in the name of Rav. Rav and Rabbi Yohanan both taught that a woman who has reached maturity, or a woman whose virginity was lost through an object rather than through intercourse, may not marry a Kohen Gadol. If he did marry her, however, the marriage is effective and he may remain married to her.
What is the reasoning? He should not have married a woman who had reached maturity, but if he did, the marriage remains in effect because she will eventually reach that status in any event. Similarly, a woman whose virginity was lost through an object is not a complete virgin, but the matter is not considered as severe as a woman who was raped by a man.
The Gemara asks whether the same reasoning should apply to the woman who was raped. In this case as well, one could say that she will eventually have intercourse and become a non-virgin. Why, then, does the Mishnah distinguish between her case and the other cases?
The Gemara leaves this as a difficulty. Rashi explains that in the case of rape, the woman already has a defect that cannot be repaired. Although she will later become a non-virgin through permitted intercourse, in the case of rape she has already been rendered defective through an act that was prohibited. The other cases do not involve the same kind of defect. This may be why the reasoning that allows the marriage to remain in effect does not apply in the case of rape. Some later authorities use this distinction to answer the Gemara’s question: in that case, he caused the defect himself.
The Mishnah continues: if the woman was raped or seduced by another man, the Kohen Gadol may not marry her. If he did marry her, the child is the subject of a dispute. Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov says that the child is disqualified as a child of a prohibited union, while the Sages say that the child is valid.
Rav Huna said in the name of Rav that the halachah follows Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov. The reasoning might be that this woman is considered a woman of illicit relations, and there is therefore a prohibition against the Kohen marrying her. When a Kohen marries such a woman, the child becomes disqualified. Thus, according to Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov, perhaps the reason the child is disqualified is that the woman has the status of such a woman.
There is a general principle regarding Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov: his teachings are few, but they are clear and precise. His statements are described as clean and refined, and the halachah usually follows him. Nevertheless, the Gemara rejects this explanation. We know that the halachah does not follow the view that an unmarried woman who has relations with an unmarried man automatically acquires that status. Therefore, we cannot explain Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov’s ruling by saying that the woman is considered such a woman.
The Gemara leaves that explanation as a difficulty. We cannot say that she is considered such a woman because that would follow the rejected position, and therefore that cannot be the reason Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov disqualifies the child.
Rav Ashi offers a different explanation of the dispute. The question is whether a prohibition derived from a positive commandment can produce a disqualified child. We know that a prohibition stated explicitly as a negative commandment can produce such a child. For example, the Torah says that a Kohen may not marry a woman of illicit relations, and it says that a Kohen may not marry a divorcee. If a Kohen marries one of them, the child is disqualified.
The question is whether the same applies when the prohibition is derived from a positive commandment. The Kohen Gadol is commanded to marry only a virgin. If he marries a woman who is not a virgin, can that positive commandment also produce a disqualified child?
The Gemara explains the source of the distinction. The verse states that the Kohen Gadol may marry only a virgin, and then says that he may not profane his offspring. The word “only” separates the first part of the verse from the second. The prohibitions involving a widow, a divorcee, and a woman of illicit relations are included in the section that can produce a disqualified child, whereas the requirement that he marry a virgin is excluded. Therefore, marrying a non-virgin violates the positive commandment, but it does not make the child disqualified.
The Gemara asks who is the author of a teaching that excludes a woman who is menstruating from the category of women whose children become disqualified. The answer would seem to be Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov, because he reads the verse in this way. The word “only” interrupts the verse: the women mentioned before that word can produce a disqualified child, but a woman who is merely menstruating cannot.
Again, the Gemara raises a difficulty. If the word “only” separates the sections, why was it placed between the references to the widow, divorcee, woman of illicit relations, and the virgin? Why was it not placed at the end? The Gemara leaves this as a difficulty. A difficulty in the Gemara does not necessarily overturn the reasoning; it means that the explanation requires clarification, and it may have an answer.
We now begin a new teaching. The Torah permits a Kohen to become impure for certain close relatives, although he may not become impure for outsiders. Among those relatives is his sister, provided that she is a virgin who has not been with a man.
What is the law if his sister is engaged but not yet married? There is a dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehudah, who say that he may become impure for her, and Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon, who say that he may not become impure for her.
If she was raped or seduced, everyone agrees that he may not become impure for her. Regarding a woman whose virginity was lost through an object, Rabbi Shimon says that he may not become impure for her. Regarding a woman who has reached maturity, everyone agrees that he may become impure for her.
Rabbi Shimon’s principle is that a Kohen may become impure for a sister who is fit to marry a Kohen Gadol. If she is not fit to marry a Kohen Gadol, he may not become impure for her. Since Rabbi Shimon holds that a woman whose virginity was lost through an object may not marry a Kohen Gadol, he says that her brother may not become impure for her.
We therefore have several cases: there is a dispute regarding an engaged sister; in the case of rape or seduction, everyone says that he may not become impure for her; regarding a woman whose virginity was lost through an object, Rabbi Shimon says that he may not become impure for her; and regarding a woman who has reached maturity, everyone agrees that he may become impure for her.
Each position must be supported by the verses. Rashi explains that the teaching does not need to discuss a married sister, because the verse requires her to be a virgin, and a married woman is no longer a virgin. The cases under discussion are therefore an engaged woman, a woman who was raped or seduced, a woman whose virginity was lost through an object, and a woman who reached maturity.
Regarding the case of rape or seduction, everyone agrees that the brother may not become impure for her because she is not fit to marry a Kohen Gadol. Rabbi Shimon applies his principle that the category of a virgin used here parallels the category of a virgin used regarding the Kohen Gadol: whoever is disqualified from marrying a Kohen Gadol is excluded from the permission for the brother to become impure.
Regarding a woman who has reached maturity, everyone agrees that the brother may become impure for her. Even though she is not a complete virgin, there is a special verse concerning impurity that teaches that a Kohen Gadol may become impure for such a woman. This rule therefore applies even according to Rabbi Shimon.
Why do Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehudah say that the brother may become impure for an engaged sister? They interpret the verse, “and for his virgin sister,” as excluding a woman who was raped or seduced, because she is no longer a virgin, but not an engaged woman.
Rashi explains that the verse excludes the woman who was raped or seduced because she is no longer a virgin. The question is then raised regarding a woman whose virginity was lost through an object: perhaps the verse should exclude her as well, and perhaps the word “virgin” should not be limited to a woman whose virginity was lost through a man.
The answer is that the verse refers to a woman whose virginity was lost through a man. A woman whose virginity was lost through an object is therefore included, and according to Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehudah, her brother may become impure for her.
The phrase “who is close to him” is understood as including an engaged sister, because she is still close to her brother. Although she has undergone betrothal, she has not yet entered complete marriage, and the verse includes her in the permission for her brother to become impure.
The Gemara asks why an additional expression is needed to include a woman who has reached maturity. Rabbi Meir already interprets the word “virgin” broadly, as including even a woman who is no longer a complete virgin. Why, then, is another expression necessary?
The answer is that one might have compared the “virgin” in this verse to another verse involving a young virgin who was raped. Just as that verse refers specifically to a young woman, perhaps the word here would also be limited to a young woman. The additional expression teaches that even a woman who has reached maturity is included.
Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon interpret the verse differently. When it says, “and for his virgin sister,” they exclude the woman who was raped or seduced and also the woman whose virginity was lost through an object, because none of them is considered a virgin for this purpose.
They also interpret the words “who had not been with a man” as excluding an engaged woman. Although she has not yet had relations, she has undergone betrothal, and therefore she is not included in the category of a sister who had not been with a man.
The phrase “who is close to him” then includes a woman who had been engaged but was divorced. Once she is divorced, she is again close to her brother in the relevant sense, and the verse permits him to become impure for her. The same expression also includes a woman who has reached maturity.
The Gemara challenges this interpretation from Rabbi Shimon’s own principle: Rabbi Shimon says that a sister is included only if she is fit to marry a Kohen Gadol. A divorced woman is not fit to marry a Kohen Gadol, so how can she be included?
The answer is that the additional expression is a special biblical inclusion. Without it, we would apply Rabbi Shimon’s general rule and exclude her. The verse nevertheless teaches that in this case the brother may become impure for her.
The Gemara then asks: if the verse can include a divorced engaged woman despite her disqualification from marrying a Kohen Gadol, why does it not also include a woman whose virginity was lost through an object?
The answer is that the expression can include only one of the two cases. The question is therefore which case is more likely to be included. In the case of a divorced engaged woman, nothing happened to her physical status; the change was a legal act of divorce. In the case of a woman whose virginity was lost through an object, there was a physical change to her. If one of the two must remain excluded, it is more reasonable to include the woman whose status changed only through a legal act and to exclude the woman who underwent a physical change.
The Gemara then observes that Rabbi Yosei agreed with Rabbi Shimon regarding the engaged sister, but Rabbi Shimon alone stated that the woman whose virginity was lost through an object is excluded. Since Rabbi Yosei left his usual partner, Rabbi Shimon, in that case, perhaps Rabbi Yosei agrees with Rabbi Meir that a woman whose virginity was lost through an object is included.
From where would Rabbi Yosei know this? He can derive it from the phrase “who had not been with a man.” The exclusion applies only to a woman whose virginity was lost through a man. A woman whose virginity was lost through an object was not with a man and is therefore included.
The Gemara challenges this derivation. Rabbi Yosei already used the phrase “who had not been with a man” to exclude an engaged woman, because she has undergone betrothal. How can he use the same phrase to include a woman whose virginity was lost through an object?
The answer is that the phrase can be divided: one part excludes an engaged woman because she has undergone betrothal, while the reference to a man excludes only a woman whose virginity was lost through intercourse. Thus Rabbi Yosei can both exclude the engaged woman and include the woman whose virginity was lost through an object.
The Gemara then returns to the word that includes a woman who has reached maturity. Rabbi Shimon’s position was that the word “virgin” means a complete virgin. If so, how can the verse include a woman who has reached maturity, whose virginity has already diminished?
The answer is that the derivation proceeds in the opposite direction. Since the verse requires an additional expression to include a woman who has reached maturity, we know that the ordinary word “virgin” means a complete virgin. The additional expression teaches that even a woman who is no longer a complete virgin is included. Thus the derivation works according to Rabbi Shimon as well.
The Gemara now discusses the statement of Rabbi Shimon ben Yohai: a female convert who converted before the age of three years and one day is fit to marry a Kohen. The general issue is that a convert is prohibited to a Kohen. The reason given by Rashi and the Gemara is that an ordinary non-Jewish woman is presumed to have had illicit relations, and therefore a female convert is associated with that status. Rabbi Shimon ben Yohai teaches that when she converted before the age of three years and one day, this concern does not apply, and she is permitted to marry a Kohen.
The Gemara brings a proof from the women of Midian. The women of Midian caused Israel to sin, and the people were commanded to wage war against Midian. The verse says that all the young girls who had not known a man were to be kept alive. They could be preserved, and they could eventually be converted and married.
Pinchas was among those who went to war, and Pinchas was a Kohen. Therefore, Rabbi Shimon ben Yohai understands that the Torah sanctioned the possibility of a female convert being married to a Kohen. The question is how the age of three years and one day is established.
The other Sages disagree and say that the women were kept as servants, not for marriage. The Gemara challenges Rabbi Shimon ben Yohai: if the verse is speaking about young girls, why specifically three years and one day? Perhaps any girl who had never had relations should be permitted, even if she were fifteen years old.
To answer this, the Gemara examines the verses concerning the women of Midian. One verse says that every woman who had known a man was to be killed. This implies that a woman who had not known a man was to be kept alive. The language of that verse refers to adult women.
Another verse says that among the young girls, those who had not known a man were to be kept alive. This appears to create a contradiction. One verse seems to say that regarding young girls it makes no difference whether they had relations, while the other verse distinguishes between those who had known a man and those who had not.
The Gemara resolves the contradiction by explaining that “known a man” refers not necessarily to actual intercourse, but to one who is physically capable of intercourse. Thus, when the verse says that a woman who had known a man was to be killed, it means that any female who had reached the age at which she was capable of intercourse was included. A girl below that age was to be kept alive.
How do we know that the age is three years and one day? The Gemara brings a teaching that the expression refers to one who is capable of intercourse, not only to someone who actually had intercourse. A girl of three years and one day is already included in that category. The first verse therefore refers to girls from that age upward, while the girls who were kept alive were those below that age.
The Gemara brings a supporting teaching. When the verse speaks of every woman who had known a man, it can be understood as referring to anyone capable of intercourse. Alternatively, perhaps it refers only to one who actually had intercourse. The second verse concerning the young girls resolves the matter: the verses must be understood in terms of potential capability, because otherwise they contradict one another.
Rashi asks how the soldiers could know whether a girl was exactly three years and one day old. In the case of older women, there is no need for precise calculation, but here the distinction determines whether the girl would be killed or preserved.
The Gemara explains that they passed the women before the headplate of the Kohen Gadol, which bore the Divine Name. If a woman’s face became pale and sickly, that was an indication that she had been with a man; if not, she was preserved. The physical reaction in the face revealed the underlying matter.
Rabbi Yochanan said that a person’s face reveals whether he has committed a transgression. The Gemara compares this to the verse that says that the faces of sinners testify against them.
The Gemara brings a similar story from the time of the concubine at Givah. A man and his concubine traveled to the territory of Benjamin. The people there abused the woman throughout the night, and she died as a result. The man publicized what had happened, and Israel declared war against Benjamin. They also made an oath that no one would marry into the tribe of Benjamin.
There was a danger that the tribe of Benjamin would be wiped out, because without marriages to the other tribes its population would continue to decline. However, some people from Jabesh-gilead had not participated in the war against Benjamin and had not been included in the oath. Their daughters could therefore be given in marriage to the men of Benjamin.
The question was how they knew which women were virgins and which had had relations. They placed the women over a barrel of wine. If a woman had had relations, the smell of the wine would emerge from her mouth. If she had not had relations, the wine would not pass through her in that manner, and the smell would not emerge from her mouth.
The Gemara asks why they did not simply pass the women before the headplate, as was done with the women of Midian. It answers that the headplate is intended to function for positive purposes, not for punishment. If the headplate revealed that a woman had been with a man, she would be killed, and the headplate would then have been used for punishment.
The Gemara asks that the headplate was nevertheless used for punishment in the case of the women of Midian. The answer is that it may be used for punishment when determining the fate of non-Jewish women, but not in the same way for Jewish women. Therefore, in the case of the women from Jabesh-gilead, they used the wine-barrel method.
Rabbi Yaakov said in the name of Rabbi Yehoshua that the halachah follows the view that a female convert who converted before the age of three years and one day is permitted to marry a Kohen.
Rabbi Zeira asked Rabbi Yaakov bar Eidi whether he had heard this as an explicit ruling or whether he had inferred it from a story. The possible inference was from an incident involving Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi. There was a city in the Land of Israel that had acquired a questionable reputation regarding the status of some of its families. Rabbi sent Rabbi Romanus to investigate. He found that a Kohen was married to a female convert who had converted before the age of three years and one day. Rabbi accepted this situation.
One could infer from that story that such a female convert is permitted to a Kohen. Rabbi Yaakov bar Eidi responded that he did not rely on the inference from the story; he had heard the ruling explicitly.
The Gemara asks why it matters whether he heard the ruling explicitly or inferred it from the story. Perhaps the story itself is a valid proof. The answer is that the story could be explained differently: perhaps the woman was prohibited initially, but since the Kohen had already married her, the authorities allowed them to remain married.
We have seen a similar distinction earlier. Rav and Rabbi Yohanan said that a woman who had reached maturity or whose virginity had been lost through an object may not marry a Kohen Gadol, but if he married her, she may remain married. Perhaps, then, the Kohen in the story was also allowed to remain married only because the marriage had already taken place.
The Gemara rejects the comparison. In the earlier cases, the woman will eventually reach the status that caused the prohibition: every woman eventually reaches maturity, and every married woman eventually has intercourse. Therefore, there is a rationale for allowing her to remain married. In the case of a female convert, however, the concern is that she has the status of a woman of illicit relations. There is no reason to say that every woman will eventually acquire that status. Therefore, the inference from the story is valid: the fact that Rabbi allowed the marriage indicates that it was permitted from the outset.
Rabbi Safra, however, did derive the ruling from the inference. When challenged that perhaps the woman was merely permitted to remain married after the fact, he answered that the cases are not comparable. The earlier rulings were based on the fact that the woman would eventually acquire the relevant status, whereas the prohibition concerning a female convert is based on a different concern. Therefore, the story supports the conclusion that a female convert who converted before the age of three years and one day is permitted to marry a Kohen.
When some people referred to Rabbi Safra as though he had reached an unacceptable conclusion, he responded forcefully that they should retract that characterization, or he would remove Rabbi Yaakov bar Eidi from their ears. His language was intentionally strong: he was insisting that the inference from the story was entirely sound.
May the study bring blessing and success. Amen.