The Eri B. Sitt Edition, an audio series of the Talmud Bavli, is dedicated by our dear friend Mr. Elliot Shasho, may Hashem grant him healing and life. The study of Massechet Ketubot is dedicated in memory of the learning of Massechet Ketubot, with prayers that he and his family have a good and blessed year, wealth, honor, peace in the home, and success in all their endeavors. With Hashem’s help, may he continue to support Torah and all holy projects. Amen.
The daf is also being studied for the soul of Avraham ben Esther, may his soul rest in Eden, and for the complete healing of Yosef ben Sarah, Rahamim ben Adel, and Sarah bat Rachel.
We begin today’s daf on 11b, three lines from the bottom. The Beraita teaches: If a first man married a woman, and witnesses testified that she had not been secluded with him—that there had been a wedding canopy but no seclusion, and therefore they had not been together—or that there had been seclusion but insufficient time for relations, in any event the testimony established that she had not had relations, the second man who marries her cannot later make a claim regarding her virginity.
Once the first man had married her, the second husband cannot say that she was not a virgin. Let us read Rashi. Even if there are witnesses, he still cannot make this claim. In his mind, he may think that the witnesses are merely covering for her and trying to protect her. Nevertheless, once she had already been married, he cannot say that she was not a virgin. The fact that she had been married previously means that he accepted her on the assumption that she was not necessarily a virgin, and he cannot suddenly claim otherwise.
That is the first ruling of the Gemara. Rabah derives a halachah from this Beraita: If a man marries a woman on the assumption that she is a virgin, and it is later discovered that she had previously had relations, she still receives a marriage contract of one hundred zuz, the amount assigned to a non-virgin. This is not considered a mistaken transaction.
The case is one in which she had been presumed to be a virgin because witnesses had testified that there had been no seclusion or that there had not been enough time for relations. Nevertheless, when she is discovered to have had relations, the Gemara says that this is not a mistaken transaction. The second husband cannot claim that he relied on the testimony and therefore that the marriage should be annulled. He must pay her one hundred zuz.
Rav Ashi says that ordinarily, if a man marries a woman believing her to be a virgin and she is discovered not to be one, it is a mistaken transaction and she receives nothing. Why is the case of the Beraita different? Because the first man had already married her. Since she had previously been married, the second husband should have understood that she might not be a virgin. For that reason, she receives one hundred zuz and he has no claim regarding her virginity.
The Gemara challenges this ruling. If we tell the second husband that he has no claim and should not come to court, perhaps he will fail to reveal an important fact. Perhaps witnesses will later emerge and establish that she had relations after the betrothal. In that case, she would be forbidden to him. Why not require him to come to court and testify that she was not a virgin? The court might then determine that she had relations after the betrothal, in which case she would be prohibited to him.
Rashi explains that if the husband is not permitted to bring the matter before the court, the case will never be investigated. Perhaps there were witnesses who knew that she had relations after the betrothal, and she would therefore be forbidden to him. If the husband comes to court and raises his claim, perhaps the truth will emerge.
The Gemara answers that the case is one in which the second husband betrothed her and had relations with her immediately afterward. There is therefore no concern that she had relations after the betrothal but before he had relations with her. That is the first explanation of the Gemara.
Some explain this entire discussion not with reference to the Beraita, but to the Mishnah. The Mishnah states that a woman who is a virgin widow, a divorcee, a woman released through halitzah, or a woman who had previously been married receives a marriage contract of one hundred zuz and has no claim regarding virginity.
How can a woman be a virgin who had previously been married? For example, she entered the wedding canopy, but before relations took place, her husband died. She is then a virgin widow. What is the law? Her marriage contract is one hundred zuz, and the second husband has no claim regarding her virginity. Once she had already been married, he cannot claim that she was not a virgin.
Rabah says that this teaches the same principle: A man who marries a woman on the assumption that she is a virgin, and she is later found not to be one, still owes her one hundred zuz. She was presumed to be a virgin because she had entered the wedding canopy without having relations, but she had then become a widow or had been divorced. Nevertheless, the second husband cannot make a claim regarding virginity.
Rav Ashi responds that perhaps a mistaken transaction ordinarily results in her receiving nothing. This case is different because she had already entered the wedding canopy. The second husband should have suspected that something might have happened. Therefore, he has no claim regarding her virginity. Once again, the Gemara raises the concern that if he is not permitted to bring his claim to court, perhaps the court will fail to discover that she had relations after the betrothal. The Gemara answers that the case is one in which he betrothed her and had relations immediately afterward, so there is no concern that she had relations after the betrothal but before he had relations with her.
According to the opinion that explains Rabah’s statement with reference to the Beraita, let us review the Beraita. A woman had previously been married, and witnesses testified that nothing had happened between her and the first husband. She then married a second man. The second man has no claim regarding her virginity. Rabah derives from this that when a woman is presumed to be a virgin but is later found not to be one, she still receives one hundred zuz.
According to this explanation, the Beraita is a stronger proof than the Mishnah. The novelty of the Beraita is that there were witnesses who testified that nothing had happened, and nevertheless the second husband has no claim. The witnesses might have led him to rely on the assumption that she was a virgin, yet because she had already been married, the law is different. If this is true in the Beraita, it is certainly true in the Mishnah, where there were no witnesses. There, too, the woman had already entered marriage, and the husband has no claim regarding her virginity.
However, the reverse is not necessarily true. If the discussion is based on the Mishnah, the case of the Mishnah may be different precisely because there were no witnesses. Since she had already been married, the husband has no claim. But in the Beraita, the second husband could say that witnesses had testified that nothing had happened, and that he relied on them. According to this approach, he might retain a claim regarding her virginity in the case of the Beraita.
The Gemara then proceeds to the next Mishnah: A man who ate at his father-in-law’s home in Yehudah has no claim regarding virginity. In Yehudah, it was customary for the groom and bride—or the betrothed couple—to have seclusion before the wedding, so that they could become familiar and comfortable with one another. Since there had been seclusion, the husband cannot later claim that he did not find evidence of virginity. It is possible that he himself was the one who caused its loss. Therefore, anyone in Yehudah who followed this custom had no claim regarding virginity.
The Gemara derives from the wording of the Mishnah that there were also places in Yehudah where people did not eat at the father-in-law’s home and did not practice this seclusion. If the law applied uniformly throughout Yehudah, the Mishnah could simply have stated that the law applied in Yehudah. Instead, it says that a man who ate at his father-in-law’s home in Yehudah had no claim. This indicates that there were different local customs within Yehudah.
A Beraita supports this. Rabbi Yehudah teaches that in the earlier period in Yehudah, the bride and groom would have seclusion for one hour before entering the wedding canopy. This was done so that the groom’s heart would become familiar and comfortable with his bride. In the Galilee, however, this practice did not exist.
The Beraita adds that in Yehudah, they would appoint two attendants, one for the groom and one for the bride. The groom’s attendant ensured that the bride did not produce a false cloth with blood on it to create the appearance that she had been a virgin. The bride’s attendant ensured that the groom did not take the genuine blood and destroy it. That was the custom in Yehudah. In the Galilee, they did not appoint such attendants. Instead, the attendants would sleep in the same house as the bride and groom.
Rashi explains that their purpose was to examine what had occurred that night and prevent either side from engaging in deception. The bride should not be able to bring a pot or cloth with drops of blood and claim that it was genuine, and the groom should not be able to destroy the evidence. In a place where the custom of seclusion existed, there was no need for these attendants, because the husband had no claim regarding virginity in any event.
We therefore see that Yehudah itself had different customs. In some places, they practiced seclusion, and in those places there was no need for attendants. In other places, they did not practice seclusion, and they appointed attendants to protect the husband’s and wife’s claims.
The Gemara now analyzes the conclusion of the Beraita: Anyone who does not follow this custom has no claim regarding virginity. To what does this statement refer? If it refers to the first part, the practice of seclusion, the wording seems incorrect. It should say that anyone who follows the custom of seclusion has no claim regarding virginity, not that anyone who does not follow the custom has no claim.
Perhaps the statement refers instead to the attendants. It would then mean that anyone who does not have the custom of attendants has no claim regarding virginity. But the Gemara challenges this as well. It should say that anyone who is not inspected has no claim. The husband is the one who makes the claim regarding virginity, but he is not the one who performs the inspection. The bride’s father appoints an attendant to ensure that the bride does not produce false evidence, while the husband’s side appoints an attendant to ensure that the groom does not destroy the genuine evidence.
Therefore, the wording should have been: Anyone who is not watched or inspected has no claim regarding virginity. If the groom is being watched, he cannot be accused of destroying the evidence. But if he is not being watched, the wife’s side can say that he took the cloth and destroyed it, and he therefore loses his claim. The same applies to the bride: if she is not being watched, the husband can claim that she produced false evidence.
Abaye answers that the statement does in fact refer to the first part, the practice of seclusion, but the wording must be read differently: Anyone who follows the custom of seclusion has no claim regarding virginity. The text is understood as referring to a person who follows this particular custom, rather than to one who does not follow it.
The Gemara challenges this reading because the text says, “anyone who does not follow.” Rav Ashi therefore offers another explanation. The statement refers to the custom of the Galilee. In the Galilee, the custom was not to practice seclusion. If a couple in the Galilee did not follow the Galilean custom and instead practiced the custom of Yehudah by having seclusion, the husband had no claim regarding virginity. In other words, where the Galilean custom was not followed and the couple practiced seclusion, there was no claim regarding virginity.
Rav Ashi thus preserves the wording “anyone who does not follow the custom.” The statement means that anyone in the Galilee who does not follow the Galilean custom of avoiding seclusion, but instead follows the custom of Yehudah and practices seclusion, has no claim regarding virginity.
Rav Ashi then offers another possibility: The statement refers to the attendants, and the wording should be changed to read, “Anyone who is not inspected has no claim regarding virginity.” Since the groom is not being watched, he might take the cloth and destroy it. Without reliable evidence, he cannot claim that he did not find signs of virginity. Therefore, if he was not inspected, he loses that claim.
We now continue to the next Mishnah. An Israelite widow and a priestly widow each receive a marriage contract of one hundred zuz. The regular law of a widow is that she receives one hundred zuz, whether she is the daughter of an Israelite or the daughter of a priest.
However, the court of the priests would collect four hundred zuz for a priestly virgin, and the Sages did not protest. Normally, a virgin receives a marriage contract of two hundred zuz. The priestly families instituted that a priestly virgin would receive four hundred zuz, in order to protect the status of priestly families.
This was an addition to the marriage contract. Anyone may add money to a marriage contract as long as the minimum amount is observed. The priestly families established a standard addition, bringing the amount for a priestly virgin to four hundred zuz in total.
The Gemara raises a difficulty. A Beraita states that when a priest’s daughter becomes a widow, her marriage contract is two hundred zuz. This appears to contradict the Mishnah, which says that both an Israelite widow and a priestly widow receive one hundred zuz.
The Gemara explains that there were two different enactments. Originally, the enactment was that a priestly virgin would receive a marriage contract of four hundred zuz, while a priest’s daughter who became a widow would receive one hundred zuz. Thus, a widow received the same amount whether she was the daughter of an Israelite or the daughter of a priest, but a priestly virgin received four hundred zuz.
The priestly court later observed that people were treating priestly widows lightly. Since the marriage contract of a priestly widow was only one hundred zuz, it was easy for a man to divorce her. The Sages were concerned that people would devalue priestly widows, so they increased the marriage contract of a priestly widow to two hundred zuz.
But then another problem arose: no one wanted to marry them. A man would say that for the same two hundred zuz, he could marry an Israelite virgin. Why would he marry a priestly widow? As a result, the enactment was reversed, and the amount was returned to one hundred zuz. The two statements therefore reflect two different stages: first, the amount was increased to two hundred zuz so that priestly widows would not be treated lightly; afterward, because no one wanted to marry them, the enactment was changed back.
The Mishnah says that the court of the priests instituted four hundred zuz for a priestly virgin, and the Sages did not protest. Rabbi Yehudah said in the name of Shmuel that it was not only a priestly court that could make such an enactment. Even distinguished families among the Israelites could follow the practice of the priestly families if they wished.
For example, a distinguished family could announce that it wanted its daughters to be married with a marriage contract of four hundred zuz. The family did not need to be priestly, and the Sages did not necessarily have to institute the practice. Families with distinguished lineage could establish this condition for themselves.
The Gemara challenges this from a Beraita: A family that wishes to follow the practice of the priests may do so. This applies, for example, when an Israelite woman marries a priest or when a priest’s daughter marries an Israelite. In either case, there is a priestly connection, and the family may institute a marriage contract of four hundred zuz.
The Gemara initially understands that when both parties are Israelites, they may not make such an enactment, because there is no priestly lineage involved. Shmuel, however, would have said that even an entirely Israelite family could make this enactment. The Gemara therefore explains that the Beraita is not excluding such families; it is merely teaching the more obvious cases first.
It is obvious that an Israelite man who marries an Israelite woman cannot say, “I elevated you,” and therefore refuse to pay the additional amount. They are equal in status. The woman can claim that they are both Israelites and that there is no basis for reducing the marriage contract.
But even when a priest marries an Israelite woman, one might have thought that the priest could say, “Why should I pay four hundred zuz? You are an Israelite woman. By marrying me, you have been elevated, and you can now partake of priestly gifts.” The Beraita teaches that even in such a case, the woman may demand a marriage contract of four hundred zuz. The priest cannot claim that he elevated her and therefore owes her nothing beyond the regular amount.
The principle is therefore broad: any distinguished family that wishes to establish a higher marriage contract for its daughters may do so; this is not limited to priestly families.
The next Mishnah discusses a man who marries a woman and does not find evidence of virginity. She says to him, “I was assaulted after I became betrothed.” She admits that she is not a virgin, but claims that the assault occurred after the betrothal and therefore after she was already connected to him. She says, in effect, “Your field was flooded.” Just as a person who buys a field suffers a loss from a problem that arises after the purchase, she claims that this loss occurred after she became his responsibility.
She therefore demands her marriage contract. The husband responds that the assault occurred before the betrothal. He claims that when he married her, she was already not a virgin, and therefore he owes her nothing.
Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Eliezer say that she is believed. Rabbi Yehoshua says that she is not believed. The meaning of Rabbi Yehoshua’s statement is that we do not rely on her testimony alone. There is a teaching in Pirkei Avot that the world stands on three things, one of which is truth. Rabbi Yehoshua is saying that we cannot base the ruling on this woman’s testimony when he believes that she is making a false claim. Her statement alone is not sufficient. If she wishes to take the money, she must bring proof that the assault occurred after the betrothal.
The Gemara analyzes the reasoning behind the dispute between Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Yehoshua. A related dispute is recorded: If a person says to another, “You owe me one hundred,” and the other replies, “I do not know,” Rabbi Yehudah and Rav Huna say that he must pay. Rav Nahman and Rabbi Yohanan say that he is exempt.
What is the basis of the dispute? Rabbi Yehudah and Rav Huna say that when one person is certain and the other is uncertain, the certain claim is stronger. The claimant says, “I know that you owe me the money,” while the other says, “I do not know whether I owe you.” This is a classic case of certainty against uncertainty, and the certain claim prevails.
Rav Nahman and Rabbi Yohanan reason differently. A person who wants to remove money from another must bring proof. The money is currently in the possession of the defendant, and the general rule is that the burden of proof rests on the person seeking to take the money. Until the claimant brings evidence, the money remains where it is, and the defendant is exempt.
Abaye says to Rav Yosef: From where did Rabbi Yehudah and Rav Huna derive their position? They must have learned it from their teacher, Shmuel. A Mishnah later on states that if a woman is pregnant and people ask her who fathered the child, and she says that she became pregnant from a qualified individual, she is believed.
For example, if she says that she became pregnant from a priest, she is believed, and the child does not disqualify her from marrying into the priesthood. A woman who had relations with a qualified person is not considered disqualified in the same way as a woman who had relations with someone forbidden to her, such as a gentile. If she says that the father was a priest, her statement is accepted.
Shmuel ruled in accordance with Rabban Gamliel. Abaye says that Shmuel did not teach this only in the case of the pregnant woman. He also ruled in the earlier case, where the woman claimed that she had been assaulted after the betrothal. In both situations, he accepted her statement.
The Gemara explains the word “also.” One might have thought that the rule of Rabban Gamliel applied only to the case of the pregnant woman, because there are additional grounds for believing her. In the case of the marriage contract, however, the husband is in possession of the money, and one normally does not remove money from its current possessor without proof. Nevertheless, Shmuel teaches that even in the marriage-contract case, the woman is believed.
Why is she believed? Because her claim is certain while the husband’s response is uncertain. She says, “I know that the assault occurred after the betrothal,” while he says, “Perhaps it occurred before.” Thus, the rule that certainty is stronger than uncertainty applies even though the husband is currently in possession of the money.
This demonstrates that Rabbi Yehudah and Rav Huna derived their position from Shmuel. Their teacher ruled that a certain claim prevails even in a case involving money held by the defendant.
It would seem that Rav Nahman, who rules that the money remains with its current possessor until the claimant brings proof, could not agree with Shmuel. We have a general rule that in monetary cases the law follows Rav Nahman, yet in the case of the marriage contract we follow Rabban Gamliel and believe the woman. How can both rulings coexist?
The Gemara answers that Rav Nahman can agree with the Mishnah because this case has additional factors. The woman has a compelling claim, and she also has a presumptive status supporting her. In addition, she possesses a stronger alternative claim: she could have made a different claim that would have been more advantageous to her. Because of these factors, Rav Nahman can accept the ruling of the Mishnah even though he generally holds that the claimant must bring proof.
It therefore follows that the final halachah is like Rav Nahman: In an ordinary dispute between a certain claim and an uncertain response, certainty does not automatically prevail. The rule is that the person seeking to remove money from another must bring proof, and the money remains with its current possessor.
Nevertheless, in the case of the woman who says, “I was assaulted after I became betrothed,” she receives her marriage contract. The additional factors of her stronger alternative claim and her presumptive status give her testimony greater credibility. Therefore, this case does not contradict Rav Nahman’s general rule.
May everything we learn bring blessing. Amen.