The Eri B. Sitt Edition, an audio series of the Talmud Bavli, is dedicated by our dear friend Mr. Elliot Shasho. May Hashem sustain him and grant him life. May the merit of studying Massechet Ketubot stand for him. With God’s help, may this year be a good and blessed year for him, with happiness, wealth, honor, and peace in his home. May he continue to support Torah and all holy projects. Amen.
We begin today’s page, on page 12b, directly with the Mishnah. The Mishnah says that she claims she was a woman whose virginity was lost through an accident. He comes along and says, “No. You are a woman who had intercourse with another man.” In other words, he claims that before the betrothal, before they were married, she had been with someone else. Therefore, he says that he does not owe her the amount due to a virgin.
We will see exactly what he is claiming when we study the Gemara. She comes along and says, “I agree that I am not a virgin, but it happened because of an accident.” We have to determine how much she wants and how much he wants to pay—or does not want to pay.
Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Yehoshua disagree. Rabban Gamliel says that she is believed; Rabbi Yehoshua says that we do not accept her statement. Once again, as in the previous Mishnah, she is claiming one thing and he is claiming another. Since she is trying to extract money from the husband, she must establish her greater claim. Until then, we rely on the presumption that she does not have the status she claims. This is the same principle we saw in the previous Mishnah.
The Gemara now asks: What exactly are the claims of the husband and the wife? Obviously, this is a monetary dispute. She says, “I was injured accidentally, and therefore I am entitled to the amount due to a virgin.” How much money does she want? He says, “You had intercourse with another man,” and therefore he does not owe her the amount due to a virgin. How much is he claiming that he must pay? Is he saying that he owes her one hundred, or is he saying that he owes her nothing?
Rabbi Yohanan says that the dispute is between two hundred and one hundred. She claims, “I was injured accidentally, and therefore I am considered like a virgin and am entitled to two hundred.” He says, “No. You had intercourse with another man, so I am giving you only one hundred.”
Rabbi Elazar says that the dispute is between one hundred and nothing. She claims, “I was injured accidentally, and therefore I am entitled to one hundred.” He says, “I owe you nothing, because the entire marriage was based on a mistaken transaction.” That is the dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Rabbi Elazar: What are the actual monetary claims in this case?
The Gemara asks about Rabbi Yohanan’s reasoning. Why does he understand the dispute to be between two hundred and one hundred? He follows the view of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Meir teaches that whether the husband knew or did not know that she was not a virgin, she receives two hundred. Even if she was injured accidentally, that fact does not cause her to lose the amount due to a virgin. Thus, she comes and says, “I want my two hundred.” He answers, “I married you on the understanding that you were a virgin, and you were not. Therefore, I will give you only one hundred.” That explains the dispute between two hundred and one hundred.
Rabbi Elazar, however, follows the view of the Sages. According to the Sages, whether the husband knew or did not know, once it turns out that she was not a virgin, she forfeits part of the marriage settlement and receives only one hundred. Therefore, she is claiming one hundred, while he claims that he owes her nothing.
The Gemara says that it understands why Rabbi Elazar does not explain the Mishnah according to Rabbi Yohanan. He would rather establish the Mishnah according to the position of the Sages and say that the claims are one hundred and nothing. But why would Rabbi Yohanan establish the Mishnah according to the less prevalent position of Rabbi Meir rather than according to the view of the Sages?
Rabbi Yohanan holds that when a man marries a woman on the presumption that she is a virgin, and it turns out that she had intercourse, she still has a marriage settlement of one hundred. Therefore, if the case in the Mishnah is one in which she claims one hundred and he claims that he owes her one hundred, what difference is there between her claim and his claim? What would the Mishnah be teaching us?
According to Rabbi Elazar, the Mishnah makes sense: she claims one hundred, and he claims that he owes her nothing. But according to Rabbi Yohanan, if both sides agree that she is entitled to one hundred, what is the novelty of the Mishnah?
Therefore, Rabbi Yohanan must understand the Mishnah as a dispute between two hundred and one hundred. She says, “I was injured accidentally, and I want the full amount due to a virgin.” He says, “I did not know that you were not a virgin; you had intercourse with another man, and therefore I will give you only one hundred.” To create a genuine dispute according to Rabbi Yohanan, she must be claiming two hundred, as Rabbi Meir teaches.
It follows that Rabbi Yohanan understands the claims as two hundred and one hundred, while Rabbi Elazar understands them as one hundred and nothing. The Gemara says that this is acceptable. According to Rabbi Elazar, there is a reason that two Mishnayot are needed. The first Mishnah teaches one point, and this Mishnah teaches another.
In the first Mishnah, the husband says that she had intercourse before the marriage and that the entire transaction was mistaken. The language implies that he is saying, “I owe you nothing.” The first Mishnah is therefore needed to teach that position. The present Mishnah comes to teach that when she claims she was injured accidentally, she is entitled to something, even though he disputes the amount.
Rashi explains that the words “she claims she was injured accidentally” exclude the position of Rami bar Hama. Rami bar Hama says that when she was injured accidentally, she receives nothing. In his view, even if the husband did not know that she was not a virgin and assumed that she was, she receives nothing.
But this Mishnah does not follow Rami bar Hama, because the woman has a monetary claim. She is not being told that she receives nothing. Therefore, according to the Gemara, Rabbi Elazar can explain why both Mishnayot are necessary. The first teaches that when the husband says the marriage was a mistaken transaction, he claims that he owes nothing. The second teaches that when she claims that she was injured accidentally, she still receives one hundred.
According to Rabbi Yohanan, however, why are two cases necessary? Rabbi Yohanan holds that when a man marries a woman on the presumption that she is a virgin and it turns out that she had intercourse, she receives one hundred. Therefore, in the first Mishnah, when she says that she was injured accidentally and he says that the marriage was a mistaken transaction, what does “mistaken transaction” mean? It cannot mean that he owes her nothing, because Rabbi Yohanan holds that he must give her at least one hundred.
According to Rabbi Yohanan, she must be claiming two hundred, and he must be claiming one hundred. The first Mishnah, when it says “mistaken transaction,” does not mean that he owes her nothing. It means that he refuses to give her the two hundred she is demanding, but he must still give her one hundred. Thus, the two Mishnayot appear to be teaching the same case: two hundred and one hundred.
The Gemara answers that both Mishnayot are nevertheless needed. One teaches the leniency of Rabban Gamliel, and the other teaches the strictness of Rabbi Yehoshua.
The first Mishnah teaches the strictness of Rabbi Yehoshua. Even in the first case, where she has an argument that could have made her believable—she could have said that she had intercourse only after the betrothal—Rabbi Yehoshua still says that she is not believed.
The second Mishnah teaches the leniency of Rabban Gamliel. In that case, she claims that she was injured accidentally, which is not a stronger claim and does not give her the same credibility. Nevertheless, Rabban Gamliel says that she is believed. Although both cases involve a dispute between two hundred and one hundred, each Mishnah teaches a different point: the leniency of Rabban Gamliel and the strictness of Rabbi Yehoshua.
The next Mishnah discusses a woman who was seen speaking with a man. The concern is that she may have had intercourse with someone who is disqualified from marrying into the priesthood. She identifies the man and says that he is fit. We must determine who this man was and what exactly happened when she was seen speaking with him. The Gemara will explain what “speaking” means.
The issue is not the marriage of a High Priest, for whom there are additional restrictions. We are discussing an ordinary priest. An ordinary priest may not marry a woman who had intercourse with a person of disqualified lineage, such as a convert from certain prohibited relationships or a person of defective lineage. But if she had intercourse with someone who is fit, even if it was outside marriage, she remains permitted to marry a priest.
She says, “I was with this man, and he is fit.” Rabban Gamliel says that she is believed. Rabbi Yehoshua says, “No, we do not rely on her testimony,” and she is forbidden to marry into the priesthood. We must now see what the Gemara understands by the term “speaking.”
The next case is that she is pregnant. This is a different case. Here, it is already apparent that she is pregnant, and we want to know from whom she became pregnant. She identifies the man and says that he is fit. The issue is that she was secluded with a man. Ordinarily, one might say that since they were merely secluded, we do not know that intercourse occurred. Nevertheless, because of the special stringency applied to priestly lineage, the Sages imposed an additional restriction.
The Mishnah may be using the expression “speaking” as a euphemism for intercourse. The Mishnah says that she was seen speaking with a man, and the Gemara asks whether this really means that she had intercourse with him. The Gemara explains that the Torah sometimes uses euphemistic language for intercourse. The verse says that she ate, wiped her mouth, and said, “I have done no evil.” This refers to a woman who engaged in a forbidden relationship. The expression “she ate” is a euphemism for intercourse, and “she wiped her mouth” refers to cleaning herself afterward. We therefore see that Scripture uses such language as a euphemism.
Accordingly, the phrase “she was seen speaking with a man” may mean that she was secluded with him, and the phrase “she is pregnant” means that there is evidence that intercourse occurred. Now we understand why the Mishnah needs two cases. The first case involves seclusion, and the second involves pregnancy, where the intercourse is known.
In the first case, even though they were merely secluded, Rabbi Yehoshua is stringent and says that she is forbidden to marry into the priesthood. In the second case, where she is pregnant and it is clear that intercourse occurred, the question is whether she is believed when she says that the man was fit.
The Gemara asks why both cases are needed. Perhaps one case teaches that she herself is permitted to marry into the priesthood, while the other teaches that her daughter is also permitted to marry into the priesthood. This is an important distinction. We can understand why she is believed regarding herself: until this point, she had the presumption that she was permitted. She remains within her previous presumptive status. But her daughter never had that presumption. The novelty would therefore be that the daughter is also considered fit.
One authority teaches that when the mother is considered fit, the daughter is also considered fit. Another authority says that the mother is believed regarding herself but not regarding her daughter, because the daughter does not have her own presumption of fitness.
According to the position that the mother is believed for the daughter as well, the Mishnah needs two cases to teach both points: that she is believed regarding herself and that she is believed regarding her daughter. According to the position that she is not believed regarding her daughter, the two cases may serve a different purpose.
Rabbi Yehoshua says that even when they were merely secluded, she is forbidden to marry into the priesthood. Although there were no witnesses that intercourse occurred, the Sages imposed a special stringency concerning priestly lineage. In matters of priestly lineage, they were more stringent about the possibility that she had intercourse with a disqualified man.
The Gemara then asks about a case in which witnesses saw her enter a secluded place with a man, such as a ruin. A ruin is a place where one might assume that intercourse occurred. There are therefore two possibilities: she was merely secluded with a man, or she entered a ruin, where there is a stronger presumption that intercourse occurred.
They ask her, “What is the identity of the man with whom you were?” She answers that he is a priest, meaning that he is her relative—for example, her cousin, the son of her father’s brother—and that he is fit. Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Yehoshua disagree. Rabban Gamliel says that she is believed and may marry a priest. Rabbi Yehoshua says that she is not believed.
The Gemara uses this case to explain why two cases are needed. One case involves ordinary seclusion, and the other involves a ruin, where intercourse is more strongly presumed. Just as there is a dispute in the Mishnah regarding seclusion, there is a dispute in the additional case involving a ruin.
Perhaps, however, the two cases are really one case: she was secluded in a ruin, a place where intercourse is automatically presumed. The Gemara rejects this answer. The wording indicates two different cases of ruins: a ruin located in the city and a ruin located in the countryside.
Both cases are needed. If we were told only about a ruin in the city, one might say that Rabban Gamliel believes her because the majority of the people in the city are Jewish, and therefore the man with whom she was is likely to be fit. But if she was in a ruin in the countryside, where the people present are more likely to be disqualified, one might think that Rabban Gamliel would agree that she is forbidden. The Mishnah therefore teaches that even in that case, Rabban Gamliel permits her.
Conversely, if we were told only about a ruin in the countryside, one might say that Rabbi Yehoshua is stringent because the majority of people in the countryside are disqualified. But in a ruin in the city, where the majority are fit, one might think that Rabbi Yehoshua would agree with Rabban Gamliel. Therefore, both cases are necessary.
The Gemara raises another question from a teaching in the Tosefta. The case is one in which she is pregnant, and they ask her who the father is. She identifies a particular man and says that he is a priest. Rabban Gamliel says that she is believed, while Rabbi Yehoshua says that she is not believed.
Rabbi Yehoshua challenges Rabban Gamliel from the case of a woman who was taken captive. If a woman was taken captive by non-Jews and then says that nothing happened to her, she is not believed with regard to marrying a priest. Rabbi Yehoshua says: You agree that she is not believed in the case of captivity, so why should she be believed in the case of pregnancy?
Rabban Gamliel responds that the cases are different. In the case of captivity, there are witnesses that she was taken captive. Once there are witnesses that she entered captivity, it is as though there are witnesses that something happened to her. But in the case of pregnancy, although it is clear that she had intercourse with someone, we do not know that she had intercourse with the particular man she identifies.
The Gemara challenges this distinction. What do you mean that there are no witnesses in the case of pregnancy? The pregnancy itself is evidence that intercourse occurred. The pregnancy is the strongest possible evidence that she was with a man. Why, then, should she have credibility in identifying the man?
The Gemara answers that most non-Jews are sexually uninhibited. Therefore, in the case of a woman taken captive by non-Jews, she is presumed to have had intercourse with someone disqualified from marrying into the priesthood. The Gemara does not accept this as a complete answer, because even in the case of pregnancy there is evidence that she had intercourse. The question remains: Why should she be believed in one case and not the other?
The Gemara then says that no one is considered a guardian with regard to sexual misconduct. No person is presumed protected from such behavior, and we cannot automatically rely on a woman’s testimony in these matters. We must understand precisely what this response is answering.
Rashi explains the exchange as follows. Rabban Gamliel says that she is believed when she says that she had intercourse with a fit man, and Rabbi Yehoshua says that she is not believed. Rabban Gamliel then says that he agrees with Rabbi Yehoshua in the case of captivity: there, she is not believed. Rabbi Yehoshua responds that if so, what is the difference between captivity and the case of pregnancy?
Rabban Gamliel concedes that Rabbi Yehoshua has a point regarding the case of pregnancy, but he does not retract his position. Later, the Gemara will show that Rabban Gamliel continues to maintain that she is believed even in the case of pregnancy. He had received a tradition from his teachers and therefore retained his position, even while acknowledging the force of Rabbi Yehoshua’s argument.
Rabban Gamliel then asks Rabbi Yehoshua: I understand why you are strict in the case of captivity, because there are witnesses that she was taken captive. But why are you strict in the case where she was merely secluded? There are no witnesses that intercourse took place. Why should she not be believed when she says that the man was fit?
Rabbi Yehoshua answers that the case of seclusion is like the case of captivity. In the case of captivity, we assume that intercourse occurred with someone disqualified. Similarly, when she was secluded with a man, we assume that intercourse occurred. Since we do not know that the man was fit, she cannot be believed merely because she identifies him as such.
Rabban Gamliel responds that the cases are different. In the case of captivity, the majority of the people are sexually uninhibited, and therefore there is a strong presumption that intercourse occurred with someone disqualified. In the case of ordinary seclusion, however, that same presumption does not exist.
Rabbi Yehoshua answers that even in the case of seclusion, there is a concern that intercourse occurred with a disqualified man. Since the woman was secluded with a man, something may have happened, and we cannot rely on her testimony to establish that the man was fit.
The Gemara observes that the teaching appears to discuss two cases: a woman who was seen speaking with a man and a woman who was pregnant. In the exchange between Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Yehoshua, both cases appear. This supports the opinion that they are arguing about both cases.
Another view had understood that the argument concerned only the case of pregnancy, while the case of seclusion was not itself a dispute. But the text appears to show that both cases were discussed, creating a refutation of that interpretation.
The Gemara raises another difficulty. Rabbi Yehoshua says that the case of seclusion is like the case of captivity. But there should be a distinction between them. In the case of captivity, the woman is among non-Jews, and the majority of non-Jews are presumed to be sexually uninhibited. But in the case of seclusion, she is in a Jewish setting, where the majority of the people around her are fit. Why does Rabbi Yehoshua not distinguish between the two cases?
From the fact that Rabbi Yehoshua does not make this distinction, the Gemara derives that he maintains the same position even when the majority of the people are fit. Even in a place where most people are fit, he remains stringent and does not believe her testimony. This is true even in a ruin in the city, where most of the people are Jewish and fit.
The Gemara returns to the dispute concerning whether the mother’s testimony also establishes the fitness of her daughter. One view says that just as she is believed regarding herself, she is believed regarding her daughter. Rabbi Elazar says that she is believed regarding herself but not regarding her daughter.
The logic of Rabbi Elazar is straightforward. Before this matter arose, the mother had a presumption that she was fit. Now she says that she was secluded with a man, but that the man was fit. Her statement is consistent with her previous presumption, so she remains in that status. Her daughter, however, never had a presumption of fitness. Therefore, the mother’s testimony cannot establish the daughter’s status.
Another authority goes further and says that the mother’s presumption also extends to her daughter. Since the daughter is part of the mother’s family status, the mother’s presumption of fitness carries over to the daughter. The early commentators explain that this is not two separate presumptions; rather, the daughter is included within the mother’s existing presumption.
Rabbi Elazar raises a question to Rabbi Yohanan. We understand why a woman is believed regarding herself, but how can she be believed regarding her daughter? The daughter is described as a child of uncertain paternal identity. Ordinarily, such a child is treated as disqualified. How can the daughter be both described as a child of uncertain identity and still be considered fit to marry into the priesthood?
The Gemara answers that there is a case in which a person may be called a child of uncertain paternal identity and nevertheless be fit. Shmuel teaches that if ten priests are standing in one place, one of them leaves, and that priest has intercourse with a woman, the child is considered a child of uncertain paternal identity. We do not know which of the ten priests was the father, but we do know that the father was a priest.
The Gemara asks what practical laws are meant by calling this child a child of uncertain paternal identity. Perhaps it means that he cannot inherit from any of the ten priests, because he cannot prove which one was his father. But that is obvious. Since he does not know which man was his father, he cannot claim an inheritance from any of them.
The Gemara answers that the term refers to other laws. The child cannot be silenced when he comes to serve in the Temple or when he seeks the privileges of priesthood. Since it is certain that his father was a priest, he is a priest himself. However, the Sages imposed a limitation: unless a priest knows his father’s identity, he may not receive all the privileges of priestly lineage.
This is derived through a textual association from the verse concerning the priests and their lineage. The verse indicates that the priestly privileges belong to those whose lineage is known. The Sages used this as a support for excluding a child who knows only that his father was a priest but does not know which priest he was.
Nevertheless, this shows that there can be a person who is called a child of uncertain paternal identity and is still fit to marry into the priesthood. If the child is a boy, he is a priest whose father is unknown. If the child has a daughter, she is also fit to marry into the priesthood, because there is no known disqualification affecting her.
Therefore, when the Mishnah says that the daughter is a child of uncertain paternal identity, that expression does not necessarily mean that she is disqualified. It means that her father is unknown. If the facts establish that her father was a priest who was fit, she may still be fit to marry into the priesthood.
This is not a separate dispute but a teaching from the earlier source. It explains how a daughter can be described as a child of uncertain paternal identity and nevertheless be considered fit. The uncertainty concerns the identity of the father, not the fitness of the father. That is the conclusion of the discussion.