This is the Eri B. Sit edition and audio series of the Talmud Bavli. May Hashem continue to support Torah and all holy projects. Amen.
We begin today’s daf on page 22b, three lines from the bottom. The Mishnah discusses a case in which two witnesses come and say that a woman became betrothed, while two other witnesses come and say that she never became betrothed. She may not marry. However, if she did marry, she may remain married.
The Mishnah then discusses a second case. Two witnesses say that she was divorced, while two others say that she was not divorced. In that case, she may not marry another man, but if she did marry, she must leave the marriage.
What is the difference between the case of betrothal and the case of divorce? Why, in the case of betrothal, do we say that if she married, she may remain married, while in the case of divorce, we say that she must leave?
Rashi explains that the Gemara is speaking about a case involving one witness. Let us analyze the case. Two witnesses come and say that she is unmarried, while one witness comes and says that she became betrothed.
Until this point, everyone agrees that her established status was that of an unmarried woman. The witnesses who say that she was not betrothed say that she is still unmarried. The witness who says that she was betrothed also agrees that until now she had been unmarried; he is merely saying that she subsequently became betrothed.
Therefore, there are two witnesses saying that her established status was that of an unmarried woman, and one witness saying that she became betrothed. Since it is two witnesses against one, if she marries another man, she may remain married. Two witnesses say that she was unmarried, and only one says that she became betrothed.
In the second case, however, two witnesses say that she was a married woman, while one witness says that she was divorced. The two witnesses establish that she was married, and the one witness says only that she was later divorced. Therefore, her established status is that of a married woman. If she marries someone else, she must leave that marriage, because two witnesses say that she was married and only one says that she was divorced.
That is the distinction between the two cases: in the case of betrothal, her established status was that she was unmarried, whereas in the case of divorce, her established status was that she was married. The Gemara is therefore explaining the Mishnah as referring not to two witnesses against two witnesses, but to two witnesses against one.
The Gemara challenges this interpretation. The Mishnah appears to be speaking about two witnesses on each side. How can we reinterpret it as a case involving only one witness?
The Gemara answers that the law should be reversed. In the case of betrothal, we should say that she must leave the marriage, while in the case of divorce, we should say that she may remain married.
How would that work? Two witnesses come and say, “We saw that she became betrothed.” Two other witnesses say, “We did not see her become betrothed.” The Mishnah says that she may not marry. If she did marry, she must leave.
At first glance, this seems obvious. The first two witnesses give clear testimony that they saw her become betrothed, while the other two merely say that they did not see it. Saying that one did not see something is not evidence that it did not happen. Why, then, is this case included?
The Gemara explains that the case is one in which the witnesses who say, “We did not see her become betrothed,” live in the same courtyard as the woman. One might have thought that their testimony is significant: if she had actually become betrothed, they should have heard something. Perhaps the fact that they heard nothing is meaningful testimony.
The Gemara therefore teaches that this is not so. People sometimes become betrothed privately. The betrothal may take place discreetly, and the fact that the witnesses lived in the same courtyard and did not see or hear anything does not establish that no betrothal occurred. Consequently, the testimony of the witnesses who say, “We saw that she became betrothed,” is accepted, while the testimony of those who say only, “We did not see anything,” is not sufficient. If she married someone else, she must leave.
The same reasoning applies to the second case. Two witnesses say, “We saw that she was divorced,” while two others say, “We did not see her get divorced.” She may not marry, but if she did marry, she may remain married.
Why is that not obvious? The witnesses who say that they saw the divorce provide clear testimony. The others merely say that they did not see it. The Gemara explains that even if those witnesses lived in the same courtyard, and one might have thought that they should have heard about the divorce, people may also arrange a divorce privately. Their failure to see or hear anything is therefore not sufficient to challenge the testimony of those who say that they saw the divorce.
The commentators explain that people sometimes arrange a betrothal privately for several possible reasons. A man may want to ensure that someone else does not marry the woman first, so he performs the betrothal discreetly in order to secure the relationship. Alternatively, he may be marrying a woman who is beneath his own social standing and may therefore be embarrassed to publicize the betrothal. A person may also wish to avoid embarrassing the woman by making the matter public. For these reasons, the fact that people nearby did not hear anything does not prove that no betrothal or divorce occurred.
These are the Gemara’s two answers. The first answer interprets the Mishnah as speaking about two witnesses against one witness. The second answer retains the case of two witnesses against two witnesses but reverses the rulings: in the case of betrothal, she must leave the marriage, and in the case of divorce, she may remain married.
The Gemara now returns to another matter in the Mishnah. At the end of the Mishnah, there were two cases in which a woman is believed because of the principle that the person who creates a prohibition can also establish permission. She says, “I was married, but I was divorced,” or, “I was taken captive, but I remained ritually pure.” In both cases, she is believed.
However, if witnesses come and testify that she had been married, she is no longer believed when she says that she was divorced. The witnesses establish that she was a married woman, and she cannot simply create her own permission by saying that she was divorced.
The Mishnah then says that if she married and afterward witnesses came, she does not have to leave the marriage. The Gemara asks: to which of the two cases in the Mishnah does this ruling refer? Is it referring to the woman who says, “I was married and divorced,” or to the woman who says, “I was taken captive but remained pure”?
Rabbi Oshaya applies the ruling to the first case, the case of the married woman. She says, “I was married, but I was divorced.” She marries, and afterward witnesses come and say that she had indeed been married. Even so, she does not have to leave the marriage.
Rav Avin applies the ruling to the second case, that of the woman who had been taken captive. She says, “I was taken captive, but I remained pure.” She marries, and afterward witnesses come and say that she had been taken captive. In that case as well, she does not have to leave the marriage.
There is therefore a dispute about which case the final ruling of the Mishnah addresses. According to the opinion that applies it to the first case, the case of the married woman, the law is lenient even in a matter involving a married woman. If so, it is understandable that the law would also be lenient in the case of a woman taken captive, because the concern there is an additional stringency imposed with regard to the priesthood. When a woman is taken captive, the concern is that she may have been violated by her captors, and she is therefore prohibited from marrying a priest. That prohibition is itself a stringency concerning priestly status.
According to the opinion that applies the ruling only to the second case, the case of the captive woman, the law in the first case would be stricter. If she said that she was divorced, married, and only afterward witnesses came and said that she had been a married woman, she would have to leave the marriage.
The Gemara asks whether the dispute between Rabbi Oshaya and Rav Avin reflects the position of Rav Hamnuna. Rav Hamnuna taught that when a woman says to her husband, “You divorced me,” she is believed. The reason is that a woman is not brazen in front of her husband. If he had not divorced her, she would not have the audacity to tell him that he had divorced her.
According to the opinion that applies the Mishnah’s ruling to the first case, the woman’s claim that she was divorced is accepted because of Rav Hamnuna’s principle. She is believed when she says that she was divorced, since a woman is not brazen in front of her husband.
But perhaps that principle applies only when she is speaking directly to her husband. In the Mishnah, however, she is not speaking in front of her husband. The witnesses have already established that she was a married woman, and she is now merely claiming that she was divorced. Perhaps she is not believed in that situation.
Accordingly, everyone agrees that a woman is not brazen in front of her husband. The dispute is whether the same principle applies even when she is not speaking in front of him.
The Mishnah is discussing a case in which she is not speaking in front of her husband. The witnesses come and establish that she had been a married woman, and her only remaining claim is, “I was divorced.” The opinion that applies the Mishnah to this case maintains that a woman is not brazen even when she is not speaking directly in front of her husband, and she is therefore believed. The other opinion maintains that the principle applies only when she is speaking in front of her husband. When she is not speaking in front of him, she may be brazen, and she is not believed.
Abba, the father of Shmuel, offers another explanation of the Mishnah’s wording. When the Mishnah says, “If she married,” it does not necessarily mean that she actually married. It may mean that once the court permitted her to marry, she acquired the status of a permitted woman. Even if she had not yet married, once the court permitted her to marry a priest, that permission could not be withdrawn merely because witnesses later appeared.
The Gemara challenges this explanation because the wording of the Mishnah seems to say that she actually married: “If she married, she does not leave.” It does not say merely that she was permitted to marry.
The Gemara answers that the wording can mean that she does not lose her permission to marry. In other words, once the court permitted her to marry, later testimony does not remove that permission.
The Sages taught: A woman comes and says, “I was taken captive, but I remained pure.” We do not wait until witnesses appear to confirm her statement. Since the person who creates the prohibition can establish the permission, she is permitted immediately.
What if the court permitted her to marry based on that principle, and witnesses subsequently came and said, “We do not know what happened to her”? That testimony changes nothing. We already learned that once she was permitted to marry and then married, even if witnesses later appear, she may remain married.
But what if witnesses come and say that they know that she was defiled? That is different. They are not merely saying that she was taken captive; they are testifying that she was violated. In that case, even if she already married and has children, she must leave the marriage, because the witnesses are establishing that she is prohibited from marrying a priest.
The Gemara distinguishes between witnesses who come after the fact and say that she was taken captive, and witnesses who come and say that she was defiled. The former testimony does not necessarily establish a prohibition, because she may still have remained pure. The latter testimony directly establishes that she is prohibited.
The Gemara then discusses a case involving women who were taken captive and brought to Nehardea. Abba, the father of Shmuel, sat with them in order to protect them from the gentiles. He wanted to act as their guardian and prevent any further violation.
Shmuel said to him, “What are you accomplishing? Before you began protecting them, who knows what may already have happened? Perhaps they were violated before you arrived.”
His father replied, “If these women were your daughters, would you speak about them so disparagingly? At least allow me to protect them now. I am not determining what may have happened in the past; I am trying to protect the daughters of Israel from any further violation. If they were your daughters, would you leave them unprotected?”
The Gemara says that once Abba, the father of Shmuel, made that statement, it was as though he had unintentionally uttered a curse. It was like a king who inadvertently pronounced a death sentence: once the sentence has been spoken, it must be carried out.
As a result, Shmuel’s own daughters were eventually taken captive. Their captors brought them to Babylonia in order to demand a ransom. The girls were intelligent. They told the captors, “You remain outside the study hall. We will enter and obtain the ransom money from the scholars.”
The captors remained outside, while the girls entered the study hall. The first one said, “I was taken captive, but I remained pure.” The second one said the same thing: “I was taken captive, but I remained pure.”
Because they had kept the captors outside, the scholars knew that the women had been taken captive only from the women’s own testimony. This was a case in which the women themselves created the prohibition and established the permission. They were therefore believed when they said that they had remained pure.
The scholars permitted them to marry priests. Subsequently, the captors entered. At that point, it was no longer possible to say that the women’s captivity was known from the captors themselves, because the scholars already knew about it from the women’s own testimony. Since the women had already been permitted to marry, the later arrival of the captors did not change the ruling.
The Gemara says that these women must have been the daughters of a great scholar. They understood that if the captors entered the study hall, the scholars would know about their captivity from an outside source. By keeping the captors outside, they ensured that the scholars would hear the matter from their own testimony and could apply the principle that the person who creates the prohibition can establish the permission.
Rav Shimon bar Abba, who was a priest and was apparently related to Shmuel’s family, was told, “Go and marry one of them.” Since they had already been permitted, they were considered eligible to marry a priest.
He responded that perhaps there were witnesses elsewhere who knew that the women had been taken captive and who might testify that they had been defiled. The Gemara answered that as long as those witnesses had not appeared, their possible existence did not affect the ruling. We do not worry about witnesses who may be somewhere else in the world until they actually come forward.
However, the Gemara clarifies that this is only when the possible witnesses have not appeared. If witnesses of defilement actually come forward, the ruling changes. Even if the woman had already married and had children, she would have to leave the marriage, as we learned. The question was whether there might be such witnesses; until they appear, there is nothing to consider.
The Gemara returns to the point that the daughters of Shmuel acted with wisdom. By keeping the captors outside, they ensured that the scholars would hear the testimony from them and would be able to permit them on the basis of that testimony.
The Mishnah then discusses two women who were taken captive. One says, “I was taken captive, but I remained pure,” and the other says, “I was taken captive, but I remained pure.” Each woman is believed with regard to the other.
Why are they believed? Witnesses had already testified that they had been taken captive. Therefore, the women do not have the usual principle that the person who creates the prohibition can establish the permission. Their captivity is already known from the witnesses. Nevertheless, one woman may testify that the other remained pure, and the Sages accept that testimony. This is the novelty of the Mishnah: one woman may testify on behalf of another in the case of a captive woman.
The case is therefore as follows. Two women were taken captive, and each one comes to testify about herself. Neither is believed merely on the basis of her own statement, because witnesses had already testified that they were taken captive. But each woman may testify about her companion. Even though she is only one witness, and even though she is a woman, the Sages accepted such testimony in the case of a captive woman.
The Gemara now brings a teaching that analyzes four distinct cases. In every case, the two women were taken captive.
In the first case, one woman says, “I am defiled, but my companion is pure.” She is not believed regarding her companion.
In the second case, she says, “I am pure, but my companion is defiled.” She is not believed regarding her companion.
In the third case, she says, “Both my companion and I are defiled.” She is believed regarding herself, but she is not believed regarding her companion.
In the fourth case, she says, “Both my companion and I are pure.” She is believed regarding her companion, but she is not believed regarding herself.
The Gemara analyzes the second case. If there were no witnesses, why would she not be believed when she says, “I was taken captive, but I remained pure”? That would be a case in which she herself creates the prohibition and establishes the permission. Why should she not be believed?
The Gemara answers that the case must be one in which witnesses had already come and testified that she had been taken captive. Therefore, when she says, “I am pure,” she has no independent basis for establishing her permission. The witnesses have already established her status as a captive woman, and she is not believed to remove that status by her own testimony.
When she says, “My companion is defiled,” she is also not believed. She is only one witness, and one witness cannot establish that another woman is prohibited in this matter.
The Gemara then analyzes the third case, in which she says, “Both my companion and I are defiled.” In that case, she is believed with regard to herself but not with regard to her companion.
If witnesses had already come and testified that the women were taken captive, why is she not believed regarding her companion? The witnesses have already established that the women were captive, and she is merely confirming that status.
The Gemara answers that the third case must be speaking where there were no witnesses. She is believed regarding herself because she is incriminating herself. But she is not believed to establish that her companion is defiled, because she is only one witness.
The Gemara then analyzes the fourth case, in which she says, “Both my companion and I are pure.” She is believed regarding her companion but not regarding herself.
If there were no witnesses, why would she be believed regarding herself? The case must therefore involve witnesses who had already testified that she was taken captive. Her own testimony cannot establish her purity, because the witnesses already established her status as a captive woman. But she is believed regarding her companion because one witness is accepted in the case of a captive woman.
It emerges that, according to this analysis, the second case involves prior witnesses, while the third case does not involve prior witnesses. The Gemara notes that it is unusual for one teaching to contain cases that are established in different ways, some with witnesses and some without. Nevertheless, the wording appears to require that distinction.
Rav Pappa offers another explanation. According to Rav Pappa, all four cases involve witnesses who came first and testified that the women had been taken captive. In addition, there is one witness who comes and says the opposite of whatever the woman claims.
Thus, the basic situation in all four cases is that witnesses establish that the women were captive. Then one additional witness appears and contradicts the testimony of the woman who is speaking. With that condition, all four cases can be understood consistently.
Let us return to the first case: “I am defiled, but my companion is pure.” She is believed regarding both statements. One witness then comes and says the opposite: “You are pure, and your companion is defiled.”
Regarding herself, she has already declared, “I am defiled.” Once a person establishes herself as prohibited, one witness cannot remove her from that prohibition. She remains prohibited despite the contradicting witness.
Regarding her companion, however, she is believed. One witness is accepted in the case of a captive woman to testify that the woman remained pure. The woman’s testimony regarding her companion is therefore treated as having the force of two witnesses, while the single witness who contradicts her has the force of only one. Consequently, the companion is considered pure.
The second case is that she says, “I am pure, but my companion is defiled.” One witness comes and says the opposite: “You are defiled, and your companion is pure.”
Regarding herself, she is not believed. The witnesses had already testified that she was taken captive, and she is now trying to establish her purity. She has no independent basis to do so, and the additional witness agrees that she is defiled.
Regarding her companion, however, the companion is considered pure. Although the woman who is speaking says that her companion is defiled, the additional witness says that the companion is pure. Since one witness is accepted to establish purity in the case of a captive woman, the companion is considered pure.
The third case is that she says, “Both my companion and I are defiled.” One witness then says, “Both of you are pure.”
Regarding herself, she remains defiled. Once she has declared herself defiled, she has established herself as prohibited, and the contradicting witness cannot remove her from that status.
Regarding her companion, she is not believed to say that the companion is defiled, because the accepted testimony in this area is the testimony establishing purity. The single witness who says that the companion is pure is therefore accepted, and the companion is considered pure.
The Gemara points out that the novelty of the third case appears to be the same as the novelty of the second case: one witness is accepted to say that a captive woman remained pure. Why, then, is the third case necessary?
The Gemara explains that the first two cases are called the first section, because they are parallel cases that reverse one another. The third and fourth cases are similarly parallel. The teaching mentions both because the third case contains an additional possible concern.
When a woman says, “I am defiled, and my companion is defiled,” one might think that she is deliberately incriminating herself only in order to make her claim about her companion credible. Perhaps she is really pure, but she is willing to say that she herself is defiled so that the court will believe her when she says that her companion is also defiled. It would be similar to the idea of a person who says, “Let me be destroyed, as long as I can also destroy my enemies.”
One might therefore have thought that she should not be believed even regarding herself, because perhaps her self-incrimination is merely a strategy to damage her companion. The teaching therefore tells us that she is believed regarding herself as defiled, although she is not believed regarding her companion.
Finally, in the fourth case, she says, “Both my companion and I are pure.” One witness comes and says the opposite: “Both of you are defiled.” She is believed regarding her companion, because one witness is accepted to establish purity in the case of a captive woman. She is not believed regarding herself, because prior witnesses already established that she was taken captive, and she cannot remove that status through her own testimony.
The Gemara asks why the fourth case is necessary. The first case also teaches that a woman is believed regarding her companion even when one witness contradicts her. The Gemara answers that perhaps the reason she is believed in the first case is that she has already disqualified herself by saying, “I am defiled.” Since she is willing to incriminate herself, perhaps we trust her regarding her companion as well.
In the fourth case, however, she says, “I am pure, and my companion is pure.” One might have thought that her real concern is only to establish her own permission, and that she mentions her companion merely as an additional part of the claim. Perhaps she is not believed regarding her companion in that situation. The teaching therefore tells us that she is believed regarding her companion even in that case, although she is not believed regarding herself.
We therefore have two ways to understand the four cases. According to Abaye, the cases must be divided: some involve witnesses who had already testified that the women were taken captive, while others do not. The cases are then arranged in parallel, even though the factual circumstances differ.
According to Rav Pappa, all four cases involve prior witnesses who testified that the women were taken captive, together with one additional witness who contradicts the claim made by the woman in each case. With that structure, all four rulings can be understood.
Amen.