The Eri B. Sitt Edition, an audio series on the Talmud Bavli. Massechet Ketubot has been dedicated by our dear friend Mr. Elliot Shasho. May God sustain him and grant him life. May the merit of the study of Massechet Ketubot stand for him. With God’s help, may this year be a good and blessed year, filled with wealth, happiness, honor, and peace in the home. May he continue to support Torah and all holy projects. Amen.
Today’s daf has been dedicated by Mr. Victor Gindi for continued success in all his endeavors, continued success in business, health, happiness, and all good things. Amen.
We begin today’s daf two lines from the bottom. The Gemara asks: “A daughter of a secondary forbidden relationship—does she receive support from the estate or not?”
What is meant by a daughter of a secondary forbidden relationship? We learned in Massechet Yevamot that certain women are forbidden by rabbinic law to marry. These women are called secondary relatives, because they are secondary to the primary forbidden relationships prohibited by the Torah. For example, a grandmother would be a classic case of such a relationship.
Let us say that a man married a woman who was forbidden to him as a secondary relative, and they had a daughter. The wife then died, and later the husband died as well. The question is whether the daughter receives support from the estate. The law is that the estate must provide support for the daughters until they marry or until they become adults, as we learned on yesterday’s daf. Does the daughter of a woman in a secondary forbidden relationship receive this support, which is a condition of the marriage contract, or not?
The Gemara asks: Since a woman in a secondary forbidden relationship does not receive a marriage contract, perhaps she also does not receive the conditions associated with the marriage contract. The rabbis penalized her because she entered into a prohibited marriage, and therefore they did not give her a marriage contract. If she has no marriage contract, perhaps her daughter also does not receive support from the estate.
Or perhaps we should say that the mother committed the prohibition, not the child. The mother married the man despite the prohibition, and therefore she was penalized by having her marriage contract taken away. We should not penalize the child, however. In that case, the conditions of the marriage contract should still be enforced by the court, and perhaps the daughter should receive support. The Gemara leaves this question unresolved.
Rava asked the next question: What is the law concerning a daughter born to a betrothed woman? A man became betrothed, had relations with his betrothed during the betrothal period, and they had a daughter. He then died before the marriage was completed. Does this daughter receive support from the estate or not?
What is the basis of the question? Since the woman has a marriage contract, perhaps the daughter receives support as one of its conditions. Why would a betrothed woman have a marriage contract? The Gemara explains that this could refer to a case in which he wrote her a marriage contract already at the time of the betrothal. Alternatively, it could follow the opinion that the marriage contract of a betrothed woman takes effect automatically from the time of betrothal.
Since there is a marriage contract in either of these cases, perhaps she receives the associated support. Or perhaps the original enactment of the Sages was that the marriage contract does not truly take effect until the marriage is completed. Although he wrote it at the time of betrothal, the original enactment was not meant to be enforced until the marriage. Since there was no completed marriage, perhaps there are no conditions of the marriage contract either. The Gemara also leaves this question unresolved.
Rav Pappa asked about a daughter born from a woman who was violated. The law concerning such a woman is that the man must marry her, and the Torah does not permit him to divorce her. He must remain married to her for the rest of his life. The question is: If he had a daughter with this woman and then died, must the estate provide the daughter with support?
We know that there is a dispute about whether the woman herself receives a marriage contract. Rabbi Yosei holds that although the man who violated her paid her father the prescribed penalty of one hundred silver coins, she still receives a marriage contract. According to this opinion, if she qualifies for a marriage contract, she also qualifies for its conditions, and therefore the estate must support her daughter.
The question is according to the opinion of the Rabbis. They hold that the money the father received as the penalty for the violation is itself the marriage contract. That money takes the place of the marriage contract, so in this case there is no separate marriage contract. If there is no marriage contract, perhaps there are no conditions of the marriage contract, and the daughter does not receive support.
Or perhaps the reasoning behind the marriage contract is not relevant in this case. Why do we require a marriage contract? So that it will not be easy for a husband to divorce his wife. The obligation to pay her a substantial amount makes him think twice before divorcing her. In this case, however, the husband cannot divorce her in any event, because the Torah requires him to remain married to her. Therefore, a marriage contract is unnecessary as an incentive to keep him married.
Nevertheless, perhaps the conditions of the marriage contract remain in force. The marriage contract itself is unnecessary as an incentive, but the Sages may still have enforced its conditions. The conditions of the marriage contract are not merely an incentive; they are obligations established by the court. Therefore, even though there is no marriage contract for the particular reason that the woman cannot be divorced, perhaps the conditions of the marriage contract still apply. The Gemara leaves this matter unresolved as well.
The Gemara now discusses the wording of a marriage contract. One of the conditions recorded in the marriage contract is that if the husband dies and the woman becomes a widow, she will be supported from the estate. The wording does not merely say that she will be supported from his assets. It says that she will be supported from the house for as long as she remains in his house. This was understood to mean that as long as she remains a widow and does not remarry, the estate provides her with support.
The Gemara derives a law from the wording: “In my house, but not in my hut.” What does this mean? If the husband has a proper house and dies, the heirs must provide the widow with a room in that house where she can live comfortably. They may not tell her to return to her father’s house, where they will support her from there.
But if he does not have a house and owns only a small hut—a narrow, cramped dwelling—the heirs may tell her to return to her father’s house. No one intended for her to remain in that small hut if there is not enough room for everyone. Since the marriage contract says that she is supported as long as she lives in his house, the heirs may say that he never intended the provision to apply to a hut. They may send her back to her father’s home and provide her support there.
The Gemara emphasizes, however, that one should not think that her right to live in the house and her right to receive support are interdependent. They are separate matters. Even if she is not living in the house, she still receives support. One might have thought that since she does not fulfill the condition of living “in my house,” she also loses the support. The Gemara says that this is not so: She still receives support.
Rashi explains how the Sages derived the distinction between “in my house” and “not in my hut.” The wording of the marriage contract includes the expression “in my house” twice: “You will sit in my house all the days of your widowhood.” Since “in my house” is written twice, the first mention teaches the basic law, while the second teaches that the law does not apply when the husband lived in a small, cramped dwelling. In that case, the heirs may tell her to return to her father’s house, although they must continue providing her with support there.
Mar bar Rav Ashi is more stringent. He says that in such a case she requires both things: She must have the house in order to receive support. If the husband did not have a proper house, then just as the heirs may send her back to her father’s home, she also forfeits her right to support.
The Gemara says that the law does not follow Mar bar Rav Ashi. She does receive support. Thus, there can be a case in which the widow does not live in the husband’s house but nevertheless continues to receive support from the estate.
The Gemara then discusses various circumstances that might indicate that the widow is no longer attached to her deceased husband. Her support is provided as long as she remains a widow and remains connected to her husband’s household. Once it appears that she has moved on to someone else, perhaps she loses her right to support.
First, what is the law if a man proposes to her and she accepts the proposal? He asks, “Will you marry me?” and she answers yes. At that point, her mind is already directed toward another man. Before she has formally left her deceased husband’s household, she is already preparing to do so. Perhaps she should therefore lose her support.
If she did not accept the proposal, however, she continues to receive support. One might argue that even if she rejected the proposal, her mind is still elsewhere. Perhaps she rejected him only because she did not like the way he proposed, but the fact that she entertained the proposal indicates that she is already considering remarriage. Nevertheless, the ruling is that she continues to receive support.
Rav Anan explained that he heard from Mar Shmuel what this ruling means. If she rejected the proposal because of her first husband—saying, in effect, “I cannot marry you because I still remember my original husband”—then she receives support. Her mind is not directed toward remarriage, and she remains attached to her deceased husband.
But if she rejected the proposal because she said that the man was not suitable for her, then it is clear that she does want to remarry and that she rejected only this particular man. In that case, she loses her support.
Rav Chisda said that if she committed an act of sexual misconduct with another man, she loses her support. She is no longer acting as a married woman, but has gone with someone else outside of marriage. Therefore, she loses her right to support from her deceased husband’s estate.
Rav Yosef goes further and says that if she applies cosmetics or arranges her hair in a particular way, she loses her support. The reason is that she is clearly preparing herself to remarry. She is not beautifying herself for her deceased husband; she is doing so to attract someone else, and therefore she loses her support.
The Gemara challenges this reasoning. The opinion that says that sexual misconduct causes her to lose support should certainly say that putting on makeup causes her to lose support, because makeup is done willingly and is under her control. One might argue that sexual misconduct is almost beyond her control, because the evil inclination overcomes her and she seeks companionship. If that nevertheless causes her to lose support, then surely deliberately putting on makeup in an effort to attract someone should cause her to lose support.
But perhaps the opposite is true. The opinion that says that makeup causes her to lose support may hold that if she commits sexual misconduct, she still receives support. Why? Because she truly remains attached to her deceased husband, but her evil inclination overcame her. The Gemara discusses these possibilities.
The practical ruling, however, does not follow these suggested cutoffs. Even if she accepts another man’s proposal, commits sexual misconduct, or applies makeup, she still receives support from her original husband’s estate. The actual cutoff is when she comes to court and demands payment of her marriage contract.
As long as she does not claim her marriage contract in court, she continues to receive support. The wording of the marriage contract is that she receives support for the entire duration of her widowhood. Once she demands payment of the marriage contract, however, she is effectively preparing to leave and go elsewhere, and she loses her support.
The Gemara brings a related teaching. Suppose a widow sold her marriage contract, which has financial value. Alternatively, suppose she mortgaged it or designated it as collateral for a debt. An arrangement of this kind is called an apotiki: She designates a particular asset and says, “If I do not pay you, you may collect from this asset.” If she designated the marriage contract as an apotiki for someone else, she loses her support.
The Gemara asks why these actions were listed as causing her to lose support, but simply requesting payment of the marriage contract was not included on the list. The Gemara answers that there is a distinction. The actions just mentioned cause her to lose support whether they were carried out in court or outside of court. They demonstrate that she has left her husband’s domain.
Claiming the marriage contract, however, causes her to lose support only if she makes the claim in court. If she merely tells the heirs, “I want my marriage contract,” that alone does not end her right to support. Only when she formally claims payment before the court does she lose the support.
We learned in the Mishnah that there were two different versions of the wording of the marriage contract. In one version, the woman receives support for the entire duration of her widowhood. In the other version, used in Judea, she receives support until the heirs decide to give her the payment of her marriage contract. According to one version, the matter depends on her remaining a widow; according to the Judean version, it depends on the heirs.
It was taught that Rav said the heirs may force her to accept payment of the marriage contract and may then stop providing support. Shmuel, however, said that the law in the Galilee and in Jerusalem is that as long as she remains in the house, she continues to receive support and cannot be forced to accept payment of the marriage contract.
In Pumbedita and all its surrounding areas, the custom followed Rav: The heirs could force her to take the marriage contract, after which she would lose her support. In Nehardea and all its surrounding suburbs, however, the custom followed Shmuel. As long as she remained in the house, the heirs could not force her to accept payment of the marriage contract, and she continued to receive support.
There was once a woman from Mechoza who had married a man from Nehardea. Her husband died, and she came before Rav Nachman seeking support. Rav Nachman had heard that she was originally from Babylonia, from the city of Mechoza, and he therefore said that Babylonia and all its surrounding areas follow Rav. According to Rav, the heirs can force her to accept payment of the marriage contract. He told her that since she was from Mechoza, she had to follow the custom of Babylonia.
They replied to him that although she was from Babylonia, she had married a man from Nehardea. Since her marriage was connected to Nehardea, the law of Nehardea applied, and that law followed Shmuel. Therefore, she could continue receiving support and could not be forced to accept payment of the marriage contract.
The Gemara then asks a technical question: What is considered the boundary of Nehardea? The answer is that any region measured according to the measurement used in Nehardea is considered part of the Nehardea area. Nehardea had a particular measure, and any place that still used the Nehardea measure was considered part of that region.
The Gemara now records a dispute concerning the clothing of a widow. Rav says that when a widow comes to collect her marriage contract, the value of the clothing she is wearing is assessed and deducted from the amount of the marriage contract. The clothing technically belonged to her husband, who purchased it for her. Therefore, when she comes before the court to collect two hundred zuz, for example, the heirs may say that the clothing she is wearing is worth one hundred zuz, and they need to pay her only the remaining one hundred.
Shmuel says that the value of the clothing she is wearing is not deducted from her marriage contract. Although her husband gave her the clothing, he gave it to her as a gift. Nevertheless, the explanation is that he gave it to her on the condition that she would continue wearing it while living with him. He did not intend for her to take the clothing and use it when she went to marry someone else.
Therefore, once the husband dies, the heirs can say, “My father gave you that dress for the period when you were living with him. It is worth one hundred zuz. We will give you another one hundred zuz, and that will complete the two hundred zuz of your marriage contract.” This is how Rav understands the matter.
When the Gemara says that the clothing she is wearing is assessed, this does not necessarily mean only the clothing she is wearing when she comes to court. It means all the clothing she received from her husband, including clothing that is still in her closet.
Shmuel, however, says that the clothing is hers. Her husband gave it to her, and therefore it is not assessed or deducted from the marriage contract.
Rav Chiya bar Avin said that the opposite applies in the case of a worker. In earlier times, a worker was sometimes paid by the day and sometimes lived in his employer’s home. The employer would provide him with food and other support, and after the worker had completed his period of employment, he would leave and receive the balance of his payment.
The question is whether the employer can deduct the value of clothing that he gave the worker from the worker’s wages. Rav Chiya bar Avin says that in this case the clothing is deducted from the worker’s payment, in accordance with Shmuel’s position concerning a widow. The clothing is considered to belong to the employer, and its value can be deducted.
The logic might be as follows: In the case of a widow, she is leaving to marry somebody else. Therefore, the heirs deduct the value of the clothing from the marriage contract, because the husband gave her the clothing for the period during which she would remain with him. Once he dies and she leaves to go elsewhere, the clothing was not intended for that purpose.
In the case of a worker, however, everyone knows from the outset that he will eventually leave and go somewhere else. When the employer gives him a shirt or other clothing, he does not give it to him as a gift separate from the wages. It may therefore be treated as a payment toward the worker’s salary and deducted from the amount owed.
Rav Chiya bar Avin is saying that the reasoning is reversed in the case of a worker. Rav says that the employer may deduct the value of the clothing, while Shmuel says that he may not.
Rav Kahana came along and said that the same dispute applies in both cases. The same argument that Rav and Shmuel have concerning a widow’s clothing applies to the clothing of a worker. According to Rav, the value of the clothing is assessed and deducted from the payment, because the clothing was given only for the period during which the worker was in the employer’s service. Once he leaves, the clothing can be taken into account. According to Shmuel, it is not deducted.
Rav added a way to remember this law. The word “orphan” in this context refers to a worker. Whether one is dealing with a worker or with a widow who is leaving, the instruction is: Remove their clothing before sending them away. The clothing does not necessarily belong to them, and therefore it can either be returned or its value can be deducted from the payment owed to them.
Rav Nachman said that although the Mishnah appears to follow Shmuel, the law follows Rav. The Mishnah states that if a man consecrates his assets or declares the monetary value of himself to the Temple, he may not use his wife’s clothing, his children’s clothing, clothing that he dyed for his wife but has not yet given her, or new shoes that he bought for them in order to fulfill that obligation.
Superficially, the Mishnah seems to say that these items do not belong to the husband and therefore follows Shmuel. Nevertheless, the law follows Rav. The Gemara explains that the Mishnah can still be understood according to Rav because it is discussing clothing given while the woman is still married to him.
When a man buys clothing for his wife, he gives it to her for the period during which she remains his wife and lives with him. As long as she is his wife, even Rav agrees that he cannot take the clothing for another purpose. The case of the Mishnah concerns a man who consecrates his property while he is still married. At that point, he certainly may not use his wife’s clothing.
The case of collecting a marriage contract, however, concerns a widow who is leaving to marry someone else. There, the husband’s gift of the clothing was limited to the time when she was living with him. Since she is no longer living with him, the heirs may deduct its value. Thus, the Mishnah can be consistent with Rav.
The Gemara relates an incident involving the daughter-in-law of the family of Bar Elyashiv. She came to the heirs and said, “I want my marriage contract.” She was going to court to claim payment. She arrived wearing very inexpensive clothing, so the heirs told her that it was not fitting for her to come to court dressed that way. They told her to go home, put on her finest clothing, and then return to court.
She went home, put on all the clothing she had, and came back. The heirs then told her that all the clothing she was wearing would be assessed and deducted from her marriage contract. Their request that she dress appropriately had been a scheme to make sure that she would not conceal her clothing or claim that she owned nothing of value. She had put on all her clothing, and its value was therefore deducted from the marriage contract.
The halachic conclusion follows Rav: The value of the clothing is assessed and deducted from the marriage contract.
The Gemara then relates a story about a man who was on his deathbed. He committed himself to providing a certain dowry for his daughter. We have learned that after a father dies, the estate must set aside money for the wedding of his orphaned daughter. In addition to that established obligation, a father can specify what he wishes to provide for her dowry.
Before he died, this man said that he wanted to give his daughter certain items. At the time, the items were worth a particular amount of money. Afterwards, their price went down, and the heirs were able to purchase them more cheaply. The question was: Who receives the difference? Must the daughter receive the items together with the extra money, or may the heirs keep the savings?
Rav Idi bar Avin said that the profit belongs to the orphans. The father committed himself to provide certain items, and she received those items. The heirs therefore do not have to pay the value those items had on the day of the commitment. They purchase the items at their current price, give her what the father specified, and keep the difference.
Another case involved a man who told his family before he died, “Four hundred zuz from the wine is for my daughter’s dowry.” Rashi explains that this means the wine was designated as collateral for the dowry. He did not pledge the wine itself. Rather, he pledged four hundred zuz and placed the wine as security from which the money could be collected.
Afterwards, the price of wine increased, so that the wine that had been worth four hundred zuz was now worth five hundred. The additional value belongs to the heirs. One cannot say that he committed himself to four hundred zuz worth of wine and that, because the wine increased in value, she must receive five hundred zuz worth. He pledged four hundred zuz; he merely designated the wine as the source from which that amount could be collected. Therefore, the daughter receives four hundred zuz, and the increase remains with the orphans.
If he had said, “This wine,” then he would have pledged the wine itself, and even if its value increased, she would receive that wine. But he did not say, “This wine.” He said, “Four hundred zuz from the wine,” and therefore the heirs need provide only four hundred zuz.
The Gemara relates another incident involving relatives of Rabbi Yochanan. They were dealing with a case involving their father’s widow. She had eaten a great deal during the marriage, and the husband had been supporting her with regular payments. After he died, the orphans were concerned that she would consume the entire estate through her support.
Before the father died, they had anticipated this problem. They told him to designate a particular field from which she would receive her support. At least then the amount would be limited to the produce of the field. The field would produce a certain amount of fruit, and she would receive her support from that produce.
The father did so, and then he died. The widow now came and claimed support. The orphans told her that she would receive whatever the field produced, and nothing more. She went before Reish Lakish for a ruling.
They argued that when the field was designated, it was merely added as an extra source of support. In other words, in addition to everything else she was entitled to receive, she was also given the produce of that field. Reish Lakish ruled that she was entitled to the field in addition to the support she had previously been owed.
The orphans then came to Rabbi Yochanan and asked what they should do. Rabbi Yochanan had said that designating the field did not work in that manner. He held that when the field was designated, it became the source of all her support.
Rabbi Yochanan told the orphans forcefully that they had to give her what he had instructed. Otherwise, he would place them under a ban. In other words, if they refused to follow his ruling, he would issue a ban against them, and they would have to distance themselves from the community.
The orphans returned to Rabbi Yochanan and asked him what they should do. They explained that Reish Lakish was ruling against them and that they could not oppose him. Rabbi Yochanan then clarified the matter.
If the father had said, “I designate this field for your support,” then the field was an addition to the support she was otherwise entitled to receive. The wording means that she receives the field in addition to her regular support.
But if he had said, “This is your support,” then the field is the entire source of her support. In that case, the widow must subsist on the field’s produce, and she does not receive additional support from the estate.
The Gemara is explaining that the wording is decisive. When the father said, “For your support,” he added the field to the existing obligation. When he said, “This is your support,” he designated the field as the complete payment of her support.
Rashi explains the source of this principle. We find that a person can designate a field for the payment of a marriage contract, and if the woman accepts it, she is bound by that arrangement. For example, if a man gives all his assets to his children while he is alive and writes to his wife, “You will receive this particular field,” and she accepts it, she has accepted that field in place of the marriage contract.
If this principle applies to the essential payment of the marriage contract, then it certainly applies to the conditions of the marriage contract, which include support. Rabbi Yochanan was therefore telling the relatives to designate a field as the source of her support. If she accepted it, the field could become the full payment of what she was owed.
After the incident, the widow went to Reish Lakish and told him what had happened. Reish Lakish said that her acceptance did not change the matter. She was still entitled to the field in addition to everything else she was owed. Rabbi Yochanan had ruled differently, but Rabbi Yochanan either meant that he could not oppose Reish Lakish, or he later retracted and clarified that the outcome depended on the exact wording used.
The conclusion is that if the father said, “For your support,” the field is an addition to the support. If he said, “This is your support,” then the field constitutes the entire support, and she receives no further payment. This distinction depends entirely on whether the field was designated as an addition to her support or as the support itself.
That is the conclusion of this discussion.