The Elliot B. Sitt Edition and Audio Series of the Talmud, Masechet Bava Kamma, has been generously sponsored in our Daf Yomi program by our good friend, patron, and charter member of our Daf Yomi class, Siyahu Asher HaKohen, and his dear wife, Rina. May they, with God’s help, continue to enjoy success and prosperity in all their endeavors, good health, happiness, prosperity, and much pleasure from their children. May they enjoy many years of tranquility, peace in their home, and peace of mind. Amen.
We begin today’s page on 112a, at the very beginning of the first side, at the top right. On yesterday’s page, we had a statement of Rami bar Hama: when a person’s child inherits from him, the possession of the heir is considered a separate possession. It is as though a third party acquired the item; the heir’s possession is considered distinct from the father’s possession.
Yesterday, this statement was discussed in the context of a person who was a robber. For example, a father stole an item, and the victim subsequently relinquished hope of recovering it. The father then gave the item to his children as an inheritance. The relinquishment of ownership by the victim, together with the change of possession when the children inherited the item, creates a combination of relinquishment and change of possession. Since the children are considered to have acquired the item through the inheritance, they do not have to return it. They acquire the object.
That was one context in which Rami bar Hama’s statement was presented. The Gemara on today’s page, however, says that there was another version concerning the context in which Rami bar Hama made his statement that an heir’s possession is like the possession of a purchaser. He did not make the statement in the context of robbery. Rather, he made it in the context of a case involving interest.
The Gemara presents the alternative version: a father had interest in his possession. He had lent someone money and charged interest, and he was now holding the interest that had been paid to him. He then bequeathed that interest to his children. Even though the children knew that the money was interest, they were not obligated to return it. The borrower had already relinquished hope of recovering his money, and once the children received it, their possession was considered a new possession. Thus, we see that Rami bar Hama made his statement regarding interest: the possession of an heir is like the possession of a purchaser.
Rava rejects this. Rava says that the possession of an heir is not a separate possession; it is not like the possession of a purchaser. Why, then, may the children retain the interest? The Torah says, “Do not take from him interest,” and then says, “Return it to him.” The Torah requires the person who charged the interest to return it, so that the parties can live peacefully with one another as brothers. The Torah specifically obligates the person who charged the interest to return it. The children, however, did not charge the interest. Therefore, they are not obligated to return it.
This is a special scriptural enactment. In truth, the possession of the heir is not like the possession of a purchaser, and the interest remains prohibited. Nevertheless, the special enactment teaches that only the person who charged the interest must return it. The children did not charge the interest, so they do not have to return it.
The Gemara says that the opinion that interprets Rami bar Hama’s statement in this way will understand that it was stated regarding the case in the Mishnah. In other words, there was a way to answer the case of the interest according to Rava by saying that the children are exempt because they were not the ones who charged the interest. Nevertheless, Rami bar Hama did not use that answer. He maintained that even in the case of interest, the reason the children were exempt was that the possession of an heir is like the possession of a purchaser.
If one understands Rami bar Hama’s statement as referring specifically to the Mishnah’s case of robbery, however, one can say that in the case of interest he agrees with Rava. In the case of interest, there is no need to say that the possession of an heir is like the possession of a purchaser. The children are exempt simply because they did not charge the interest, and the Torah’s obligation to return it applies only to the person who charged it.
Rashi explains that in the case of the Mishnah, where the stolen property remains in existence, if one says that the property is not acquired through the inheritance, then there is no other reason to exempt the heirs. One must therefore say that the victim’s relinquishment of ownership, together with the change of possession caused by the inheritance, is what allows the heirs to retain the item.
By contrast, if one discusses the case of interest, there is a way to exempt the children without relying on Rami bar Hama’s principle. One can say that Rava’s special scriptural enactment applies: the person who charged the interest must return it, but the children who inherited it do not.
The Gemara then brings a baraita: If a person steals property and feeds it to his children, the children are exempt from payment. If the stolen item remains before them, however, they must return it. According to Rami bar Hama, this baraita can be understood as referring to a case before the victim relinquished hope of recovering the item. Since there was no relinquishment of ownership, the change of possession brought about by the inheritance would not be sufficient to transfer ownership.
Why, then, are the minor children exempt? This is a novelty. The stolen property still exists, so one might think that they should have to return it. The answer is that minors are not subject to being taken to court. The robbery remains in existence, but it cannot be collected from the minors through litigation. That is why the minors are exempt.
According to this interpretation, if the stolen property remains in existence, adult children must return it. If it was given to minor children before the victim relinquished ownership, the minors may keep it because they cannot be taken to court.
The baraita adds that if the adult children say, “We do not know the accounts that our father had with you. Perhaps our father already paid you,” they are exempt. The Gemara challenges this: what kind of ruling is that? The victim says with certainty, “You stole my property,” while the children say only, “Perhaps our father paid you.” A certain claim should prevail over an uncertain claim.
The Gemara answers that the children did not actually say that they were uncertain. The initial wording was rhetorical. They were saying, “Do you think we know the accounts our father had with you?” But the baraita must be understood as saying that they know their father’s accounts with the claimant and know that nothing remains in their possession because their father already paid him. In that case, they are making a definite claim against the victim’s definite claim. Unless the victim can bring proof, the children are exempt.
The Gemara then brings another baraita. If a person steals property and gives it to his children, and they consume it, the children are obligated to pay, whether they are adults or minors.
According to Rav Chisda, this is understandable. Rav Chisda maintains that before relinquishment of ownership, consumption of the stolen property is not sufficient to exempt the children. Therefore, they are obligated to pay.
But according to Rami bar Hama, how can this be understood? Even if the baraita is referring to a time before the victim relinquished ownership, why should adult children who consumed the item have to pay? The Gemara raises another question. A minor who personally damages someone’s property is exempt. Certainly, then, in this case, where the minors did not enter someone else’s property and steal or damage the item themselves, but merely inherited it from their father and consumed it, they should be exempt. The baraita therefore appears difficult.
Rav Pappa answers that the baraita must be read differently. It means that the father left the stolen property before the children, and they had not yet consumed it. Whether the children were adults or minors, they were obligated to return it. Since the property itself remained in existence, even minor children had to return it.
According to this interpretation, the baraita disagrees with Sumchus, who says that minors cannot be taken to court. The Rabbis maintain that although one cannot collect from minors in the ordinary manner, the stolen property itself must nevertheless be returned when it is still in existence. This removes the difficulty for Rami bar Hama: even according to him, when the stolen property remains in existence, it must be returned.
The Gemara now discusses another case. A father borrowed a cow, and the cow was still within the term of the loan when he died. He bequeathed the cow to his children. The children may continue using the cow until the end of the original loan term. For example, if the father borrowed it for thirty days and died after fifteen days, the children may use it for the remaining fifteen days.
Ordinarily, a borrower is in the most stringent category of guardians. Even in a case of unavoidable accident, a borrower is liable. In this case, however, the children are not liable for an unavoidable accident, because they were not the ones who borrowed the animal. They did not personally accept the responsibility of a borrower. Therefore, they receive the best of both sides: they may complete the father’s loan term, but if something happens to the animal, they are not responsible.
Rashi explains that the children never accepted responsibility for guarding the animal. They inherited the right to use it, but they did not accept the obligations that the father had accepted when he borrowed it.
The Gemara then presents a different case. Suppose the children did not know that the cow had been borrowed. They thought it belonged to their father, so they slaughtered it and ate it. Since they had no intention of stealing it—they genuinely thought it belonged to their father—they must pay only the value of inexpensive meat. They do not have to pay the full value of the animal as high-quality meat. Rashi explains that they pay two-thirds of the value, receiving a one-third discount.
The reason is that they did not intend to steal. If one tells them, “You did not know whether the cow belonged to you or to your father, so you should have left it alone,” they answer that they acted under the assumption that it was their father’s property. Since there was no intention to steal, their liability is assessed at the discounted value of the meat.
The Gemara then adds that if the father left land to the children, they must pay. This statement is unclear. To which case does it refer?
Some understand that it returns to the first case, the case of the borrowed cow. Although the children are not personally liable if the animal dies, there may already have been a lien on the father’s land. When the father borrowed the cow, his land may have become subject to the lender’s claim in the event that the animal died. The question is when that lien takes effect.
Rava maintains that the obligation takes effect at the time of the loan. When a person borrows an animal, the animal is still alive and nothing has yet happened to it. Nevertheless, the borrower’s land already becomes subject to the obligation in case the animal later dies. According to this view, the lien exists from the moment of the loan.
There is another way to understand the matter. Perhaps the lien does not take effect until the animal actually dies. According to that view, when the father borrowed the animal, no lien yet existed. The obligation arose only when the animal died. If it died after the father’s death, while it was in the children’s possession, then the lien would not have existed during the father’s lifetime.
Thus, if the statement that the children must pay from the land refers to the first case, it means the following: the father borrowed the cow while he owned land, and his land became subject to the lender’s claim immediately. The father then died and left the land to his children. They used the cow for the remainder of the term, and the cow subsequently died. Although the children themselves did not accept the responsibilities of borrowers, the land they inherited was already subject to the father’s obligation. They must therefore pay from the land.
Others understand the statement as referring to the second case, where the children slaughtered the cow because they thought it belonged to their father. Ordinarily, they pay only the discounted value of the meat. If the father left them land, however, they take the place of the father because a lien already existed on the land. They must therefore pay the full value from the land.
This is a dispute concerning which case the statement about land defines: the first case or the second case.
The Gemara says that the one who teaches the statement about land regarding the first case would certainly agree that it applies to the second case as well. The first case itself is subject to a dispute between Rava and Rav Pappa regarding the time when the lien takes effect. In the second case, however, the obligation is clear according to everyone once the children inherited land and consumed the animal. Therefore, if the statement about land is necessary to establish liability in the first case, it is certainly necessary in the second case.
Rava’s position is that the borrower’s obligations take effect at the time of the loan. The animal is still alive, but the borrower’s land is already subject to the obligation in the event of an unavoidable accident. When the children inherit the land, the lien continues to affect it. If the animal dies while in their possession, they may say that they did not accept the responsibilities of borrowers, but the land inherited from their father is already subject to the lender’s claim.
Rav Pappa disagrees. He says that when a person borrows an object, no lien takes effect immediately. The obligation for an unavoidable accident arises only when the accident occurs. Until then, the borrower is merely required to return the object. Therefore, if the father borrowed the cow and died before it died, there was no lien on his land. The animal died only after the children inherited it, so they are not liable.
The fundamental dispute is when the obligation of a borrower takes effect: at the time of the loan or at the time of the unavoidable accident. Rava says it takes effect at the time of the loan. Rav Pappa says it takes effect only when the accident occurs.
To understand Rav Pappa’s position more clearly, the Gemara brings another case. A person stole an animal and slaughtered it on Shabbat. He is liable to pay the fourfold or fivefold payment. The reason is that he was already liable as a thief before Shabbat. When he slaughtered the animal on Shabbat, he violated Shabbat, but the theft had taken place earlier.
There is a general principle that when a single act creates both a monetary obligation and a more severe punishment, the person is exempt from the monetary obligation because of the more severe punishment. Had the theft itself taken place on Shabbat, the person would have been subject to the punishment for violating Shabbat and exempt from the monetary payment. Here, however, he had already become a thief before Shabbat. When he slaughtered the animal on Shabbat, the fourfold or fivefold payment is a penalty that arose after he was already liable for the theft.
The principle exempting a person from a monetary obligation because of a more severe punishment applies to ordinary monetary obligations, but not to a penalty. Since the entire obligation to pay the fourfold or fivefold amount is itself a novel penalty, the principle does not exempt him. He must pay the fourfold or fivefold payment.
Rashi explains that the person was already liable as a thief on Friday, when he stole the animal. What was added on Shabbat was the penalty. Therefore, he must pay the fourfold or fivefold amount. The more severe punishment for violating Shabbat does not eliminate a penalty.
The Gemara then presents another case. A person borrowed a cow and slaughtered it on Shabbat. He is exempt from the fourfold or fivefold payment because the violation of Shabbat and the act of slaughter took place at the same time as the theft. The obligation of theft arose only when he slaughtered the animal, since before that he was merely a borrower. Because the monetary obligation and the violation of Shabbat occurred simultaneously, the principle exempts him from the monetary payment.
What do we see from this? The obligation of theft did not take effect when he borrowed the animal. It took effect only when he slaughtered it. This supports Rav Pappa’s position that the obligation of a borrower does not take effect at the time of the loan. It takes effect only when the event creating the obligation occurs.
Rashi explains that when the man borrowed the cow on Friday, nothing had yet happened. He was obligated to return it, but the obligation to pay for an unavoidable accident had not yet taken effect. When the animal was slaughtered on Shabbat, that was the moment at which the act of theft occurred. Therefore, the violation of Shabbat and the theft occurred together.
One might ask about the fourfold or fivefold penalty. Rashi explains that this penalty applies in a case of an actual thief or in the case of a guardian who falsely claims that the animal was stolen and then slaughters it. It does not apply to an ordinary borrower in the same way. A borrower is comparable in this respect to a paid guardian, who is liable for the animal but does not become subject to the fourfold or fivefold penalty merely because he slaughtered it.
A guardian who claims that the animal was stolen can become liable for the penalty because theft would have exempted him, and his false claim is therefore significant. A borrower, however, would be liable even if the animal had genuinely been stolen. Theft is not a claim that would exempt him. Therefore, the fourfold or fivefold penalty does not apply to him in the same manner.
Thus, the case of the borrowed cow demonstrates Rav Pappa’s position: the obligation for an unavoidable accident takes effect at the time of the accident, not at the time the item was received for safekeeping or use. By contrast, in the case of an actual thief, the liability begins when the person steals the item.
The Gemara now returns to the verse, “He shall return the stolen item that he stole.” The Torah says that a person must return the stolen object that he stole. What do the apparently extra words teach?
The verse teaches that when the stolen item itself remains in existence, the thief must return the item as it is. If the stolen item is no longer in existence, however, the thief is not required to return the original item itself. This does not mean that a person may simply steal property and consume it without any obligation. The Gemara will explain the particular circumstance in which the consumed property does not have to be returned as an object.
The Gemara says that from here the Rabbis derived that if a person steals an item and feeds it to his children, the children are exempt from payment when the item has been consumed. This is understood in a case where the victim had already relinquished hope of recovering the item. According to Rav Chisda, the combination of relinquishment and consumption means that the children do not have to pay. According to Rami bar Hama, even before relinquishment, once the item was consumed by someone else, the children are not required to return the original item.
If the father left the stolen object before the children as an inheritance, however, the children are obligated to return it, whether they are adults or minors. As long as the stolen object remains in existence, the verse requires its return.
This part of the baraita is easier to understand if it refers to a time before the victim relinquished ownership. Even if one maintains that an heir’s possession is like the possession of a purchaser, a change of possession without relinquishment does not transfer ownership. Therefore, the children must return the item.
According to the other opinion, however, relinquishment together with the father’s bequest to the children would create both relinquishment and a change of possession, and the children would acquire the object. Nevertheless, the baraita says that whether the children are adults or minors, they must return the item. The Gemara then discusses the position of Sumchus, who maintains that a minor is not subject to being taken to court.
The Gemara relates an incident involving Rabbi Yirmiyah bar Abba. His father-in-law passed away, and Rabbi Yirmiyah claimed that a certain house belonged to him as part of the estate. His brother-in-law, who was a minor, disagreed. When Rabbi Yirmiyah came to take possession of the house, the minor closed the door in his face. He was effectively saying, “Leave. This is my father’s house.”
Rabbi Yirmiyah wanted to establish possession of the house because he believed it belonged to him. When the minor saw him approaching, he initially refused to let him in. Rabbi Yirmiyah then went to the court and sought support for his claim.
The minor’s position was that he was the heir and was protecting his property. Rabbi Yirmiyah responded that he could bring witnesses to show that the house had belonged to him even during the father-in-law’s lifetime, and that the minor had not inherited it.
The court asked whether Rabbi Yirmiyah could bring witnesses when the opposing litigant was not present. The minor was not considered subject to ordinary litigation. It would be like bringing witnesses to court against a person without having that person present to respond.
Rabbi Yirmiyah replied that the baraita says that when a father steals property and leaves it to his children, both adult and minor children must return it. This appears to show that the victim can bring the minor before the court and testify against him, and that the minor can be obligated to return the stolen property. If so, why could Rabbi Yirmiyah not bring witnesses against his minor brother-in-law?
The response was that the baraita follows the opinion of Sumchus, who maintains that minors can be dealt with in this way. Sumchus is a minority opinion. The Rabbis disagree and maintain that a minor cannot be taken to court in the ordinary manner.
Rabbi Yirmiyah objected: Are you going to impose the entire world according to the opinion of Sumchus merely to take money away from me? Sumchus’s position would harm him, because he wanted to bring witnesses to establish that the house belonged to him. The court answered that the baraita itself follows Sumchus, and it cannot be used as proof that the Rabbis agree with him.
In the meantime, another statement was brought before them. Rabbi Shaya taught a case involving a minor who inherited servants from his father. The minor took the servants with him as guards and went to a field belonging to someone else. He claimed that the field belonged to him because it had belonged to his father.
Rabbi Shaya ruled that the field should not be taken away from its current possessor and given immediately to the minor merely because the minor claimed that he had witnesses. The court waits until the minor becomes an adult. At that point, he may bring his witnesses and establish his claim.
Rabbi Yirmiyah’s associates sought to use this as support for his position. Just as, in Rabbi Shaya’s case, the field was not given to the minor merely because he claimed that he had witnesses, so too, in Rabbi Yirmiyah’s case, the house should remain with Rabbi Yirmiyah until the minor grows up. Once the minor becomes an adult, he can bring his witnesses and prove his claim.
The response was that the two cases are not comparable. In Rabbi Shaya’s case, the minor was coming from outside the property. He had no established possession deriving from his father. He appeared after his father’s death and claimed, without an existing presumption of ownership, that the field belonged to him. Since the minor had no prior established possession, the court does not transfer the field to him on the basis of his claim.
Here, by contrast, the minor was the heir. He inherited the house from his father, and everyone knew that the deceased had possessed the house. The minor therefore had an established presumption of possession as the heir. Rabbi Yirmiyah was the one seeking to remove the house from him. The cases are therefore different.
The Gemara then discusses the general question of whether testimony may be accepted without the opposing litigant present. Rav Shabbatai says that testimony may be accepted even when it is not given in the presence of the litigant.
Rabbi Hanan was astonished. Can testimony really be accepted without the opposing litigant present? Rabbi Yirmiyah understood from Rabbi Yosef bar Hanina that Rabbi Hanan must have been referring to an exceptional case: the litigant was ill, the witnesses were ill, or the witnesses were about to leave for overseas. The court had summoned the opposing litigant, but he did not come.
In such a case, the court may accept the testimony even without the litigant’s presence. The claimant or the witnesses are pressed for time, and if the court waits, the testimony may be lost. Ordinarily, however, testimony is not accepted against a person without his presence.
Rabbi Yehudah said in the name of Shmuel that witnesses may be accepted even when they are not testifying in the presence of the opposing litigant. Rav Okba explained that this refers to a case in which the litigant had already been summoned to court, but did not appear. Once the proceedings had begun and the person failed to come, the court may proceed without him.
If the proceedings had not yet begun, however, the person could say, “I do not want to go to this court. I want to go to the great court in Jerusalem.” Therefore, the court cannot simply begin hearing witnesses in his absence before the case has been opened.
The Gemara asks that even after he was summoned, he might still claim that he wishes to appear before the great court. The answer is that the claimant has a letter from the great court in Jerusalem authorizing the local court to judge the matter. Since permission has already been obtained, the litigant cannot delay the proceedings by insisting on going to Jerusalem.
The Gemara then presents another case. A lender possesses a document stating that a particular borrower owes him money. The question is how the document is authenticated. Perhaps the signatures are forged. The lender must establish the authenticity of the document by bringing either the witnesses who signed it to testify that the signatures are theirs, or other witnesses who recognize the signatures of the original witnesses.
The document may be authenticated even without the borrower’s presence. The court writes on the document that three judges sat together and verified the signatures. Once the document has been properly authenticated, it may be used to collect the debt.
Rabbi Yohanan disagrees. He says that a document may not be authenticated unless the borrower is present. Rabbi Yosef bar Abin explains Rabbi Yohanan’s reasoning from the verse concerning an ox: “And the owner of the ox shall be warned, and he shall not guard it.” The Torah says that the owner must come before the court and stand by his ox.
Earlier in the tractate, the Gemara discussed an ox that kills. Even if the ox killed previously and the court had not yet executed it, the ox must still be killed. Once it kills three times, it becomes an ox known to be dangerous, and its owner must pay the penalty. The owner must be brought before the court and warned concerning the ox.
Rabbi Yohanan derives from this that one cannot impose an obligation on a person without his presence before the court. Just as the owner of the ox must be present when the court establishes the ox’s status, the borrower must be present when the court authenticates the document and creates an enforceable monetary obligation against him.
The Gemara then discusses what happens if the borrower says, “It is a forgery.” If he merely makes that claim, the court does not stop the process. But if he says, “Give me time to bring witnesses who will prove that the document is forged,” the court gives him time.
If he appears within the allotted period and brings his witnesses, the court hears them. If he does not appear, the court proceeds. The court first gives him the opportunity to respond. If he does not come, the court summons him on Monday, Thursday, and the following Monday, since the court sits on those days.
If he still does not appear, the court writes a document placing him under a formal ban for refusing to appear. This process lasts ninety days. During the first thirty days, the lender does not seize the borrower’s assets, because the borrower may be gathering money in order to pay. During the second thirty days, the lender still does not seize the assets, because the borrower may need to sell property in order to raise the money. During the final thirty days, the court still waits, because the borrower may be working or hiring himself out in order to obtain the funds.
After ninety days, if the borrower has still not appeared or paid, the court issues an enforcement document, called an adrakhta. This gives the lender permission to go and seize the borrower’s property.
This ninety-day process applies when the borrower says that he will come to court and prove that the document is false. The court gives him the opportunity to do so. If he says immediately that he will not appear, the court does not wait ninety days. The enforcement document is written at once.
The same distinction applies to a deposit. A loan is ordinarily spent by the borrower, so the borrower needs time to obtain money to repay it. A deposit, however, is collateral that the person is not permitted to use. The item should therefore still be in his possession. The owner of the deposit is not required to wait ninety days. The court issues the enforcement document immediately so that he can seize the deposit.
The enforcement document permits the lender to seize land. It does not ordinarily permit him to seize movable property. The concern is that the lender might take the movable property and consume or use it. The borrower could then bring witnesses and prove that the document was forged, while the lender would no longer have the movable property available to return.
Land is different because land cannot be consumed in the same way. If the lender takes land and the borrower later proves that the document was forged, the land can be returned. Therefore, the court allows the lender to seize land.
The Gemara asks whether the lender may seize movable property when the borrower also owns land. One possibility is that he may do so, because if the borrower later proves that the document was forged and the lender has already consumed the movable property, the lender can compensate him from the land.
The Gemara rejects this. Even when the borrower owns land, the court is concerned that the land might deteriorate or become ruined. The lender might consume the movable property, and the land might then lose its value. The borrower would have no adequate source from which to recover his money. Therefore, the lender may not seize movable property.
The lender may seize land because natural deterioration is not a reason to prevent the seizure. If the land loses value through ordinary natural causes, it would have lost value even while remaining in the borrower’s possession. The court is not concerned that the lender himself will deliberately damage it.
The Gemara also discusses whether the borrower must be informed that the enforcement document is being issued. This requirement applies when the borrower is nearby. The court does not, however, go to great lengths to inform a person who is on the other side of the world.
If the borrower is far away but has relatives near the court, the court informs the relatives and instructs them to notify him. If he is far away but caravans regularly travel to his location, the court may wait up to twelve months for a caravan to go there, inform him, and return with confirmation that he was notified.
The Gemara relates a case involving Ravina. A lender named Mar Acha was owed money, but the enforcement document was not issued for twelve months because the borrower was far away. Ravina waited for a caravan to travel to the borrower, inform him, and return.
The Gemara rejects the possibility of deriving a general rule from that incident. Mar Acha was an aggressive person. Once he received an enforcement document, he would not readily return it, even if the borrower later proved that the document was forged. Ravina therefore delayed issuing it because he did not want Mar Acha to receive such power before the borrower had been notified.
In an ordinary case, the court does not wait twelve months. If a messenger can leave on Tuesday, inform the borrower, and return on Wednesday, the court waits until Thursday, when the court is again in session. This gives the borrower an opportunity to appear. The court does not delay beyond that ordinary period merely because he is far away.
The messenger who summons people to court is trusted in a particular respect. If he returns and says that the person refused to come, the court accepts his report as though it were supported by two witnesses. The Rabbis trusted the court’s messenger not to lie about whether the person refused to appear.
This trust is sufficient to place the person under a verbal ban for refusing to come. It is not sufficient, however, to write a formal document of banishment against him. Such a document costs money to prepare, and the person who is placed under the ban must pay for it. Since the testimony of only one messenger would result in a monetary charge, the court does not write the document solely on the messenger’s testimony.
Rashi explains that when the court writes a formal document placing someone under a ban, the person must pay for the writing. Even if he later appears in court, the document is not torn up until he pays the cost. He caused the court to write it and caused the scribe to spend time and ink. Therefore, the court does not impose that monetary obligation on the basis of a single witness, even though it may verbally place him under a ban on the messenger’s report.
That concludes the discussion.