The study of this page of the Gemara in Shabbat, specifically the third page of Masechet Shabbat, has been dedicated for the complete recovery of all those suffering from illness. It is our hope that the merit of studying this tractate and the sanctity of the day will serve as a protection for us. Additionally, today’s study is dedicated to the complete recovery of Yitzchak ben Mazal among the other ill of Israel.
To establish the context for the upcoming discussion, we must briefly revisit the Mishnah. The Mishnah began by discussing the various forms of carrying on the Sabbath, explaining that there are two primary cases of bringing objects out that expand into four, and similarly, two cases of bringing objects in that expand into four. These include scenarios involving a person standing inside a private domain and another standing outside in a public domain. Essentially, the Mishnah presents eight distinct cases: four that are prohibited Biblically and four that are prohibited Rabbinically.
To review the logic, a Biblical violation requires both an act of lifting from one domain and an act of placing in another domain, both performed by the same person. However, if the lifting is done by one person and the placing is done by another, both individuals are exempt from Biblical liability. In this context, being exempt means that while they are not Biblically liable, the action remains Rabbinically forbidden. Rashi explains that Biblical liability implies that if the act was done unintentionally, one must bring a sin offering; if it was done intentionally without a prior warning, one is liable for spiritual excision; and if it was done intentionally after a warning, one is liable for stoning.
The Mishnah details these eight cases, beginning with the poor man. If the poor man lifts an object in the public domain and places it in the private domain of the homeowner, the poor man is liable because he performed the entire labor. In this case, the homeowner is exempt and permitted, as he performed no action. In the second case, if the poor man lifts an object from the private domain—by reaching in and picking up a piece of bread—and brings it back to place it in the public domain, the poor man is again liable and the homeowner is exempt and permitted. The third and fourth cases involve the homeowner performing the lifting and placing, either bringing an object into the private domain or taking it out to the public domain. In these instances, the homeowner is liable and the poor man is exempt and permitted. The Mishnah does not distinguish between bringing an object out and bringing an object in; both are included in the prohibition of carrying between domains.
The remaining four cases are Rabbinic in nature because the labor is shared. For example, if the poor man lifts an object in the public domain and reaches his hand into the private domain, but the homeowner takes it from his hand and places it down, both are exempt. The poor man performed the lifting but not the placing, and the homeowner performed the placing but not the lifting. Similarly, if the homeowner lifts an object in the private domain and reaches out, and the poor man takes it and places it in the public domain, both are exempt. These shared actions are exempt from Biblical punishment but remain Rabbinically forbidden. While there are technically more than eight permutations when considering both sides of every interaction, the Gemara asks why the Mishnah only lists these specific eight.
The Gemara begins with a question from Rav Matna to Abaye: are there only eight Rabbinic cases? Ostensibly, there should be twelve or even sixteen if we count every side of every interaction, including the cases where one party is exempt and permitted. The Gemara resolves this by explaining that the Mishnah follows a specific rule: it only counts Rabbinic exemptions that could potentially lead to a Biblical sin offering. The act of lifting is more concerning than the act of placing because the person who lifts the object might proceed to place it himself, thereby completing a Biblical violation. Therefore, the Mishnah lists the cases involving the one who lifts, as that action is the start of the prohibited labor.
A side point arises regarding the term "exempt." In the context of the laws of the Sabbath, does "exempt" ever mean "permitted"? Shmuel taught that throughout the laws of the Sabbath, every "exempt" case is still Rabbinically forbidden, except for three specific instances: trapping a deer, trapping a snake, and lancing a boil to drain pus. These three are exempt and permitted. The Gemara clarifies that Shmuel was highlighting a novel insight regarding cases where a person performs a physical action. However, in cases where a person performs no action at all—such as the homeowner who simply stands still while the poor man does everything—it is obvious that he is exempt and permitted. We do not need a special teaching to know that doing nothing is permitted.
The Gemara then establishes the source for the rule that shared labor is exempt. A Baraita notes that the Torah, in discussing the sin offering, uses a word implying that liability is only incurred when an individual performs the entirety of a prohibited labor. If two people perform a single labor together, they are Biblically exempt. This scriptural decree is the foundation for the principle that shared actions on the Sabbath do not carry Biblical liability.
Rav once asked Rebbe a question: if a person is standing in a domain and a friend burdens him with food and drink, and the person then walks out into another domain, is the movement of his body considered the act of lifting the object? We know that picking an object up from the floor is an act of lifting. But here, the object was placed on him while he was stationary. Does his subsequent movement constitute lifting the object from its place? Rebbe answered that he is liable. Moving the body is considered equivalent to lifting the object because the body is viewed as resting on the ground. Rebbe immediately distinguished this from the case of a hand. If a person reaches their hand into another domain, we do not say the hand is "resting" in a way that its movement constitutes a Biblical act of lifting. The body is grounded in a domain, but the hand extended into another domain does not share that same status of resting.
Following this, Abaye inquired about the status of a person's hand. Is the hand considered a public domain, a private domain, or perhaps a semi-public domain known as a karmelit? We can prove from the Mishnah that it is neither a public nor a private domain, because if it were, the rulings of the Mishnah regarding shared actions would result in Biblical liability rather than Rabbinic exemption. Therefore, Abaye suggests that perhaps the Sages gave the hand the status of a semi-public domain. The practical difference of this classification would be whether the Sages imposed a penalty. If a person reached their hand into another domain with an object, would they be forbidden from bringing it back, effectively forced to keep their hand extended until the conclusion of the Sabbath?
The Gemara attempts to resolve this by looking at conflicting Baraita sources. One source says it is forbidden to bring the hand back, while another says it is permitted. One resolution is based on height. If the hand is above ten handbreadths, it is in a place of exemption, and the Sages did not impose a penalty there. If it is below ten handbreadths, it is within the restricted area of the public domain. A second resolution suggests that it depends on when the action began. If the hand was extended before the Sabbath began, there was no violation, so the person may bring it back. If it was extended intentionally after the Sabbath began, the Sages imposed a penalty, requiring the person to keep their hand there as a consequence of their prohibited action.
This leads to a final inquiry by Rabbi Bai regarding a person who sticks bread onto the wall of an oven on the Sabbath. If he leaves it, the bread will bake, and he will be liable for a Biblical sin offering. Is he permitted to perform a Rabbinic violation—removing the bread with a spatula—to save himself from the more severe Biblical violation? The Gemara initially tries to prove from the case of the extended hand that we do not permit a smaller violation to prevent a larger one. However, the Gemara concludes that the two cases are not comparable. In the case of the hand, the question is whether the Sages should create a new penalty. In the case of the bread in the oven, the Rabbinic restriction against removing the bread already exists. Whether we can suspend an existing Rabbinic restriction to prevent a Biblical one remains a distinct and unresolved question. In practice, the case of the hand depends on whether the act was unintentional or intentional, and it does not provide a definitive proof for the dilemma of the bread in the oven.