We are beginning three lines from the bottom of the page. A person made a vow against his fellow that he would not allow his fellow to derive any benefit from him. Reuven is the person imposing the vow, and Shimon is the person prohibited from benefiting. Reuven is saying that he may not provide Shimon with any benefit.
The Mishnah says that the person prohibited from benefiting may not lend anything to the person who imposed the vow. According to the Ran, this means that Shimon may not lend anything to Reuven. The question is: why not? Reuven said that he would not provide Shimon with any benefit. Shimon, however, is permitted to provide benefit to Reuven. Why, then, may Shimon not lend something to Reuven? The Gemara will answer that question.
The Mishnah also says that Shimon may not borrow from Reuven. That is understandable. Shimon is receiving benefit from Reuven, and therefore he may not borrow from him. Similarly, Shimon may not borrow money from Reuven, because he is receiving benefit. The same applies to purchasing something from Reuven: if Shimon buys from Reuven, Shimon is receiving benefit from him. But why may Shimon not sell something to Reuven? In that case, Reuven is the one receiving the benefit, not Shimon.
We therefore have six cases. At first, we understand three of them: Shimon may not borrow an item from Reuven, borrow money from Reuven, or buy something from Reuven, because in each case Shimon receives benefit from Reuven. But we do not yet understand why Shimon may not lend an item or money to Reuven, or sell something to Reuven, since those cases benefit Reuven.
Before we become confused by the wording of the Gemara, we will read the wording of the Ran, which makes the most sense. The Ran explains that the cases in the Mishnah refer to a person prohibited from benefiting from the person who imposed the vow. Shimon is prohibited from benefiting from Reuven because he receives benefit when he borrows money from Reuven, buys something from him, or borrows an item from him. For that reason, these activities are prohibited.
But why should Shimon be prohibited from lending money to Reuven? Reuven is the one receiving the benefit, and the vow was not formulated in that direction. Shimon should therefore be permitted to perform all of these activities. That is the basic question of the Gemara.
The Gemara gives two answers. The first answer is that the vow applies in both directions. When the vow was made, the intention was that neither person would provide benefit to the other and neither person would receive benefit from the other. That explains why Shimon may neither lend to Reuven nor borrow from him: ultimately, both are prohibited from deriving benefit from one another.
At this point, the Ran explains that we must understand the Mishnah as teaching that when two people are prohibited from benefiting from one another, neither may derive benefit from the other. We previously learned the position of Rabbi Eliezer regarding something that a person is willing to forgo. For example, a person may go to a fruit store and pay for a certain amount of fruit, and the storekeeper may place a few extra apples in the bag. That is something people generally do not mind; it is considered a matter that the person has waived.
Similarly, if someone walks through another person’s field, the owner may not care. There is a broader question regarding such matters: when a person willingly forgoes something, do we consider that benefit for purposes of vows? One might think that something is considered benefit only when society generally regards it as having value. If everyone considers the extra apple insignificant, or if people do not care about someone walking through their field, perhaps it should not be considered benefit.
Rabbi Eliezer holds that even something a person is willing to forgo is prohibited when one is prohibited from deriving benefit. Although the value is minimal and the benefit is slight, it is still considered benefit. The novelty of the Mishnah, according to this view, is that even these minor benefits are prohibited when a person is prohibited from deriving benefit.
For example, one might think that lending a dollar would not matter: “Who cares? It is only a dollar.” Similarly, one might think that lending someone a utensil is not significant enough to be considered benefit. The Mishnah teaches that when people make vows against one another, even matters that some people would willingly forgo and would not regard as significant are still prohibited. This creates a novelty according to the position of Rabbi Eliezer, who holds that something a person is willing to forgo is nevertheless prohibited when one is prohibited from deriving benefit.
Abaye gives a second answer. He says that the prohibition in the other direction is a rabbinic safeguard. Technically, the vow applies only in one direction: Reuven said that he would not provide benefit to Shimon. Reuven therefore may not lend Shimon money or utensils. But the Sages instituted a safeguard that Shimon should also be prohibited from providing benefit to Reuven, because otherwise one might come to confuse the two directions. If Shimon is permitted to lend to Reuven, people might mistakenly think that Reuven is also permitted to lend to Shimon.
According to this answer, three of the laws are the direct result of the vow, while the other three are rabbinic safeguards.
The Ran raises several questions at this point. Once we say that the Sages instituted such a safeguard, we must reconcile this with other statements in Tractate Nedarim. If one person makes a vow against another, are we now saying that the prohibition automatically applies in both directions because of a rabbinic safeguard?
The Ran discusses a case later in the tractate in which this safeguard was not imposed. That case involves a person who made a vow concerning all of Israel, saying that he would not provide benefit to anyone from the Jewish people. The ruling there is that other people may provide benefit to him, but he may not derive benefit from them. The Ran explains, based on the Rambam, that the Sages could not impose the safeguard in that case. If the person were prohibited from both giving and receiving benefit from all Jews, he would be forced to obtain his needs only from non-Jews. It would not be reasonable to place him in that situation.
Thus, the Sages did not impose the safeguard in every case. Here, where the vow concerns two individuals, they imposed a prohibition in both directions. But they did not impose a prohibition that would prevent a person who vowed against all Jews from conducting any transactions with them, because that would place him in an untenable position.
The Ran raises another question concerning a later case involving two people. One person says to the other, “I am prohibited to you,” meaning that the other person may not derive benefit from him. The language there seems to indicate that the prohibition applies only in one direction. Why, then, does the Gemara say here that the prohibition applies in both directions because of a rabbinic safeguard?
The Ran answers that the two cases involve different types of benefit. In the cases of our Mishnah, the benefits are things that people may not naturally recognize as prohibited. A person might say, “What difference does it make if I lend him money? I will get it back.” Or, “What difference does it make if I lend him my lawnmower?” Since people might not recognize these activities as prohibited benefits, the Sages instituted a safeguard. If Shimon is allowed to give such a benefit to Reuven, people may come to think that Reuven may also give it to Shimon.
In the other case, however, the discussion involves an obvious, tangible benefit, such as giving someone fruit to eat. Everyone understands that eating fruit provided by another person is benefit. No one is likely to make a mistake and think that such an act is permitted in the other direction. Therefore, where the benefit is obvious, the Sages needed to impose the safeguard in only one direction.
The Ran is therefore drawing a precise distinction. Whether the prohibition applies in both directions depends on the nature of the benefit. When the benefit is less obvious and people may not recognize it as prohibited, the Sages extended the prohibition in both directions. When the benefit is obvious, they did not need to do so.
The next Mishnah discusses a person who had asked his fellow to lend him a cow, but the fellow refused. The first person became angry and said, “This field is prohibited to me as far as plowing with that cow is concerned.” He meant that he would never again use that cow to plow his field.
If the person who made the vow normally plowed his own field, then he alone is prohibited from using the cow, while everyone else is permitted to use it. Since he himself is the one who plows, his statement means that he will not derive benefit from that cow by using it for his field.
But if he does not normally plow his own field, then both he and everyone else are prohibited from using the cow to plow that field. Since he does not plow, his statement was not referring specifically to his own actions. Rather, he meant that he would not derive benefit from the cow’s plowing that field. Therefore, the cow may not be used to plow the field by anyone.
In other words, when he himself is the person who plows, his statement is understood as a prohibition on his own use of the cow, while another person may take the cow and plow the field. But when he does not plow at all, what could he have meant by saying that he would not benefit from the plowing of this cow? He meant that the field should not be plowed with that cow, whoever performs the plowing. Consequently, everyone is prohibited from doing so.
The Mishnah then presents another case. Reuven tells Shimon, “You may not derive any benefit from me.” Shimon is the person prohibited from benefiting, and Reuven is the person who imposed the vow.
Shimon then has nothing to eat. Reuven feels bad because he made a vow against him, but he needs to find a way to provide Shimon with food without violating the vow. Reuven goes to a shopkeeper with whom he normally does business and says, “This person, Shimon, may not derive benefit from me, and I do not know what to do.” The shopkeeper gives Shimon food and then collects payment from Reuven, charging it to Reuven’s account.
The same applies if Shimon’s house needs to be built, his fence needs to be repaired, or his field needs to be harvested. Reuven may tell the workers, “This person, Shimon, is prohibited from deriving benefit from me.” The workers may then build Shimon’s house, repair his fence, or harvest his field, and afterward they may return to Reuven and receive payment.
What happens if Reuven and Shimon are walking together and no one else is with them? Shimon is hungry, and Reuven has made a vow against him. How can Reuven get food to Shimon?
The Mishnah says that if another person is present, Reuven may give the food to that third person as a gift, and the third person may then give it to Shimon. The food may not pass directly from Reuven to Shimon. But if no other person is present, Reuven may place the food on a rock, a wall, or a fence, and say, “This is ownerless and available to anyone who wants it.” Shimon may then take the food and eat it.
Rabbi Yosei disagrees and says that even this is prohibited. Reuven may not place the food down and declare it ownerless in order for Shimon to take it. We need to understand why. The food is no longer being given directly by Reuven. Reuven placed it on the ground and declared that anyone who was hungry could take it.
Let us first examine the Ran’s explanation of the Mishnah. Regarding the cow, the Ran explains that the person did not want to lend it to his fellow, and, because he became angry, he made a vow concerning its use. If he himself plows, he is prohibited from using the cow, while Rabbi Bar Yassin—or the other person mentioned in the discussion—is permitted to use it. This indicates that he prohibited only himself. But if he does not plow himself, then he and everyone else are prohibited, because he did not intend to prohibit only his own plowing. He intended to prohibit any benefit from the plowing of that cow in his field.
The Ran then explains the case involving the shopkeeper. Reuven may say to the shopkeeper, “Please help me. Shimon is very hungry, and I do not know what to do.” The shopkeeper may give Shimon food and charge the cost to Reuven’s account.
The novelty of this ruling is that Reuven normally goes to this shopkeeper to purchase things and receives credit from him. One might therefore think that the shopkeeper is acting as Reuven’s agent. If the shopkeeper is acting as Reuven’s agent, the arrangement would be prohibited, because it would be as though Reuven himself were providing benefit to Shimon.
The Ran explains that the shopkeeper is not considered Reuven’s agent merely because he normally gives Reuven credit. As long as Reuven simply says, “I have a problem; I do not know what to do,” and the shopkeeper independently decides to provide Shimon with food, the arrangement is permitted. The shopkeeper may later come to Reuven and collect payment if he wishes.
All the more so, if people were walking in the street and someone called out, “Whoever gives Shimon food will not lose,” that would certainly be permitted. The novelty of the Mishnah is that even when the person is a shopkeeper who knows Reuven and normally does business with him, we do not automatically assume that he is acting as Reuven’s agent.
However, the Ran explains that if Reuven says in a more direct manner, “Whoever hears me, please support Shimon,” that may be different. Since he is speaking to people in a nearby area and asking someone to go provide Shimon with food, it sounds more like a direct request to act on his behalf. By contrast, if he merely says, “I have a problem and I do not know what to do,” that is permitted.
The Mishnah says that the shopkeeper may collect payment from Reuven if he wishes. This does not mean that the shopkeeper must be paid. If he were required to collect payment, the arrangement would be problematic, because it would then appear that he had acted as Reuven’s agent. Rather, the shopkeeper may choose to accept payment, but no one can require him to do so.
The next case in the Mishnah involves Shimon’s need to build his house, repair his fence, or harvest his field. The Mishnah teaches that the same leniency applies not only to food, which is a basic necessity, but also to these needs. Reuven may approach the workers and explain that Shimon is prohibited from deriving benefit from him. The workers may then perform the work for Shimon and later receive payment from Reuven.
Now we must understand Rabbi Yosei’s position. Reuven and Shimon are walking alone, Shimon is hungry, and Reuven has made a vow against him. It seems logical that Reuven should be able to place food on a rock, declare it ownerless, and allow Shimon to take it. Shimon is not taking the food from Reuven; he is taking it from the ownerless property. Why does Rabbi Yosei prohibit this?
Rabbi Yohanan explains that Rabbi Yosei’s reason is that ownerless property has the same legal status as a gift. Just as a gift does not leave the giver’s possession until it enters the recipient’s possession, so too, ownerless property remains connected to the person who declared it ownerless until someone else takes possession of it.
When a person says, “I am giving this as a gift to so-and-so,” the item remains his until the recipient takes it. Until that point, he can retract the gift and keep the item for himself. Similarly, when a person declares an item ownerless, he can retract that declaration and take the item back until someone else acquires it.
Accordingly, when Shimon takes the food from the rock, the food is considered to have come from Reuven. Reuven remained connected to it until Shimon acquired it. Since Shimon is benefiting from something that is still considered to be Reuven’s, the act is prohibited.
The Ran explains that just as a person who designated an item as a gift may retract that designation before the recipient acquires it, so too, a person who declared an item ownerless may retract the declaration before someone else takes possession. Until another person acquires the item, the original owner remains connected to it. Once another person takes it, the item leaves his control, but until then, the original owner can undo the declaration.
The Gemara then raises a question. Rabbi Yosei’s ruling seems to distinguish between two sequences. If Reuven first made the vow against Shimon and only afterward declared the food ownerless, Shimon may not take it. But if Reuven first declared the food ownerless and only afterward made the vow, Shimon may take it.
Why should the order matter? If the reason for Rabbi Yosei’s ruling is that ownerless property remains in the possession of the person who declared it ownerless until someone else takes it, then it should make no difference whether the vow came before the declaration of ownerlessness or afterward. In either case, when Shimon takes the food, it is still considered to be coming from Reuven.
The Gemara answers that when a person makes a vow against his fellow without specifying every item, his intention is not directed toward items that he had already declared ownerless. Therefore, if he first declared the food ownerless and only afterward made the vow, the food is not included in the vow. Even though, as a matter of law, the item remains connected to him until someone acquires it, the person’s intention when making the vow was not directed toward that item.
By contrast, if he first made the vow and only afterward declared the food ownerless, then at the time he made the vow the food was still his property and was included in the vow. He cannot then declare it ownerless in order to provide it to Shimon. That is the distinction between declaring the item ownerless before the vow and declaring it ownerless afterward.
The Gemara raises a further question through a teaching involving two slaves. A person gave part of his property to one slave and then gave all of his property to a second slave. The first slave does not acquire the property, while the second slave acquires everything, including the first slave.
The reason is that when the owner gave only part of his property to the first slave, the slave himself was also one of the owner’s assets. Since the owner gave only part of his property, perhaps he excluded the slave himself. If the slave did not acquire himself, he remained a slave, and a slave cannot independently acquire the other property. The property therefore returns to the original owner.
When the owner then gave all his property to the second slave, the word “everything” included the second slave himself. The second slave thereby acquired his freedom, and, once free, he acquired all the property, including the first slave.
What does this have to do with our discussion of vows and ownerless property? The Ran explains that this case appears to establish a different principle. We just said that when a person declares something ownerless and later makes a vow, his intention is not directed toward the item he had already relinquished. But in the case of the slaves, the owner first gave property to the first slave and then gave all of the property to the second slave. The property had already been transferred, yet it was still included in the second transfer.
It therefore appears that a person can relinquish property in one transaction and still have that property in mind for a later transaction. If so, why do we say that when a person declares property ownerless and then makes a vow, the ownerless property is not included because his mind is no longer directed toward it?
Rava responds by reconsidering the reason for Rabbi Yosei’s ruling. Perhaps Rabbi Yosei does not prohibit the act because ownerless property technically remains in the possession of the person who declared it ownerless. Perhaps, according to the basic law, ownerless property leaves the person’s possession when he declares it ownerless, and Shimon would ordinarily be permitted to take it.
Instead, Rabbi Yosei prohibits the arrangement as a rabbinic safeguard because of the incident known as the gift of Bet Horon. The concern is that this is not a genuine declaration of ownerlessness. Reuven is not truly seeking to make the food available to everyone. He is declaring it ownerless only so that Shimon can take it.
Under the basic law, if a person declares an item ownerless, it becomes ownerless, and Shimon may take it from the rock and eat it. However, in this case the Sages were concerned that the declaration might not be made sincerely. If we permit this type of arrangement, a person might eventually say explicitly, “I am declaring this item ownerless for Shimon,” or “I am declaring this bread ownerless for Shimon.” That would no longer be a genuine act of ownerlessness.
The concern is therefore about the person’s intention. Why is Reuven declaring the food ownerless? He does not really want it to be available to everyone. He wants it to reach Shimon. Because the vow was already in effect, we are concerned that the declaration of ownerlessness is merely a device to circumvent the vow and transfer the food to Shimon.
This also explains the distinction between the two sequences. If Reuven first declared the food ownerless and only afterward made the vow, there is no concern. At the time he declared it ownerless, no vow was in effect, so the declaration was a legitimate act of ownerlessness. But if he first made the vow and afterward declared the food ownerless, the declaration is suspect. Once the vow is already in effect, we are concerned that the ownerlessness is being done only to get the food to Shimon.
According to this explanation, Rabbi Yosei agrees with the ordinary legal mechanics of ownerless property. When a person declares an item ownerless, it leaves his possession. The reason Shimon may not take the food in this case is not that the food technically remains Reuven’s property. The prohibition is a rabbinic safeguard, modeled on the incident of Bet Horon, intended to prevent a person from using a superficial declaration of ownerlessness to evade a vow.
Thus, when the declaration of ownerlessness preceded the vow, there is no reason for concern. The declaration was made before the vow existed and was therefore a legitimate declaration. But when the vow came first, the later declaration of ownerlessness is prohibited because it appears to be a device designed specifically to provide benefit to the person against whom the vow was made.