A Yissachar / Zebulun Partnership in Loving Memory of Yishak ben Simcha A"H & Felicia bat Miriam A"H
Rabbi Eli Mansour

Daf Yomi

Nedarim 14A - 14B (12th Cycle Daf Yomi Shiur)

Lectured by Rabbi Eli Mansour

Published
May 21, 2006
Duration
74:16

This transcript was auto-generated and polished for readability. While we aim for accuracy, errors may occur. If you notice a mistake, please click to submit corrections.

The Elliot B. Sit edition of the audio series of the Talmud Bavli begins with a dedication. Today's Daf is dedicated by Mr. Uri Nidam, may Hashem protect and sustain him, in honor of all members of the Minyan, all participants of Daf Yomi, and in honor of the Rabbi, may he merit to perform good deeds and continue to succeed in all his endeavors, amen. Today's study of Gemara Nedarim, Daf Yud Daled, is also dedicated for a complete recovery for Shlomo ben Miriam, Yosef ben Sarah, and Sarah bat Rachel. May they be healed among all the sick of Israel, amen. Additionally, this Daf is being studied for the elevation of the soul of Avraham ben Esther; may his spirit find rest in the Garden of Eden, amen.

We commence today's Daf on Yud Gimmel, Amud Sheni, beginning four lines from the bottom. The Mishnah states, "And these are permissible," referring to certain Nedarim that are not effective. This means that the Neder is not binding, and one does not even need to seek an absolution from a Rabbi to nullify it. The Mishnah continues, "And these are permissible: Chullin she'ochel lecha," meaning the food that I will eat from you is considered chullin. This is obvious, as it is permitted, thereby it is muttar.

The Gemara explains: the reason it is stated as permissible is because he specified "the chullin that I will eat." If he had said "lachullin she'ochel lecha," it would imply that it is not chullin but rather a korban. Hence, the Gemara seeks to clarify who the author of the Mishnah is. If it were Rabbi Meir, we would encounter a problem, as Rabbi Meir does not accept implications. Therefore, the Mishnah cannot be in accordance with Rabbi Meir.

Rather, it must be in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda, who maintains that when one says "chullin she'ochel lecha," it is muttar. Conversely, if he says "lachullin she'ochel lecha," it would be considered asur. The Gemara asserts that this aligns with the first Mishnah we learned, which also reflects Rabbi Yehuda's position regarding implications. The Gemara questions the necessity of having two Mishnayot that convey the same halachic principle. The Gemara responds that the first case serves as an introduction to the subsequent cases, which involve intrinsically asur items.

The Gemara continues to analyze the implications of the Mishnah. It notes that if a person states a food item as chullin, it is clear that it is muttar. However, if he states it as something asur, such as chazir or avodah zarah, the Mishnah teaches us that those vows do not take effect.

Next, the Gemara questions the rationale behind introducing the case of chullin. It suggests that the case may be unnecessary since the implications of the subsequent cases already clarify that no absolution is required for intrinsically asur items. The Gemara concludes that the mention of chullin serves to emphasize that these cases require no absolution at all.

As the discussion progresses, the Gemara raises the question of how one can declare something as asur based on a Neder and why one cannot apply that to something intrinsically asur. The Gemara cites the verse, "Ish ki yidor neder l'Hashem, ad sheyidor bedavar hanadur," indicating that a vow must pertain to something that can be vowed upon, not to items that are already asur by nature.

In conclusion, the Gemara emphasizes that one cannot make a Neder on something that is inherently asur, yet if one were to do so, the Neder would not take effect. This leads to the understanding that the Mishnah reflects the view of Rabbi Yehuda, who allows for implications in certain cases, while Rabbi Meir does not.

Finally, the Gemara discusses the case of a man who tells his wife, "You are like my mother," which raises the need for an absolution due to the commonality of such vows among the amei haaretz. This is contrasted with the case of a talmid chacham, who would not require an absolution in similar situations, as he is presumed to understand the implications of his words better.

As we conclude, we are reminded of the significance of distinguishing between different cases and the halachic implications of our words, particularly in the context of Nedarim. Each case brings forth its own nuances, emphasizing the importance of clarity and understanding in our speech and commitments.