The Mishnah presents a case where a man was married to two women. One wife was his niece, and the other was a second wife. Upon his death, the laws of levirate marriage, or Yibum, did not apply to the niece because she had forced her father into the marriage. Consequently, her co-wife (Tzara) was considered a Tzara Erva, meaning she was exempt from Yibum and Halitza (a ceremony releasing the widow from Yibum). The Mishnah states that this Tzara, believing herself free, married another man (Nisit). However, it was later discovered that the first wife, the niece, was an Ailonit—a woman incapable of bearing children. In such a case, the initial marriage to the Ailonit is retroactively nullified, meaning the deceased man was only ever married to the Tzara. This implies the Tzara was actually obligated to her brother-in-law (Yavam) for Yibum, and her subsequent marriage to another man was forbidden. The Mishnah rules that she must leave the man she married and is also forbidden to the Yavam.
The Gemara analyzes the Mishnah's use of the word Nisit ("she got married"). The implication (diuk) is that the prohibition to the Yavam only applies if she formally married another man. What if she merely engaged in illicit relations (znut) with another man without formal marriage? The Gemara asks if, in such a case, she would be permitted to the Yavam. This seems counterintuitive, as even znut generally prohibits a woman to her Yavam. The Gemara answers that the Mishnah's ruling of Nisit implies a broader principle (huwa deen leznu) that applies even to znut. The Mishnah specifically mentioned marriage because it is the more common and publicly known scenario.
An alternative interpretation suggests that the Mishnah's use of Nisit is precise and that the prohibition applies only to marriage, not to znut. Why would marriage be more stringent? Because marriage is a public act (nisuin), and people might confuse it with a case where a woman's husband went overseas, was reported dead, and she remarried. If her first husband later reappears, she is forbidden to him out of concern that people might mistakenly believe she received a divorce before remarrying, and then returned to her original husband after being divorced from the second—a forbidden act. Similarly, in our case, if the Tzara remarries, people might assume she first performed Halitza with the Yavam, and then, after her second marriage ended, returned to the Yavam. Since a Yavam cannot remarry a woman to whom he performed Halitza, this confusion would lead to a prohibition. This concern (gezira) applies to marriage because it is public. However, znut is not public, so there is no concern of such confusion. Furthermore, a woman who engaged in znut is considered a zonah (a promiscuous woman), and people would not suspect the Yavam of taking back a zonah, thus eliminating the need for a gezira. Therefore, according to this view, there is a distinction between Nisit and znut: marriage prohibits her to the Yavam, but znut does not.
The Mishnah then presents a second case: a man married to two wives, one of whom performed Yibum with the brother-in-law. The Tzara was then free to marry anyone. However, it was later discovered that the woman who performed Yibum was an Ailonit, making her Yibum invalid. This means the Tzara was still obligated to the Yavam. But in the interim, she had married another man. The Mishnah rules that she is forbidden both to the man she married and to the Yavam. The Gemara asks why two seemingly identical cases are presented. The answer is that the first case, involving a Tzara Erva, is more lenient because no Yibum was ever fulfilled. In such a scenario, we would be more inclined to permit the Tzara to return to the Yavam, as she was never truly obligated to him initially. Therefore, the Mishnah teaches that even in this lenient case, she is forbidden. Conversely, in the second case, where a legitimate Yibum was initially performed (albeit by an Ailonit), the Tzara was initially "in play" for Yibum. One might think she should be more strictly prohibited for rushing into a second marriage. Thus, both cases are necessary to teach the breadth of the prohibition.
The Mishnah then discusses a case where a scribe mistakenly swapped a divorce document (Get) and a receipt (Shovar) for a woman's Ketubah (marriage contract payment). The husband received the Get and the wife received the Shovar. Believing herself divorced, the woman remarried. Later, she discovered she only had the Shovar, meaning she was never divorced. The Mishnah states that all the stringencies (dirachim) associated with an invalid divorce apply. Rabbi Meir says that if the error is discovered immediately (l'altar), it is not a Get, and everything is fine. But if discovered later, we do not trust the couple, and the Get is considered valid, impacting the second marriage. The Gemara seeks to define "immediately" (l'altar) versus "later" (l'ahar zeman).
One opinion suggests "immediately" means while they are still in court, discussing the matter. "Later" means after they have left the court. Another, more understandable, opinion defines "immediately" as before she remarries. If she discovers the error before remarrying, we believe her, and the documents can be switched. However, if she discovers the error after remarrying, it is "later," and we do not believe her claim, as it would invalidate her second marriage and potentially cause the second husband to have committed adultery (Eshet Ish). The Gemara cites a teaching that "we do not leave the first husband to mess up the second guy," supporting the idea that the cutoff point is before the second marriage, as it directly involves the "second guy." The Gemara then clarifies that the "right of the second guy" (zikuto shel sheni) refers to his potential right to marry her without issue, assuming she was divorced. If she comes back later to claim the Get was invalid, it would retroactively invalidate his marriage, which is what we seek to prevent.
The next Mishnah discusses a man who wrote a Get for his wife but changed his mind and never delivered it. Beit Shammai rules that she cannot marry a Kohen (priest), even though the Get was never delivered, due to the "smell of a Get" (Reiach HaGet). This means the mere existence of a written Get creates a public perception that she is divorced, and a Kohen is forbidden to marry a divorcee (Gerusha). Beit Hillel disagrees, holding that without delivery, there is no divorce, and thus no prohibition. The Gemara then presents a query from Rav Yosef ben Edra to Shmuel: if rumors circulate that a Kohen wrote a Get for his wife, but they continue to live together, should they be forced to divorce? Shmuel replies, "She must leave" (Tzei), but adds, "it requires investigation" (Davar Salik Bidika).
Rashi explains that "she must leave" is due to the rumor. The Gemara asks what needs to be investigated. One interpretation is whether the rumors can be suppressed. However, this is rejected because Shmuel lived in Nehardea, where rabbis did not suppress rumors to avoid appearing to cover up sins. Instead, the investigation refers to the local usage of language. In some towns, the word "wrote" (Katav) was synonymous with "gave" (Natan). If the rumor meant "he gave a Get," then the Kohen would be living with a divorcee, which is forbidden. If "wrote" simply meant he drafted it, with no implication of delivery, then there is no issue. Thus, the investigation is to determine the precise meaning of the rumor in that community.
The Gemara challenges this: even if "wrote" and "gave" are interchangeable, there must still be a word for merely writing a Get. So, if people say "he wrote a Get," it could still mean he only drafted it. The Gemara responds that we must be concerned (Hoshesh) that some people might interpret "wrote" as "gave," leading to the same problem. Therefore, if the investigation reveals that "wrote" can be understood as "gave," she must leave. The Gemara then raises a difficulty: why should she leave due to a rumor, when the general rule is that rumors after marriage are disregarded? This Kohen and his wife are already married. The Gemara clarifies that "she must leave" does not mean she must divorce her current husband. Rather, it refers to a case where the Kohen husband died, and she then sought to marry a second Kohen. The rumor of her previous "divorce" would now apply to her eligibility for the second marriage, which is considered "before marriage" for the second Kohen. However, this creates a new problem: if the rumor is accepted to prevent her second marriage, it implies her first marriage ended in divorce, making her children from the first marriage Halalim (profaned). The Gemara answers that people will assume the divorce occurred close to the first husband's death, thus not affecting the children's status.
The Gemara then highlights a difference between earlier (Dorot Rishonim) and later (Dorot Aharonim) generations, with the former being more stringent (Humrot). One example is the case of Reiach HaGet: Beit Shammai (representing earlier generations) was stringent, prohibiting a Kohen's wife from marrying another Kohen even if the Get was only written but not delivered. In contrast, Rabbi Dosa (representing later generations) was lenient regarding a Kohen's daughter who was taken captive. Although captivity usually renders a woman a zonah, prohibiting her from eating Terumah (priestly tithes), Rabbi Dosa permitted her to eat it, assuming the captor merely "played around" without full violation. This shows a greater leniency in later generations.
Another example of generational difference concerns the law of Ma'aser (tithes). To be obligated in Ma'aser, produce must pass through the threshold of a house. Earlier generations would intentionally bring their produce through the door to ensure they were obligated, demonstrating their eagerness to perform the mitzvah. Later generations, however, would avoid this, bringing produce through roofs or storage yards to be exempt from the Torah-level obligation of Ma'aser, even though it remained forbidden by rabbinic decree (Tevel Med Rabbanan) for casual consumption (Achilat Arai).
The Mishnah then discusses a man who divorced his wife and subsequently stayed with her in an inn (Pundaki). Beit Shammai holds that no further Get is needed, as they assume a man might engage in illicit relations (Be'ilat Zenut) without intent for remarriage. Beit Hillel, however, asserts that if a man engages in intimacy with his divorced wife, it must be with intent for remarriage (L'Shem Kiddushin), thus requiring a second Get. Beit Hillel qualifies this: this assumption only applies if they were previously married (Nisuin) and were therefore comfortable with each other. If they were only engaged (Erusin), Beit Hillel agrees that no second Get is needed, as they are not yet fully accustomed to each other.
The Gemara clarifies that the Mishnah's case is not merely about them being alone in the inn, but specifically when witnesses saw the act of intimacy (Be'ilah). If witnesses saw the act, then the dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel concerns the intent: Beit Shammai assumes Be'ilat Zenut, while Beit Hillel assumes Be'ilat Kiddushin. However, if witnesses only saw them enter the inn (Yichud) but not the act, everyone agrees no second Get is needed, as we do not assume intimacy occurred. This interpretation is challenged as inconsistent with other teachings. Therefore, the Gemara offers a different interpretation: the Mishnah's dispute concerns a case where witnesses saw them in seclusion (Yichud), but not the act of intimacy. Beit Shammai says that seclusion alone does not imply intimacy. Beit Hillel argues that if witnesses saw them in seclusion, especially given their prior marital intimacy, we assume intimacy occurred with intent for remarriage, thus requiring a second Get. The Gemara explains that Beit Hillel considers the witnesses to the seclusion as if they were witnesses to the intimacy itself, due to the strong presumption of intimacy in such a situation.
The next Mishnah introduces the concept of a Get Mekushar (folded Get), a special type of Get developed for Kohanim (priests). Kohanim are known to be meticulous (Kapdanim) and prone to anger, which could lead them to hastily divorce their wives and then regret it. Since a Kohen cannot remarry a divorcee, the Rabbis made it difficult for them to issue a Get by requiring a lengthy process. A Get Mekushar is written in sections, folded, and sewn, with witnesses signing on each fold. If a fold lacks a signature, it's called a Get Kirei'a (a torn or incomplete Get) and is invalid. This is because if the husband made, for example, eleven folds, it is assumed he intended for eleven witnesses to sign, and if one is missing, the condition is not met, rendering the Get invalid, similar to a conditional Get where not all specified witnesses sign. This is a rabbinic decree (Gezira) due to the concern (Hashash) of such a condition.
The Mishnah states that if a Kohen gave his wife a Get Kirei'a, and she, believing it valid, remarried, she must leave her second husband (as the Get was invalid, making her an Eshet Ish to her first husband) and cannot return to her first husband (due to the stringencies of an invalid divorce). All the stringencies apply, including the children being Mamzerim. The Mishnah adds that "anyone can complete it" (Hakol Mashlimim Alav), meaning any individual can sign the missing fold to validate the Get. Rabbi Akiva disagrees, saying only a relative (Karov) can complete it. Rashi clarifies that this "completion" is not about validating the Get itself, which is already valid with two kosher witnesses, but merely to prevent future questions about the missing signature. Therefore, even a disqualified witness (Ed Pasul) like a thief (Ganav) or robber (Gazlan) could sign to fill the blank, according to the first opinion. Rabbi Akiva, however, limits this to a relative, who is generally a disqualified witness for other reasons but is of good lineage.
The Gemara explains the reason for the invalidity of a Get Kirei'a: it's a Gezira (rabbinic decree) due to the concern that the husband might have said, "All of you [witnesses] sign" (Kulechem), and if one is missing, the condition is unfulfilled. The Gemara asks why an indentured servant (Eved) cannot sign to complete the Get, as he is also a disqualified witness. The concern is that if an Eved signs, people might mistakenly think he is a full Jew and eligible for marriage, leading to errors in lineage (Yichus). The Gemara then asks why a Gazlan (robber) cannot sign, as he has good lineage. The answer is that people might assume he has repented (Teshuvah) and is now a kosher witness, leading them to rely on him for other documents where his testimony would be invalid. A Karov (relative), however, has no such lineage issues and is not assumed to have repented, so Rabbi Akiva permits him to sign.
The Gemara further defines a Get Kirei'a as having more folds than witnesses (e.g., seven folds and six witnesses). It then states a new rule for a Get Mekushar: it requires a minimum of three witnesses, not just two like a regular Get Pashut. This is to further slow down the Kohen's divorce process. Even Ben Nanas (who was generally lenient) agrees that if a Get Mekushar has three folds and only two witnesses, the third missing signature must be from a kosher witness or a relative, not an intrinsically disqualified one like a Gazlan. The Gemara then discusses the limit on relatives: only one relative can sign to complete a Get Mekushar, not two. This is out of concern that if two relatives sign, they might later be the only ones available to validate the Get, which would be invalid as two relatives cannot validate a Get. This concern is particularly relevant because, when validating a Get, one does not need consecutive witnesses; any three can be chosen. Thus, if there are multiple relatives, there is a risk that the validating witnesses might include two relatives and only one kosher witness, invalidating the Get.
The Gemara concludes by reaffirming that an Eved can be used to complete a Get, as long as the Get has not yet been delivered. Once delivered, no further additions can be made.