The Eli B. Sitt Edition and Audio Series of the Talmud Bavli, Tractate Kiddushin, has been sponsored by our good friend Vestahayim Idana, may his name and memory be a blessing, in honor of his wife, Nina bat Rivka. May they have many years of peace in the home, success, livelihood, and all good things, together with health, happiness, satisfaction from their children, and every blessing. Amen.
We are studying today at the bottom of the page, beginning with the words, “Rabbi Yohanan said in the name of Rabbi Yohanan: They counted and concluded.” The scholars of the study hall took a vote, and the vote established that a person who betroths a woman with his share of a sacrifice has not betrothed her, whether the sacrifice is one of the most sacred offerings or a lesser sacred offering.
Whether it is a sin offering, in which case the priest has a share, or a peace offering, in which case the owners have a share, it is not considered the person’s property. The Gemara explained that the eating of these offerings is like eating from the table of God. Therefore, the offering is not considered the money of either the priest or the owner, and it cannot be used to betroth a woman. Accordingly, if a person betroths a woman with his portion of a sacrifice, the scholars of the study hall concluded that the betrothal is invalid.
Rav, however, said that the dispute still remains. This refers to the dispute we learned yesterday between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosef. Rabbi Yehuda derived his position from the verse, “It shall be yours from the most sacred offerings.” Rabbi Yehuda learned from the word “yours” that it is yours for all your needs, including betrothal. Rabbi Yosef, however, said that the sacrifice may be used only for eating, deriving this from the word “fire.” Just as fire consumes, so too the sacrifice is designated only for consumption.
There was therefore a dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosef. Rabbi Yohanan said that the scholars took a vote and everyone agreed that no type of sacrifice may be used for betrothal; Rabbi Yehuda retracted his original position based on the word “yours.” Rav then said that the dispute still remains and that Rabbi Yehuda never retracted his position. The question is whether one may betroth a woman with a portion of a sacrifice.
It makes sense to say that Rabbi Yohanan is correct, and that Rabbi Yehuda did in fact retract his position. A sacrifice is not considered the person’s property; it is considered the property of the Holy One, blessed be He. Therefore, it cannot be used for betrothal.
The Gemara will prove this from a baraita. Let us study the baraita independently and see where the proof lies that sacrifices are considered the property of Heaven.
The baraita asks: From where do we know that one may not exchange meal offerings for animal offerings? There are two types of sacred offerings under discussion: a meal offering, which is made from flour, and an animal offering. How do we know that priests may not trade one with another? One priest cannot say to another, “You take fifteen dinars’ worth of my meal offering, and I will take fifteen dinars’ worth of meat from your sin offering.” There is no barter of this kind in the Temple.
The verse teaches that the entire meal offering belongs to the descendants of Aaron. Since the entire meal offering is divided among the priests, it cannot be sold or exchanged. It must be eaten by the descendants of Aaron, and there is no trading one offering for another.
One might have thought that this prohibition applies only to animal offerings that cannot be brought in an alternative form of lesser expense. A poor person who cannot afford a regular animal offering may sometimes bring birds instead. Therefore, one might have reasoned that an animal offering cannot be exchanged for a meal offering, because even a poor person cannot substitute a meal offering for that animal offering. Perhaps, however, a meal offering may be exchanged for a bird offering, since a bird can sometimes be brought as an alternative to an animal offering.
For example, the Torah says that if a person cannot afford two turtledoves or two young pigeons, he may bring a meal offering for his sin offering. One might therefore think that an item that can sometimes substitute for a meal offering may itself be exchanged for a meal offering.
The verse therefore states, “And every meal offering baked in a pan, and every meal offering mixed with oil, shall belong to all the descendants of Aaron.” The verse did not need to list every type of meal offering, because the words “every meal offering” already include them all. The additional wording teaches that not only may a meal offering not be exchanged for an animal offering; it may not even be exchanged for a bird offering.
One might still argue that birds and animal offerings are different because the slaughter of a bird is performed by hand, with the priest’s fingernail, whereas an animal is slaughtered with a knife. Since the procedures are different, perhaps a bird offering cannot be exchanged for an animal offering. But perhaps different meal offerings may be exchanged with one another, since the acts performed with them are similar and both involve taking a portion of the meal offering.
The verse therefore states that every meal offering belongs to the descendants of Aaron. This teaches that there is no exchanging or trading even among different types of meal offerings.
One might then say that perhaps different types of meal offerings may not be exchanged because their results are different. A meal offering made in a shallow pan is crisp, while one made in a deep vessel is softer. Perhaps, however, two meal offerings with the same consistency may be exchanged.
The baraita therefore brings another verse: “And every meal offering mixed with oil, or dry, shall belong to all the descendants of Aaron.” This additional wording teaches that even similar items may not be exchanged.
Rashi explains that the shallow pan and the deep vessel were utensils used in the Temple. All meal offerings were prepared with oil. The shallow pan was broad and not deep, so the flour spread across the entire vessel. The fire burned away much of the oil, and the result was a brittle meal offering. The deep vessel held the oil around the flour, causing it to boil and penetrate the dough, producing a softer result. One might therefore think that these different products could not be exchanged, but that two meal offerings of the same type could be exchanged. The verse teaches that this too is prohibited.
One might further say that all these restrictions apply only to the most sacred offerings. Perhaps one may not exchange one most-sacred offering for another, but one may exchange one lesser sacred offering for another. A peace offering, for example, may be eaten by the owners. Since the owners have a share in it, perhaps a person may sell or exchange his portion of one peace offering for a portion of another.
The verse discusses the thanksgiving offering immediately after discussing the meal offering. A thanksgiving offering is a type of peace offering. Just as we learned from the verse concerning meal offerings that they may not be exchanged, so too the lesser sacred offerings mentioned alongside them may not be exchanged. Therefore, even one peace offering may not be exchanged for another.
The verse says, “A man according to his fellow.” What does the word “man” teach? It teaches that even an adult priest with a physical blemish may receive a share of the offerings. Although a priest with a blemish may not perform the regular service in the Temple, such priests had certain permitted duties. They checked the Temple wood to ensure that it contained no worms, and they were permitted to flay animals and slaughter them. Thus, the verse teaches that a priest with a blemish may receive a share of the offerings.
By contrast, a minor priest may not receive a share. Even if he has no blemish and is otherwise fit for service, he does not receive a portion of the offerings. The word “man” teaches that he must be an adult.
Now we can understand the proof. This entire discussion appears in the Sifra, the Torah of the Priests, the midrash on Leviticus. What did the Sifra teach regarding sacrifices? There is no trading. The offerings have no monetary value that allows one priest to exchange one sacrifice for another. If the offering were considered the priest’s property, why could he not exchange it? He could determine a fair value and trade his offering for another priest’s offering. The only reason he cannot do so must be that the offering is considered the property of Heaven. Therefore, it cannot be exchanged for money or for another offering.
Whenever the Gemara cites an unattributed statement from the Sifra, it follows the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. What does this baraita teach by saying that there is no exchange? It teaches that the offering is truly the property of Heaven. If so, Rabbi Yehuda must hold that a sacrifice cannot be used to betroth a woman, because it is not the person’s property. This proves that Rabbi Yohanan was correct: Rabbi Yehuda retracted his original position.
Yesterday we learned that Rabbi Yehuda had held that one may use a sacrifice for betrothal because it was considered the person’s property. Rabbi Yohanan told us that the scholars voted and everyone, including Rabbi Yehuda, agreed that this was not permitted. The proof from the unattributed Sifra makes good sense: since the sacrifice cannot be traded, it is not considered the person’s money and cannot be used for betrothal.
Rav, however, said the opposite: Rabbi Yehuda continued to disagree and maintained that one may betroth a woman with a sacrifice. If so, the Gemara asks, do you have a baraita that supports Rabbi Yehuda according to Rav?
The Gemara brings the following teaching. For forty years, during the time of Shimon HaTzadik, there was a blessing in the showbread. Every priest who received even an olive-sized portion was satisfied. He could eat it and still have leftovers.
From that point onward, after Shimon HaTzadik died, there was a curse involving the showbread. Any priest who received even a portion the size of a bean would not eat it. The modest priests would say, “What benefit do we have from eating such a small amount? It will not satisfy us,” and they would leave it.
The greedy priests, however, would take their portion and the portions of the other priests. They would apparently exchange the showbread for something else, perhaps a portion of a peace offering. This seems to prove that one may exchange sacred offerings. If so, the opinion that allows this must be Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that the offering is considered a person’s property.
The Gemara rejects this proof. The priests were not exchanging the showbread. What they were doing was grabbing it. Once the modest priests refused to eat their portions because such a small amount would not satisfy them, the greedy priests would seize those portions as well.
This interpretation is supported by the continuation of the baraita, which says that the greedy priests would take their own portion and the portion of their fellow. They are called the sons of the violent, because a person who pressures another and takes something from him through force is considered one who extorts.
Abba bar Rav Shila explains how we know that this term refers to an extortionist. King David says, “Save me from the hand of the wicked, from the hand of the unjust and the extortionist.” The word refers to someone who takes what belongs to another person. Another verse asks God to strengthen the victim against the one who has taken from him, meaning that the victim should be granted justice in court. Thus, the word refers to a thief or extortionist, not to someone who legitimately exchanged his portion.
We therefore have no proof that Rabbi Yehuda holds that a sacrifice is considered a person’s property. On the contrary, the baraita may support the view that Rabbi Yehuda retracted his original position.
We now return to a quotation from the Mishnah. The Mishnah presents two items over which there is a dispute regarding betrothal: second tithe and consecrated property.
Second tithe is produce that must be brought to Jerusalem and eaten there during the first, second, fourth, and fifth years of the seven-year cycle. According to Rabbi Meir, whether the man betroths a woman with second tithe unintentionally or intentionally, the betrothal is invalid. Rabbi Yehuda says that if he does so unintentionally, the betrothal is invalid, but if he does so intentionally, the betrothal is valid.
This is difficult. We can understand Rabbi Yehuda’s ruling that an unintentional act does not effect betrothal if second tithe is considered the property of Heaven. But why does he say that an intentional act does effect betrothal? If second tithe is considered the person’s property, he should be able to betroth the woman with it whether he acted intentionally or unintentionally. If it is not considered his property, the betrothal should never be valid. What is the logic of this distinction?
The same difficulty exists regarding consecrated property, although the positions are reversed. Rabbi Meir says that intentional use effects betrothal, but unintentional use does not. Rabbi Yehuda says that intentional use does not effect betrothal, but unintentional use does. We must understand the logic behind the distinction between an intentional act and an unintentional act.
The Gemara states the positions: Rabbi Meir says that intentional use effects betrothal but unintentional use does not. Rabbi Yehuda says that unintentional use effects betrothal but intentional use does not. Rabbi Yaakov explains the reasoning.
Rabbi Yohanan had made two statements regarding the unintentional cases: according to Rabbi Yehuda, unintentional use of second tithe does not effect betrothal, and according to Rabbi Meir, unintentional use of consecrated property does not effect betrothal. Rabbi Yohanan explained the logic of both cases, although the Gemara initially does not make clear which explanation applies to which case.
In both cases, the unintentional betrothal is considered a mistaken betrothal. The practical difference is whether the woman alone objects or whether both the man and the woman object.
Regarding second tithe, the woman is not pleased when she discovers what happened. She does not want second tithe because she must take it to Jerusalem in order to use it. The man, however, may be pleased. He has second tithe that he cannot use outside Jerusalem, and by giving it to the woman he may hope to obtain a betrothal without giving her ordinary money. She, however, does not want the obligation of bringing the item to Jerusalem.
Regarding consecrated property, both of them object when they discover what happened. The woman does not want consecrated property because she may not use it for personal purposes. If she accepts it as betrothal money, she is using consecrated property for herself and may become liable for misuse of consecrated property. The man also does not want this. By transferring consecrated property to her, he too becomes involved in the misuse of something sacred. Therefore, neither of them wants the betrothal.
Rashi explains that this distinction matters. If the problem is only the woman’s objection, then the betrothal could be valid if she later says that she is willing to accept the item. But if both of them object, it is not enough for the woman to say that she accepts it, because the man also does not want the arrangement.
Rashi explains that the woman’s objection in the case of second tithe results from the trouble of taking it to Jerusalem. In the case of consecrated property, both of them object because both are concerned with the prohibition of misusing consecrated property.
Rabbi Yaakov then says that the opposite explanation is also possible. Perhaps in the case of second tithe, both of them object. The woman is not pleased because of the trouble of bringing it to Jerusalem, while the man is also not pleased because he remains responsible for the item until the betrothal takes effect.
Second tithe has no usable value outside Jerusalem. If the man gives it to her in Tel Aviv, for example, the betrothal does not take effect immediately, because the item has no value there. The betrothal takes effect only when she reaches Jerusalem, where she can eat the second tithe or use it as required. Until then, the man remains responsible for the item. If it is lost or stolen on the way, he may have to provide another item of betrothal money. He does not want a pending arrangement in which he remains responsible for the item while she transports it to Jerusalem.
Rashi explains that if the man had known in advance that this was second tithe, he would not have given it to her. A woman is more vulnerable on the road and may not be able to protect the item. The man does not want to betroth her with something for which he may remain responsible during the journey. He also does not want her to complain that he gave her an item that she cannot use outside Jerusalem.
According to this explanation, both the man and the woman object to the second tithe. It follows that if she later says that she is willing to accept it, that alone is not enough; the man must also be willing.
In the case of consecrated property, however, according to this approach the woman alone objects. When she discovers that the item was consecrated, she says, “Why should I accept this? If I had not accepted it, he would have had to give me something else. I do not want to receive an item that will cause me to violate the prohibition against misusing consecrated property. Give me something else.”
The man, however, is pleased. He would rather give her consecrated property than give her another item. He has no use for the consecrated property in any event, and by giving it to her he can avoid giving something else. Therefore, in the unintentional case of consecrated property, the woman is the one who objects, while the man is satisfied.
Thus, there are two ways to understand Rabbi Yohanan’s statement. In the unintentional case of second tithe, the objection may be only the woman’s, because she must bring the item to Jerusalem; alternatively, the man may object as well, because he remains responsible for it until the betrothal takes effect. In the unintentional case of consecrated property, the objection may be the woman’s alone, because accepting it exposes her to misuse of sacred property; alternatively, both may object because both become involved with the consecrated item.
These are the two ways of analyzing the unintentional cases and the reason that the Mishnah distinguishes between intentional and unintentional use. Amen and amen.