This is the Eri B. Sit edition and audio series of the Talmud Bavli, Bava Metzia, page 92, side one. Today’s page is dedicated in memory of Abraham ben Esther. May his soul be bound in the bond of eternal life. Amen.
We begin today’s page with the Mishnah: A worker may eat cucumbers, even if they are worth a dinar. A cucumber is mentioned as an example, but the same applies to a fig, even if it too is worth a dinar.
Even if the fruit is expensive, and the worker will ultimately eat more than he is being paid for his labor, the first opinion in the Mishnah, that of the first anonymous authority, says that this is permitted. The Torah allows a worker to eat according to his satiation. Whatever satisfies him, he may eat. That is the opinion of the first authority.
Rabbi Elazar Chasma says that a worker may not eat more than the value of his wages. How does he derive this? He learns it from the word “according to your soul” in the verse. In his view, the worker may eat only in proportion to what he is being paid to do. The work may involve climbing trees, facing danger, or otherwise risking himself. The amount he may eat corresponds to the degree of risk and liability he accepted in order to perform the work, but he may not eat more than that.
The third opinion is that of the Sages, who permit the worker to eat even more than he is being paid. This seems redundant, because that is apparently also the opinion of the first authority. The Gemara therefore asks: If both the first authority and the Sages permit the worker to eat more than his wages, what is the difference between them?
The Mishnah continues: “But we advise the person not to make himself ravenous.” We tell the worker, in effect, not to arrive as a glutton and eat excessively, because this will ultimately work against him. The landowner may decide that it is not worthwhile to hire workers who eat more than they earn, and he may stop hiring him or other workers altogether.
Rashi explains that this is simply good advice. It is not in the worker’s interest to eat more than he is being paid, because he may no longer be offered employment. The Gemara asks: If the Sages are the ones who permit a worker to eat more than his wages, then the Sages’ opinion seems to be identical to that of the first authority. The only addition is that they advise him not to take advantage of the permission.
The Gemara answers that there is a practical difference. Does one have to give the worker this advice? According to the first authority, no. The Torah permits him to eat, so let him eat. Why should we advise him against doing what the Torah permits? According to the Sages, however, we do give him this advice. It is not that he is forbidden to eat more than his wages; if he wants to eat, he may. But for his own benefit, we tell him that it is unwise to do so, because he may lose future employment.
The Gemara offers another answer. The difference between the two opinions may concern the teaching of Rav Asi. Rav Asi said that even if the worker was hired only to pick one cluster of grapes, he may eat the entire cluster. According to Rav Asi, the worker may consume the whole item on which he is working.
Rashi explains that the Mishnah may mean that a worker may eat all the cucumbers, even though he is not going to leave them for the owner, and even though their value is greater than the value of his wages. Rabbi Elazar Chasma, however, says that it makes no difference whether the worker was hired only to work on one cucumber or one cluster, or whether he was hired as a day laborer to work throughout the field. He may never eat more than the value of his wages.
The third opinion divides the cases. If the worker was hired to work on one specific item, he may eat the entire item. If he was hired as a day laborer for the entire day, he may eat more than the value of his wages. Thus, there are essentially three opinions: one opinion permits him to eat the entire item on which he is working and also permits him to eat more than his wages when he is working for the entire day; Rabbi Elazar Chasma never permits him to eat more than his wages and certainly does not permit him to consume the entire item; and the third opinion distinguishes between working on one item and working as a day laborer.
The Gemara cites another statement of Rav Asi. Rav Asi said that even if the worker was hired to pick only one cluster, he may eat the cluster immediately. The case is that the owner hired him for the entire day, but the only task assigned to him was to pick one cluster. The worker arrives at nine o’clock in the morning and immediately begins eating the cluster, even before doing any work. One might have thought that he must work first and eat afterward, but Rav Asi says that he may eat immediately.
We therefore need both statements of Rav Asi, because each teaches a separate novelty. If we had only been told that a worker hired to pick one cluster may eat the entire cluster, we might have said that this is because there is nothing left to place in the owner’s basket. Once the worker eats the cluster, the job is finished. Perhaps, however, when the worker is hired for the entire day and will have opportunities to place produce in the owner’s basket, he must first perform some work and place produce in the basket before he begins eating.
Conversely, if we had only been told that a worker hired for the entire day may eat immediately, we might have said that he is permitted to do so because he will still have time to complete the work and fill the owner’s basket. But when he was hired to work on only one cluster, perhaps he may not eat it immediately, because once he eats it there will be nothing left for him to place in the owner’s basket. Therefore, both rulings are necessary.
The Gemara gives a further answer regarding the difference between the first authority and the Sages. The first answer was that the difference concerns whether we advise the worker not to eat excessively. The second answer is that the difference concerns a worker hired to work on one cluster. According to the first authority, he may eat the entire cluster. According to the other opinion, a worker may eat more than his wages only when he is hired for the entire day, but not when he is hired to work on one specific item.
The Gemara then cites a hidden written record. In earlier times, the teachings were generally transmitted orally. People could write personal notes to help themselves remember what they had learned, but they were not permitted to use those notes to teach publicly. They would therefore write down material for their own memory, memorize it, and then hide the notes. Rav Asi said that he found one such hidden parchment belonging to Ivya, and it contained the following teaching from Isi ben Yehudah:
“When you enter your fellow’s vineyard, you may eat.” The verse is understood to mean that anyone may enter the field and eat, even if he is not a worker. Rashi explains that this refers even to someone who was not hired as a worker.
When Rav saw this teaching, he exclaimed that it was impossible. “Isi has left no livelihood for any living person.” If every person could enter someone else’s field and eat as many grapes as he wished, how could a landowner make a living?
Rashi explains that the first authority does not accept the position of Isi. The opening statement of the Mishnah says that workers may eat, indicating that only workers have this right. The Sages, however, may be offering a different rationale for permitting a worker to eat more than his wages. They may be saying that a worker may eat more than he earns because even a person who is not a worker may eat from the field. If someone who is not being paid may eat, then certainly a worker, who is being paid and is performing work, may eat.
According to this version, the dispute between the first authority and the Sages is whether they accept the teaching of Isi ben Yehudah. The first authority is more stringent, because he permits only a worker to eat. The Sages permit even a stranger to enter the field and eat.
Rav Asi said that he presented this teaching before Rav Kahana and attempted to reconcile it. It is difficult to understand how the landowner could permit people who were not hired to enter his field and eat. Rav Asi therefore suggested that perhaps Isi was discussing people who enter the field and work voluntarily. They were not formally hired, but they would perform work like workers, and while working they would be permitted to eat.
Even this explanation, however, is difficult. A landowner would still prefer to hire workers and allow them to eat while they work than to allow people to enter on their own, perform a small amount of labor, eat until they are full, and then leave. A hired worker will continue working after eating and will complete the job for which he was hired. These other people may work briefly, eat repeatedly, become full, and go home while the work remains unfinished. Why would the landowner want such people in his field?
Rashi explains that this is precisely the difficulty. The Mishnah is speaking about workers who continue working after they eat. In that case, the landowner receives the value of the labor for which he is paying. But people who enter the field on their own may eat more than the work they perform and leave once they are full. Rav Asi therefore says that he still does not understand the teaching of Isi ben Yehudah, even with this explanation.
The Gemara now raises a new question: When the Torah gives a worker the right to eat from the produce, whose produce is he considered to be eating? Is he eating from his own produce, or is he eating from what belongs to Heaven?
In other words, does the Torah give the worker an additional benefit as part of his wages? He is hired for a certain salary, and the Torah adds produce to his compensation. If so, the produce is considered his, and he should be able to give it to his wife or children. Or is the right to eat merely a gift from Heaven, similar to other forms of charity and agricultural gifts? If so, perhaps the produce is not considered his property, and he cannot transfer it to someone else.
Rashi explains the first possibility: “He eats from his own.” The produce is an addition to his wages, an extra benefit that the Torah gave him as part of his compensation. The second possibility is that it comes from Heaven as an act of kindness. In either case, the worker may eat it. The practical difference is whether he may say, “I do not want to eat; let my wife and children eat in my place.”
If the produce is considered his wages, he may give his wages to whomever he wishes, including his wife and children. The Torah gave him an additional benefit, and he may transfer that benefit just as he may transfer his ordinary wages.
If, however, the produce is a gift from Heaven, then it may be compared to charity. Until the gift reaches his hand, it does not belong to him in a way that allows him to transfer it to his wife and children. The two sides of the question are therefore whether the produce is a monetary benefit belonging to the worker or a personal entitlement that Heaven granted specifically to him.
The Gemara brings proofs and examines them back and forth. First it cites our Mishnah: “A worker may eat cucumbers, even if they are worth a dinar.” One might say that this proves the produce is his, because the Torah gave him an additional benefit as part of his wages. The worker may have been hired for a small wage, yet he can eat produce worth far more than that wage. This sounds like an extra payment that belongs to him.
But the Gemara rejects the proof. Whether one says that the produce is his or that it comes from Heaven, the result is difficult to understand. In either case, the worker may end up eating produce worth many times more than his wages. If it is his wages, why would the Torah give him such a large bonus? And if it comes from Heaven, would Heaven really grant him an entitlement worth so much more than what he is being paid?
The Gemara answers that the very fact that the worker may eat more than his wages cannot prove either side. Whichever way one explains it, one must say that the Torah granted him this entitlement. The amount he may eat does not establish whether the produce is classified as his wages or as a gift from Heaven.
The Gemara then cites the second opinion in the Mishnah: Rabbi Elazar Chasma says that a worker may not eat more than the value of his wages, while the Sages permit him to eat more. One might suggest that Rabbi Elazar Chasma must hold that the produce is his wages. Since it is his wages, the Torah will not give him a bonus greater than the value of the work he is performing. The Sages, who permit him to eat as much as he wishes, must hold that the produce comes from Heaven, and therefore the gift may be greater than his wages.
The Gemara rejects this as well. It is possible that everyone agrees that the produce is his, meaning that the Torah gave it to him as an addition to his wages. The dispute concerns how to understand the phrase “according to your soul.”
Rabbi Elazar Chasma understands “according to your soul” to mean that the worker may eat in proportion to the danger involved in the work—the work for which he is risking himself. If he is being paid to climb trees and expose himself to danger, he may eat according to that degree of risk, but not more. The amount he may eat corresponds to what he is being paid to risk himself for.
The Sages understand “according to your soul” differently. They learn from it that just as the owner, if he were performing the work himself, would not receive lashes for refraining from eating, so too a worker who is prevented from eating does not receive lashes. The verse is teaching a law concerning preventing the worker from eating, not limiting the worker’s food to the value of his wages. Therefore, the verse cannot prove that the worker may eat only as much as he is being paid for.
The Gemara has still not established whether the produce is considered the worker’s own wages or a gift from Heaven. It brings another case involving a hired worker who is a nazirite. A nazirite may not eat grapes. Such a worker says, “Give the grapes to my wife and children.” If the grapes are considered his wages, why should he not be able to give them to his family? If, however, the grapes are an entitlement from Heaven, perhaps he cannot transfer them, because the Torah did not give the entitlement to anyone else.
The Gemara rejects this proof. The case of a nazirite is different, because special safeguards are established for a nazirite. There is an expression instructing the nazirite to stay away and go around the vineyard rather than approach it. We do not want the nazirite to come close to the grapes, lest he eat them. Therefore, even if he is working in the vineyard, we may prevent him from giving the grapes to his wife and children as an additional safeguard.
Rashi explains that this restriction may also discourage a nazirite from taking such work in the first place. If he knows that he cannot eat the grapes and cannot even give them to his wife and children, he may not hire himself out to work in the vineyard. This concern is unique to a nazirite, and therefore the case does not prove anything about an ordinary worker.
The Gemara attempts to distinguish between two teachings, one of which mentions a nazirite and one of which mentions an ordinary worker. It rejects the claim that the ordinary worker must also have been a nazirite. The two teachings may have been recorded at different times and in different contexts. The fact that one source discusses a nazirite and another discusses a worker does not establish that they are referring to the same individual.
The Gemara cites another teaching: A person who tells a worker, “Give the produce to my wife and children,” is not obeyed; the produce may not be placed in the worker’s own basket. The Gemara initially suggests that this proves the produce is not the worker’s property. Perhaps the reason he cannot give it to his wife and children is that the Torah gave him only the right to eat it, not the right to transfer it.
But the Gemara responds that this worker may also have been a nazirite. If so, the restriction may be based on the special safeguards of a nazirite rather than on the general status of the worker’s produce.
One might ask: If the worker was a nazirite, why does the teaching give the reason that the produce may not be placed in his basket? Why not simply say that the restriction applies because he is a nazirite? The Gemara answers that the wording of the teaching follows the verse discussing a worker, but the actual case may involve a nazirite. The verse was cited because it uses the word “worker,” but the practical reason for the ruling is the safeguard established for a nazirite.
Thus, the case still does not provide proof. The grapes may ordinarily be considered the worker’s own wages, and an ordinary worker may be able to give them to his wife and children. The nazirite is different because of the safeguard requiring him to stay away from the vineyard.
The Gemara next discusses a worker hired to spread out figs in the field so that they can dry. A worker has the right to eat, and produce that has not yet reached the final stage of processing is not yet subject to tithes. Rashi explains that since the figs are still in the process of being dried, the final processing has not been completed. Therefore, the worker may eat them without separating tithes.
But what if the owner makes a condition? He tells the worker that he wants his wife and children to eat as well, or the worker says, “I will not eat; give my portion to my son.” The ruling is that the worker himself may eat and remains exempt from tithes, because that is the Torah’s law. His son, however, may not eat without separating tithes.
Rashi gives a difficult explanation for why the worker is exempt from tithes. Without Rashi, we would understand the exemption from the phrase “according to your soul.” Just as the owner, if he were eating from the produce while performing the work, would be exempt from tithes, so too the worker is exempt.
Rashi instead derives the exemption from the comparison to the agricultural gifts given to the poor. When a poor person enters a field and eats from the gleanings, the forgotten produce, or the corner of the field, he does not separate tithes. These gifts are exempt from tithes. Similarly, the worker’s produce is exempt.
It is not immediately clear why Rashi needs to introduce this additional source, since the earlier derivation from “according to your soul” already taught that the worker is exempt. Perhaps the earlier derivation is used for another law, and therefore we return here to the comparison with the gifts given to the poor. In any event, the central point is that the worker may eat and is exempt from tithes, whereas his son, who is not the worker, is obligated to separate tithes.
Rashi explains the difference between the worker and his son by saying that the worker is eating under the Torah’s special permission. The son, however, is treated as though he acquired the produce. Once the worker transfers it to his son, it is considered to have reached the final stage of acquisition, and the son is obligated to separate tithes.
The Gemara now returns to the question of ownership. If the produce belongs to the worker—if it is an addition to his wages—why is the son obligated to separate tithes? The son is eating produce that belongs to his father. Just as the father would be exempt if he ate it as a worker, why should the son be obligated?
Rashi explains that if the worker himself eats, he is exempt because of the special derivation concerning a worker. If the father gives the produce to his son in place of his own eating, however, the son does not have that status. The son is eating as the recipient of a transfer, not as the worker performing the labor, and therefore he is obligated to separate tithes.
The Gemara wants to use this case as evidence that the produce is not the worker’s own property but comes from Heaven. If it is a gift from Heaven, then the worker cannot transfer the exemption to his son. The son received the produce, but he did not receive the Torah’s special exemption from tithes.
The Gemara suggests that the reason the son is obligated is that the transfer has the character of a sale. The worker says, in effect, “My son will eat my produce,” or “My son will eat in my place.” Since he makes an explicit condition, it resembles a transaction, and the son is treated as having acquired the produce. Once the produce has been acquired, it is subject to tithes.
However, if the worker simply eats the produce himself, there is no transaction. Even though he is being paid, the Torah independently allows a worker to eat. The exemption does not arise because he purchased the fruit through his labor, but because he is a worker. When he makes a condition that his son should eat instead of him, the arrangement resembles a sale or transfer, and the son is obligated to separate tithes. Therefore, this case does not conclusively prove whether the produce is the worker’s property or a gift from Heaven.
The Gemara brings another case. A person hires a worker to work among fourth-year trees. The fruit of the fourth year is sacred and must be taken to Jerusalem, where it is eaten in the manner of second tithe. The worker may not eat that fruit in the field.
If the owner did not inform the worker that the trees were fourth-year trees, the owner must redeem the fruit and make it edible for the worker. The worker went to the field assuming that he would be able to eat the produce. The owner misrepresented the nature of the work, and therefore he must redeem the fruit so that the worker can eat it.
The Gemara again asks whether this proves that the produce is part of the worker’s wages or whether it is an entitlement granted by Heaven. If it is a gift from Heaven, why must the owner redeem the fruit? Heaven did not grant the worker permission to eat fourth-year fruit. If, however, the produce is part of his wages, the case is understandable: The worker agreed to work in exchange for money and produce, and the owner failed to provide the produce he was expecting. This appears to be a mistaken transaction.
The Gemara rejects the proof. Even if the worker’s right to eat is an entitlement from Heaven, the owner must still redeem the fruit because the situation appears to be a mistaken transaction. The worker entered the field believing that he would be able to eat. Although the law may be that he has no right to eat fourth-year fruit, the owner’s failure to inform him creates the appearance of misrepresentation. Therefore, the owner must redeem the fruit, but this does not prove that the produce is part of the worker’s wages.
The Gemara then examines the continuation of the same teaching. Suppose the figs were pressed into cakes and later broke apart. Or suppose the seals of the wine containers were removed. The worker is hired to arrange or handle the produce, but the produce had already reached the final stage of processing before he arrived. It is therefore already subject to tithes, and the worker may not eat it.
In the case of the figs, the worker may have been hired to spread them out after the pressed cakes broke apart. He thinks he is working with produce that is not yet subject to tithes, but in fact the final processing had already been completed before the cakes broke apart. In the case of the wine, the barrels had already been sealed, which ordinarily indicates that the final processing had been completed. The seals later came off, and the worker was hired to deal with the wine, not realizing that it had already become subject to tithes.
The ruling is that if the owner did not inform him, the owner must separate tithes and allow the worker to eat. The Gemara again asks: If the worker’s right to eat is merely a gift from Heaven, why should the owner have to correct the situation? Heaven did not grant him permission to eat produce that was already subject to tithes. But if the produce is part of his compensation, the ruling makes sense. The worker agreed to receive wages plus edible produce, and the owner must provide what the worker reasonably expected.
The Gemara responds that this too may be explained by the appearance of a mistaken transaction. The worker entered the field expecting to eat, and the owner failed to inform him that the produce was already subject to tithes. Therefore, the owner must separate tithes and allow him to eat, even though the ruling does not prove that the produce is part of his wages.
The Gemara distinguishes between the case of the broken fig cakes and the case of the wine. In the case of the figs, it is understandable that the worker was misled. Once the cakes broke apart, the worker could not know that the final processing had already been completed. He might reasonably think that the produce was still exempt from tithes.
But in the case of the wine, what is the mistaken transaction? The worker knows that the wine was placed in the containers, and there is a general rule that once wine reaches the pit, it becomes subject to tithes. Why should he assume that he will be permitted to drink it?
The Gemara answers that the obligation to separate tithes does not arise merely when the wine enters the pit. According to this explanation, the final stage is reached only after the foam and sediment have been removed from the surface. Until that process is completed, the wine is not yet fully processed. Therefore, a worker hired to work with the wine may assume that the foam has not yet been removed and that he will be able to drink.
Rabbi Akiva offers a different version. According to Rabbi Akiva, the final stage is not reached until the wine is taken from the pit and placed in barrels. If so, there is no need to say that the barrels broke and the wine fell back into the pit. The case can be explained simply: The worker is told to seal the barrels. He assumes that the wine is still in the stage before the final processing, when foam remains and he may drink. When he arrives, he discovers that the foam has already been removed, and the wine is already subject to tithes. This creates the appearance of a mistaken transaction.
The Gemara asks why the owner cannot respond that the worker should have realized that the foam might already have been removed. The owner told him only to seal the barrel; why did the worker assume that the foam was still present?
The answer is that the person who seals the barrels is normally also the person who removes the foam. Therefore, the worker can say that when he was told to seal the barrels, he assumed that he would be performing the earlier task of removing the foam and would consequently be permitted to drink. Since the owner did not inform him that this process had already been completed, the situation has the character of a mistaken transaction.
Despite all these cases, the Gemara still has not proven whether the worker’s produce is considered his own wages or an entitlement from Heaven.
The Gemara now discusses a worker who makes a condition concerning his right to eat. A worker may say, “I will not eat the produce; instead, compensate me with money.” He may make this condition for himself, and he may also make it on behalf of his adult wife, adult son, or adult daughter, because they understand the matter and can waive their rights.
The same applies to an adult servant or maidservant. The master may make a condition on their behalf, saying that they will not eat the produce and will instead receive additional payment. Since they are adults, they have the ability to waive the right that the Torah gave them.
But a person may not make this condition on behalf of minor children or minor servants. A minor cannot waive the right to eat. The Torah gave that right to the worker, and the minor does not have the legal capacity to relinquish it.
The Gemara asks what we learn from this. If the worker or the adult family member waives the right to eat, the owner may pay the additional amount that was agreed upon. The question is whether the right to eat is a monetary entitlement belonging to the worker, which can be waived, or whether it is a personal gift from Heaven that cannot be transferred.
The Gemara initially assumes that the father is supporting his children. Since he provides their food and other needs, their wages belong to him, and he may negotiate on their behalf. Their ordinary wages belong to him because he supports them, and perhaps the additional produce should belong to him for the same reason.
If the produce is a monetary benefit—an addition to their wages—then even the minors should be included in the father’s rights. Just as their wages belong to the father when he supports them, the additional benefit of the produce should also belong to him. But if the produce is an entitlement from Heaven, it belongs specifically to the worker. A minor cannot waive it, and the father cannot take it merely because he supports the child.
The Gemara suggests that this is the dispute between the Mishnah and another teaching. The other teaching says that a condition may be made even for minor servants, while the Mishnah says that one may not make such a condition for minor children or minor servants. Perhaps the teaching that permits the condition views the produce as the worker’s wages, which gives the father or master monetary rights. The Mishnah, however, views the produce as an entitlement from Heaven, which belongs to the minor and cannot be waived.
The Gemara rejects this explanation. Perhaps the Mishnah is discussing a case in which the father or master is not supporting the minor. In that case, the wages and the produce belong to the minor, and the father or master cannot take them. The other teaching, however, may be discussing a case in which the father or master is supporting the minor, and therefore has rights to the wages and to the additional benefit.
The Gemara asks why, if that is the distinction, the other teaching draws a distinction between a minor son and a minor servant. If the father or master is supporting them, both should be treated alike. The Gemara answers that there is another issue: A father is not permitted to cause his child unnecessary distress. Even if the father has monetary rights to the child’s wages, he may not instruct the child to work all day without allowing him to eat. Preventing the child from eating would cause him distress.
Thus, according to this explanation, the father may have monetary rights to the wages and perhaps even to the additional produce, but he may not deprive his child of the experience of eating while working. This limitation applies to a child, whereas the master may be able to make the condition with respect to a minor servant.
The Gemara then asks how to establish the Mishnah. We would say that the father or master is not supporting the minors, and therefore the produce belongs to them. Since a minor cannot waive his rights, the father or master cannot make a condition to take the produce instead.
This explanation works according to the opinion that a master may not tell a servant, “Work for me, but I will not support you.” According to that opinion, if the master does not provide support, the servant keeps his wages. Therefore, if the master is not supporting the minor servant, the servant keeps both the wages and the additional produce, and the master cannot make a condition concerning them.
But according to the opinion that a master may tell a servant, “Work for me and I will not support you,” while still taking the servant’s wages, the explanation does not work. Even if the master is not providing support, the servant’s wages belong to the master. If the produce is also considered part of the wages, it should belong to the master as well. Why, then, does the Mishnah say that the master cannot make a condition regarding a minor servant?
The Gemara therefore readjusts the explanation. Both the Mishnah and the other teaching may be discussing a case in which the master is not supporting the servant. The dispute concerns whether, in such a situation, the master may nevertheless take the servant’s wages.
According to the other teaching, the master may take the wages even though he is not providing support. Since the produce is considered part of the wages, he may also make a condition concerning the produce. According to the Mishnah, however, when the master does not provide support, the servant keeps the wages and the additional produce. An adult servant can waive the right and agree to the master’s condition, but a minor cannot waive it.
The Gemara then objects that this would make the other teaching consistent with Rabbi Yohanan’s opinion, which says that a master may tell his servant, “I will not support you,” and still retain the servant’s wages. But can we really have Rabbi Yohanan rule according to the other teaching when there is a Mishnah that appears to say otherwise? Ordinarily, a teaching in the Mishnah takes precedence over a later teaching, so this solution is not satisfactory.
The Gemara returns to the beginning and gives the final answer. Everyone agrees that the produce eaten by the worker is an entitlement from Heaven. It is a form of kindness granted specifically to the worker, rather than an ordinary monetary addition to his wages.
Accordingly, even if the father or master supports the minor, that does not give him ownership of the produce. Monetary rights may belong to the father or master when he provides support, just as the wages may belong to him. But this entitlement is not ordinary wages. It is a right granted directly to the worker, and the worker must waive it in order for someone else to receive it.
This explains the Mishnah. A minor cannot waive his rights, so the father or master cannot make a condition that the minor will not eat and that the father or master will receive additional payment instead. The produce remains the minor’s entitlement.
What, then, does the other teaching mean when it says that a condition may be made for minors? The Gemara explains that “making a condition” does not mean that the father or master may remove the minor’s right to eat. Rather, it means that the father or master may arrange to feed the child before he begins working. He may say, “I will give him a large meal before he goes to work, so that he will already be full and will probably not eat from the produce while working.” The owner may compensate him for the fact that the child is unlikely to eat.
This is not a condition that the child may not eat. If the child becomes hungry, he may still eat, because the Torah’s right remains in place. The father or master may only arrange to feed him beforehand, making it likely that he will not exercise the right to eat during the work. Thus, the teaching does not permit the father to waive the child’s right; it allows him to make practical arrangements so that the child will already be full.
The Gemara explains that the same interpretation must be applied to the teaching concerning an animal. One cannot make a condition that the animal may not eat, because the Torah prohibits muzzling an animal while it works. But one may feed the animal generously before bringing it to work. The animal will then be full and may not eat during the work, and the owner may receive compensation for the food that would otherwise have been consumed.
The Gemara rejects that interpretation as well. Ultimately, the dispute between the Mishnah and the other teaching concerns the fundamental question of whether the produce is considered the worker’s own property or an entitlement from Heaven.
According to the other teaching, the produce is considered the worker’s own. It is an addition to the worker’s wages, and therefore the father or master has rights to it just as he has rights to the wages themselves. The master may make a condition that the servant will not eat and will instead receive additional payment, because the produce is part of the servant’s compensation. The limitation concerning a minor son is a separate issue: A father may not cause his child distress by preventing him from eating.
According to the Mishnah, however, the produce is an entitlement from Heaven. It is a special gift given to the worker, comparable to charity, and it does not become the father’s or master’s monetary property. The only way for the father or master to receive it would be for the worker to waive the right. An adult can waive the right, but a minor cannot. Therefore, the father or master cannot make the condition for a minor.
The final conclusion is that whether a worker’s right to eat is considered his own property or an entitlement from Heaven depends on the dispute between the Mishnah and the other teaching. One view understands it as an addition to the worker’s wages, while the other understands it as a special gift granted by Heaven to the worker himself.
May the One who grants understanding help us continue to clarify these matters. Amen.