The Gemara presents the view of Rav Asher, who states that acquisition through pulling (meshichah) is not effective for a non-Jew. That is, when a non-Jew pulls an item, it is not considered acquired by them. This statement is then challenged.
Rav Hasda challenges Rav Asher, citing a teaching: "One who sells wine to an idol worshipper, if they settled on a price before he poured it, the money is permissible." The challenge is this: if pulling is not a valid mode of acquisition for a non-Jew, then when the non-Jew takes the wine, it is still in the Jewish seller's possession. Consequently, if the non-Jew touches it, the wine should become forbidden as libation wine (yayin nesekh), and the money received for it should also be forbidden. The fact that the money is permissible implies that the wine is considered to belong to the non-Jew upon their taking it, which contradicts Rav Asher's position.
To resolve this, it is suggested that the case refers not merely to settling a price, but to the non-Jew having already paid for the wine. If payment occurred, then the wine belongs to the non-Jew, and when they touch it, they are touching their own property, thus the money is permissible. However, this explanation faces a difficulty. The text continues, stating that "if the Jew poured the wine before they settled on a price, the money is forbidden." If the non-Jew had already paid, why would the money be forbidden, regardless of whether a price was settled? This implies that the case where the money is forbidden must refer to a situation where a price was not settled, even if some money was given, but not necessarily the full payment that would effect acquisition. The core problem remains: if pulling is not a valid acquisition for a non-Jew, then the wine remains in the Jew's possession, and any touch by the non-Jew should render it forbidden.
Rav Ashi offers a different approach, stating that according to those who hold that pulling is an effective acquisition for a non-Jew, the distinction between the money being permissible or forbidden depends on whether a price was settled. If a price was settled, the non-Jew's mind is settled (samkhah da'at) on the deal, and their pulling effects acquisition, making the wine their property. If no price was settled, even if the non-Jew pulls the wine, their mind is not settled on the purchase, and thus the pulling does not effect acquisition. In such a case, the wine remains in the Jew's possession, and the non-Jew's touch renders it forbidden. This explanation reconciles the text by making the effectiveness of pulling contingent on the non-Jew's settled intention, which is tied to a settled price.
The Gemara then brings another challenge, citing Abaye in the name of Rav Huna bar Abba, who said in the name of Rav Yochanan: "A Noahide is executed even for stealing less than the value of a penny (sheveh perutah), and it is not returned." The initial difficulty is: if pulling is not an effective acquisition for a non-Jew, then if a non-Jew steals less than a penny's worth from a Jew, it is not considered a theft in the halachic sense (as it's less than a sheveh perutah, which is the minimum for theft by a Jew, and the item never truly left the Jew's possession). Why then would the Noahide be executed, and why would the text state it is "not returned," implying it was stolen in the first place? The Gemara explains that the Noahide is executed not for theft, but for the distress (tza'ar) caused to the Jew. The phrase "it is not returned" means it doesn't fall under the category of items that need to be returned as stolen property, because it never truly left the Jew's possession to begin with.
The Gemara then presents a more significant difficulty from the continuation of this teaching: "If a non-Jew stole less than a penny's worth from a Jew, and then another non-Jew came and stole that same item from the first non-Jew, the second non-Jew is also executed." This is problematic. If the first non-Jew's pulling did not effect acquisition, then the item remains the Jew's. The second non-Jew, by stealing from the first non-Jew, did not cause distress to the Jew, and the item is still less than a penny's worth. Therefore, there is no basis for executing the second non-Jew. The only way to explain this is to conclude that pulling *is* an effective acquisition for a non-Jew. If so, when the first non-Jew pulled the item, it became his property. The second non-Jew then stole from the first non-Jew, and since the item was now the first non-Jew's, the second non-Jew is executed for stealing from another non-Jew, even if the value is less than a penny. This is a definitive proof that acquisition by pulling is effective for a non-Jew.
The discussion then shifts to the concept of a continuous stream (nitzok) as a connection (chibur) for rendering wine forbidden as libation wine. Rav Huna states that a continuous stream of wine creates a connection, meaning if kosher wine flows into libation wine, the entire stream and potentially the source become forbidden. The Gemara seeks a proof for this from a teaching: "One who pours from a barrel into a pit, the flowing stream that descends is forbidden." This seems to support the idea that the stream acts as a connection, rendering it forbidden by contact with the libation wine in the pit.
However, the Gemara rejects this proof, explaining that the case refers to a non-Jew pouring the wine. In such a scenario, the stream is forbidden not because of the connection of nitzok, but because the non-Jew is actively moving the wine with their force (ko'ach). The rabbis decreed that even wine moved by a non-Jew's force, without direct touch, becomes forbidden. If this is the case, the Gemara asks, why is only the stream forbidden? The wine remaining in the barrel, which is also being moved by the non-Jew's force, should also become forbidden. The Gemara answers that the rabbis were lenient regarding the wine remaining in the barrel, only decreeing on the portion that emerges from the barrel due to the non-Jew's force. This demonstrates that rabbinic decrees can have specific limitations.
Rashi comments on this, stating that the law is like Rav Shishat, who holds that nitzok is a connection for libation wine. However, Rashi's statement that the wine remaining in the barrel is permissible seems to contradict the idea of nitzok being a connection. If the stream connects, it should connect the entire barrel to the forbidden wine. The commentators explain that Rashi's intention is that while nitzok is generally a connection, in this specific case, the rabbis were lenient and did not extend the prohibition to the wine remaining in the barrel, even if it was technically connected via the stream. This is a specific rabbinic leniency within the broader framework of nitzok as a connection.
The Gemara continues with practical applications regarding nitzok. Jewish wine sellers, when measuring wine for a non-Jew, are concerned about the non-Jew's barrel containing libation wine. To avoid creating a prohibited stream, they are advised to pour the wine in spurts, stopping the flow before it reaches the bottom of the non-Jew's barrel, or to pour it from a distance, so that the wine travels through the air before entering the non-Jew's vessel, thus preventing a continuous stream.
Another related halacha concerns a non-Jew helping a Jew pour wine from one vessel to another. A Jew should not allow a non-Jew to help, even if the Jew is also involved. The concern is that the Jew might inadvertently walk away, leaving the non-Jew to pour alone. If the non-Jew pours alone, the wine is moved by their force, potentially rendering it forbidden. While direct assistance with the Jew present would be permissible, the rabbinic decree prevents this to avoid the possibility of the non-Jew being left unsupervised.
The Gemara then discusses an apparatus called a Gishta and Batgishta, which functions like a siphon to transfer wine between barrels. If a non-Jew touches the opening of this siphon where the wine is flowing out, Rava rules that all the wine, even that in the first barrel, becomes forbidden. This implies that the siphon creates a continuous connection, similar to nitzok, making the entire system forbidden upon contact. The Gemara clarifies that this is a stronger type of connection than a simple nitzok, as the wine is drawn out automatically, making the connection more inherent and continuous. Therefore, touching any part of this automatic flow renders the entire connected wine forbidden.
Finally, the Gemara discusses a wide vessel with multiple straws (kenish kanim) from which several people can drink simultaneously. If a Jew and a non-Jew drink from such a vessel at the same time, it is permissible as long as the wine is continuously flowing out. The concern is that if the flow stops, any wine that touched the non-Jew's mouth might flow back into the barrel, rendering the entire barrel forbidden. Therefore, the Gemara advises that the Jew must stop drinking first. If the non-Jew stops first, their backwash could contaminate the barrel, making it forbidden for the Jew to continue drinking. This is why Rava bar Rav Huna permitted drinking with non-Jews from such a device, and some even say he himself partook, provided the proper precautions were observed.