We are beginning on folio 5b, three lines from the bottom. The Gemara states: “Rabbi Shimon says.” We are discussing the offering brought when the court makes an erroneous ruling that causes the community to sin. Who brings the offering? According to Rabbi Meir, the court brings it. According to Rabbi Shimon, the people and the court bring it.
Rabbi Shimon derives his position from a verse concerning the offerings brought at the inauguration of the Mishkan. The Torah describes two bulls: one bull for a burnt-offering and one bull for a sin-offering. Why does the Torah specify that there were two bulls? It might have been enough to say that one was a burnt-offering and the other a sin-offering. The additional wording teaches that the second bull had the status of a burnt-offering with regard to eating: just as a burnt-offering is not eaten, this sin-offering was also not eaten.
There are two types of sin-offerings. An external sin-offering is one whose blood is sprinkled on the outer altar, and its meat is eaten by the priests. An internal sin-offering is one whose blood is brought inside; the offering itself is completely burned and is not eaten. The sin-offering brought at the inauguration of the Mishkan was brought on the outer altar, so ordinarily the priests should have been permitted to eat it. The Torah therefore comes to teach that this offering was an exception: although it was technically an external sin-offering, it could not be eaten.
Rabbi Yosef gives another example of this principle. When the Jewish people returned from Babylonia to Jerusalem, the verse says that the returning exiles brought offerings to the God of Israel. They brought twelve bulls, ninety-six rams, and seventy-seven goats as sin-offerings. The verse refers to all of them as burnt-offerings, yet it explicitly calls the twelve goats sin-offerings. How can the verse describe them as both sin-offerings and burnt-offerings?
The answer is that although these offerings were sin-offerings, they had the status of burnt-offerings with regard to eating. They were not eaten. Rabbi Yehuda taught that these twelve goats were brought to atone for the sin of idolatry committed during the time of King Zedekiah, the last king of Judah before the destruction. Seventy years later, when the exiles returned from Babylonia, they brought offerings for that sin.
The verse therefore indicates that twelve sin-offerings were brought, but it does not explain why twelve were required. The Gemara understands that the offerings corresponded to the twelve tribes. Alternatively, seven tribes may have committed the sin, while the remaining tribes were included through the arrangement described by Rabbi Shimon. In either case, the passage serves as a source for the idea that a sin-offering can, under certain circumstances, have the status of a burnt-offering and not be eaten.
This brings us back to our original dispute. When the court makes an erroneous ruling and the community follows it, how many offerings are brought? According to Rabbi Meir, the court brings one offering. According to Rabbi Shimon, each tribe brings an offering, and the court brings an additional offering.
The Gemara asks which opinion is reflected in the twelve offerings brought when the exiles returned. It would seem to fit Rabbi Yehuda, who normally views each tribe as bringing its own offering. Perhaps all twelve tribes had committed the sin, so each one brought an offering. Alternatively, seven tribes had sinned, and the other tribes were included through the relevant halachic mechanism.
The case can also be explained according to Rabbi Shimon. Perhaps eleven tribes committed the sin, and the court brought the twelfth offering. Or perhaps the community made twelve separate erroneous rulings, each followed by a transgression, so that twelve offerings were required. The Gemara explains that this would not mean that the community sinned twelve times as a single continuous act. Rather, the court ruled, the community transgressed, the court retracted its ruling, and then the court issued another erroneous ruling. This process occurred twelve times.
The Gemara now raises a technical difficulty. The people who worshipped idols during the time of Zedekiah had died by the time the exiles returned. How could offerings be brought for people who were no longer alive?
There is a general rule that when the owner of an individual sin-offering dies, the offering is disqualified and is left to die. The Gemara therefore asks how a sin-offering could be brought seventy years after the sin, when those who committed it were no longer alive.
Rav Pappa answers that the rule applies when the owner of an individual offering dies, but not when the offering belongs to the community. The community does not “die” in the same way that an individual does. Even if members of the community die, the community continues to exist, and the offering may still be brought.
Where do we see that the community is treated as continuing to exist? The verse says, “Instead of your fathers shall be your sons.” This indicates that the children can assume the place of their fathers and atone for their sins. Even when the original sinners are no longer present, the next generation can take their place.
The Gemara challenges this proof. Perhaps that verse refers to an individual whose son replaces him. That would still be a matter involving individuals, not the special status of a community.
The Gemara offers another example. Every new month, the community brings a sin-offering. We learned in Tractate Shevuot that this offering atones for certain sins committed by the community during the previous month, including entering the Temple while impure. The offering is purchased from the communal treasury. But some of the people who contributed to the treasury at the beginning of the year may have died before the offering was brought. If the offering requires all its original owners to be alive, how can it be brought?
We must therefore conclude that when an offering belongs to the community, the death of some of its members does not invalidate it. The Gemara responds that the people who contributed to the monthly offering might still be alive; perhaps only some of them had died. That does not prove that an offering may be brought entirely on behalf of people who are all dead, as in the case of the offerings brought upon the return from Babylonia.
The Gemara brings the ritual of the calf whose neck is broken as another proof. When a murdered person is found between two cities and the identity of the murderer is unknown, the city nearest to the body brings a calf and recites a declaration of atonement. The declaration says, “Atone for Your people Israel, whom You redeemed.” This atonement refers to the entire nation that God redeemed from Egypt. No one from the generation of the Exodus was still alive, yet the ritual is described as atoning for them.
Rav Pappa rejects the comparison. In the case of the calf, there are living people for whom the ritual also provides atonement, and the deceased can be included with them. In the case of the offerings brought by the returning exiles, however, perhaps the offerings were brought solely for those who had died. Therefore, the calf whose neck is broken does not yet prove that an offering may be brought exclusively on behalf of the deceased.
The Gemara answers that not everyone from the earlier generation had died. When the Second Temple was inaugurated, the older people cried because they remembered the First Temple, while the younger people rejoiced because they had never seen the First Temple and considered the new building magnificent. The verse says that the sound of the crying could not be distinguished from the sound of the rejoicing because it was heard from a distance.
From this the Gemara initially infers that members of the older generation were present. Perhaps there were only a few elderly people, however, and they did not constitute the majority. The Gemara therefore asks whether the requirement is merely that some members of the original community remain alive, or whether the majority of that community must still be alive.
The verse says that the sound of the rejoicing could not be heard because it was drowned out by the crying. This indicates that the older people who were crying outnumbered the younger people who were rejoicing. The majority of the older generation was therefore still alive. The Gemara concludes that not only did some of the original sinners survive; the majority of them survived and were present.
There is another difficulty. A sin-offering is not ordinarily brought for an intentional sin. The people who worshipped idols did so intentionally. How, then, could a sin-offering be brought for them?
The Gemara answers that this was a special dispensation. Normally, a sin-offering is not brought for an intentional transgression, but in this case the offering was nevertheless brought. One might have thought that the people had followed an erroneous ruling of the court and were therefore considered inadvertent sinners. The Gemara makes clear that the court had erred, while the people who followed the ruling were considered intentional in their continued conduct. Even so, this case received a special dispensation.
This also explains the large number of offerings brought at that time: twelve bulls and seventy-seven goats, in addition to the ninety-six rams. The twelve bulls and twelve goats corresponded to the offerings required for idolatry. But what was the purpose of all the additional offerings? The Gemara infers that those additional offerings reflected a special dispensation granted for that particular occasion.
The Gemara then brings a teaching concerning a situation in which the court rules in error and the community follows its ruling. The court and the community are liable to bring an offering. The teaching states that even if one member of the community dies before the offering is brought, the offering must still be brought. One might have thought that because an owner of a sin-offering died, the offering should be left to die. The teaching therefore states that the death of one member of the community does not invalidate the offering.
However, if one of the judges who participated in the erroneous ruling dies before the offering is brought, the offering is no longer brought. The Gemara explains this distinction through the language of the teaching: the community and the court are treated as two parties, or partners, in the offering. If one member of the community dies, the community remains a valid communal entity. If one member of the court dies, however, the court is no longer the same body that issued the erroneous ruling.
Rashi explains that the term “partners” does not mean ordinary partners in an individual offering. The offering results from two distinct components: the court must issue the erroneous ruling, and the community must follow that ruling and sin. Both bodies are therefore required for the offering to be brought.
The Gemara asks who authored this teaching. Rav Chisda said in the name of Rav Zeira, who said in the name of Rabbi Yirmeya, who said in the name of Rav: it is the view of Rabbi Meir.
This makes sense according to Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Meir holds that the court brings the offering, not the community. If one member of the community dies, the body responsible for bringing the offering—the court—remains intact, so the offering must still be brought. But if one member of the court dies, the body responsible for bringing the offering is no longer complete, and the offering is not brought.
Rabbi Yosef challenges this explanation. Who says that the teaching follows Rabbi Meir? Perhaps it follows Rabbi Shimon. According to Rabbi Shimon, both the community and the court bring offerings. If one member of the community dies, the community still brings its offering because there is a general rule that a community does not die. If one member of the court dies, however, the court is treated as an individual partnership, and its offering is not brought.
Abaye rejects the possibility that the teaching follows Rabbi Shimon. We already find elsewhere that Rabbi Shimon holds that a sin-offering belonging to partners is not subject to the law that it must be left to die when one of its owners dies.
The Torah requires two offerings on Yom Kippur: a bull that atones for the priests and a goat that atones for the entire Jewish people. If these offerings are lost, two replacement offerings are designated and brought. If the original offerings are subsequently found, Rabbi Yehuda says that they must be left to die. Rabbi Shimon says that they are allowed to graze until they develop a physical blemish, at which point they may be redeemed.
Rabbi Shimon explains that the original offerings do not have to die because they are communal offerings. The law requiring a sin-offering to be left to die applies to an individual offering, not to an offering belonging to a group of partners.
The priests are considered partners in the bull brought on Yom Kippur because the offering provides atonement for all of them. The situation is therefore comparable to the court and the community in the offering brought for an erroneous ruling. If Rabbi Shimon says that the law of leaving the offering to die does not apply to the joint offering of the priests, then he should likewise say that it does not apply when one member of the court dies.
Rashi explains the source of the comparison. The verse refers to the bull of Yom Kippur as an offering that provides atonement for the priests. It is therefore a sin-offering belonging to partners rather than to one individual. Since Rabbi Shimon says that a sin-offering belonging to partners is not subject to the law of death, we cannot say that the teaching concerning the death of one judge follows Rabbi Shimon.
There is, however, an important distinction. In the case of the Yom Kippur offerings, the priests had already achieved atonement through the replacement offerings. The original offerings therefore cannot be brought as offerings of atonement, and they are allowed to graze until they become blemished. In the case of the offering for the community’s erroneous ruling, however, the offering has not yet been brought. If one member of the court dies, why should the offering not simply be brought by the remaining members?
Nevertheless, the comparison remains valid with regard to the law of death. If a sin-offering belonging to partners is not left to die when its owners are no longer able to use it, then the same rule should apply to the communal offering involving the court and the community. Therefore, the teaching cannot be Rabbi Shimon’s, and it must follow Rabbi Meir.
Rabbi Yosef then raises another question. If the priests themselves are considered a community, perhaps there should be an additional offering for them. According to Rabbi Shimon, twelve offerings are brought for the twelve tribes, and an additional offering is brought by the court. If the priests are also considered a community, perhaps they should bring another offering as well.
The Gemara answers that the tribe of Levi is not included in the count of the twelve tribes for this purpose. The priests belong to the tribe of Levi, so the offering of the priests does not create a thirteenth tribal offering.
Why is the tribe of Levi excluded? The Gemara cites the verse in which God tells Jacob that he will become “a congregation of nations” and then promises him the land. This indicates that the term “congregation of nations” refers to tribes that have a portion in the Land of Israel. Since the tribe of Levi does not receive a regular territorial portion, it is not included in that count.
The Gemara challenges this reasoning. Ephraim and Manasseh, the two sons of Joseph, are counted as separate tribes in the division of the land. Perhaps they are considered separate tribes only for the division of the land, but not for every other halachic matter. If so, they cannot automatically be counted as two tribes here.
The Gemara responds that Ephraim and Manasseh were also counted separately in the arrangement of the camps and banners in the wilderness. Each group of tribes traveled under its own banner, and Ephraim and Manasseh were treated as separate tribal units. This indicates that they are counted separately not only for the division of the land.
The Gemara rejects that proof as well. Perhaps Ephraim and Manasseh were separated for the sake of honor, so that each would have its own banner, but that does not prove that they were halachically treated as two tribes in every context.
A further proof is brought from the inauguration of the Mishkan. The offerings were brought over twelve days, with a separate tribal leader bringing offerings on each day. This suggests that Ephraim and Manasseh were treated as separate tribes. The Gemara again answers that the arrangement may have been made for the honor of the tribal leaders and does not necessarily establish their status for every halachic matter.
The same question arises concerning the inauguration of the Temple built by Solomon. Solomon celebrated for seven days, whereas Moses celebrated the inauguration of the Mishkan for twelve days. The reason given is that Moses wanted to honor the tribal leaders. If Ephraim and Manasseh had not been treated as separate tribes, their leaders would have been excluded. This is another indication that Ephraim and Manasseh were counted separately for that purpose.
The Gemara concludes that Ephraim and Manasseh are counted as two tribes in this context, while the tribe of Levi is not included. Thus, the count remains twelve: eleven tribes together with Ephraim and Manasseh, with Levi excluded from the calculation.
Rabbi Yosef’s original conclusion therefore remains: the priests are considered a communal body for certain purposes, including the bull of Yom Kippur, but this does not necessarily mean that the court is considered a community for the same purpose. The court may still be treated as a partnership composed of individuals.
Accordingly, Rabbi Shimon can maintain that a sin-offering belonging to a true community is not subject to the law that it must be left to die, while a sin-offering belonging to the court may still be subject to that law. The priests are called a community with regard to the Yom Kippur offering, but the court is not necessarily called a community in this respect.
The Gemara now seeks a general rule: does the law that a sin-offering must be left to die apply only to an individual, or does it also apply to a communal offering or an offering belonging to partners?
The Mishnah states that there are five sin-offerings that must be left to die. The first is the offspring of a sin-offering. If an animal was designated as a sin-offering and then gave birth, the offspring also acquires a certain sanctity, but it cannot be brought as the original sin-offering. The offspring must therefore be left to die.
The second is an animal substituted for a sin-offering. If a person attempts to transfer the sanctity of a sin-offering to another animal, the transfer is prohibited, but the second animal nevertheless becomes sanctified. That substituted animal must be left to die.
The third is a sin-offering whose owner died. If a person designated a sin-offering and died before bringing it, the offering must be left to die.
The fourth is a sin-offering whose owner obtained atonement through another offering. For example, a person designated a sin-offering, lost it, and brought a replacement. If the original offering is then found, it must be left to die.
The fifth is a sin-offering that has passed its first year. A sin-offering must be within its first year, and once it has become too old, it is no longer fit to be offered and must be left to die.
The Gemara asks whether these five cases refer only to an individual or whether they also include a communal offering. The first case clearly cannot apply to a community, because a communal offering does not involve a female animal of the relevant type, and therefore there cannot be an offspring of such an offering. The law of the offspring of a sin-offering must therefore refer to an individual.
The second case also appears to apply only to an individual. The law of substitution does not operate in the same way for a communal offering. If the community attempts to transfer the sanctity of one offering to another, the act of substitution does not take effect in the ordinary manner. Thus, the case of the substituted sin-offering must also refer to an individual.
The third case, in which the owner dies, also appears to refer to an individual. We have already established that when one member of a community dies, the communal offering remains valid. Therefore, the case of a sin-offering whose owner died must refer to an individual.
The question is what to do with the fourth and fifth cases. A communal offering could be lost, replaced, and then found, or it could pass its first year before being offered. Those cases could seemingly apply to either an individual or a community.
The Gemara suggests that since the first three cases clearly refer to an individual, the last two cases should also be understood as referring to an individual. All five cases are listed together, suggesting that they share the same framework.
The Gemara challenges this inference: how can we derive cases that are possible in both contexts from cases that are possible only in one context? The first three cases must refer to an individual because they cannot apply to a community, but the last two cases could apply to a community as well.
Rabbi Shimon had a tradition that all five cases were transmitted together as one group. Since the first three cases can apply only to an individual, he understood that all five cases were taught in the context of an individual. The fact that they were transmitted together indicates that they share the same legal framework.
Rashi explains that this was part of an oral tradition: Moses was taught that there are five cases in which a sin-offering must be left to die, and all five were taught in the context of an individual offering. If the teaching had referred to a community, three of the five cases would not have been possible, because a community does not bring the relevant female offering, does not perform substitution in the same way, and is not invalidated by the death of one of its members.
Rabbi Shimon’s position therefore appears to be that the law of a sin-offering being left to die applies to an individual, but not to a communal offering or to an offering belonging to partners. This returns us to the original case involving the court and the community.
If one member of the court dies, Rabbi Shimon should say that the offering is still brought. The court and the community are partners in the offering, and the law that a sin-offering must be left to die does not apply to partners in the same way that it applies to an individual.
We can now understand why the teaching stating that the offering is not brought when one member of the court dies cannot follow Rabbi Shimon. It must follow Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Meir holds that the court alone brings the offering, and the law of a sin-offering being left to die can apply even to this partnership-like structure. Rabbi Shimon, however, holds that the communal aspect of the offering prevents the law of death from applying.
In the case of the priests, Rabbi Shimon’s position is evident. The priests’ offering on Yom Kippur is considered a communal offering. If they received atonement through a replacement offering and later found the original, they do not leave the original to die; they allow it to graze until it develops a blemish and then redeem it. This shows that the law of a sin-offering being left to die does not apply to a communal offering.
Rabbi Meir does not accept this proof. He does not have Rabbi Shimon’s tradition that all five cases of a sin-offering being left to die apply only to an individual. Therefore, Rabbi Meir can maintain that the law does apply to a partnership such as the court, even though it does not apply in the same way to the priests, who are specifically treated as a community.
Thus, the final conclusion is that the teaching stating that the offering is not brought after the death of one member of the court follows Rabbi Meir. According to Rabbi Meir, the court brings the offering, and the death of one judge means that the body responsible for bringing it is no longer intact. According to Rabbi Shimon, the offering is a partnership between the court and the community, and the death of one participant does not invalidate it, because the law of a sin-offering being left to die does not apply to a communal or partnership offering in the same manner as it applies to an individual.
Hadran alach, “We will return to you,” and the discussion concludes with this distinction between an individual offering, a communal offering, and an offering brought jointly by the court and the community.