The discussion begins by examining the laws of a Kohen Mashiach, the High Priest anointed with the special anointing oil, and how his sin offerings differ from those of an ordinary individual or the community. The Gemara establishes that a Kohen Mashiach brings a sin offering only if his transgression stems from a mistaken ruling he himself made. He is not like a regular person who commits a sin inadvertently and brings an offering; for the Kohen Mashiach, a mistaken ruling must precede the action.
For instance, if the Kohen Mashiach mistakenly permitted the consumption of forbidden fat, and then, relying on his own erroneous ruling, he ate it, he would bring a sin offering. This applies even if he made the ruling inadvertently, but then, when performing the action, he realized his ruling was wrong yet ate anyway. Alternatively, if he knew his ruling was mistaken but forgot that his ruling was flawed when he committed the action, he would still be considered to have sinned inadvertently and would bring an offering. The Gemara provides a formula: the laws for a Kohen Mashiach's personal sin offering mirror those of a mistaken ruling by the Beit Din for the community. Just as the Beit Din must make an inadvertent ruling, and the community must transgress inadvertently, so too the Kohen Mashiach must make an inadvertent ruling and then transgress that ruling inadvertently.
The Gemara then introduces a comparison to the community's sin offering (Par He'elem Davar Shel Tzibur). If the Beit Din made an intentional erroneous ruling, and the community transgressed inadvertently, the community would bring a regular sin offering (a ewe or a she-goat). However, if a Kohen Mashiach made an intentional ruling, and then acted upon it, he brings nothing. This highlights a significant difference: the Kohen Mashiach only brings an offering for an inadvertent action that follows an inadvertent ruling. If his ruling was intentional, even if his action was inadvertent, he does not bring an offering. This is because his offering is specifically for a "mistake of action" that stems from a "mistake of ruling."
The Gemara questions the novelty of this rule, arguing that if the Kohen Mashiach made an inadvertent ruling and then acted inadvertently, it is obviously a case of inadvertent sin, warranting an offering. The novelty lies in a specific scenario: if he made a ruling, but later forgot the reasoning behind it. When he then ate the forbidden fat, he might have said, "I know I permitted it, but I don't remember why; I'll rely on that permission." One might argue that if he had remembered the reason, he might have retracted his ruling, thus making his action akin to an intentional transgression. However, the Gemara teaches that even in such a case, it is still considered an inadvertent sin, and he brings an offering, as long as he did not know the specific reasons at the time of the transgression.
The source for these laws, comparing the Kohen Mashiach to the community, is derived from the verse "Le'ashmat Ha'am" (to the discredit of the people). This verse implies that the Kohen Mashiach's sin is connected to the people's guilt because he serves as their representative, bringing atonement for them. More profoundly, it teaches that his sin follows the same rules as the community's sin offering, which is brought when the people commit a sin based on an erroneous ruling by the Beit Din. The Gemara considers whether this comparison could be derived through logical inference (a Binyan Av), arguing that both the community and the Kohen Mashiach are distinct from an individual in their sin offerings. An individual brings a ewe or she-goat, while the community brings a bull. Similarly, the Kohen Mashiach does not bring an offering for a regular inadvertent sin, unlike an individual. Since both are different from an individual, one might infer that the Kohen Mashiach's law is like the community's: he is liable only for an inadvertent action following his own inadvertent ruling.
However, the Gemara challenges this Binyan Av by proposing an alternative comparison: to a Nasi (prince or leader). A Nasi, when he sins, also brings a different offering than an individual (a he-goat). Therefore, one could argue that just as a Nasi brings an offering for any inadvertent sin, even without a prior erroneous ruling, so too the Kohen Mashiach should bring an offering for any inadvertent sin. The Gemara concludes that neither comparison is fully conclusive through logical inference alone because there are distinguishing factors for each. For example, the community brings a bull and does not bring an Asham Talui (a suspense offering for a doubtful sin), a characteristic shared with the Kohen Mashiach. The Nasi, on the other hand, brings a he-goat for idolatry and an Asham Vadai (a definite guilt offering) for certain sins, also shared by the Kohen Mashiach. Since the Binyan Av is not conclusive, the verse "Le'ashmat Ha'am" is necessary to explicitly teach that the Kohen Mashiach is compared to the community, meaning he only brings an offering for an inadvertent action following an inadvertent ruling.
The Gemara then clarifies that the Kohen Mashiach does not bring an Asham Talui. This is derived from the verse "And the Kohen shall atone for him for his inadvertent sin which he sinned." This implies that an Asham Talui is brought only by someone whose sin is a direct inadvertent action, not one that requires a prior mistaken ruling. Since the Kohen Mashiach only brings an offering for an inadvertent action that follows a mistaken ruling, he is excluded from bringing an Asham Talui.
The Mishnah presents two cases regarding the Kohen Mashiach's sin offering. The first case describes a Kohen Mashiach who makes a ruling by himself and transgresses it by himself. In this scenario, he brings his own offering. The novelty here is that even if the community also brought an offering for a different transgression, the Kohen Mashiach must bring his own if his ruling and transgression pertain to a different forbidden item. For example, if the Beit Din permitted forbidden fat, and he permitted idolatry, he brings his own offering, as his sin is distinct. The second case is when he makes the same mistaken ruling as the Beit Din and transgresses along with the community. In this instance, he is covered by the community's offering.
The Mishnah further clarifies that a ruling, whether by the Beit Din or the Kohen Mashiach, is only considered valid if it permits a part of a prohibition, not the entire prohibition. For example, they can permit a specific type of forbidden fat, but not all forbidden fat. This is derived from the verse "He'elem Davar" (hiding of a matter), implying an item, not the entire body of a prohibition. This rule applies even to idolatry, where the ruling must pertain to a part of idolatry, not its entirety. The Mishnah's ruling, which states that the Beit Din is not liable until they permit part of a prohibition, aligns with the view of Rabbi Meir.
The Gemara then addresses the case where the Kohen Mashiach is covered by the community's offering when he transgresses with them. It considers a counter-argument based on the Nasi, who is distinct from an individual in his offering. One might argue that the Kohen Mashiach, being distinct from an individual, should follow the Nasi's law and bring his own offering even when transgressing with the community. However, this is refuted by noting that the Nasi is always included in the community's offerings, even on Yom Kippur, whereas the Kohen Mashiach brings his own offerings on Yom Kippur. Therefore, the Kohen Mashiach is not always included with the community. The verse "Al Hattato Asher Hata" (for his sin which he sinned) teaches that he brings an offering when his sin is unique to him, but when he sins with the community, he is covered by their offering.
The Gemara then seeks to define the precise scenario for the Kohen Mashiach bringing his own offering when he rules and transgresses alone. If he is an expert (Mufleh) and the community members are not, then their ruling is invalid, and he would naturally bring his own offering. Conversely, if he is not the Mufleh and the other members are, his ruling would be invalid. The case where he brings his own offering is when he is a legitimate ruler (a Mufleh), and his ruling is valid, but he ruled on a different prohibition than the Beit Din. For example, if he permitted idolatry while the Beit Din permitted forbidden fat. In such a case, his ruling is legitimate, but since it concerns a different prohibition, he cannot be covered by their offering and must bring his own.
The Gemara explains why these are distinct rulings. First, the scriptural sources for permitting forbidden fat and permitting idolatry are different, indicating two distinct prohibitions. Second, the offerings are different: for forbidden fat, one brings a bull, while for idolatry, the community brings a bull and a he-goat. These fundamental differences necessitate separate offerings. The discussion then moves to a more subtle case: what if both the Kohen Mashiach and the Beit Din permitted different types of forbidden fat? Since the sources for these different types of fat might come from different verses, implying different reasons for their prohibition, they could be considered distinct. However, the Gemara concludes that "fat is fat," meaning all types of forbidden fat are considered one category. Therefore, if the Kohen Mashiach and the Beit Din both permitted forbidden fat, even different types, he would be covered by their offering, as the underlying offering (a bull) is the same.
Finally, the Gemara reiterates that the ruling, whether by the Beit Din or the Kohen Mashiach, must pertain to a part of a prohibition, not its entirety. This is derived from the phrase "He'elem Davar" (hiding of an item), implying a specific item, not the entire body of a prohibition. This principle applies even to idolatry, where the ruling cannot permit all forms of idolatry, but only a specific aspect. This is learned through a textual comparison (Gezerah Shavah) between the term "Mi'ayneh" found in the context of idolatry and the term "He'elem Davar" found in the context of other sins, establishing that the same rule of permitting only a part of the prohibition applies.