The Eddie B. Sitt Edition and Audio Series of the Talmud, Massechet Zevahim, has been dedicated by our good friend and student of the shiur, Daf Yomi student Binyamin HaKohen, known as Bani Cohen, or Bani C. May he have success and prosperity. Since he is a kohen, may it be that, when Mashiach comes, he will serve in the Temple together with the other kohanim. May he merit this in the zechut of having dedicated this tractate, which specifically discusses the service of the kohanim in the Temple and the offerings.
Today’s material is on page 12b. We begin with the Mishnah: “Pesach.” This is a new case that we have not yet discussed. Let us return to what we learned in the first Mishnah. We learned that if someone slaughters a Passover offering outside its proper time, with the intention that it be a Passover offering, it becomes a peace offering. Our discussion today concerns what is considered “outside its proper time.”
It is clear that if someone brings a Passover offering in the middle of Adar, when it is not yet the time of Passover, and brings it with the intention that it be a Passover offering, it becomes a peace offering. It is also obvious that if he brings it on the thirteenth of Nisan, one day before it is supposed to be brought, that is also considered outside its proper time, and it becomes a peace offering. The time of the Passover offering is the fourteenth of Nisan, in the afternoon, between the evenings.
We are therefore discussing a case in which a person brings the Passover offering in the morning of the fourteenth, before the proper time, with the intention that it be a Passover offering. The Mishnah teaches that it becomes a peace offering because it was brought as a Passover offering, but not at the proper time.
The Gemara says that the Mishnah is following the view of Rabbi Yehoshua. Rabbi Yehoshua says that it is as though the offering had been slaughtered on the thirteenth, and it is therefore considered a peace offering. We understand that view. The offering was brought in the morning, before the proper time, so it is treated like an offering brought on the thirteenth.
Ben Beteira, however, says that the offering is invalid. It is as though it had been slaughtered between the evenings, at its proper time. Even though it was actually slaughtered in the morning, Ben Beteira treats the entire day as the proper time for the Passover offering. Since it was slaughtered at its proper time with the wrong intention, it is invalid.
Shimon ben Azzai said: “I received a tradition from the seventy-two elders, on the day when they appointed Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah as the head of the academy.” This refers to the famous story mentioned in Massechet Berachot. The tradition was that all offerings that are eaten, when they are not brought for the sake of their obligation, are still valid, except for the Passover offering and the sin offering.
What is different in Shimon ben Azzai’s statement from the first Mishnah? The first Mishnah said that all offerings slaughtered without the proper intention remain valid. Shimon ben Azzai says that only offerings that are eaten are included. He does not include a burnt offering. According to Shimon ben Azzai, if a burnt offering is slaughtered without the proper intention, it is invalid.
Where did the anonymous first Mishnah hold? It said, “All offerings,” and the end of that phrase is understood to mean all offerings that are eaten. The Mishnah itself then states this explicitly: the Passover offering and the sin offering are exceptions. Everyone agrees that slaughtering those offerings without the proper intention makes them invalid. Shimon ben Azzai’s addition is the burnt offering, which the Sages did not accept.
Rabbi Elazar said in the name of Rabbi Oshaya that Ben Beteira considered the entire day to be the proper time for the Passover offering. If a person slaughtered the Passover offering on the fourteenth of Nisan in the morning with the intention that it be a Passover offering, it is valid, because Ben Beteira holds that the entire day is its proper time.
If so, why does the Mishnah say that it is “as though it had been slaughtered at its proper time”? According to Ben Beteira, it was actually slaughtered at its proper time. The answer is that since Rabbi Yehoshua used the expression “as though,” saying that it was as though it had been slaughtered on the thirteenth, Ben Beteira also used the expression “as though.” According to Ben Beteira, however, the offering really was brought at the proper time.
The Gemara asks: If this is where they disagree, why did they argue in the case of an offering brought without the proper intention? They should have argued in the more fundamental case of an offering brought in the morning with the proper intention. That would teach us the greater novelty: according to Ben Beteira, one may bring the Passover offering in the morning of the fourteenth with the intention that it be a Passover offering, and it is valid; whereas Rabbi Yehoshua would say that, because it is not yet the proper time, it is invalid or becomes a peace offering.
Why did the Mishnah present the case of an offering brought without the proper intention? If it had taught us only the case of an offering brought with the proper intention, I might have thought that Rabbi Yehoshua would agree with Ben Beteira when the offering was brought without the proper intention. Perhaps Rabbi Yehoshua would say that an offering brought with the proper intention in the morning is invalid because it is not yet the proper time, but that an offering brought without the proper intention is also invalid because the fourteenth is nevertheless the day on which the offering is brought. Perhaps, with regard to an offering brought without the proper intention, the entire day is considered its proper time.
The Mishnah therefore teaches that this is not so. According to Rabbi Yehoshua, if the offering is brought in the morning, the morning is not considered part of the proper time at all. Even though the offering is brought on the day when it will later be brought in the afternoon, the morning is still entirely outside its proper time. It is not merely that part of the day is suitable and part is unsuitable. The morning is considered outside the proper time, and the offering is therefore treated accordingly.
The Gemara then asks: How could Ben Beteira say that the Passover offering may be brought in the morning, when the verse says that it is brought between the evenings? The explicit time seems to be the afternoon.
Ulla, the son of Rav Ila’i, explains that “between the evenings” means between the two evenings. It refers to the period between the previous night and the following night. The entire day of the fourteenth is therefore included in the period called “between the evenings.” According to Ben Beteira, the Passover offering may be brought throughout that day.
We find a similar expression with the daily offering. Two daily burnt offerings were brought every day. The verse says that one lamb is offered in the morning, and it also says that the other is offered between the evenings. From this we understand that one is specifically offered in the morning, while the other is offered later in the day.
The Gemara challenges this inference. Perhaps one lamb must be offered in the morning, while the other may be offered throughout the entire day. The Gemara answers that the verse says, “one lamb you shall offer in the morning,” teaching that only one may be offered in the morning, not both. The second one must therefore be offered in the afternoon.
The daily offering has a special requirement. What about the lamps of the menorah? The verse also uses the expression “between the evenings” regarding the lighting of the lamps. Does that mean that the lamps may be lit throughout the entire day, even in the morning?
The Gemara answers that the lamps are different. The verse says that the lamps must burn from evening until morning. What do we learn from the phrase “from evening until morning”? A teaching explains that one must place enough oil in the lamps for them to burn from evening until morning. Another teaching derives from the phrase that the only Temple service that is valid from evening until morning is the lighting of the menorah.
This means that the lighting of the menorah is the final service of the day. It is not a service performed in the morning. After the menorah is lit in the afternoon, the Temple is effectively completed for that day, and it remains lit through the night until morning.
What about the incense? The incense was offered every day, once in the morning and once in the afternoon. The Gemara answers that the incense is different. Its wording is not being used to establish that the service can be performed throughout the day. The verses concerning the incense are understood differently.
The Gemara then returns to the Passover offering itself. The verse says, “There you shall slaughter the Passover offering in the evening.” The word “in the evening” clearly indicates the afternoon. Why, then, would Ben Beteira say that the offering may be brought in the morning?
The Gemara explains that the additional expression “in the evening” comes to teach that the Passover offering must be delayed. The daily afternoon offering is brought between the evenings, but the Passover offering is brought after it. The verse concerning the daily offering says “between the evenings,” while the verse concerning the Passover offering says both “between the evenings” and “in the evening.” The additional expression teaches that the Passover offering is delayed until after the afternoon daily offering.
How do we know which offering comes first on the fourteenth of Nisan? The daily offering is brought first, since it is described as being brought between the evenings. The Passover offering is then brought afterward, because the verse adds the words “in the evening.”
The Gemara finds this difficult. According to the view that the Passover offering may be slaughtered in the morning, the order seems strange. In the morning, one may bring the Passover offering. But once the afternoon arrives, the offering must be delayed until after the daily offering. Why would an offering be permitted earlier in the day but required to be delayed later in the day?
The Gemara answers that this phenomenon does exist. We find it with the additional prayer and the afternoon prayer on a fast day. The additional prayer normally precedes the afternoon prayer. However, once the time of the afternoon prayer arrives, the afternoon prayer is recited first, and only afterward is the additional prayer recited. Thus, something that normally comes first may be delayed when its later time arrives.
Similarly, according to Ben Beteira, the Passover offering may be brought in the morning. Once the afternoon arrives, however, the afternoon daily offering comes first, and the Passover offering is brought afterward.
The Gemara now asks another question. If Ben Beteira derives that the Passover offering may be brought in the morning from the expression “between the evenings,” why does the Torah use that expression concerning the incense and the menorah as well? According to Ben Beteira, the expression “between the evenings” has already been neutralized with regard to the Passover offering and understood as referring to the morning. Why does it appear elsewhere?
The Gemara explains that, according to Ben Beteira, “between the evenings” does not necessarily mean the afternoon. In the case of the Passover offering, it means the entire day, including the morning. The same expression in the other verses must therefore be interpreted through their respective contexts and additional verses.
The Gemara then returns to the dispute between Rabbi Yehoshua and Ben Beteira. Rabbi Yehoshua says that the morning of the fourteenth is not the proper time. Ben Beteira says that the entire day is the proper time. Rabbi counters Rabbi Yehoshua: I agree with you regarding the thirteenth. The thirteenth is certainly not the proper time, because no part of the thirteenth is suitable for bringing the Passover offering. But regarding the fourteenth, part of the day is suitable, because the offering may be brought in the afternoon. Since part of the day is suitable, you should agree that the entire day is considered the proper time.
The Gemara asks why the earlier discussion said that only part of the day is suitable. According to Ben Beteira, the entire day is suitable. If Rabbi was defending Ben Beteira, he should have said that the whole day is suitable, not merely that part of the day is suitable.
The answer is that Rabbi was speaking within the framework of Rabbi Yehoshua’s position. He was telling Rabbi Yehoshua: You are correct that the thirteenth is not the proper time, because none of that day is suitable. But on the fourteenth, you must concede that the day has the status of the proper time, since at least part of it is suitable. Therefore, according to this argument, an offering brought in the morning without the proper intention would be invalid, because it was brought on the day of its proper time, even though it was not yet the afternoon.
This creates a change in the understanding of Ben Beteira’s view. At first, we said that if the Passover offering was brought in the morning with the proper intention, it was valid, because the entire day was its proper time. We also said that if it was brought in the morning without the proper intention, it was valid, because the morning was considered outside the proper time. Now the argument is that the morning is not the actual time for bringing the offering, but it is nevertheless the day of the offering. Therefore, an offering brought with the proper intention in the morning would be invalid because it was not brought at the precise time, while an offering brought without the proper intention would also be invalid because it was brought on the day of its proper time.
Ben Beteira’s position would then be that the precise time for the Passover offering is the afternoon, as we learned when we were younger. If it is brought in the morning with the proper intention, it is invalid because it was not brought at the proper time. If it is brought in the morning without the proper intention, it is also invalid, because it was brought on the day of the proper time. Thus, the morning is not the actual time, but it is part of the day designated for the offering.
When Abaye heard this, he strongly questioned it. How can this be? If the offering was designated in the morning, why should it be permanently disqualified? Perhaps the person designated the Passover offering in the morning, at a time when it was not yet suitable for use. Since it was not suitable at that moment, perhaps it was rejected from the outset. Once something is rejected, it cannot become suitable later.
Perhaps the person designated it yesterday, on the thirteenth. On the thirteenth, it was at least suitable for something: if he had brought it without the proper intention, it could have been a peace offering. But once the morning of the fourteenth arrives, it is not suitable for anything. It is not suitable as a Passover offering, because it is not yet the afternoon, and it is no longer suitable as a peace offering, because it is now the day of the Passover offering. At that point, it becomes rejected.
Abaye asks: What is the law when an offering is rejected in this manner and then later becomes suitable? Does the principle of rejection apply even when the only thing lacking is time? If the offering itself has no defect and all that is missing is the arrival of the proper time, perhaps it is not considered rejected. Perhaps one simply waits until the time arrives, and the passage of time repairs the situation by itself.
The Gemara brings a related case concerning animal tithes. The tenth animal that passes through the pen is designated as the tithe offering. It is brought to the Temple, and part of it is placed on the altar; the remainder may be eaten. However, an animal cannot be brought as an offering until it is eight days old, as the verse says that it must be offered from the eighth day onward.
Suppose a person placed the animals in the pen on the night before the eighth day. For example, the eighth day is Wednesday, and he performed the procedure on Tuesday night. Technically, the animal was already entering its eighth day, but it was nighttime and was not yet suitable to be brought as an offering. What is the law? Do we say that, because it was designated at a time when it was not yet suitable, it was rejected and can never be brought? Or do we say that it was merely lacking time, and that this does not constitute rejection?
Rabbi Yochanan brings a teaching concerning this case. One verse says that the animal must remain under its mother for seven days, which implies that once seven days have passed, even the night of the eighth day is sufficient for its designation. Another verse says that it must be brought on the eighth day, implying that the night before is not sufficient.
The Gemara answers that the night is suitable for designation, while the day is suitable for bringing the offering. This teaches that designation at night is not a problem, even though the offering itself is not brought at night. We therefore see a principle: something may be designated before the time at which it can actually be offered, without being considered rejected.
There was a view that the principle of rejection applies only when the animal was initially suitable and then became unsuitable. According to that view, if the animal was never suitable in the first place, perhaps it is not considered rejected. But from the teaching of Rabbi Yochanan, it is clear that the principle can apply from the time of designation, even while the animal is still alive. The animal was designated, and only afterward does one wait for the proper time.
The Gemara therefore says that the principle of rejection does apply even to a living animal. Rabbi Yochanan gives a classic case: an animal belonged to two partners. One partner sanctified his half, then purchased the other half from his partner and sanctified that half as well. The animal is consecrated, but it may not be brought on the altar.
Why may it not be brought? When the first partner sanctified his half, the animal was not suitable for the altar, because only half of it was consecrated. The other half was ordinary property. The animal was therefore rejected from the outset. Even after the first partner acquired the second half and sanctified it, the animal remains disqualified for the altar.
What is done with such an animal? It is sold, and the money is used to purchase another offering. If the person made a substitution, transferring the sanctity to another animal, the substituted animal also receives sanctity. However, it too may not be brought on the altar, because it has the same status as the original animal. It must be sold, and the money is used for another offering.
The Gemara derives three important laws from this case. First, living animals can become rejected. The animal was alive when the first half was sanctified, yet because it was not suitable for the altar, it was considered rejected.
Second, rejection applies even when the animal was not previously suitable for the altar. Some might have thought that rejection applies only when something was initially suitable and then lost that status. This case teaches that even if it was never suitable for the altar from the beginning, the principle of rejection applies.
Third, there is rejection even with regard to monetary sanctity. The animal did not initially receive full sanctity as an offering. At most, it received sanctity that required its monetary value to be used for another offering. Nevertheless, the principle of rejection applies even to this type of sanctity. Although the animal itself was never suitable for the altar and was only suitable for redemption, it still becomes subject to the laws of rejection.
This is the principle that the Gemara needs here: Rabbi Yochanan holds that rejection applies even when the animal is alive, and even when the sanctity is monetary rather than sanctity of the animal itself.
Ulla said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan that if a person ate forbidden fat and designated a sin offering, and then became an apostate, the offering is rejected. Once he repents, it cannot be brought, because at the time when the animal was designated, the person was no longer fit to bring the offering.
In another case, Rabbi Yirmeyah said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan that if a person ate forbidden fat, designated a sin offering, and then became mentally incompetent, the offering is rejected. If he later regained his mental competence, the offering still cannot be brought. Since there was a moment when the person was not fit to bring the offering, it was rejected.
Why are both cases necessary? If we had been taught only the first case, in which the person became an apostate, we might have said that rejection applies because the person caused the disqualification himself. He was in control of his return to observance. Perhaps, however, when a person became mentally incompetent, the matter occurred beyond his control, and when he later became competent again, the offering would be restored. The second case teaches that it is rejected even when the disqualification occurred involuntarily.
The Gemara discusses another case. A person ate forbidden fat and designated a sin offering. The court then ruled that the forbidden fat was permitted, so the offering was no longer needed. Later, the court realized that it had made a mistake and retracted its ruling. The forbidden fat was again considered prohibited, and the person once again required a sin offering. What is the status of the original offering?
This is a question of rejection. At the moment when the court ruled that the fat was permitted, the offering was no longer needed. Later, when the court reversed itself, the offering again appeared to be needed. Does the fact that it was temporarily unnecessary constitute rejection?
The Gemara does not resolve the matter. We understand why one might call this rejection: there was a moment when the offering was not valid for its purpose, and afterward it became relevant again. But perhaps it is not considered rejection because nothing happened to the offering itself. The issue arose from an external ruling of the court. Nothing intrinsic changed in the person, and nothing intrinsic changed in the animal. Perhaps rejection applies only when the defect is in the offering or in the person bringing it, not when the status changes because of an external court ruling.
Rabbi Yochanan would open his teaching about the laws of rejection with this case. It was his standard example. He would say that the clearest case of rejection is one in which the court itself ruled that the forbidden fat was permitted. Once the court ruled that the sin had not occurred, the offering lost its status entirely. It was not an offering for this person, and it was not an offering for anyone else, because the fat was considered permitted. Therefore, when the court later reversed its ruling, the original offering remained rejected.
In the cases of the apostate and the mentally incompetent person, the problem is with the person, not with the offering itself. If another person had committed the same sin and was fit to bring an offering, that offering would be valid. The offering itself has not lost its status; the individual is unable to bring it because he is an apostate or mentally incompetent. In the case of the court’s ruling, however, the offering is not valid for this person or for anyone else, because the underlying act was ruled permissible.
This is how Rashi explains the distinction. Tosafot has another approach, but according to Rashi, Rabbi Yochanan regarded the court’s ruling as the obvious case of rejection because the offering itself had lost its status.
We return to Shimon ben Azzai’s statement in the Mishnah: “I received a tradition from the seventy-two elders.” Why does he say “the seventy-two elders” in the singular form rather than using the ordinary expression for seventy-two elders? There were seventy-two scholars in the academy. The Torah sometimes uses the expression “elder” in a way that can refer to the group as a unified body.
The explanation is that the agreement was unanimous. On that day, all the scholars were brought together in the academy, and they voted on a number of halachic matters. It was a special day in the academy, and the seventy-two elders reached a unified decision on these laws. Shimon ben Azzai therefore refers to them as a single body of elders.
The Gemara then asks what Shimon ben Azzai was adding. According to him, all offerings that are eaten remain valid when slaughtered without the proper intention, except for the sin offering and the Passover offering. He adds the burnt offering to the list of offerings for which slaughter without the proper intention is invalid.
What is the source for the burnt offering? The verse concerning the burnt offering says that it must be brought as a burnt offering. This teaches that if it was not brought for the sake of a burnt offering, it is invalid.
The Gemara challenges this reasoning. If the expression teaches that the burnt offering must be brought with the proper intention, then the same expression should teach that a guilt offering must also be brought with the proper intention and that, if it was not, it is invalid.
The Gemara answers that the expression concerning the burnt offering appears after the actual offering has already been placed on the altar. It therefore cannot be teaching that the slaughter must be performed with the proper intention, because the slaughter occurred earlier. The expression is being used for another purpose.
The Gemara then presents another proof. Shimon ben Azzai may derive the law through a kal vachomer. A sin offering is not entirely burned on the altar, yet slaughtering it without the proper intention makes it invalid. Certainly a burnt offering, which is entirely placed on the altar, should be invalid when slaughtered without the proper intention.
The Gemara rejects this kal vachomer. The sin offering has a special stringency: it brings atonement. A burnt offering does not have that same function. Perhaps the invalidation of an offering brought without the proper intention is connected specifically to the atoning nature of the sin offering.
The Gemara then says that the Passover offering can serve as the other side of the comparison. The Passover offering does not have the same atoning function, yet it also has a special stringency: it has a designated time and must be brought on the fourteenth of Nisan. Perhaps the law of invalidation stems from the special stringencies of these offerings.
The argument therefore returns in a circle. The special stringency of the sin offering cannot establish the law for the burnt offering, because the burnt offering lacks that stringency. The special stringency of the Passover offering also cannot establish the law for the burnt offering, because the burnt offering lacks the Passover offering’s fixed time. The Gemara seeks a common feature shared by the sin offering and the Passover offering.
The common feature is that both are sacred offerings, and in both cases slaughter without the proper intention makes the offering invalid. Shimon ben Azzai can then say that a burnt offering is also sacred, and therefore slaughtering it without the proper intention should make it invalid as well.
The Gemara challenges this too. If that is the principle, then a guilt offering should also be included, because it too is sacred. Why does Shimon ben Azzai add only the burnt offering?
The answer is that the sin offering and the Passover offering can be brought by the community as well as by an individual. The communal sin offering is brought when the community commits a certain type of inadvertent transgression, and the daily burnt offering is also a communal offering. The Passover offering, although brought by individuals, is brought by groups in a communal framework. A guilt offering, by contrast, is brought only by an individual. Since the sin offering, Passover offering, and burnt offering share the feature that they can be associated with the community, the guilt offering is not included in the comparison.
The Gemara then raises another difficulty. Perhaps Shimon ben Azzai’s derivation from the sin offering and the Passover offering is not valid because both have an additional common feature: failure to bring them involves a form of punishment. The sin offering atones for a transgression, and failure to bring the Passover offering carries a severe consequence. The burnt offering does not share that feature. Perhaps this common severity is what makes slaughter without the proper intention invalid in those two offerings.
If so, how does Shimon ben Azzai know that a burnt offering slaughtered without the proper intention is invalid? The Gemara answers that he did not derive it from the kal vachomer at all. He had a received tradition that a burnt offering slaughtered without the proper intention is invalid.
Why, then, did Rav Huna present a kal vachomer? The Gemara explains that Rav Huna did not rely on the kal vachomer as the actual source. He presented it to sharpen the students. He wanted them to challenge the reasoning and point out that the sin offering and Passover offering have additional stringencies that the burnt offering does not share.
In the end, the law concerning the burnt offering rests on the received tradition of Ben Azzai. The kal vachomer was only a method of sharpening the students’ understanding and encouraging them to identify the distinctions between the different offerings.