The Mishnah in Masechet Makot outlines various transgressions that incur the penalty of lashes. One such case involves eating tevel, which refers to produce from which the required tithes (terumot, maaser rishon, and maaser sheni) have not been separated. Until these tithes are given, the produce is forbidden for consumption.
According to Rabbi Shimon, one who eats even a minute amount (a kol shehu) of tevel is liable for lashes. The Sages (Hachamim), however, contend that liability only applies if one eats a minimum quantity of an olive's size (a kezayit). The Gemara delves into the nature of this dispute, asking how much tevel must be consumed to incur liability.
Rabbi Yirmiyah suggests that the dispute between the Sages and Rabbi Shimon specifically concerns whole wheat grains (chita). Rashi explains that a whole grain is considered a complete creation (a biriyah) in its natural state. In such a case, Rabbi Shimon would rule that a kol shehu is sufficient for liability because its complete form renders it significant (chashuv). However, if the wheat is ground into flour (kemach), it is no longer considered a complete creation, and everyone would agree that a kezayit is required. Another opinion, attributed to Rabbi Amiya, asserts that the dispute between Rabbi Shimon and the Sages applies to both whole grains and flour. According to this view, Rabbi Shimon maintains that a kol shehu is always sufficient for tevel, regardless of its form, while the Sages always require a kezayit.
Our Mishnah then records Rabbi Shimon challenging the Sages: "Do you not agree with me that in the case of eating an ant, even a kol shehu incurs liability?" Yesterday's lesson on the folio taught that eating even a single ant makes one liable. Rabbi Shimon argues that just as an ant, being a complete creation, makes one liable for a small quantity, so too should tevel, when in the form of a whole grain (chita), incur liability for a kol shehu. The Sages respond by distinguishing between types of complete creations: an ant is a living creature, whereas a grain of wheat is not. The significance of a living creature, they contend, makes even a small amount subject to liability, unlike a lifeless grain.
The Gemara then brings a beraita (an external Mishnah-like teaching) that supports Rabbi Yirmiyah's opinion. This beraita states that Rabbi Shimon holds that a kol shehu of tevel incurs lashes, whether it is flour or whole wheat. The Sages, however, only require a kezayit for bringing a sacrifice (a korban), but for lashes, a kol shehu is sufficient. Rashi clarifies that this means if someone unknowingly eats a kol shehu of forbidden food that would normally incur the spiritual excision (karet), such as chelev (forbidden fat), Rabbi Shimon would rule that they are liable for lashes, but not for bringing a korban chatat, as a korban requires a kezayit. Rabbi Shimon does not differentiate between types of complete creations, considering any whole item, like a single grape, a biriyah. The Sages, however, require a kezayit for a grape, but for a living creature like an ant, even a small quantity incurs liability.
A difficulty arises from the law of the sciatic nerve (gid hanasheh). The Gemara elsewhere discusses that eating a gid hanasheh, even if it is lifeless, is considered a biriyah. This contradicts the Sages' distinction that a biriyah must have life to be significant. Tosafot addresses this by suggesting that even if the gid hanasheh itself is lifeless, it is considered significant because it originates from a living animal, unlike a grain of wheat which comes from the ground and is inherently lifeless.
The Mishnah continues with other cases of liability for lashes. One is eating bikurim (first fruits) before the special recitation (kiri'ah) is performed over them. The Torah mandates that the first fruits of the seven species of Israel be brought to the Temple, and a specific passage from Parashat Kitavo (Deuteronomy 26:5-10) be recited by the owner before presenting them to the priest. Until this recitation is completed, the bikurim are forbidden for consumption. Eating them before this act incurs lashes. Similarly, one who eats kodshei kodashim (most holy offerings) outside the designated area in the Temple courtyard, or kodashim kalim (lesser holy offerings) or unredeemed maaser sheni outside the walls of Jerusalem, is liable for lashes. The Mishnah repeats the case of maaser sheni, which the Gemara will question later.
Another case is breaking a bone of the Korban Pesach (Paschal lamb) when the lamb is ritually pure (tahor). The Torah explicitly forbids breaking a bone of the Paschal lamb. The Mishnah specifies "the bones" (ha'atzim), implying that not all bones are included. As learned in Masechet Pesachim, this prohibition applies only to bones containing marrow. Breaking a bone without marrow does not incur liability. However, if the Korban Pesach was ritually impure (tameh), breaking a bone does not incur lashes.
The Mishnah also discusses the prohibition of leaving over parts of the Korban Pesach until morning (notar). If one leaves over parts, they are not liable for lashes because this is a passive transgression (a prohibition that is rectified by a positive command, lav shenitak la'aseh) and involves no active deed. Furthermore, one does not incur lashes for breaking a bone of notar or of a ritually impure Korban Pesach.
A final case involves the commandment of sending away the mother bird (shiluach haken). If one takes the young birds or eggs while the mother is present, without first sending the mother away, Rabbi Yehuda states that they are liable for lashes. The Sages, however, contend that this is a lav shenitak la'aseh, meaning it is a prohibition that can be rectified by a positive command (sending the mother away), and therefore does not incur lashes. Rabbi Yehuda argues that in this case, the positive command ("you shall surely send away") precedes the prohibition ("you shall not take the mother with the young"), making it a unique situation where lashes are incurred. Rashi explains that Rabbi Yehuda interprets the verse as if the command to send away is primary, thereby transforming the prohibition into one that is not rectified by a subsequent positive command.
Rabbah bar Hanan, quoting Rabbi Yohanan, states that the Mishnah's ruling regarding bikurim (that eating them before the recitation incurs lashes) follows the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. Rashi clarifies that Rabbi Akiva is often referred to as "Siti Matah" (a term whose meaning is debated, but here implies a foundational authority). Rabbi Akiva holds that the recitation (kiri'ah) is an essential prerequisite (me'akevet) for the consumption of bikurim. The Sages, however, believe that the mere placement of the bikurim next to the altar (hanacha) is what permits their consumption, and the recitation is not essential. The Torah mentions the placement twice, indicating its significance.
The Gemara then asks why it is necessary to state that the Mishnah follows Rabbi Akiva, when it could also follow Rabbi Shimon, who also holds that the recitation is essential. The answer is that Rabbi Shimon's opinion on this matter is already well-known from other sources, whereas Rabbi Akiva's stance is not as obvious. Therefore, the Mishnah explicitly attributes this view to Rabbi Akiva to inform us of his position.
The Gemara then delves into Rabbi Shimon's intricate derivation of laws from a verse in Deuteronomy (12:17). The verse lists several items that may not be eaten "in your gates," including "the tithe of your grain, your wine, and your oil; and the firstborn of your cattle and your flock; and all your vows, and your freewill offerings, and the heave-offering of your hand." Rabbi Shimon interprets each phrase, often by reading the verse backwards, to derive various halachic restrictions.
He begins with "the heave-offering of your hand" (u'terumat yadecha), which he identifies as bikurim. He explains that the word "hand" (yadecha) alludes to bikurim because the priest takes the basket of bikurim from the owner's hands. Rabbi Shimon argues that the verse cannot merely be teaching that bikurim cannot be eaten outside Jerusalem, as this could be derived by an a fortiori argument (kal vachomer) from maaser sheni, which is generally more lenient but also forbidden outside Jerusalem. Therefore, the verse must be teaching a new law: that one who eats bikurim before the recitation is liable for lashes. This aligns with his opinion in the Mishnah.
Next, Rabbi Shimon interprets "your freewill offerings" (v'nidvotecha) as referring to peace offerings (todah u'shlamim). Again, he argues that the verse cannot merely forbid eating them outside Jerusalem (due to the kal vachomer from maaser sheni). Instead, it must be teaching that one who eats these offerings before their blood is sprinkled on the altar (zerikat hadam) is liable for lashes. He derives this by adding a negative prohibition (lo ta'aseh) to an existing positive command (mitzvah ase) to sprinkle the blood before eating.
Continuing backwards, "your vows" (v'nidarecha) refers to burnt offerings (olah). Rabbi Shimon again dismisses derivations about eating outside Jerusalem or before sprinkling the blood (using kal vachomer from maaser sheni and todah u'shlamim, respectively). He also dismisses a derivation about eating after sprinkling the blood outside the curtains of the Temple courtyard (using kal vachomer from chatat v'asham). Instead, he concludes that this phrase teaches that one who eats a burnt offering at all, even after the blood is sprinkled and even within the Temple courtyard, is liable for lashes. This is because a burnt offering is entirely consumed on the altar and is not meant for human consumption. Thus, he adds a negative prohibition to the positive command that the burnt offering must be entirely burned on the altar (kalil toktar).
"The firstborn of your cattle and your flock" (u'bechorot bekarecha v'tzonecha) refers to the firstborn animal (bechor). Rabbi Shimon argues that this phrase cannot merely forbid eating it outside Jerusalem (kal vachomer from maaser sheni) or before sprinkling the blood (kal vachomer from todah u'shlamim). Therefore, it must be teaching that a non-priest (zar) who eats a firstborn animal, even after its blood has been sprinkled, is liable for lashes. This adds a negative prohibition to the positive command that the meat of the firstborn belongs to the priest.
Finally, "the tithe of your grain, your wine, and your oil" (maaser deganecha v'tiroshecha v'yitzharecha) refers to sin offerings (chatat) and guilt offerings (asham). Rabbi Shimon, through a series of kal vachomer arguments, concludes that this phrase teaches that a priest who eats a sin offering or guilt offering outside the curtains of the Temple courtyard, even after its blood has been sprinkled, is liable for lashes. This adds a negative prohibition to the positive command that these offerings must be eaten within the Temple courtyard.
Upon hearing Rabbi Shimon's intricate derivations, Rabbah exclaimed that if a woman is pregnant, she should pray that her child be like Rabbi Shimon, marveling at his intellectual prowess. However, the Gemara immediately challenges Rabbi Shimon's kal vachomer arguments, demonstrating their flaws. For example, Rabbi Shimon assumed that bikurim are more stringent than maaser sheni because only priests may eat them, whereas maaser sheni may be eaten by anyone. The Gemara counters that maaser sheni is more stringent in that it is forbidden to an onen (one who has lost a close relative but has not yet buried them), whereas bikurim are permitted to an onen. Thus, the kal vachomer is invalid. Similarly, the Gemara refutes Rabbi Shimon's comparisons between other offerings, finding counter-stringencies in the supposedly "lenient" items, thereby invalidating his entire chain of reasoning. For instance, while todah u'shlamim require blood sprinkling and burning of fats, maaser sheni has the stringency of requiring redemption on a coin with an image (kesef surah).
The Gemara then points out a seeming contradiction in the discussion of burnt offerings (olah). At one point, olah is considered stringent because the entire animal is consumed on the altar. Yet, later, it is considered lenient compared to other offerings because it has only one "eating" (by the altar), whereas others have two (by the altar and by the owners). The resolution offered is that when comparing olah to other offerings in general, its complete consumption on the altar is indeed a stringency. However, Rabbah's critique of Rabbi Shimon's derivation from olah was different. Rabbi Shimon tried to derive a law of consumption for olah from chatat and asham, which are edible. Rabbah argued that one cannot learn laws of consumption for an offering that is entirely inedible (olah) from offerings that are meant to be eaten (chatat and asham). The very premise of discussing "eating" an olah is flawed, as it is not meant for human consumption at all. Therefore, Rabbi Shimon's ingenious method of deriving laws by reading the verse backwards, though impressive, was ultimately based on flawed comparisons.