The Mishnah discusses a city whose inhabitants worship a particular deity on a designated holiday. Since the people of the city celebrate that holiday and honor the deity there, it is clear that one may not conduct business with them on the day of the holiday or during the three preceding days, as we have learned in the Gemara.
What, however, is the law regarding the outskirts of the city? The Mishnah says that there is no problem conducting business with people who live outside the city, because one may assume that they do not worship the idolatry located in the city. The Mishnah presents the opposite case as well: if the idolatry is worshipped on the outskirts, then the city itself is permitted.
The Mishnah also discusses someone who needs something from the city—for example, he needs to speak to someone there. May he enter the city on the day of the holiday, or is that prohibited? The concern is that it may appear that he has come to worship with them. Otherwise, why would he be in that city on the day of its holiday?
The Mishnah answers that it depends on the road. If the road ends in that city and there is no way to continue from there to another city, it is prohibited to enter. People will assume that the only reason he came was to participate in the idolatrous worship. If, however, the city is on a thoroughfare and the road continues from that city to another place, it is permitted. People will say that he is merely passing through and will not assume that he came for the idolatry.
The Gemara begins by asking: What is considered the outskirts? We have said that it is permitted to conduct business with the cities on the outskirts on the day of the holiday celebrated in the main city, but how far away must a place be to be considered part of the outskirts?
Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said in the name of Rabbi Hanina that it is comparable to Atluza of Gaza. Atluza, as she explains, was like a meat market located next to Gaza. Gaza was a Philistine city where idolatry was worshipped, and the meat market was very close to it. Thus, even if the place is extremely close—like the distance between Atluza and the city of Gaza—it is still permitted.
The Gemara presents another version of this discussion. According to that version, Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish, in the name of Rabbi Hanina, was asked specifically about Atluza of Gaza: Does this place have the permission mentioned in the Mishnah because it is considered outside the city, even though it is so close? The question was whether a place as close as Atluza was nevertheless permitted.
The answer referred to the city of Tyre. Had you ever gone to Tyre, the answer said, you would have seen Jewish people and non-Jews placing two pots on the same stovetop. The non-Jew would place his food in one pot, and the Jew would place his food in the other. The Sages did not suspect that anything improper would happen, even though permitted and non-permitted food was being cooked side by side.
Just as the Sages were not concerned when the pots of non-Jews were placed next to the pots of Jews, so too one need not be concerned about conducting business with people living on the outskirts. Ultimately, the outskirts are not celebrating the holiday themselves, and therefore we do not suspect them merely because they are close to the city.
Abaye now analyzes the meaning of the statement that the Sages “were not concerned.” What was the potential concern regarding the two pots? Perhaps the non-Jew would place something into the Jew’s pot while the Jew was not looking. The Gemara teaches that we do not make such a suspicion. We do not say that perhaps, when the Jew turned his head, the non-Jew inserted carrion into the pot.
Thus, even though carrion involves a prohibition from the Torah, we do not suspect that the non-Jew will secretly place it into the Jew’s pot. The Jew may place his pot beside the non-Jew’s pot without concern, even regarding a possible Torah-level prohibition.
Abaye applies this reasoning to the outskirts of a city where idolatry is worshipped. Even though there may be a possible Torah-level concern there, just as we do not suspect the non-Jew of placing carrion into the Jewish pot, we do not suspect the people on the outskirts of having a connection to the idolatry.
What would constitute a Torah-level concern regarding the money received from the people on the outskirts? Sometimes idolaters would use money itself as an offering. Such money would be considered money of idolatry, and if it eventually came into one’s possession, it would be prohibited from the Torah. The Torah prohibits benefiting from anything used for idolatry.
There is another possibility as well. The money may have been used to purchase an offering for the idolatry. In that case, too, the money would be considered connected to idolatry and would be prohibited from the Torah. Therefore, whether the money itself was offered or whether it was used to purchase something for the idolatry, there is a possible Torah-level prohibition.
Now apply this to the case before us. A person goes to the outskirts, to Atluza of Gaza, on the day when idolatry is being worshipped in Gaza. There is technically a Torah-level concern. Perhaps he sells them an animal, and the money they give him was itself used for idolatry in the city. Alternatively, perhaps the people of Atluza will take the animal he sells them and bring it to the city as an offering. In either case, there is a possible Torah-level concern.
Abaye’s novelty is that even though there is a possible Torah-level prohibition involving the money or the animal, we do not suspect it. This is comparable to the two pots: even though there was a possible Torah-level concern that carrion had been placed into the Jewish pot, the Sages did not suspect it. Similarly, we do not suspect the possible Torah-level concern in the case of the outskirts.
Before proceeding, Tosafot raises a question regarding the statement that we do not suspect that the non-Jew secretly placed carrion into the pot. Why would we suspect that in the first place? Every non-Jewish attendant is considered to be someone who comes and goes. Since he knows that the Jew is nearby and may return at any moment, he should be afraid to do something improper. Why would he place carrion into the pot?
Tosafot answers that the principle that the non-Jew is afraid applies when he would fear consequences if he were caught. In this case, however, he has an excuse. He could take a spoon, stir the pot, and claim that he was merely preventing the food from burning. If he used a spoon containing carrion while stirring, he could say that he had no intention of doing anything wrong.
Alternatively, Tosafot explains that the discussion may involve food belonging to a host or innkeeper rather than food belonging to the Jew himself. In that case, the non-Jew is not afraid to do anything to the pot.
In any event, Tosafot clarifies what the actual concern was. We are not worried that the non-Jew will simply take a piece of carrion and throw it into the Jewish pot. Why would he waste his own money? The carrion costs money, and he would gain nothing by throwing it away merely to ruin the Jew’s food.
The concern is that he might take his own lean piece of meat, place it into the Jewish pot, and take the Jew’s fatty piece of meat for himself. In that case, he would benefit financially. He would put the lean piece into the Jewish pot and take the better piece for himself. Even regarding that possibility, the Gemara says that we do not need to be concerned.
Tosafot applies this principle to another situation. We are able to leave our pots with non-Jewish maids because we do not suspect that a maid will purchase carrion at her own expense merely to ruin the food. The real concern would be that she might exchange a lean piece for a fatty piece in order to benefit herself. Since the Gemara says that we do not suspect even that possibility, there is no concern about the maid simply ruining the pot at her own expense.
According to Abaye, then, the lesson is that even when there is a possible Torah-level prohibition, we do not suspect such conduct. Similarly, we do not need to be concerned about the Torah-level prohibitions that might arise when conducting business with people living outside the city of idolatry.
The Gemara offers a second explanation. Rava understands the statement about the two pots differently. According to him, there was never a concern that the non-Jew would place carrion into the pot. If he were caught doing that, the Jew could take him to court and recover payment. The non-Jew is afraid to do something for which he could be caught and forced to pay.
Rava therefore says that we should not infer from the case of the two pots that a Torah-level concern is disregarded in the case of idolatry. In the case of the pots, the non-Jew is afraid to place carrion into the food because he could be caught and held financially responsible. In the case of the outskirts, however, one must be concerned that the non-Jew may actually worship idolatry.
The people living on the outskirts may be friends with the people in the city. Perhaps they are participating in the worship and are using the money they receive to purchase an offering for the idolatry. In that case, the money would be money connected to idolatry and would be prohibited from the Torah.
What, then, is the lesson from the two pots? Rava says that we do not need to be concerned about the rabbinic prohibition of food cooked by a non-Jew. Perhaps the two pots were placed near the fire and the non-Jew turned on the fire, causing the Jewish food to become subject to that prohibition. The Sages did not suspect that possibility.
Similarly, in the case of the outskirts, if you know that the money came from the person’s own pocket and did not come from the city of idolatry, then the money itself is not a concern. The only remaining possibility is that the person may take the animal he purchased and bring it to the city for idolatrous worship. That is already a rabbinic concern, and we do not need to be concerned about a doubtful rabbinic prohibition.
According to Rava, therefore, if you do not know where the money came from, you must be concerned. Perhaps the money is connected to idolatry, which would be a Torah-level prohibition. Why were the Sages not concerned about the Torah-level prohibition in the case of the carrion? Because the non-Jew would not do something for which he could be caught, taken to court, and required to pay.
By contrast, if you know that the money came from the person’s own pocket and did not originate in the city of idolatry, you do not have to suspect that he will take the animal to the city and use it for idolatrous worship. That is a rabbinic concern, and the Sages did not require us to be concerned about such a doubtful rabbinic prohibition. According to this explanation, it is permitted to conduct business in that marketplace as long as the money is known to have come from the person’s own pocket.
The Gemara offers a third answer in the name of Rabbah bar Ulla. The statement that the Sages were not concerned does not refer to food cooked by a non-Jew, because once the Jew places the food on the fire, there is generally no concern of that kind. The issue is rather the possibility of a splatter. Something from the non-Jew’s pot might splatter into the Jewish pot.
Even that possibility is not a concern, because it is remote. First, who says that anything will splatter? And even if something does splatter, there is a probability that it will not create a problem. We therefore do not suspect such a far-fetched possibility.
Rabbah bar Ulla applies this to the outskirts as well. According to this explanation, one must be concerned even about a doubtful rabbinic prohibition. Thus, even if one knows that the money came from the person’s own pocket, one must still be concerned that he may take the animal to the city and use it for idolatry. The novelty is that, although the three-day prohibition applies in the city itself, it does not apply to the outskirts.
According to this third explanation, the outskirts are prohibited only on the actual day of the holiday, not during the three preceding days. The concern about doing business with the people of the outskirts during those three days is comparable to the concern about a splatter from one pot entering the other: it is considered too remote.
There is a difficulty, however. The Mishnah appears to permit business with the outskirts even on the day of the holiday. The answer is that the Mishnah may be referring to places that are farther away, whereas Rabbah bar Ulla is discussing an extremely close place, such as Atluza of Gaza. In a distant place, even the day itself may be permitted. In a place as close as Atluza, however, business is prohibited on the day itself, though not during the three preceding days.
We can now review the three explanations. The Gemara asked how close a place can be and still be considered the outskirts. It answered with the example of Atluza, the market outside Gaza. The comparison to Tyre teaches that when two pots are placed on the same fire, the Sages did not suspect that something improper would happen.
According to Abaye, this teaches that we do not suspect even a Torah-level prohibition. Therefore, if we do not know where the money came from, we still do not have to suspect that it was used for idolatry. According to Rava, however, the reason we do not suspect a Torah-level prohibition in the case of the two pots is that the non-Jew would be afraid of being caught and taken to court. In the case of the outskirts, we must be concerned that the money may be connected to idolatry.
According to Rava, we do not have to be concerned about the rabbinic prohibition of food cooked by a non-Jew. Similarly, if we know that the money came from the person’s own pocket and not from the city, we do not have to be concerned that he may take the animal to the city. According to Rabbah bar Ulla, however, we must be concerned even about a doubtful rabbinic prohibition. The only thing we do not suspect is a remote possibility, such as a drop splattering from one pot into another.
Accordingly, Rabbah bar Ulla permits business with the close outskirts during the three days before the holiday but prohibits it on the day itself. The Mishnah’s permission must then refer to more distant outskirts, where even the day itself is permitted.
The Gemara returns to the Mishnah’s discussion of entering the city of idolatry. May a person go there on the day of the holiday? The Mishnah distinguishes between two situations. If all the roads end in that city, it is prohibited, because people will assume that he came to participate in the worship. If the roads continue from that city to another place, it is permitted, because people will assume that he is merely passing through.
The Gemara gives additional examples. If a person has a thorn in his foot near the idolatry and wants to bend down to remove it, he may not do so if it appears that he is bowing to the idolatry. If it does not appear that he is bowing to the idolatry, it is permitted.
Similarly, if a person’s money was scattered in front of the idolatry, he may not bend down to collect it if this would appear to be an act of bowing. If it does not appear that he is bowing to the idolatry, he may collect the money.
The same applies to a spring located in front of the idolatry. If a person wants to bend down and cup water in his hands, he may not do so if it appears that he is bowing to the idolatry. Although his intention is only to drink the water, observers may think that he is bowing to the idolatry. If it does not appear that he is bowing to it, it is permitted.
The Gemara then discusses statues through which water flows. The water may pass through the statue’s mouth and then flow toward the city. One may not place one’s mouth on the mouth of the statue to drink. It appears that one is kissing the idolatry, and kissing idolatry is also prohibited from the Torah, not only bowing.
Similarly, one may not place one’s mouth on a pipe through which water is flowing. The concern in that case is danger. When a person drinks directly from the pipe, he cannot see what is in the water. There may be an aluka, a leech, in the water, and drinking it could endanger him.
The Gemara asks what it means when these actions are permitted if it is not recognizable that the person is bowing to the idolatry. Perhaps no one is present to see him. That cannot be the explanation, because Rabbi Yehuda said in the name of Rav that whenever the Rabbis prohibit something because of the appearance it creates, it remains prohibited even in private.
The permission therefore applies when the act itself does not appear to be directed toward the idolatry. For example, the person may have his back toward it, or he may be standing to its side rather than facing it. In such a case, no one will think that he is worshipping the idolatry. The fact that no one happens to be present does not create the permission.
The Gemara gives several cases to establish the same principle: the thorn, the scattered money, and the spring. Why are all three necessary?
If the Gemara had taught only the case of the thorn, one might have said that a person is not permitted to bow down because he can simply walk away and remove the thorn a few minutes later. Although the thorn is painful, he can tolerate it temporarily.
The case of the scattered money teaches that even when there is a financial loss, one may not bow down. If a person cannot bend down to collect the money, he will lose it, but that does not permit him to perform an act that appears to be bowing to the idolatry.
Conversely, if the Gemara had taught only the case of the money, one might have said that a person may not bow down merely to avoid losing money, but perhaps the rule is different when he needs water. If he does not drink, he may die of thirst. The case of the spring teaches that even then he may not bow down to obtain the water.
Even though preserving life generally overrides the Torah, it does not override idolatry. Although this is not direct worship of the idolatry, it is considered a form of degradation or service connected to idolatry, and it remains prohibited. The Gemara therefore teaches that a person must be prepared to give up his life rather than bow down in order to drink the water.
The Gemara then asks why it needed to mention the statues with water flowing through their mouths. It had already taught that one may not bow down to drink water from a spring, even when his life is in danger. Why was it necessary to add that one may not place his mouth on the mouth of the statue and drink?
One possible answer would be that kissing idolatry is less severe than bowing, so perhaps a separate teaching is needed to prohibit it. Tosafot explains, however, that both acts involve a Torah-level prohibition. Once we know that one may not bow down to drink the water, there would seem to be no need to tell us separately that one may not kiss the mouth of the idolatry for the same purpose.
The Gemara answers that the case of the statue is needed as an introduction to the final case, involving the pipe. Since the teaching wanted to discuss placing one’s mouth on a pipe and the danger of a leech, it first mentioned a similar case: placing one’s mouth on the mouth of a statue. The statue case serves as a transition to the discussion of drinking directly from the pipe.
The Gemara now asks about the danger of the aluka. An aluka is understood as a leech or similar creature found in water. A person should not drink water directly from a river or pool. He should not place his mouth directly into the water, and he should not scoop it up with one hand.
When a person scoops water with one hand, he drinks quickly because the water spills through his fingers. He may swallow it without examining it. When he uses both hands, he can inspect the water before drinking it. He must therefore avoid drinking in a manner that prevents him from checking whether there is a creature in the water.
If he drinks in the dangerous manner and swallows an aluka, it can endanger his life. The expression used is that the danger comes from the aluka. Some versions of the text have a different wording, and the exact reading is left for Tosafot to discuss.
The Gemara brings a proof regarding the seriousness of this danger. If someone swallowed a creature from the water, one may heat water for him on Shabbat so that the heat will kill it. This is permitted because it is considered a danger to life.
While the water is being prepared, he should swallow vinegar. The vinegar slows the process and gives him time until the water can be heated and administered to him. This shows how serious the danger is.
The Gemara also discusses someone who swallowed a scorpion, or what is described as a hornet-like creature. He will certainly not survive, but he should nevertheless be given strong vinegar. The Gemara asks why he should be given anything if he cannot live. The answer is that the vinegar may prolong his life long enough for him to write his final will and testament for his children.
The Gemara then says that a person should not drink water at night, even from a vessel. The concern is that certain spirits are present at night and may place impurity in the water. Drinking such water would be dangerous, and a person would be held responsible for endangering himself.
The Gemara identifies the spirit associated with blindness. It enters the water at night, and therefore the concern in this case is not an aluka, since the water is in a cup and can be seen. The concern is that the spirit is present in the water.
What should a thirsty person do in the middle of the night? If someone else is with him, he should wake that person and tell him that he is thirsty. When two people are present, the spirit does not emerge.
If no one else is present, he should knock on the lid or side of the vessel containing the water. The purpose is to frighten the spirit, causing it to think that two people are present and to leave.
He may also recite a formula addressed to a person, son of a person, saying that his mother told him to be careful and to beware of the spirit. These words are part of the formula transmitted for removing the spirit. The recitation is intended to frighten it and drive it away.
Tosafot discusses the version that speaks of a creature swallowed from the water. If the person can remain alive for a long time after swallowing it, why not simply wait until after Shabbat to heat the water? Tosafot answers that even when a person can survive temporarily, the danger still permits violating Shabbat to treat him.
For example, if someone has a wound on the back of his hand or the back of his foot, the law treats it like an internal wound, and Shabbat may be violated for it, even though such a wound may sometimes heal on its own. The same principle applies here. Even if the person can continue living for some time, the water may be heated on Shabbat.
Tosafot also discusses another reading of the word for the creature. According to that version, it is a small bug found in the water that draws out a person’s intestines and causes severe internal damage. The person’s stomach can swell and burst.
Tosafot then addresses the statement that one should not drink water at night. Rashi’s version says that the prohibition applies not only to rivers and pools but also to water in vessels. According to Rashi, the spirits enter vessels as well. This explains why the Gemara later advises a solitary person to knock on the vessel.
Tosafot, however, maintains that the spirit enters rivers and pools but not vessels or jugs. According to Tosafot, the concern applies only to natural bodies of water. Tosafot therefore does not have the version that requires a person who is alone to knock on the vessel at night.
There is also another version according to which the spirit emerges only on certain nights, described as Tuesday night and Wednesday night. Thus, there are different readings regarding when the spirit appears: according to Rashi, the concern applies broadly and includes water in vessels; according to Tosafot, it applies only to rivers and pools; and according to another version, it applies only on particular nights.
Finally, Rashi gives the formula intended to remove the spirit. The formula begins with a complete word, and then one letter is removed successively, as though the power of the spirit is being diminished step by step. The spirit begins with its full name, and each successive recitation reduces it until only the final letter remains. In this way, its power is progressively weakened and it is driven away.
Blessed is the Lord forever. Amen and amen.