We begin the Mishnah on 61a. Suppose you are making wine in a gentile’s house, while the wine remains in the gentile’s possession. You intend to use the wine and purchase it from him; you will take it from him later, but for now it remains in his possession. If the gentile’s house is open to the public domain, and the city contains both Jews and gentiles, the wine is permitted. The gentile will be afraid that a Jew might catch him touching it, because Jews and gentiles live in the city and his house is open to the public domain.
It is not necessary for a Jew to sit there and watch him twenty-four hours a day. The Mishnah says that even if the Jew enters and leaves repeatedly, the gentile will be afraid. We will see what that statement means.
The Mishnah continues with another case. You are making wine for the gentile so that it will be suitable for drinking, and you leave it in his domain. In this case, the gentile writes to the Jew, “I have been paid for it.” Why does that make a difference? Because the wine is locked, as we learned earlier, and the Jew has the right to come and take it whenever he wants. The gentile will not break the lock in order to do anything to the wine, especially once he has acknowledged that he has already been paid.
Before he has been paid, the gentile is not afraid to touch the wine. If the Jew comes and says, “That is my wine,” the gentile can answer, “You have not paid for it yet. Leave; it is still mine.” Once he says, “I have been paid,” however, the gentile is afraid to touch it. It is true that the Jew owes him money, but the wine was not given as collateral for that debt. Therefore, the gentile will be afraid to touch it.
The Gemara asks about a city whose entire population is gentile. We said that the wine is permitted because the gentile would be afraid to touch it, but why should he be afraid? What about Jewish peddlers who pass through the city? They do not live there, but Jewish peddlers come through, and the gentile should therefore be afraid that they might see him touching the wine.
The answer is that this is a city with a locked gate. Normally, when people enter the city, the gate must be opened. If a Jewish peddler is coming, the gentile knows that he is entering because the gate has to be opened. Therefore, the gentile is not afraid of the peddler in this case.
We have established several rules. If the gentile lives in a city that contains Jews, and his house is open to the public domain, the wine is permitted because he will not touch it. Even if his house is not open to the public domain, but he has a window open to the public domain through which people can see in and out, that is also sufficient. He is afraid that a Jew might see him.
The same applies to a refuse dump. People go there throughout the day, including to relieve themselves, so it is also considered a place where a Jew might see him. Therefore, the gentile is afraid to touch the wine.
The Gemara discusses a palm tree belonging to a Jew. The Jew regularly comes to collect its fruit. If the tree stands in front of the gentile’s house, the Jew will climb it to pick the fruit, so the gentile will be afraid to touch the wine because the Jew might see him.
The Gemara then says that there is a dispute regarding a palm tree whose top has broken off and which no longer produces fruit. Do we still assume that the Jew will come to the tree? One opinion says that the wine is forbidden. Since the Jew will no longer come to collect fruit, the gentile is not afraid that the Jew will catch him touching the wine. The other opinion says that the wine remains permitted. The Jew might still climb the tree in order to obtain an elevated view and search for an animal that he has lost. Since the tree still benefits the Jew, he may still pass by it, and the gentile remains afraid to touch the wine.
Rashi explains that Jewish peddlers travel from one place to another. When they arrive, they go directly onward. Perhaps they will see the gentile touching the wine. However, when a city has a gate and a lock, everyone knows when someone enters the city. Therefore, when Jewish peddlers arrive, the gentile knows about it and is afraid.
Rashi also explains that even if the gentile’s house is not open to the public domain, the wine is permitted if there is a window open toward the public domain in front of his house. Since people can see into the window, the gentile is afraid that a Jew might see him.
Rashi offers another explanation. The window may not open onto the public domain at all. Rather, a Jew lives across from the gentile, and their windows face one another. Even though this is not a public domain, the Jew can look directly at the gentile, and the gentile will be afraid.
Regarding the refuse dump, Rashi explains that people are frequently present there. Regarding the palm tree, he explains that when the tree is standing and producing fruit, the Jew will climb it to pick the fruit and will be able to observe what is happening. If the tree has broken and no longer produces fruit, why would the Jew climb it? One rabbi says that there is no reason for him to do so. The other says that he may still climb it to obtain an elevated view and search for his animal.
Let us continue with a case from a Beraita. A Jew either purchases or rents a house in a courtyard where gentiles live. The Jew lives in the same courtyard as the gentiles, and he fills a separate area with wine. The wine is permitted. Why? Since the Jew lives in the same courtyard, the gentile will be afraid to touch the wine, because the Jew may see him or pass through the courtyard at any time.
This is true even though the Jew does not have the key and the wine is not locked. Apparently, the wine is kept in a separate storage area, and the gentile will not enter and ruin it because he knows that it belongs to the Jew. Even if the Jew is not home all the time, the wine is still permitted.
The first case therefore deals with wine belonging to either the owner of the house or another Jew. The next case concerns a Jew who lives in a different courtyard. The wine is still permitted, but additional safeguards are required: the key and the seal must be in the Jew’s possession.
We must point out that we already learned that if the gentile’s house is open to the public domain and Jews live in the area, the wine is permitted, because the gentile is afraid that a Jew will see him. Therefore, in this case, it must be understood that the gentile’s house is not open to the public domain. Otherwise, the wine would already be permitted for that reason, as the commentators point out.
The third case is where a Jew prepares wine belonging to a gentile in a pure manner, taking care that the gentile does not touch it. The Jew is making the wine for himself or intends to use it, but the wine is being made in the gentile’s domain. If a Jew lives in the same courtyard, the wine is permitted, but the key and seal must be in the Jew’s possession.
Why are the key and seal necessary in this case? The wine does not yet belong to the Jew. He is merely working for the gentile. Therefore, even though a Jew lives in the same courtyard, the gentile is not necessarily afraid to touch the wine. He can reason, “It is my wine. What difference does it make if a Jew helped me prepare it?” Since it is not yet the Jew’s wine, it is permitted only when the Jew has the key and the seal.
At this point, Rabbi Yohanan says that there is an error in the text of the Beraita. When a Jew is making wine in the gentile’s domain and a Jew lives in the same courtyard, the wine is permitted even if the Jew does not have the key and seal. Rabbi Yohanan holds that, just as in the beginning of the Mishnah, once the Jew is in the same courtyard, the gentile is afraid to tamper with the wine.
What happens if the Jew lives in another courtyard? Rabbi Meir says that the wine is forbidden even if the key and seal are in the Jew’s possession. His reasoning is that the wine belongs to the gentile, remains in the gentile’s courtyard, and the Jew is far away. The gentile is not afraid to break the lock and enter. The text is not yet clear regarding which case the other rabbis are addressing, so we will wait for the Gemara.
The rabbis say that the wine remains forbidden until a guardian sits and watches it, or until there is a trusted person who comes at intervals. The Gemara asks what kind of guardian this means. If he comes at fixed times, the gentile knows exactly when he is coming. The intended meaning must be that he comes at irregular times, without notice—for example, one time at seven o’clock and another time at a different hour. In that situation, the gentile will be afraid.
Let us return to the Mishnah. The Mishnah quotes Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, but we do not yet know what he means. The Gemara will explain it.
Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar appears to be responding to something said by the first anonymous opinion. The first opinion discussed the case of a Jew who helps a gentile make wine, while ensuring that the gentile does not touch it, and then leaves the wine in the gentile’s house. If the city contains only gentiles, the wine is forbidden because the gentile is not afraid to touch it. Even if his house is open to the public domain, who is going to see him? Only gentiles. He is not afraid of them.
What, then, does Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar mean when he says that the gentile’s domains are all considered one domain? First, the Gemara must determine whether he is being more stringent than the rabbis or more lenient.
One interpretation is that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar is being lenient. Just as wine is forbidden when it is in the house of the gentile who made it, so too, if the wine is found in another gentile’s house, it remains permitted. We do not suspect that the second gentile touched it. The reason is that we are not concerned about a reciprocal arrangement among the gentiles, in which one gentile allows the other to enter and perform an act of libation on his wine, with the understanding that he will later be allowed to do the same in return.
According to this interpretation, the original gentile is not afraid to touch the wine in his own house because it is his wine and he made it. But if the wine is found in another gentile’s house, the second gentile will be afraid to touch it because it does not belong to him. We do not suspect that the two gentiles made a reciprocal agreement allowing each other to enter and tamper with one another’s wine.
This is one way of understanding Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar’s statement, according to Rabbi Nachman. Rabbi Nachman explains that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar is being lenient regarding the distinction between the original gentile’s house and the second gentile’s house. Since we are not concerned about a reciprocal arrangement, we are not afraid that the second gentile touched the wine.
Another interpretation is that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar is being stringent. He says that all gentile domains are considered one. It does not matter where the wine is found; it is forbidden in every case. A Beraita supports Rabbi Nachman’s stringent interpretation: Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says that all gentile domains are considered one because of the concern about reciprocal arrangements.
According to this understanding, wherever the wine is found, it is forbidden because the gentiles may make an agreement with each other. One gentile may allow the other to enter his house and perform an act of libation on his wine, with the understanding that he will later be allowed to enter the other’s house and do the same.
Rashi explains the matter as follows. One cannot leave the wine in the house of the gentile who owns it, and one cannot necessarily leave it even in another gentile’s house. We might have thought that every house is the same and that all the domains are considered one. However, since the wine is being placed in a house that does not belong to the owner of the wine, that gentile should be afraid to touch it because it is not his.
Why, then, does Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar remain concerned? Even regarding the original gentile—the one who made the wine and in whose house the Jew left it—we may suspect a reciprocal arrangement. The Jew may have made the wine in the gentile’s house and then set it aside in a designated corner. The gentile knows that it is the Jew’s wine and that he may not touch it. Why should we suspect the gentile of touching it?
The concern is that the original gentile may make an arrangement with the gentile across the street. He may say, “If you want to perform an act of libation on this wine, do so. When I later need to perform such an act, I will come to your house and do it there.” That is the concern about reciprocity. Therefore, Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar may be teaching either that we do not accept this concern or that we do accept it.
The Gemara brings another story. Parzak Rufila, who was the viceroy, or second in command to the king, had wine prepared in a pure manner. The wine was placed with a gentile sharecropper who was holding it. The rabbis said that the concern about reciprocal arrangements applies only when the two parties are ordinary equals who perform favors for each other. Today one places wine with the other, and tomorrow the other places wine with him.
In the case of Rufila and the sharecropper, however, there is no reciprocity. Rufila may place wine with the sharecropper, but the sharecropper will not one day place his wine with Rufila. Since there is no reciprocal arrangement, we do not suspect the sharecropper of touching the wine.
Generally, the concern about reciprocal favors applies when the owner of the wine is not afraid of the other person. In an ordinary case, where a Jew takes wine from one gentile and places it with another, the first gentile is not afraid to walk across the street and touch it. The concern is that the second gentile will permit him to enter, touch the wine, and then conceal what happened by claiming that nobody touched it.
According to another opinion, we are not concerned about such reciprocal arrangements. Why not? If the second gentile enters and touches the wine, the owner of the wine may say, “The wine is no longer usable. He came in and touched it.” The second gentile is not necessarily afraid to acknowledge that the wine was touched or to prevent the owner from entering.
In the case of Rufila, however, Parzak Rufila must allow him to enter. After he touches the wine, the sharecropper will not say that anything happened, because he is afraid of Rufila and will cover for him. Therefore, that case may actually be more problematic. The sharecropper will allow Rufila to enter and will conceal the fact that he touched the wine.
The Gemara gives one more case. There was Jewish wine in the city, and gentiles were found next to the barrels, handling them. The barrels were not sealed. If they had been sealed, there would be no concern, so we must be dealing with unsealed barrels.
The ruling depends on what the gentiles appeared to be doing. If, based on their position and actions, they would have been caught as thieves, the wine is permitted. We assume that they did not touch it in a prohibited manner because they were afraid of being caught stealing. If, however, they would not have been caught as thieves, we must suspect that they were handling the wine improperly, and the wine is forbidden.
Rashi concludes that if the gentile is caught in a manner that would make him appear to be stealing, and he is a weak person who is afraid of the judges of the city, we assume that he did not touch the wine. But if he is a powerful or violent person who is not afraid of the authorities or of being caught, then even if he is found among the vats, we suspect that he touched the wine.
Although the chapter ends here, something unusual occurs: Rashi’s commentary continues after the chapter has concluded. Because the preceding pages contained many cases and variables concerning wine handled by gentiles, Rashi now summarizes the laws and gives the bottom line according to his understanding.
The variables included whether the gentile acted intentionally or unintentionally; the level of benefit involved, whether the benefit was specifically from drinking or from another form of use; the meaning of an unintentional act and the different levels within that category; and the matter of indirect movement, where the motion did not come directly from the gentile’s own strength but resulted from a secondary force. There were also cases in which the gentile touched the wine indirectly, such as through a barrel or another object.
Rashi now summarizes these different laws. The worst case is where a gentile handled the wine intentionally, with the specific intention of touching it, and also moved it. If he intended to touch the wine, that is the most serious case. Even if he did not act for idolatrous purposes, the wine is forbidden for benefit. This was the case of the official who was in charge of the vats and measures: he touched and moved the wine intentionally. We applied the stringent ruling that even though he did not perform an act of libation, the wine is forbidden.
A gentile may also shake the wine even though he did not do so for the purpose of libation. That too is included in the stringent category. The next case is where he thought the liquid was oil. He did not know that there was wine in the barrel. His name was Harum. He put his hand into the barrel because he thought it contained oil, and we said that anything he intended to do with the oil applies to the wine as well.
Another case involved a gentile who fell into a pit. He entered unintentionally. Similarly, there was the case of an etrog that fell into a barrel, and the gentile put his hand in to remove it. Rashi said that as he raised his hand, his attention had to be directed away from the etrog, but the Gemara still discussed the fact that he had placed his hand into the wine.
All of those cases involved contact with the wine itself. There are also cases in which the gentile does not touch the wine directly but performs another action. For example, he may measure the wine by inserting a stick into the barrel to determine how much wine it contains. We know that he is not doing so for the purpose of libation. Another case is where there is a hornet or similar object in the wine, and he uses a stick to remove it.
In these cases, the question is whether the act is forbidden for drinking or even for benefit. The contact is not necessarily intentional, and the gentile’s purpose is clearly unrelated to libation. Nevertheless, the level of contact may affect the ruling.
The Gemara asks about a case in which a gentile performs an action involving the wine without a clear intention. One case concerned a gentile who touched the wine with his lulav. He went up to the palm tree and came into contact with the wine. The reason the wine was permitted was that his intention was unrelated to the wine. The implication is that if he had touched the wine intentionally, it would have been forbidden for benefit.
Thus, when a gentile intentionally moves or shakes the wine through another object, the wine is forbidden for benefit. This is not direct bodily contact with the wine, but it is still an intentional action performed through an intermediary.
There is also the case of a gentile pouring one liquid into another. For example, he may pour wine out of a barrel, pour water into wine, or empty a barrel. If he knows that the liquid is wine, this is forbidden. We remember the story in which Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish went to a certain town and saw gentiles pouring water directly into wine. Rabbi Yohanan instructed him to announce that the wine was forbidden, because the water being poured into the wine creates a connection between the liquid and the wine.
That case is considered a connection between the liquid being poured and the wine itself. It is therefore treated as a form of direct contact for these purposes. The concern is greater when the gentile knows that the liquid is wine.
What if the gentile does not know that the liquid is wine? This was the case of two rabbis who were sitting and drinking wine. They saw a gentile and did not know that he was a gentile. They asked him to pour for them. There were two reasons to permit the wine. First, the gentile may have assumed that the liquid was not wine, because if it were wine, the rabbis would not have asked him to pour it. Second, he did not touch the wine directly; he merely poured it, causing it to move through the force of the pouring.
According to this view, one may drink the wine. The decisive factors are that the gentile did not know that it was wine and that there was no direct attachment between his body and the wine. This is not considered an act of libation.
There was also a case in which a gentile threw a barrel into a pit. Even if he acted in anger, the ruling does not depend on his anger. Since the barrel was thrown and there was no direct connection between the gentile and the wine, it is permitted. Throwing something does not create the necessary connection. According to this approach, that is the way Rashi understands the various cases at the end of the chapter.