The Eddie D Sit edition presents an audio series on the תלמוד בבלי Talmud Bavli. Today, we study the גמרא Gemara in עבודה זרה Avodah Zarah, דף ס״ד Daf Samech Daled. This session is dedicated לעילוי נשמת le'ilui nishmat אברהם בן אסתר Avraham ben Esther, and may his soul find rest in Gan Eden Ruach Hashem tenichehu be-Gan Eden, אמן Amen. Additionally, we pray for a רפואה שלמה refuah sheleimah for מיקי בן ג׳יימי Mickey ben Jamie and אינה בת לונה Inna bat Lona, seeking healing for both body and soul refuat hanefesh u-refuat haguf. May it be Your will, and let us say אמן v'khen yehi ratzon v'nomar Amen.
We begin today's study on ס״ג עמוד ב׳ Samech Gimel Amud Bet, six lines from the bottom. The scene opens with רב נחמן Rav Nachman, עולא Ulla, and אבימי בר פפא Avimi bar Pappa seated together, along with חייא בר אמי Hiyya bar Ammi. Hiyya presents a question: שכרו לשבור ביין נסך מהו Sekharo lishbor b'yayin nesekh mahu? This question revolves around a worker whose job is to break barrels of יין נסך yayin nesekh. The concern arises because the worker is employed by a גוי goy, who certainly possesses אסור assur יין נסך yayin nesekh. As we know, working for יין נסך yayin nesekh is prohibited, and any payment received for such work is also אסור assur.
However, in this scenario, the worker is tasked with breaking the barrels. The גמרא Gemara probes whether we can argue that since the worker desires the existence of the barrels in order to break them, the payment should also be אסור assur. The reasoning is clear: the worker does not want the wine to spoil before he can complete his job, as that would leave him without work. Thus, he is indeed רוצה בקיומו rotzeh b'kiyumo, and the payment should be considered אסור assur.
On the other hand, an alternative argument suggests that one who eliminates עבודה זרה avodah zarah is acting positively, and therefore, the payment could be מותר mutar. This presents two sides to the question. Rashi Rashi clarifies that the worker is paid to break the barrels and pour out the wine. The central inquiry becomes: what is the status of his payment? The question is whether we can say that since this Jew desires the barrels to remain intact until he can break them, the payment he receives is אסור assur.
Rav Nachman responds, stating: ישבור ותבא עליו ברכה yishbor v'tavo alav berakhah. He asserts that not only is the action permitted, but it is also a source of blessing. The גמרא Gemara seeks to provide a proof for Rav Nachman’s assertion, suggesting that even if an item is אסור בהנאה assur be-hana'ah and one desires its existence, the payment for destroying it may be מותר mutar. The proof is drawn from a case involving a גוי goy who possesses a field of כלאיים kilayim, which is a prohibited mixture of plants.
The ruling states that a Jew cannot plow next to a גוי's goy field of כלאיים kilayim because it enhances the prohibited mixture. However, it is permitted to assist the גוי in uprooting the plants, despite the Jew’s desire for the plants to remain intact until he can uproot them himself. The reasoning here is to eliminate the איסור issur of כלאיים kilayim. The גמרא Gemara further identifies that this view aligns with רבי עקיבא Rabbi Akiva, who maintains that even a passive desire for the existence of כלאיים kilayim is אסור assur.
As the discussion progresses, the גמרא Gemara makes another distinction: while a Jew may not assist in maintaining the existence of עבודה זרה avodah zarah, he may be permitted to uproot it. This leads to the conclusion that destroying prohibited items is permissible even when one desires their existence for the purpose of destruction. Hence, the reasoning applies similarly to the case of יין נסך yayin nesech where the worker, despite wanting the wine to exist until he can break it, is allowed to receive payment for the destruction.
Rav Nachman’s position is further supported by a case involving a Jew owed money by a גוי goy, who sold his עבודה זרה avodah zarah and provided the Jew with payment. The גמרא Gemara questions whether the money from the sale of the עבודה זרה avodah zarah maintains its prohibited status. Rav Nachman concludes that the money from the sale of a גוי's עבודה זרה avodah zarah is indeed מותר mutar. This is evidenced by the fact that the גוי’s intention to convert nullifies the status of the עבודה זרה avodah zarah and renders the payment permissible.
In conclusion, the discussion navigates through complex halachic principles, emphasizing the distinctions between different cases and intentions regarding prohibited items. The underlying theme is the tension between the desire for existence and the permissibility of actions taken to eliminate prohibited items. Rav Nachman’s assertions, supported by the analysis of various cases, highlight the nuanced understanding of halacha in relation to עבודה זרה avodah zarah and יין נסך yayin nesech, ultimately leading to a clearer comprehension of the halachic landscape surrounding these issues.