The Eri B. Sitt Edition, an audio series on the Talmud Bavli, begins today’s discussion with the Mishnah on the wording of vows concerning a year. The Mishnah says that if a person declares, “I will not drink wine for one year,” and the year becomes a leap year, he is prohibited from drinking for that year, including the additional month.
The Mishnah is teaching that when a person says, “I will not drink wine for a year,” the additional month is included. The primary novelty is that this is not the same as saying, “This year,” or “The present year.” When a person says, “This year,” the prohibition applies to that particular year, including its thirteenth month if it is a leap year. But when he says, “One year” without specifying which year, he means a twelve-month period. The additional month is not automatically included.
This leads to an interesting point. If a person says, “I will not drink wine for one year,” and that year turns out to be a leap year, the thirteenth month does not necessarily have to be counted. Since he did not specify which year he meant, technically he could allow that year to pass and begin observing the vow the following year, which might be an ordinary twelve-month year.
Ordinarily, once a person makes a vow, he may not simply postpone it indefinitely. A person is obligated to fulfill his vows and may not delay them improperly. Nevertheless, in this case, if he allowed the first year to pass, the vow would not have taken effect during that leap year. Technically, he could observe it during the following year, which would consist of twelve months. This is an important novelty.
The Ran initially explains that when a person says “one year” without any further qualification, he means a twelve-month period. This is different from saying “this year” or “the present year.” The Ran then cites another approach and adds an even more interesting case: a person says, “One year from today.”
In the first case, the reasoning is that the person did not necessarily mean the current year. He could have meant any twelve-month period, including the following year. The other approach takes the matter further and discusses a person who says, “One year beginning today.” This is compared to the law concerning a house in a walled city, which may be redeemed within a year of its sale.
The Gemara derives from a biblical decree that, in the case of a house in a walled city, the additional month of a leap year is included. Thus, if the year is a leap year, the period becomes thirteen months. The other approach explains that a special biblical derivation is necessary in that case. Without that derivation, “one year from today” would ordinarily mean twelve months. The year begins on the day of the sale, and even there, without the biblical decree, the period would have been twelve months.
The Ran brings proofs in both directions. Then, near the end of his discussion, he retracts his initial position. He writes that even when a person makes a vow using the general expression “one year,” the vow may include the leap month. Why? Because when a person says, “One year,” he may mean the present year. Therefore, if the present year is a leap year, the vow extends for thirteen months. If he failed to observe it during that year and attempted to postpone it to the following year, he would already have violated his vow by delaying it improperly.
According to this later position of the Ran, all of these cases may involve thirteen months, whether the person said “for this year,” “for the year,” or simply “for one year.” In each case, the leap month is included.
The Mishnah continues: If a person says, “I will not drink wine until Rosh Chodesh Adar,” the question is which Adar he means when the year is a leap year. The Mishnah understands an unspecified reference to Adar as referring to Adar Rishon, the first Adar.
The Mishnah then says that if he makes the vow until the end of Adar, this likewise means the end of Adar Rishon. The Ran explains that this is the primary version of the text: “Until Rosh Chodesh Adar” means until Rosh Chodesh Adar Rishon, and “until the end of Adar” means until the end of Adar Rishon. The reason is that, when left unspecified, “Adar” refers to the first Adar.
There is, however, another version of the Mishnah that reads “until the end of Adar Sheni,” the second Adar. According to that version, the two months of Adar are treated as one extended month. Therefore, “the beginning of Adar” refers to Adar Rishon, because that is the beginning of the extended month, while “the end of Adar” refers to the end of Adar Sheni, because that is the end of the two-month period.
Accordingly, there are two textual versions. When a person says “until Rosh Chodesh Adar,” everyone agrees that this means Rosh Chodesh Adar Rishon. The disagreement concerns the phrase “until the end of Adar”: does it mean the end of Adar Rishon or the end of Adar Sheni?
The Gemara infers from our Mishnah that when a person says “Adar” without specifying, he means Adar Rishon. The Gemara then asks whether the author of the Mishnah must be Rabbi Yehuda. A baraita states that when writing a document, if the date is in Adar Rishon, one writes “Adar Rishon,” while if it is in Adar Sheni, one writes simply “Adar.” That is the position of Rabbi Meir.
Rabbi Yehuda says the opposite: in Adar Rishon one may write simply “Adar,” while in Adar Sheni one must write “Adar Sheni.” If that is so, the anonymous Mishnah, which understands unspecified “Adar” as Adar Rishon, appears to follow Rabbi Yehuda.
The Ran explains that according to the first version, the Mishnah is indeed consistent with Rabbi Yehuda. Since the two months are regarded as one extended month, the beginning of Adar is Adar Rishon, and the end of Adar is the end of Adar Rishon according to that version. Thus, an unspecified reference to Adar means Adar Rishon.
The Gemara then suggests that the Mishnah could even follow Rabbi Meir. The difference depends on whether the person knew that the year would be a leap year. When people knew that there would be a leap year, an unspecified reference to Adar could mean Adar Rishon, since it was known that there would be a second Adar. But when they did not yet know whether the year would become a leap year, an unspecified reference to Adar could mean Adar Sheni, as Rabbi Meir teaches.
The Ran explains that the baraita itself serves as a proof. It says that “until Rosh Chodesh Adar” means until Rosh Chodesh Adar Rishon, while if the year is a leap year, “until Rosh Chodesh Adar” means until Rosh Chodesh Adar Sheni. The Gemara asks: apparently, the first clause is speaking about an ordinary year, while the second clause is speaking about a leap year. If so, why does the first clause specify Adar Rishon and the second clause specify Adar Sheni?
The answer is that the two clauses refer to different circumstances. When it was known at the time the vow was made that the year would be a leap year, an unspecified reference to Adar means Adar Rishon, because the person knew that there would be an Adar Sheni. When it was not known that the year would be a leap year, the person may have intended the later Adar, and an unspecified reference to Adar can therefore mean Adar Sheni.
Thus, even according to Rabbi Meir, the two positions can be reconciled by distinguishing between whether the person knew that the year would be a leap year. If he did not know, an unspecified reference to Adar could mean Adar Rishon according to the way the Mishnah is understood. Rabbi Meir’s position that unspecified Adar means Adar Sheni would apply in the case in which the person did not know that an additional month would be added.
The Ran notes that the other textual version does not work as well with this answer. If the Mishnah says that unspecified Adar means Adar Rishon, then in a case where the person did not know that the year would be a leap year, it should follow that the prohibition applies only through Adar Sheni once the additional month is established. The alternative version therefore creates difficulty under this explanation.
This distinction has practical consequences in documents. If a person writes a document in Adar Sheni but dates it merely “Adar,” the document may be considered postdated or improperly dated, because unspecified “Adar” is understood as Adar Rishon. A document written in Adar Sheni with the date “Adar” would therefore be a problematic document. One must be careful to write “Adar Sheni” when appropriate. By contrast, in Adar Rishon one may write simply “Adar” according to the relevant opinion.
The Mishnah then presents another case. Rabbi Yehuda says that if a person says, “I will not drink wine until Pesach,” he means until the night of Pesach, the first night of the festival. The reason is that there is a clear assumption about the person’s intention. The ordinary time when people drink wine in connection with Pesach is the first night, at the Seder. Therefore, when he says that he will not drink wine until Pesach, he does not mean that he will refrain from wine throughout the first night. He means until the beginning of Pesach, after which he may drink.
This may be understood in two ways. One approach is that Rabbi Yehuda is arguing with the opinion cited earlier, which understood “until Pesach” as meaning until Pesach has passed. According to that approach, the earlier opinion and Rabbi Yehuda disagree directly.
Alternatively, one can reconcile all the opinions. Perhaps the earlier case, in which the person said, “I will not benefit until Pesach,” was not discussing wine. It was understood as referring to wine only because the preceding case involved wine. If the statement concerns other items, everyone may agree that “until Pesach” means until Pesach has ended. With regard to wine, however, there is a clear inference from ordinary practice that the person meant until the first night of Pesach, since that is the customary time for drinking wine.
The Ran explains both possibilities. According to the ordinary meaning of the words, “until Pesach” could mean until Pesach has passed. According to the contextual inference, however, the person did not intend to exclude himself from drinking the four cups of wine on Pesach. This is even more compelling than the first case, because the language is being interpreted in light of the ordinary practice associated with the occasion.
The Mishnah gives another example: A person says, “I will not eat meat until the fast.” This refers to the fast of Yom Kippur. Ordinarily, “until the fast” would mean until the fast has ended, that is, until the following night. But the Mishnah understands the person to mean until the final meal before the fast. The customary practice was to eat meat on the day before Yom Kippur, and therefore his statement is interpreted as allowing him to eat meat during that meal.
Rabbi Yosef, the son of Rabbi Yosef, gives a further example. A person says, “I will not eat garlic until Shabbat.” Ordinarily, “until Shabbat” would mean until Friday night, but the statement is understood as lasting only until the time on Friday afternoon when people customarily eat garlic. The practice was to eat garlic on Friday afternoon because it increases marital intimacy. Since Shabbat night is a time associated with marital intimacy, garlic was eaten beforehand as part of that preparation.
This case is even more striking than the previous examples. In the cases involving Pesach or the meal before Yom Kippur, there is at least a connection to a mitzvah-related practice. Here, the issue is a customary practice rather than a formal mitzvah obligation, and yet the ordinary context still establishes that when the person says “until Shabbat,” he means until the customary time for eating garlic on Friday afternoon.
The Ran points out that according to the literal wording, “until” might mean through the entire period. But according to the contextual inference, the person clearly did not intend to deprive himself of the relevant practice. This is a stronger example of interpreting the person’s words in light of his evident intention.
The Ran also cites the custom that people ate garlic on Friday afternoon as a practice instituted by Ezra. He notes that neither the father’s position nor the son’s position is accepted as the final ruling. The Rabbis disagree with both of them.
The earlier discussion involved a case in which a person was carrying clothing and was sweating. He made a vow that he would not put on the clothing. The Rabbis understood from the circumstances that he meant he would not continue carrying the clothing on his back, but that he could wear it. Although his literal words referred to putting on the clothing, the circumstances demonstrated his actual intention. In such a case, even the Rabbis accept the contextual inference.
Rabbi Yehuda extends this principle further. He applies it not only where the circumstances strongly prove the person’s intention, but even where the ordinary meaning of the words points in the opposite direction. Thus, although “until Pesach” ordinarily suggests until Pesach has ended, Rabbi Yehuda still follows the contextual inference and understands the person as referring to the beginning of Pesach.
It is possible that Rabbi Yehuda himself would not agree with every further application attributed to his son. We know that the son accepts the principle stated by his father, but the son may simply have extended it to an additional case. Therefore, it is not certain that the father would accept the son’s broader application.
The Rambam explains that the first opinion does not accept either Rabbi Yehuda’s or Rabbi Yosef’s extension of the principle. The Mishnah is presenting the most lenient positions, but the practical ruling follows the Rabbis discussed earlier. In the earlier case, where the subject was wine, the phrase “until Pesach” means until Pesach has passed. According to this approach, the fact that the later cases were brought in the Mishnah does not mean that their opinions are accepted as the law; they are presented as additional positions in the discussion.
Another approach understands the earlier case as referring to items other than wine. In that case, “until Pesach” means until Pesach has ended. But when the person specifically says, “I will not drink wine until Pesach,” the contextual inference is strong enough to indicate that he means until the first night of Pesach. This creates a significant disagreement between the Rambam and the other approach regarding a vow involving wine.
The Mishnah then turns to vows between friends. A person says to his friend, “I will not benefit from you unless you come to my house and give my son a measure of wheat and two measures of wine.” This type of vow was made when one person had repeatedly received gifts from another and felt embarrassed that he was only taking and not reciprocating. He therefore says, in effect, “I am not a dog who keeps receiving without giving anything in return.” He will not accept further benefit unless the other person comes to his house and gives something to his son.
The Mishnah allows this vow to be dissolved without formally going before a sage. The reasoning is that the person’s objective was to receive honor. He wanted to demonstrate that he was not merely accepting gifts but was also capable of giving something in return. The other person can therefore say, “If your purpose was to honor me, I receive even greater honor by not accepting the gift. People will see that you came to offer me something and that I declined it. That itself gives me honor.”
The Ran explains that the person made the vow with full intention. He was not confused when he said that he would not benefit from his friend. He meant that he was not a dog who merely receives and does not give. Nevertheless, the vow can be released because the underlying purpose was honor. The friend can say that declining the gift gives him greater honor than accepting it, and in that way the purpose of the vow has been fulfilled.
The Mishnah gives another case. A person says to his friend, “I will not benefit from you unless you come and give my son a certain amount of wheat and wine.” Rabbi Meir says that the vow remains in force until the friend gives the items to the son. The Rabbis say that the vow may be released before a sage by saying, “It is as though I received it.”
This case concerns a father who supports his son. The father is asking the other person to give the son the food so that the father himself will not have to pay for it. The benefit ultimately comes to the father, because he is responsible for supporting the son. Therefore, if the father says, “It is as though I received it,” that is effective. Since the father has treated the items as though they were given to him, the condition of the vow has been fulfilled.
If the father does not support the son, however, the situation is different. In that case, the father is not saving himself money. The gift is intended to benefit the son directly. Therefore, the son himself must say, “It is as though I received it.” The father cannot declare that the son received the benefit, because he has no authority to waive the son’s right to receive it.
The commentators explain that the reason the father made the vow was to save himself money. If the other person gave the son the wheat and wine, the father would not have to pay for those items from his own pocket. Once the father says that he no longer needs that benefit, it is as though he received it, and the vow is removed. But when the father is not supporting the children, he is not seeking to save money; he is trying to obtain a benefit for them. In that case, only the children can say that it is as though they received it.
The Mishnah then discusses a man who was being pressured to marry his niece. There is a statement that it is a mitzvah to marry one’s sister’s daughter. The verse says that one should call out to God and that God will answer, and the explanation connects this with caring for one’s family members.
The commentary on the Mishnah attributed to the Rambam explains that this is considered a significant mitzvah. He writes that a person should not distance himself from his relatives. He also gives a reason related to family resemblance and compatibility: many children resemble their maternal uncles. Since the maternal uncle is part of the same family, the marriage is viewed as having a favorable family connection.
In the case of the Mishnah, the man is being pressured to marry his niece. He says, “I will not benefit from her forever, and she may not benefit from me forever.” The intention is that he will not marry her. If she later wishes to serve him something or provide him with some other benefit, however, that may still be permitted. His intention was limited to the subject under discussion, namely marriage and marital relations.
The commentators explain that one does not determine a vow solely from the literal words. One must also consider the person’s intention and the circumstances in which the vow was made. Here, the surrounding discussion was about marriage. Therefore, when the man said that he would not receive any benefit from her, he meant the benefit that was being discussed—marriage and marital relations—not every possible service or benefit.
The final case in the Mishnah concerns a person who repeatedly pressured his friend to come to his house. The friend says, “I will not enter your house, and I will not drink even a drop of cold water there.” Despite those words, he may enter the house and drink cold water. The context shows that the discussion concerned eating a meal at the friend’s house, not entering the house under every circumstance or drinking any amount of water.
Similarly, if a person was pressuring his friend to attend a particular feast, and the friend said that he would not enter the house or drink anything, his statement is understood as referring to the feast. He may nevertheless enter the house after the feast has ended, because his intention was not to prohibit himself from entering the house permanently. He was saying only that he would not participate in the meal.
Thus, in these cases, the determining factor is not always the isolated wording of the vow. The language is interpreted in light of the subject under discussion, the circumstances, and the person’s evident intention.