The Elliot B. Sit Edition presents an audio series of the Talmud Bavli, focusing today on Nedarim Daf Mem-Zayin. We dedicate this learning for the elevation of the souls of Avraham ben Esther and Mor-Zekeni Yosef ben Sarah. May the spirit of Hashem rest upon them in Gan Eden, Amen. Additionally, we study this daf for the complete healing of Moshe ben Dina, Shlomo ben Miriam, and Sarah bat Rachel. May their recovery be near, and may it be His will, and we say Amen.
We begin today's daf on Mem-Zayin Amud Rishon, starting from the top line. The Mishna teaches us that if a person declares, "Konam to your house that I will not enter," he is effectively forbidding himself from entering that house as long as he owns it. However, if he sells the house, it is no longer his, and he may enter. In contrast, if he states, "Konam this house that I will not enter," even if he dies or sells the house, it remains forbidden for him to enter because he specified "this house." The halachic implications of these declarations are significant, as they dictate the extent of the prohibition based on the specificity of the language used.
Let us examine the Ran, who quotes this Mishna on our daf. The Ran explains, "The one who tells his friend, 'Konam to your house that I will not enter' means he is forbidding himself from entering that house. If he were to buy the field, it would also be forbidden for him to derive benefit from it. If he dies or sells the house to someone else, it becomes permissible for him to enter because it is no longer his house." The distinction here is critical; the language used in the declaration determines the outcome of the halacha. When he states "your house," it implies that he cannot enter as long as it is under his ownership, but it becomes permissible if he no longer possesses it.
However, if he states "this house," the prohibition remains even after he sells it or dies, as he has created a permanent prohibition on that specific house. The Ran further clarifies that the reason for choosing the case of selling is to highlight that it is indeed a novelty to say that selling to someone else would permit entry. If he were to sell it back to the person who made the neder, it would remain forbidden, as he is still deriving benefit from it.
The Mishna also illustrates that "Konam to this house that I will not enter" creates a more stringent prohibition. The Ran notes that sometimes "your house" can be more stringent than "this house," particularly in cases of destruction. If the house referred to as "your house" falls down and the owner builds a new one, it remains forbidden for him to enter, as it is still considered "his house." In contrast, if he specified "this house" and it falls down, he may enter the new one, as it is not the same house he originally prohibited himself from entering.
Now, the Gemara introduces a question posed by Abimi: If someone declares "Konam to this house that you are entering" and then dies or sells it to someone else, what is the halacha? The question arises whether a person can forbid something that is in his domain even after it has left his possession. The implication is whether the prohibition extends beyond his life or ownership of the item.
Rabbah responds by providing a proof. He cites a case where a father tells his son, "Konam that you will not derive benefit from me." If the father dies, the son can inherit because the prohibition was only in effect while the father was alive. However, if the father had specified that the prohibition applies in life and death, then upon the father's death, the son would not inherit. This indicates that a person can indeed forbid something while it is in his possession, and the prohibition can extend beyond his ownership.
The Gemara thus concludes that a person can indeed forbid something while it is in his possession, and this prohibition can remain in effect even after it leaves his domain. Hence, in our case, the person can declare to Shimon that he cannot enter the house, and even after his death, Shimon remains prohibited from entering because the declaration was made while the house was still in his possession.
The Ran further elaborates on this concept, emphasizing that the question is not limited to the specific case of the Mishna, but applies to all prohibitions of benefit. Rami bar Chama questions whether the exchange of forbidden fruits is also prohibited. He distinguishes between forbidding something on oneself versus forbidding it on another person. If Reuven forbids his fruits to Shimon, the question arises whether Shimon can benefit from the exchange of those fruits.
The Gemara analyzes this question and discusses whether the prohibition on the exchange stems from a specific halachic reasoning or if it is a rabbinic decree. The possibility exists that the rabbis enacted a decree to prevent benefit from such exchanges. The discussion leads to various proofs and counter-proofs, ultimately highlighting the complexity of the halachic reasoning surrounding these prohibitions.
In conclusion, the halachic principles discussed in today's daf emphasize the importance of language specificity in declarations of prohibition, the nature of ownership, and the implications of such declarations on future transactions. The nuances of these discussions reflect the depth and complexity of halachic reasoning, guiding us in our understanding of how to navigate the intricate world of obligations and prohibitions in Jewish law.