A Yissachar / Zebulun Partnership in Loving Memory of Yishak ben Simcha A"H & Felicia bat Miriam A"H
Rabbi Eli Mansour

Daf Yomi

Gittin 10A - 10B (12th Cycle Daf Yomi Shiur)

Lectured by Rabbi Eli Mansour

Published
August 16, 2006
Duration
53:11

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The Abie Sit Edition presents an audio series of the Talmud Bavli, specifically focusing on Masechet Gittin. This edition has been generously sponsored by our esteemed friend and devoted student of Daf Yomi, Mr. Haimy Dana, along with his beloved wife, may Hashem protect and sustain them. They have dedicated this masechet with the understanding that learning has the power to avert negative occurrences. Thus, our study of Masechet Gittin serves as a spiritual shield, ensuring that its teachings remain theoretical and never manifest in reality. We pray that this endeavor brings peace to their home and success in all their endeavors, as well as to all of Klal Yisrael. Amen.

Today’s Daf is Daf Yud, and we will begin on Tet Amud Bet, starting from the bottom of the page, four lines up. To recap, the Gemara has been discussing the similarities between Gittei Nashim (divorce documents) and Shichrurei Avadim (documents freeing slaves). One notable similarity discussed is that if a shtar is brought by arka'ot shel goyim (secular courts), even if the signatures are from goyim, the document remains valid (kasher). This is because goyim are also bound by monetary laws and are required to establish courts, which is one of the seven commandments given to the sons of Noah.

However, when it comes to a get signed in their courts, the get is deemed pasul (invalid). This is due to the fact that involvement in the writing of a get requires adherence to the laws of Gittin, which goyim do not follow, as their marriages do not involve kiddushin (marriage sanctification) and they do not require a divorce.

The Gemara continues by listing additional similarities, noting that both a get and a shichrur must be written lishmah (for its intended purpose). The Gemara explains that it only lists items that are assur miderabbanan (forbidden by rabbinic law) and does not include those that are assur min haTorah (forbidden by Torah law). Writing lishmah is a Torah requirement, as is the prohibition against writing while the document is mechubar (attached to the ground).

This leads us to a significant dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Elazar regarding the validity of a get signed by a goy. Rabbi Meir asserts that the power of a get comes from its signatures, encapsulated in the phrase edei chatima karte (the witnesses of the signatures effectuate the get). Therefore, if a goy signs, the get is pasul min haTorah and would not be included in the discussion of rabbinic prohibitions.

In contrast, Rabbi Elazar holds that the validity of a get is dependent upon edei mesirah (the witnesses who observe the get being handed over). He posits that a get can be valid even without witnesses, and thus, even if the witnesses are pasul, the get remains valid min haTorah. He argues that a get signed by goyim is pasul miderabbanan due to the concern of mezuyyof mitokho (falsification within the document), as it is preferable to have no signatures than to have pasul witnesses.

The Gemara then cites Rabbi Shimon, who states that even a get written in a secular court and signed by goyim is kasher. Rabbi Zera notes that Rabbi Shimon is following the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, who maintains that edei mesirah are the critical witnesses. This indicates that he does not subscribe to the notion that goyim signatures invalidate the get.

The Gemara further explores the implications of these views, concluding that both opinions align with Rabbi Elazar’s assertion that edei mesirah are sufficient for a valid get. The crux of the debate revolves around whether the presence of goyim signatures leads to a rabbinic prohibition, as Rabbi Meir suggests, or if the get remains valid as Rabbi Elazar argues.

As the Gemara continues, it reflects on the law of chazarah (retraction), noting that when a husband sends a get with a shaliach (agent), he cannot retract the get once it is in the agent's possession, as this is deemed a benefit to the wife. Rabbi Meir views the get as a detriment, as it removes the husband’s obligation to support the wife. Thus, he believes the husband can retract until the get is delivered.

This law of chazarah is likened to the laws governing the release of slaves, where the agent can also retract until the document reaches the slave. This presents a fundamental distinction between the nature of a get and a shichrur.

The Gemara then raises a question about the applicability of these laws to Kiddushin (marriage contracts). It clarifies that while the laws of chazarah apply to both Gittin and Shichrurei Avadim, they do not apply to Kiddushin in the same way, as the husband cannot unilaterally retract a Kiddushin once it has been offered willingly.

The discussion transitions to the validity of Kutim (Samaritans) as witnesses. The Gemara states that any document bearing a Kuti witness is pasul, except for Gittei Nashim and Shichrurei Avadim, as demonstrated in a case presented to Rabbi Gamliel. This leads to a further exploration of the reliability of Kutim and the conditions under which their testimony might be accepted.

Ultimately, the Gemara concludes with a nuanced understanding of the roles of Kutim in legal documents, highlighting the importance of context and the nature of the document being signed. The discussion emphasizes the complexity of halachic rulings and the careful consideration required when determining the validity of documents and witnesses.